

Theology on the Web.org.uk

Making Biblical Scholarship Accessible

This document was supplied for free educational purposes. Unless it is in the public domain, it may not be sold for profit or hosted on a webserver without the permission of the copyright holder.

If you find it of help to you and would like to support the ministry of Theology on the Web, please consider using the links below:



Buy me a coffee

<https://www.buymeacoffee.com/theology>



PATREON

<https://patreon.com/theologyontheweb>

PayPal

<https://paypal.me/robbradshaw>

AN INTRODUCTION TO
HISTORICAL THEOLOGY.

AN INTRODUCTION
TO
HISTORICAL THEOLOGY:
BEING A SKETCH OF
DOCTRINAL PROGRESS
FROM THE
Apostolic Era to the Reformation.

BY
JOHN STOUGHTON, D.D.

LONDON:
THE RELIGIOUS TRACT SOCIETY,
56 PATERNOSTER ROW, 65 ST. PAUL'S CHURCHYARD,
AND 164 PICCADILLY.

Gungay

CLAY AND TAYLOR, PRINTERS

PREFATORY NOTE.

IN a former volume an attempt was made to trace, briefly, the *Progress of Divine Revelation*. At the close I intimated a hope of reviewing the department of thought which has arisen from Scripture studies moulded by influences such as a review of the kind helps us to discover.

In the present work I have endeavoured to follow certain lines of Theological thought as far as the period of the Reformation, leaving subsequent developments for enquiry in a future volume.

In most cases references are made to the writings of Authors described; but in others notice is taken only of modern publications, where the reader may find copious and minute citations of authorities.

My endeavour has been simply to furnish young Students with an elementary introduction to a most important and interesting field of literature.

CONTENTS.

INTRODUCTION	PAGE I
------------------------	-----------

PART I.

From the Apostolic to the Nicene Period. A.D. 100—325.

CHAP.

I. DISTINGUISHED CHURCH TEACHERS	17
II. HERETICAL DOGMAS	52
III. LINES OF GENERALLY ACKNOWLEDGED CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE	64

PART II.

*From the Council of Nicæa to the Development of
Systematic Theology.* A.D. 325—730.

I. FORMATIVE INFLUENCES	85
II. THEOLOGICAL RESULTS	103
III. THEOLOGICAL RESULTS (<i>continued</i>)	134

PART III.

*From the Development of Systematic Theology to the Full
Development of Scholasticism.* A.D. 730—1060.

I. EASTERN DIVINES	169
II. WESTERN DIVINES	176

PART IV.

*From the Full Development of Scholasticism to the
Reformation. A.D. 1060—1518.*

CHAP.		PAGE
I.	SCHOLASTIC DIVINITY. 1060—1224.	213
II.	SCHOLASTIC DIVINITY (<i>continued</i>). 1060—1224.	233
III.	SCHOLASTIC DIVINITY (<i>continued</i>). 1060—1224.	241
IV.	SCHOLASTIC DIVINITY (<i>continued</i>). 1224—1436.	256
V.	POPULAR THEOLOGY. 600—1500.	289
VI.	MYSTICISM. 1097—1500.	307
VII.	PREPARATION FOR REFORM. 1350—1500.	324
VIII.	GENERAL REVIEW. 200—1500.	343

PART V.

*From the Commencement of the Reformation in Germany
under Luther to the Conclusion of it in England under
the Reign of Elizabeth. A.D. 1518—1560.*

I.	REFORMED THEOLOGY IN GERMANY	365
II.	REFORMED THEOLOGY IN SWITZERLAND	384
III.	REFORMED THEOLOGY IN FRANCE AND SCOTLAND	390
IV.	REFORMED THEOLOGY IN ITALY	414
V.	REFORMED THEOLOGY IN ENGLAND	427
	CONCLUSION	447

HISTORICAL THEOLOGY.

INTRODUCTION.

IN the present volume an attempt is made to trace the development of Dogmatic Theology.

Let me state what is meant by Dogmatic Theology. I distinguish it from Revelation on the one hand, and from Religion on the other. This distinction is of prime importance.

Theology is drawn from Revelation, and the human mind is a factor in the process. That from which a science is derived cannot be identical with the science itself; and, as it will appear that the process of forming theological conclusions is complicated, we shall find that the possibilities and probabilities of mistake are numerous. Even were the logical manipulation faultless, a distinction ought to be recognized between the Divine material and the result of its human handling; but the logical manipulation never has been faultless, and never will be. I do not believe that God's truth can ever be systematically expressed in words of human collocation, so that

those words shall certainly contain the whole of the matter of which they treat, and nothing else. In drawing water out of the wells of salvation, and pouring it into theological cisterns, some of it gets spilt; also the buckets give a tinge and a taste to the element which it had not when lying in the calm depths of the Holy Spring.

The fact of liability to error in reasoning is a cogent consideration why we should not confound our theology with God's Word; and without the distinction I do not see how we can properly adjust the relation between unchangeable truth revealed in Scripture and varieties of opinion in the Christian Church.

Equally important is the distinction between Theology and Religion, whether we regard it as taught in the Divine Book, or as experienced in the human soul. Theology has to do with it in both respects; but it is as distinguishable from the second as from the first. In relation to religion, theology is analogous to physiology and biology, which form the philosophy of organic structure and of organic life. Theology includes the philosophy of consciousness, viewed in the light of Divine revelation, and exemplified in the records of Church history. It takes account of spiritual health and spiritual disease, of the *vis vitæ* in its stages of growth, and in its liability to decline, from the first throb to the last pulsation on this side eternity. Common sense shows in a moment the distinction, as well as the connection, between theology and religion thus regarded; and without the distinction no one can discern where lies the true unity of Christ's Church, nor can any one demonstrate that Christianity has been a success. For theology has been changeful, and it takes a long time to

point out only a few of its revolutions. But Christ's *religion*, living for eighteen hundred years under forms of varying theology, has been substantially one and the same; the same in its faith at the foot of the cross, the same in its adoration on the steps of the throne, the same in its beatific hope at the bottom of that ladder which touches heaven.

The ground of the Church's unity exists in the sympathies of a common religious trust. Could one of us converse with a Nicene or Mediæval believer, there might be some difficulty in understanding him at first; but getting below the crust of a metaphysical theology, as well as below worship, discipline, and æsthetic predilections—when each came to speak to the other of God's Fatherhood and Christ's redemption, and the Spirit's indwelling, varieties would be harmonized, and men, divided by ages and creeds, would clasp hands before the one Cross and the one Mercy-Seat. No ground of unity can be found except in a common trust in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost. And the reconciliation of Church diversities in the present day—of sect with sect, party with party, and Christian with Christian—can only be accomplished after the same manner.

Though regarded in distinction from revelation and religion, theology be but a human science, it is based upon Divine objects; the character of the Lord God, the person of Jesus Christ, the grace which brings salvation, the propitiatory sacrifice for our redemption, justification by faith, and the new birth of the Spirit of God. These should be to us dearer than our lives.

The scientific treatment of such matters is to some persons a necessity. Of course the Positivist will say

that theology is an unscientific dream, a fanatical flight into cloud-land, where nothing is grasped but thin air. But in denying a place in human knowledge for theology, the Positivist also denies a place for religion, and therefore puts himself beyond our notice. The Pietist, with more plausibility, will ask, "What is the good of scientific theology? Religion is best by itself, philosophy spoils it. What does one care about the opinions of people hundreds of years ago? How are common folks to understand wire-drawn distinctions and interminable wranglings? Go to the Bible, and read that, and ask God's Spirit to enlighten you, and what you know apply to practice, and leave the rest." The mere Popularist will follow, saying, "What is there attractive in this science of which you talk? What is there in it to lay hold of the public mind? It might do in the Middle Ages; it excited interest at the Reformation, and during the Civil Wars,—but ours is a practical age; people don't care a rush about metaphysical abstractions; and your endeavour to strike down certain dogmatic errors, as you call them, is not worth powder and shot."

All I can say in reply is, that the spirit of such objections reaches to every kind of scientific inquiry—to all but the practical business of life, and the most superficial forms of knowledge; indeed, to systematic studies of every description. It must, however, be frankly confessed that for some people *theology* is not a necessity, any more than astronomy or geology. They can gaze on the stars without acquaintance with the Newtonian theory; and can walk on God's earth, and admire the mountains, uninterested in the disputes of Vulcanists and Neptunists. But all are not like them. A mind, characterized by reflective power, sagacity, and inquisi-

tiveness, will not rest content with crude, unconnected notions. It must have things analyzed, sorted, arranged. It must see how one truth squares with another, how many parts make up a whole. To such a mind, if it care about religion, theology becomes indispensable; and as true spiritual religion makes its way in England, the demand will increase.

The interests involved in the truths of Christianity will always inspire a large measure of enthusiasm respecting them. Goethe, no partial witness in the case, has said: "The deepest subject in the history of the world and of mankind, and that to which all others are subordinate, is the conflict between faith and unbelief." Assuredly it is. Controversies at Constantinople at the Nicene era, or in London and elsewhere at the Puritan epoch, may be exhausted; but not the interest felt in the Divine Christ, and the redemption He has wrought for us. They have a brightness lasting as the stars. The age when Pilate asked, "What is truth?" was one of languid *dilettante* scepticism, when luxury and splendour had enervated humanity, and nothing moved the masses but appeals to their passions. Afterwards, a voluptuous despair went on screaming through Roman and Grecian halls, "Let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die." Yet during those centuries, full of antagonist influences, Christian theology rose up, and spoke to the world with a vehemence which startled it, and swept the intellect of Europe and the East into its resistless current. Science, art, politics, may compete with theology, and drive it out of the field here and there; but it has a life and a power which will enable it in the long run to hold its own.

Therefore the history of the development of Dogmatic Theology is full of interest and importance.

It gathers up the harvest of past ages. To the Greek mind was assigned the task of elaborating doctrines concerning God, the Trinity, and the person of Christ; to the Latin Church, doctrines concerning man, sin, and grace; and to the German Church, the doctrine of justification by faith; to English theologians, the true unfolding of the new birth. In its true spirit, historical theology is both conservative and reformatory. It accepts what has endured centuries of criticism, and does not reopen for settlement controversies which time has closed. Christendom, after all, has a settled faith in a Divine Redeemer—in His propitiatory work, in salvation by grace, in the power and presence of the Holy Ghost. All Church creeds embody those doctrines. It is the business of historical theology to point them out, to uncover their foundations, to dwell on their influences.

The following are some advantages attendant on this course of study.

1. It enables us clearly to distinguish between Divine and human elements in theology. It dispels the illusion that theologians of any school have drawn their opinions, entirely and exclusively, from the fountain of God. It throws light on the genesis of opinion. And we are brought to see how metaphysics and logic, tradition and Church authority, education, circumstances, and intellectual idiosyncrasy, have had to do with forming theological thought. In schemes of divinity many questions are mooted which revelation has never settled or even raised, though we do not wonder at their having arisen. They are all curious, some interesting. They have had a fascination for good men, who have supposed them to involve important consequences; but they are human questions about Divine things—

human in their origin and human in their end. I do not say this because I attach little or no importance to evangelical theology, round which such inquiries are entwined. Quite the reverse. It is because I hold evangelical truth so dear, because I see in it the quickener of spiritual life. But it appears to me of primary importance to distinguish between the pure Gospel and that which has been mixed with it—to distinguish between what constitutes the core of Christianity, and the curious speculations woven into it, and by paring away encrustments, to bring out the lustre of the precious stones which God has laid in the foundations of His own Jerusalem.

2. In connecting the history of men with the history of their opinions, it will appear how much religious life has to do with theology: what an efficient factor it is—how the characteristic convictions of Augustine and Martin Luther grew out of the study of the Bible, under the inspiration of their own experience. Of the first it has been truly said, “From the depths of his own consciousness, he instinctively felt the dangers of Pelagianism; and he put forth his strength as God enabled him to meet the evil;” and as to the second, everybody knows how Luther’s sense of sin educated him to receive the doctrine of justification by faith. To connect principles with the men who held them is not merely interesting, but of practical value; for it assists in the understanding of principles, in the development of their full significancy, and in the elucidation of their moral and religious influence. “By their fruits ye shall know them,” is not only a test of character, but a test of doctrines.

3. This branch of study leads to a correct theory of development. Development may be true and precious.

The germinating power may come from God ; Divine seeds rooted in human intellects may grow and thrive ; yet is the growth a human process, though starting from a Divine origin, and continued under Divine culture. But development may be of another kind. If the seeds be taken from God's granary, the tillage may be bad and the soil barren, and the plant may prove abortive, or worse. Further, what is sown may be invented by man, or supplied by Satan ; or it may be (and this is most common) a mixture of seeds good and bad, gleaned from above, or gathered from below, or reaped from fields lying between. There may also be a blending of husbandry, careless and careful, foolish and wise. There may be a true development of Divine ideas, and a false development of true ideas. History brings us into contact with the facts of doctrinal development, and it forces upon us, in connection with it, the study of the Divine ideal—the Revelation of God—that standard by which developments are to be tried, and by which alone their legitimacy can be determined.

4. Our inquiries will serve to impress upon us the remembrance of what theologians are so apt to forget—that religion is encompassed with mystery—that, as Butler says, Christianity is a scheme imperfectly understood ; that beyond the region of the known there lie immense regions of the unknown ; that doctrines of grace, illuminated as they are by Gospel lights, have around them an immeasurable circle of darkness, in which genius, hoping to soar upwards to the sun, sometimes altogether loses itself ; that there are barriers to inquiry, and limits to thought ; and that it is in vain for us, in this present state of being, to beat against the bars of our little cage. Some have tried to get out, and to

reach realms where they may gaze on mysteries ; but the only result, according to the pages of history, has been like the scattering of a bird's feathers over the wires of his tiny prison.

5. This method, too, will open to us what we would call perspective in theology. All doctrines do not lie on a plane surface ; they are not like Chinese drawings, where no allowance is made for distance, and each object is alike distinct and near. Some truths are nearer to us than others. They come home, whilst others remain far away. They are in the forefront, others in the background. Some are trees under which you sit and gather fruit, others blue hills in the dim distance. This sort of perspective is maintained in the Bible. The critical investigation of systems will lay bare the fact that this sort of perspective has been often strangely forgotten ; that men have too commonly neglected to distinguish between different degrees of importance belonging to different phases of truth,—how some are of immediate, and some of only remote, interest ; how some are distinct as the piece of rock on which an Alpine traveller sits, and some as vague as feathery lines of snow and cloud, miles away, melting one into another. Nothing brings out perspective in theology like the critical study of systems in the light of God's Word. Contrast wonderfully helps us here.

6. And with the impression just indicated comes another—namely, that as there is a graduated scale in the distance—in the distinctness and in the relative importance and application of particular truths—so also there must be, in thoughtful minds, different degrees, different depths of conviction : of some things we can be more sure than of others. Of revealed verities we are as

convinced as of our own existence; of formulated presentations of things in human thought and speech, we cannot say so much, or anything like it. A theological doctrine is often but an approximation to the truth. Plato says, "Firmly to assert, 'This is exactly as I have expressed it,' befits not a man of intelligence; yet, that it is either so, or something like it, must certainly be assumed." These are wise words. We should bear them in mind in our critical inquiry into opinions; and while they aid us in judging of approximations to absolute truth which certain doctrines may have reached, these words also, through the spirit which they breathe, animate us to inquire respecting degrees and measures of conviction deserved by the conclusions of great divines.

7. Our investigations will save us from onesidedness—a great peril in the path of theological thought. Truth is one, yet has it more sides than one; and many a fiercely fought controversy resembles the old knights' quarrel about the two-faced shield. Error does not run in one direction; nor does truth; there is a marvellous blending of the two in both orthodox and heterodox systems. Keeping within Scripture lines, faithful to what is understood by evangelical truth, I hold it of importance to detect what is erroneous in accepted schemes, and to select what is true out of rejected ones.

I believe in a combination and harmony of views taken from different points of the theological compass. Pelagianism and Augustinianism are wide as the poles asunder; yet human freedom, for which Pelagius contended, must be kept in mind, as well as Divine sovereignty, for which Augustine was so justly jealous. And that great man, with all his obvious onesidedness, appreciated what was true in his opponent's theory. Is it

not, he asks, grace by which God saves the world? Is it not free-will according to which He judges the world? The question about free-will and Divine grace is so difficult, that to defend free-will seems like denying Divine grace, and to assert Divine grace appears like setting aside free-will. It is so difficult, and there is such danger of falling down precipices on one side or other of the narrow pathway. Nothing shows the difficulty more than the history of the Augustinian and Calvinistic controversy, and nothing is more adapted to guard us against the danger.

The many-sidedness and perfect harmony of God's truth is wonderful. The media through which it may be looked at, and the helps, like beautiful optical instruments, within reach for its examination, are surprisingly numerous and valuable. Philosophers, in an extreme love of simplicity, have concocted theories of morals based on some single principle, and fought to the death against a different theory, whilst a careful induction of moral phenomena, a careful study of human nature, and a careful examination of the manifold bearings and aspects of great principles, lead to the recognition of a plurality of ideas at the root of a sufficient ethical philosophy. Principles we find everywhere, running not singly, but in pairs, in triples, in companies. Theology is no exception. Over against one principle lies another which ought to be combined with it, otherwise the detached and isolated truth may operate as an error; and the speculations, controversies, and contradictions of Christendom seem to be appointed or permitted for the very purpose of bringing this fact before the children of men.

8. Curiosity as to our ancestors is natural. Instinct

guides to the Heralds' Office to search after pedigrees ; and a like feeling prompts us to inquire into the genealogical tree of opinion—the descent of thought from generation to generation, until it has become identified with ourselves, in our convictions, as its last offspring.

We cannot disconnect ourselves, even if we would, with this ancestry. "We are the heirs intellectual and moral of the past ; there is no such thing as naked manhood ; the heart of each of us wears livery which it cannot throw off." It is one of the besetting sins of the present day to boast of freshness as well as freedom, of originality as well as independence. Claims of this kind are often quite imaginary ; and when they are not they may be full of exaggeration. The form, the arrangement, the expression of theological ideas, are sometimes new, and have a pleasant and attractive freshness, which calls forth disproportioned admiration on the part of those not acquainted with the history of thought. Such history shows, in many an instance, that what is deemed a new creation or discovery is only old material melted down, and stamped with a modern Mint mark. Frequently an opinion, taken by multitudes to be such as was never conceived before, is, in truth, but beaten out of ingots dug up by intellectual toilers whose names are now despised or forgotten. It is wonderful how late pretentious speculations are found to be copies of what was propounded by fathers, philosophers, schoolmen, reformers, and old divines. The resemblance, I admit, is not necessarily a result of imitation. There may be mere coincidence between ideas of the present century and of centuries long ago ; but, at all events, it is plain that in such cases modern thinkers are but working on the track of their fathers. One lesson at least is taught :

not to think of ourselves more highly than we ought to think, but to think soberly. Frequently will the lesson be suggested in the perusal of this volume. And gratitude should mingle with modesty. For we are large debtors to the men of old, and have derived from them a good deal of instruction of which we are not sufficiently conscious.

9. Further, our connection with the past evokes the sympathies of spiritual life. It attaches us to former generations, and inspires us with satisfaction and joy to find, that in the substance of evangelical faith and sentiment we are one with the Church of all ages. To feel this is a prelibation of heaven, where our present-time relations will cease, ancestry and posterity will become contemporaneous, the faith of one will confirm the faith of another, and the joy of all will be the joy of each. And so, through that current of action and reaction, between mind and mind, and heart and heart, the tides of beatific rapture will swell in ever-deepening streams, and rush in ever-livelier currents. Not to connect ourselves with the past, not to open the sluice-gates of sympathy, letting its water into our souls—is to cut ourselves off from a priceless privilege. It is to get into a sphere of morbid individuality, where the atmosphere stimulates to pride and conceit, and the child of to-day thinks himself wiser than the man of yesterday. We would rather regard ourselves as numbered with God's children, sharing in an inheritance bequeathed ages since to a whole family, including brothers born before we were, and now gone home to live in the Father's house, where it will be our turn soon to follow.

10. I conclude these introductory remarks in the words of Richard Baxter, at the close of the first part of

his *Life and Times*, worthy of being remembered by all students: "I had a great delight in the daily new discoveries which I made, and of the light which shined in upon me, like a man who cometh into a country where he never was before ; but I little knew either how imperfectly I understood these very points, whose discovery so much delighted me, nor how much might be said against them. I am much more sensible than ever of the necessity of living upon the principles of religion which we are all agreed in, and uniting these ; and how much mischief men that over-value their own opinions have done by their controversies. I value all things according to their use and ends ; and I find in the daily practice and experience of my soul, that the knowledge of God and Christ and the Holy Ghost, and the truth of Scripture, and the life to come, is more to me than the most curious speculations."

PART I.

FROM THE APOSTOLIC TO THE NICENE PERIOD.

A. D. 100—325.

CHAPTER I.

DISTINGUISHED CHURCH TEACHERS.

THE remains of the Apostolical Fathers, as they are commonly called, furnish no indications that they employed their minds upon the study of the Gospel, beyond what was needful for experimental and practical purposes.

CLEMENT OF ROME—supposed by some, but not on sufficient grounds, to have been St. Paul's companion—may be regarded as representative of this class. His genuine Epistle, of uncertain date, containing fifty-nine short sections, is addressed to the Corinthians; in it he praises them for their virtues; and then laments the state of things which had grown up, owing to their emulation, envy, and strife. He exhorts to repentance, and adduces examples of Old Testament piety, dwelling upon the duties of faith, hospitality, and humility; of the last of these graces, Christ is exhibited as the most perfect pattern. After this, Clement dwells upon the excellence of peace, and refers to the harmony of the universe; then returning to the subject of humility, he exhorts the Church to believe in the second coming of Christ, and the resurrection of the dead, which he considers to be typified in the phoenix springing anew out of its own ashes. God sees all things; therefore, says this Father, "Let us avoid transgression, and draw near to God in purity of heart, and do the things that please Him." We are justified, he proceeds to say, not by our own works, but by faith; yet we are to maintain the practice

of good works, for great is their reward. All blessings come through Christ. He is our Captain; we are His soldiers. Let us, then, submit one to another; there being no reason for self-conceit. The apostles appointed bishops and deacons, and there should be no contention respecting the priestly office. He adds, It is wicked to vex the righteous, and the dissensions existing at the time are declared by him to be worse than those in the days of St. Paul. Christian love is again extolled and enforced; and strife-makers are exhorted to acknowledge their sinfulness. Moses is cited as an example of love, and with him, in this respect, Judith and Esther are associated. The Epistle ends with peaceful exhortations.

It plainly appears from this analysis, that the Epistle is rather religious than theological, and is by no means remarkable for force of thought, or for clearness of arrangement; and when we turn to the genuine remains of POLYCARP and IGNATIUS, they are found to be of no higher literary order, nor do they present any theological features beyond those which we find in Clement. The great difference between the Canonical writers and the Apostolical Fathers strikes every one who carefully compares them together; and the comparison suggests a cogent argument in support of the inspiration of the New Testament writers. Dr. Arnold speaks of "a wide belt of desert on every side of the garden of Scripture, and of the wilderness that reaches up to the very walls;" and we verify the truth of the image as we turn from the Canonical to the earliest Patristic authors. At the best, we find numerous quotations of Scripture, mostly from the Old Testament, piled up like unground corn. There is little or no kneading of Divine truth into daily bread.

Next to the writings of the Apostolical Fathers, *The Epistle to Diognetus* comes under consideration. This composition has been assigned to Justin Martyr, and is printed in his works; but there is internal evidence of its not being his. Critics now are agreed that it must be ascribed to one who lived at an earlier date. "We may believe that in this beautiful composition we possess a genuine production of some apostolic man, who lived not later than the beginning of the second century."¹ With regard both to contents and omissions, it is far superior to the Epistles just noticed. Its subjects are the vanity of idols, the superstitions of the Jews, the manners of the Christians, the manifestation of Christ, the state of the world before His coming, and why He was sent so late. These topics occupy ten sections—two others follow, suspected to be not genuine: From the ninth chapter I select the following extract:

"He Himself took on Him the burden of our iniquities, He gave His own Son as a ransom for us, the Holy One for transgressors, the Blameless One for the wicked, the Righteous One for the unrighteous, the Incorruptible One for the corruptible, the Immortal One for them that are mortal. For what other thing was capable of covering our sins than His righteousness? By what other was it possible that we, the wicked and ungodly, could be justified, than by the only Son of God? O sweet exchange! O unsearchable operation! O benefits surpassing all expectation, that the wickedness of many should be hid in a single righteous One, and that the righteousness of One should justify many transgressors!"

There is a true *Evangelical* ring in these words, and

¹ Introduction to the Epistle in Clark's Ante-Nicene Christian Library—*Apostolic Fathers*.

in other portions of this early production. I know not where else in primitive Church literature to light upon exactly the same kind of utterances on the subject of the atonement, and of justification through the righteousness of Christ. The language of the writer reminds one of what is afterwards found in Augustine, in St. Bernard, in Martin Luther, in the Reformers, and in the Puritans: a current of warm, glowing sentiment rushes through the words resembling that which characterizes the best theologians of the Evangelical school.

At an early period we meet with a class of divines who may be termed *Traditionalists*, in the sense of not reflecting upon truth, but simply collecting and preserving that which they deemed to be so, because received from inspired teachers. Deficient in logical acuteness, they were not less so in historical criticism, and therefore their adoption of a report is no proof of its credibility. Such a man was Papias, who tells us what he learnt from the elders; and Hegesippus belongs to the same class: it may be remarked that a Jewish element is found in all these men. In process of time it produced division, and blended degrading speculations upon the person of Christ with an ignorant attachment to ceremonial observances.

A different order of writers soon appeared. There are minds strongly disposed to inquiry and examination. They strive after the grounds, reasons, and relations of things. Some natural peculiarity lies at the basis of such tendencies, which education and circumstances serve to stimulate and develop. New information is blended with that already possessed, whenever any affinity is felt to exist between the old and the new. Also, there are minds eminently practical. They do not care to dig into foundations; they are content to build up useful

superstructures. Having ascertained facts and duties, they are not curious respecting causes and principles; yet such minds may be as active as those of a different class, and may have keenness of perception, skill in arrangement, vigour in argument, together with wisdom and tact in the practical application of ideas.

These varieties of the human intellect, under the two names of philosophical and practical, coincide with varieties in race, country, and climate. Classical history and literature testify to the predominantly philosophical cast of the Greek mind, and the practical cast of the Latin. With intellects of both orders Christianity at an early period came in contact.

Aristotle¹ speaks of the intellectual repose and apathy of Asia, and the savage energy and freedom of Europe. The Eastern loves to muse, to reason, to chew the cud of reflection and logic, whilst the Western turns knowledge to practical account, and acts as well as thinks: philosophy comes from Greece, law from Rome. Hence the speculative tendency of Eastern theology. The Eastern Church claims the title of *Orthodox*; the Eastern Councils settled creeds. On the other hand, the Western Church paid more attention to law and discipline, and produced more eminent Church rulers than are found in the East. *Philosophical* Christians, such as Justin Martyr, and others we are now to notice, were Greek in lineage and speech, in their cast of mind, and their early training.

The history of JUSTIN MARTYR'S conversion, about 140 A.D., as beautifully told by himself in his *Dialogue with Trypho the Jew*, gives the key to a good deal of his theology. Walking by the sea-side, one day, he met a

¹ *Politics*, VII. 7.

stranger, "an aged person, of reverent aspect, mild and of venerable mien. 'Do you know me?' asked the stranger. 'No,' said Justin. 'Then why look at me so closely?' 'I am surprised, for I did not expect to see any one in this lonely place. As for me, I take pleasure in lonely walks, where I can converse with myself.' 'Are you then a lover of mere arguments, and not of deeds and truth?' 'What can one do better,' answered Justin, 'than prove that reason beareth rule over all things? Every man should give himself up to philosophy.' 'Does philosophy confer happiness?' inquired the old man; 'and what is philosophy?' 'The knowledge of that which is, and the discernment of truth.' Then they talked of truth, and the soul, and God. At length Justin asked, 'Whom shall a man take as his masters?' 'There once lived,' said the stranger, 'men called prophets, who spake by the Holy Ghost. They did not give demonstrations, for they were above demonstrations. They glorified God the Father, and taught of Christ His Son, who was sent by Him. . . . Do you, above all things, pray that the gates of light may be opened to you: for these things are not to be seen and comprehended except by him to whom God and His Christ give the grace of understanding.'" The two men parted. "But," says Justin, "a flame was immediately kindled in my mind, and I was seized with an ardent love of the prophets, and of the friends of Christ."¹

The Dialogue, prefaced by this little story, is a work of considerable extent, and is intended to show that Christian doctrine is contained in the Old Testament; that Jesus is the subject of prophecy; that He is the true Messiah; that sacrifices and other typical ordinances

¹ *Dial. Trypho*, §§ 3-7.

are fulfilled in His life and death ; that the ancient saints were saved through what He did ; that John the Baptist was foretold by Isaiah ; in short, that the Divinity of the Gospel is proved by the old inspired teachers of the Jewish Church, and that Jewish unbelief is without excuse.¹

The Dialogue belongs to that class of literature commonly denominated Christian Evidences ; and it is intended, of course, to be applied to Jews with a view to their conversion. To the class of Evidences also pertain Justin's two Apologies. "After his conversion, he seems to have considered it his calling to endeavour to win from their errors men of every nation, Jews and Gentiles, and those who, under the name of Christians, taught what was untrue." The first Apology, addressed to Antoninus Pius, about A.D. 139, "remarkable for its want of clear arrangement," contains expostulations with regard to the treatment of Christians, refutations of charges brought against them, arguments in proof of Christianity drawn from miracles and prophecy, and exposures of pagan falsehoods and follies. The second Apology, addressed to Marcus Aurelius, between A.D. 161 and 166, presents answers to objections against Christianity, some of which were peculiar to that age, and it also urges the direct argument, expanded by Paley, that whilst no man ever died in attestation of philosophical opinions, men of the lowest ranks were martyrs in the cause of the Gospel.

Justin was more of an apologist than a theologian ; but considerable portions of his writings are of a dogmatic character, and he travels along lines of doctrine which

¹ A good summary of this work is furnished by Kaye in his *Account of the Writings and Opinions of Justin Martyr*, pp. 18-41.

are to be set forth hereafter in their proper place. As he had gone the round of Greek speculation, it was natural that, with a mind like his, he should seek as far as possible to amalgamate what he had thus learned with the truths he derived from the Christian revelation.

Truths are harmonious, and the relations of some to others would be sure to come under the notice of a man of his type ; but it is quite plain, after long experience, that it becomes persons of this kind to keep a tight rein upon their mental activity, and mark well the boundary-line between the *terra firma* of Divine truth and the cloud-land of human reveries. These commonplaces of wisdom were not current in the second century, and they are apt to be forgotten in the nineteenth. Yet it is worthy of remark, that Justin insists upon the vast superiority of Scripture teaching to the wisdom of ancient philosophers, and in the statement of distinctive Christian doctrine makes a classical allusion in the way of confirmatory argument only in a single instance, and that after a manner exceedingly obscure. He refers to Plato, as speaking in the *Timæus*, "physiologically" of the Son of God ; and in the same paragraph where this obscure reference occurs there is another equally obscure, to an expression in Plato, which Justin interprets in relation to the Holy Spirit, and the doctrine of the Trinity.¹ No one, upon a careful examination of the paragraph in which these notices of Plato are found, can suppose that the author had derived his belief on the points under review from a Platonic source ; though most readers probably will feel that some colouring has been given to Justin's language from the philosophical literature he had studied. It should also be noticed, that neither does this

¹ *Apol.* I., § 60.

apologist, in his copious reflections on the Logos, seek to support his statements by any appeal to the apocryphal books of the Old Testament, or to the writings of Philo, though he makes numerous citations from the Jewish Scriptures when treating of this important subject.¹ Justin spoke of Christ as the *λόγος*, or reason, of which all men participate. Philosophers, he thought, had in them a seminal portion of the Divine reason, and whatever they taught, and whatever legislators enacted wisely, came from the same origin. Socrates was debtor to the Divine Word, as well as Abraham. Hence came all prophetic inspiration, all philosophical wisdom.² Now, there is a most important sense in which human reason is God's gift, and human conscience is the voice of Heaven; but these gifts differ from each other in some important respects which Justin failed to point out.

Reference will be made hereafter to his opinions on certain fundamental doctrines, in harmony with, or in distinction from, other theologians of the ante-Nicene age; but upon one important subject there are passages in his writings which may as well be noticed at once as examples of his habit of thought. "When we say that future events have been foretold, we do not assert that they came to pass by any compulsion of destiny, but that God, foreknowing what all men would do, and determining with Himself that every man should be rewarded according to the worth of his actions, foretells by the Spirit of prophecy, that men should receive even from Him recompense in proportion to the worth of their works; always urging the human race to renewed

¹ This negative evidence may be easily tested by consulting a good index to Justin's writings.

² *Apol.* I., § 46; II., §§ 8, 13.

exertion and recollection, and showing that He has a care of it, and takes thought for it.”¹

“Justin brings forward a cavil of the Jews, either real or supposed, to this effect : That if it was foretold that Christ should die on the cross, and that they who caused His death should be Jews, the event could not fall out otherwise. To this he replies, that God is not the cause that men, of whom it is predicted that they shall be wicked, prove wicked ; but they are themselves the cause : and if the Scripture foretells the punishment of certain angels and men, it is because God foreknows that they will be unchangeably wicked, not because He has made them so. He illustrates his meaning by a reference to the prediction that the Messiah should enter Jerusalem seated on an ass. That prediction, he says, did not cause Him to be the Messiah, but pointed out to mankind a mark by which they might know that He was the Messiah.”²

Two other apologists, or writers on Evidence, claim a brief notice.

ATHENAGORAS, a heathen philosopher, said to have been converted by reading the Scriptures, wrote an Apology for the Christians, probably under Marcus Aurelius : and another work on the Christian doctrine of the Resurrection ; and here it is curious to find him resorting to a kind of metaphysical argument in answer to unbelievers. Those who deny the resurrection, he says, should prove either that God cannot or will not bring it to pass, but that He has power is proved by creation, and if He has not the will, it must be either because it would be unjust or unworthy of Him to accomplish the fact ; but neither, Athenagoras urges, can be proved. The subject of the resurrection largely occupied

¹ *Apol.* I., § 44.

² Kaye's *Justin Martyr*, p. 81.

the thoughts of Christians and their adversaries at that period ; and THEOPHILUS, another converted heathen (A.D. 181), wrote, respecting the Christian Religion, in three books ; and after dwelling on the spirituality of God, he takes up the question of rising from the dead. How he replies to objections is worth noticing. He addresses his work to one Autolycus, who says, " Show me thy God ;" and to this demand the arguments for the Divine spirituality are intended to apply. Autolycus is also represented as asking how any reasonable man could adopt the idea of a resurrection. " Show me," said he, " one man raised from the dead, that seeing him I may believe." To this Theophilus rejoins : " What great thing would it be to believe what you behold ?—and you, who are so incredulous, still believe that Hercules, though he burnt himself, is living ; and that Æsculapius, struck with lightning, was raised again after death. What is spoken by God you will not believe ; and so, if I were to show you a dead man raised to life, you would not believe. God gives many proofs of a resurrection in the changes of the seasons and the heavenly bodies ; the fructification of seeds, too, is a figure of what we expect. A constant resurrection is going on within yourself now, for your body changes ; particles of it disappear, and new particles supply the place ; all this is the work of God. Therefore do not be sceptical, but believe. I was sceptical once, but am now convinced by these considerations ; and by the manifest fulfilment of Scripture prophecies." ¹ The writer then goes on to point out the penalties of unbelief in the world to come ; thus assuming the attitude not of one engaged in a mere logical conflict, but of one who felt himself backed by Divine authority. He and others did not write as

¹ Lib. I. c. 13, 14 ; the passage is here condensed.

philosophers arguing with philosophers about a scientific theory, but as prophets repeating to their fellow-men the Revelation they had received in the Holy Scriptures. This must be remembered, or the tone of these early writers cannot be understood.

CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA (died about A.D. 220) was one of the same order as Justin Martyr, thoroughly Greek, thoroughly imbued with the spirit of philosophy. He was born a heathen, and in his youth studied the philosophers and the poets;¹ but he found no satisfaction in classical antiquity, and had his thoughts turned to the Gospel of Christ, with the same result as Justin Martyr. In Pantænus, a Christian teacher in a school at Alexandria, he found a congenial instructor; and after he became a Christian himself he succeeded his former catechetical master, about the year 189. His principal works are *Exhortations to the Greeks*, in three books, in which he exposes the folly and immorality of paganism, but also discovers in it a prophetic element; the *Pedagogue*, or Tutor, which unfolds the minutiae of Christian morality, as he understood it; and the *Stromata*, or Miscellanies, in which—according to the title, literally signifying “pieces of tapestry,” in seven books—all sorts of subjects, including history, poetry, philosophy, and religion, are brought together. In the seventh book of the *Stromata*, Clement characterizes his own work as not a well-planted garden, but a mountain in which the cypress and plane, the laurel and ivy, the apple, olive, and fig are interspersed without any order. His

¹ On the state of philosophy in the Alexandrian schools, before and after Clement's time, see *Hist. de l'École d'Alex.*, par Jules Simon. 2 vols. On the state of opinion amongst philosophical Jews, consult *Essai sur l'École Juive d'Alexandrie*, par Biet.

writings abound in references to ancient literature. No one more fully took possession of classic ground—

“——the heathen toil,
The limpid wells and orchards green,
Left ready for the spoil.”

He endeavoured to show that from the beginning mankind have had but one Teacher ; and he eagerly strove to find Christ in Plato. Philo, the philosophical Jew, was also one of his masters, who, by his theological system and expository writings, exerted great influence over the Alexandrian Father.¹ Fond of philosophical ideas and philosophical diction, Clement indulged in curious conjectures ; but it does not appear that the substance of his most important religious opinions was thereby seriously vitiated. Indeed, his philosophy was accommodated to his divinity, rather than his divinity to his philosophy ; and it may be safely affirmed that he was a man of pure and upright mind, sincerely desirous of promoting the kingdom of Christ in the world.

An impartial study of his works will probably lead to the following impressions : That he throws some of the grand truths of Revelation, in which he fully believed—such as the redemptive aspect of the work of Christ, the connection between the forgiveness of sin and the death of our Lord, and the effect of faith on the justification and holiness of the saved—too much into the background : that much of the teaching of St. Paul on the fundamental principles of the Gospel is not reflected in any of Clement’s works : that he gives undue prominence to contemplative knowledge as an

¹ The influence of Philo on Clement is illustrated by the Abbé Biet, in his *Essai sur l’École Juive d’Alexandrie.*

element in experimental religion, thus favouring a habit of mere mysticism, and also assimilating the model of Christianity "as much as possible to that of philosophical perfection:" that he frequently dwells upon what is obscure, trivial, and useless; though, at the same time, it must be confessed we should be unwilling to lose the minute picture of Alexandrian manners and customs preserved in the details of his *Pedagogue*: and that he occasionally leans to that side of theology which was afterwards taken up by Pelagius, as when, for example, Clement dwells upon free-will, and man's power to perform Divine commandments, without duly insisting upon the necessity of Divine grace. The most serious of all the drawbacks in the teaching of Clement is, perhaps, his doctrine of reserve and of accommodation. His position is, that the mysteries of the faith are not to be divulged to all. In connection with a commendable reference to our Lord's words respecting pearls cast before swine, Clement goes beyond what Christian prudence dictates, as to the importance of adaptation in religious teaching, for he lays down the principle that it is requisite to hide in mystery the wisdom taught by the Son of God.¹

This rule of reserve led to a distinction between the common believer and the true Gnostic — resembling somewhat the law of initiation into heathen mysteries; and with it is connected the principle of *accommodation*. "Being," he says, "ever persuaded of the omnipresence of God, the Gnostic is satisfied with the approval of God, and of his own conscience. Whatever is in his mind is also upon his tongue towards those who are fitting recipients: both in speaking and in living, he

¹ *Stromata*, lib. I. c. 12.

harmonizes his profession with his opinions. He both thinks and speaks what is true, except perhaps in the way of sanative treatment; then, as a physician, for the good of his patients, he may be false, or utter a falsehood, as the Sophists would call it." But Clement also remarks, "*They are not really deceivers* who accommodate themselves in conformity to the part assigned them for the salvation of others."¹ Such observations involve principles of casuistry of a most pernicious description, and carried out in after ages, they produced very pernicious results. It may be further observed, that Clement's moral instructions do not show him to have been a true moral philosopher; and that we have only to compare Clement with Paul, to become thoroughly convinced of the superiority of that mode of instruction which lays down principles rather than minute precepts, and leaves the former to be applied by the conscience and discretion of individuals. Yet it must not be overlooked, that in those early times, when the Church was in its childhood, specific teaching was needed as much as the inculcation of general truths.²

We now approach a greater man. ORIGEN exhibits the tendencies of Justin and Clement in excess; if they occasionally soared into the regions of allegory and mysticism, he made them his home; if they said some things erroneous or dubious, he started several questions either heretical or tending to heresy. Through his whole career he indicated his intellectual bent. He was inquisitive to the last degree, and could digest all kinds of knowledge, whence he was called *χαλκέντερος*

¹ *Stromata*, lib. VII. c. 8, 9.

² See Kaye's *Clement of Alexandria* for a digest of his views.

(*the brazen-bowelled*). He was born A.D. 185, and his father—a Christian—gave him a careful education, making him commit to memory portions of Scripture every day. Language and grammar were by him profoundly studied, and he became a most distinguished Hebrew scholar. He studied under Clement of Alexandria, and no doubt imbibed something from his master, but he was too original, vigorous, and independent, to be moulded strongly by external influences; and we are told distinctly that he resisted the Gnostic teaching of Paul of Antioch, who lived in the same family with himself. Refusing to adopt any Gnostic theory, he, however, so far sympathized with the spirit of the system, as to give knowledge a supreme place in his conceptions of Christianity, and to aspire after transcendental views of the Redeemer. He distinguished between those who know Him after the flesh, that is to say, in His sufferings, death, and resurrection—in other words, those who have an historical acquaintance with the Gospel,—and the *Gnostics*, those who rise from the historical to the spiritual. Communion with the Logos, or eternal reason, he supposed might become the channel of a higher knowledge, illuminating the Gnostic with a Divine philosophy. All this may be made to mean very different things, according to the way in which it is interpreted.

Origen's *Tetrapla* and *Hexapla* are well-known editions of the Old Testament—the former containing four versions, the Septuagint, Aquila, Symmachus, and Theodotion—the latter, six in some parts, and in others nine. His exegetical works include the *Tomoi*, or volumes of learned Commentary; the *Scholia*, or brief notes on Scripture; and the *Homiliae*, or popular expo-

positions. These do not come within the range of our present discussion. Nor can I take notice of his Letters. But it is appropriate here to remark, that Origen seems to have been the first of the Fathers who formed a definite view of the inspiration of the Scriptures. The "verbal" doctrine seems implied by him; for, in his Commentary on the First Psalm, he extends inspiration to the minutest letter. He compares Revelation to nature in this respect, that Divine influence extends to small things as well as great.¹ This verbal theory underlaid Origen's system of allegorical interpretation.

His well-known apologetic work, *Contra Celsum*, was written in defence of Christianity against the attacks of Celsus, a philosopher. His work entitled, *περὶ ἀρχῶν*, or *De Principiis*, which is a systematic exhibition of Christian doctrine, chiefly concerns us, being an early attempt to give a connected view of the principles of the Gospel. He adopted an obvious method of division, pursued by numerous theologians in later times, first treating of God, then of Christ, then of the Holy Spirit. These are the subjects of the first book, which also includes the fall, the nature of angels, and the destinies of the universe. The second book embraces the world, the identity of the God of the Old Testament with the God of the New, the Incarnation of Christ, the resurrection of the body, and the punishment of the wicked. The third book takes up the freedom of the will, the agency of Satan, the temptation of man, and the origin and end of the world. The fourth relates to the Divine origin of the Scriptures, and the proper mode of studying them. This selection of topics is important, as throwing light

¹ *Philocalia*, c. II. p. 23, quoted by Henderson on *Divine Inspiration*, p. 57.

upon Origen's theology, for it indicates what most interested him; and the omission of certain topics of moment betrays his neglect of certain elements of Divine truth. The positive views he enunciated led to much controversy, and brought upon him serious charges of heresy: what his opinions were in reference to some main lines of doctrinal opinion in ante-Nicene times will appear hereafter.¹ But, in the mean while, it is desirable to refer to that peculiar theory of the universe which he develops, though very obscurely, in some portions of his great work. He raises the question whether any other world existed before the present one;² and explicitly asserts, as his opinion, the existence of rational creatures from the beginning, in the unseen and eternal ages before the formation of the earth on which we dwell.³ He believed that these were of different orders, some designed to minister for the welfare of others; and speaks of a descent amongst them from a higher to a lower condition, "not only on the part of such who deserved the change, but also on the part of others, who, to serve the world, were banished from the invisible realms against their will." We are to suppose that the world was created of such a nature, as to contain not only those souls which were to be trained in it, but also those powers which were prepared for their assistance. Upon the pre-existence of the rational soul of Christ in connection with His Divine nature he emphatically insists, and speaks of the anointed union of Christ's soul with the Word of God as a reward for its love of righteousness.⁴ The nature of His soul was the same as that of others, with the power of choosing between good and

¹ See Chapter III.

² *De Principiis*, lib. II. c. 3.

³ *De Principiis*, lib. III. c. 5, § 4.

⁴ *Ibid.* lib. II. c. 4, 6.

evil ; but in Him an inextinguishable love destroyed all susceptibility of change. Origen held that a special ministry in the dispensations of time belongs to the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost ; and that, whilst the Lord dwells in every man, as wisdom or reason, the Holy Ghost dwells only in those who are walking along the way which leads to Christ.¹ He makes a distinction between the understanding and the soul, and gives it as a speculative opinion of his own, that the higher nature, the understanding in man, has fallen away, and been converted into the soul, losing its Divine fire and its love of righteousness : which idea may be taken as Origen's theory of the fall.² As he speculates on worlds before the present, he does so likewise on the existence of worlds hereafter, in which those who have not here obeyed God's Word may, by rational training, arrive at an understanding of the truth ; for the correction and improvement of those who may need it, another world resembling this, either better or worse, may be provided. Also, in connection with his theory of pre-existent orders, and their deterioration and fall, he speaks of their being remoulded by discipline, and restored to happiness.³ Here he says : "Whether any of those orders which act under the government of the devil will, in a future state, be converted to righteousness . . . is a result, which you, reader, may approve of, if neither in this nor other worlds that result is to differ from the final unity and fitness of things." He thinks this will appear to follow, that every rational nature may advance through successive stages of proficiency and failure, according to endeavours put forth through freedom of the will ;⁴ and he does not appear confident but that,

¹ *De Principiis*, lib. I. c. 3. ² lib. II. c. 8. ³ lib. I. c. 6. ⁴ *Ibid.*

after all, sin, though checked or extinguished, may break out again. These are his words: "The end of all is to abolish evil; but whether it shall be so completely destroyed that it never can revive, it is beyond our purpose to say."¹ Thus we have endeavoured briefly to indicate Origen's theory of a final restoration, adhering throughout, as far as possible, to his own phraseology, which gives a different complexion to his subject from what is presented in many summaries of his theological doctrines. It is sufficient to remark, that his scheme is purely philosophical from beginning to end, and will carry no weight with those who feel that the explicit teaching of Scripture alone affords a ground for confident belief with regard to the mysteries of the future life. At the same time, every reader must be struck with the fact, that theories now thought original, and becoming popular, are but reproductions, in some modified form, of guesses expressed by this remarkable man, who, by the way, does not seem to have attached to them that dogmatic character which is now claimed for some opinions which coincide with his.

As in the case of the *Epistle to Diognetus* we see one lasting current of theological thought, *the Evangelical*; so, in the writings of Justin Martyr, Clement, and Origen, we detect another, which, in the main, has never ceased to flow. In the *Philosophical* cast of these teachings may be detected the ancestry of intellectual methods characteristic of the Cambridge School of the seventeenth century; succeeded by the broad theological spirit which has revived in our own times.

Western divines are to be distinguished from their Eastern brethren. IRENÆUS, born in Asia Minor, between

¹ *Contra Celsum*, lib. VIII. c. 72.

the years A.D. 120 and 140, appears as a presbyter in Southern Gaul in the reign of Marcus Aurelius (161—180), and we meet with him as Bishop of Lyons about 178. Though a man of education, and acquainted with philosophy, what he brought from the East consisted chiefly in habits of thought derived from Polycarp of Smyrna, the instructor of his youth. Upon that early period of his life, he in advanced age loved to dwell. "I remember the events of those times much better than those of more recent occurrence. As the studies of youth, growing with our minds, unite with them so firmly, I can tell the very place where the blessed Polycarp was accustomed to sit and converse, and also his walks, manner of life, appearance, and conversation, and the reports he gave of what he had heard from John concerning the Lord." "These things I attentively heard, noting them down, not on paper, but in my heart."¹

In this interesting passage there is reference to the early life of Irenæus. He had not been a heathen philosopher like Justin Martyr. He had not studied in the schools of Alexandria, like Clement and Origen. He was not imbued with the spirit of classical literature. He was brought up amongst Christians. The studies of his youth were directed by "the blessed" Polycarp. He had been a disciple of the martyr, had heard from him about the Apostle John, and had drunk in from boyhood the inspiration of a simple, humble, earnest, spiritual faith. It is apparent how he had imbibed a reverence for authority. He was not a speculator, not a rationalist, not an intuitional thinker, but one who fully submitted to apostolic authority. The miracles and doctrines of the Lord, what St. John had seen and told, all this was

¹ Eusebius, *Hist.*, lib. v. c. 20.

conclusive with Irenæus. He eschewed all attempts at explaining the mysteries of Christianity; observing that in the natural works of creation, which are subject to our touch and sight, there are many things which we cannot understand, but only refer to God, as the First Cause. In his refutations of heresy, "he ever built on the words of Scripture, as their only secure foundation; and it would be impossible for the best Biblical divine of the present day to quote more largely or more familiarly every portion of the inspired volume."¹ We trace the influence of his youth upon his after life in reference to authority. Having been brought into contact with Polycarp, and having heard him talk so much of St. John, he loved to gather up all he could from living teachers in the Church, as to what they had heard from others respecting the Fathers of their faith, and respecting Jesus Christ, the author of salvation.

No one can be surprised that, within a hundred years of the death of the last apostle, importance should be attached to accounts of doctrine handed down by old men who had known him; yet even Irenæus urged tradition against heretics, chiefly on the ground that the heretics had recourse to it as more conclusive than Scripture. The champion would fight them with their own weapons; yet, in doing so, it must be acknowledged, Irenæus and others unwittingly employed an instrument used in a very different manner by persons citing tradition

¹ In reference to Irenæus, Newman remarks: "It must not be supposed that this appeal to tradition in the slightest degree disparages the sovereign authority and sufficiency of Holy Scripture as a record of the truth." "Apostolical tradition is brought forward, not to supersede Scripture, but, in conjunction with Scripture, to refute the self-authorized, arbitrary doctrines of the heretics."—*Arians of the Fourth Century*, by Dr. Newman, c. i. § iii. 2.

by itself as sufficiently authoritative, centuries after [its obscure origin. His horror of heresy is apparent from what Eusebius states. He apprehended that bold speculations, old worn-out oriental ideas, and all mythological inventions, were foreign to Christianity. He was particularly shocked at the sight of Gnosticism, which rose before him as the most abominable and mischievous of all errors, exhibiting, as it did, in his estimation, an inaccessible Deity, without any relation to mankind, without will, without love, without providence, removed far away from the government of the world; and with such an one he delighted to contrast the God of the Old and New Testaments—holy, free, loving, mysterious in His nature, but manifesting Himself to His creatures through His inexhaustible benevolence.¹

Some have spoken of the peaceable disposition of Irenæus, of his charity towards those who differed in non-essentials, of the harmony between his character and his name; but he was indignant at anything which touched what he regarded as vital truths, and uses the strongest expressions against Marcion, saying that he spoke “as with the mouth of the devil.”²

This temper appears in his *Treatise against Heresies*, which is divided into five books. “The first of them contains a minute description of the tenets of the various heretical sects, with occasional remarks in illustration of their alleged absurdities, and in confirmation of the truths which they were believed to oppose. In his second book, Irenæus proceeds to a more complete demolition of those opinions, which he had already explained, and argues at great length against them, on grounds principally of

¹ Ampère, *Hist. Lit. de la France*, i. 186.

² *Adv. Her.*, lib. i. c. xxvii. § 3.

reason. The three remaining books set forth more directly the doctrines of Revelation, as being in utter antagonism to the views held by Gnostic teachers. In the course of this argument, many passages of Scripture are quoted and commented on — many interesting statements are made, bearing on the rule of faith, and much important light is shed on the doctrines held, as well as the practices observed, by the Church of the second century.”¹

After all, blended with his submission to authority, we find in him elements akin to those we have noticed in Justin Martyr and Clement. He could Platonize; and though at times sober in his interpretations of Scripture, at other times he could betake himself to allegory, and that in the very objectionable form of giving to patriarchal misdeeds a mystical meaning.² But it should be added, that he also taught how God inflicted upon His people punishment for their transgressions, as is eminently manifest in the case of David.³

One main characteristic of Irenæus consists in his adherence to apostolic teaching; he brings out, in an orthodox form, the doctrines of our Lord's Divinity and Incarnation, dwelling on what He was, rather than on what He did. These doctrines he exhibits in opposition to heretical misrepresentation and arguments. What he taught respecting redemption will appear in a subsequent chapter. He is decidedly the champion of

¹ The treatise, entitled by himself, *Ἐλεγχος καὶ ἀνατροπή τῆς Ψευδονύμου Γνώσεως, is called, after Jerome, *Adversus Hæreses*. Beavan's account of the life and writings of Irenæus is the work of a diligent and sympathizing critic, and contains a useful analysis of his author's opinions. We have made use of the Introductory Notice to Irenæus in Clark's *Ante-Nicene Library*.

² *Adv. Hær.*, lib. IV. c. xxxi.

³ *Ibid.* lib. IV. c. xxvii. § I.

Church orthodoxy. "The truth," he says, "is to be found nowhere else but in the Catholic Church, the sole depositary of apostolical doctrine;" and here it will be interesting and instructive to append two confessions, one longer, the other shorter, which he has given as summaries of orthodox belief:

"For the Church, although spread throughout the world, even to the utmost bounds of the earth, and having received from the apostles and their disciples the faith in one God the Father Almighty, Maker of heaven and earth, and the seas, and all that in them is; and in one Jesus Christ, the Son of God, who was incarnate for our salvation; and in one Holy Ghost, who through the prophets preached the dispensations, and the advents, and the birth of a Virgin, and the passion, and the resurrection from the dead, and the ascension into heaven in flesh of the beloved Christ Jesus our Lord, and His coming from heaven in the glory of the Father, to gather together all things in one, and to raise from the dead all flesh of all mankind; that according to the good pleasure of the invisible Father, every knee may bow to Christ Jesus, our Lord and God and Saviour and King, of things in heaven, and things in earth, and things under the earth, and every tongue may confess to Him; and that He may execute just judgment upon them all, and send into eternal fire the spirits of wickedness, and the angels that sinned and were in rebellion, and the ungodly and unjust and lawless and blasphemous amongst men; and bestowing life upon the just and holy, and those who have kept His commandments, and remained in His love, some from the beginning and some after repentance, might give them incorruption, and clothe them with eternal glory. Having received this preaching, and this

faith, as we said before, the Church, though dispersed throughout the world, keeps it diligently."

And again :

"But what if the apostles had not left us any writings? Must we not have followed the order of that tradition which they delivered to those to whom they entrusted the Churches?—which order is assented to by those many barbarous tribes who believe in Christ, who have salvation written by the Spirit in their hearts without paper and ink, and diligently keep the old tradition; believing in one God, the Maker of heaven and earth, and of all that in them is, by Christ Jesus, the Son of God; who for His most exceeding love towards His own handywork, submitted to be born of the Virgin, Himself by Himself uniting man to God, and suffered under Pontius Pilate, and rose again, and was received up in glory, and will come again to be the Saviour of those who are saved, and the Judge of those who are judged, and sendeth into eternal fire those who pervert the truth, and despise His Father and His coming." ¹

In the writings of Irenæus may be traced the current of thought and feeling characteristic of a class of theologians who have appeared in all ages, as distinguished from those represented by the author of the *Epistle to Diognetus*, and from those represented by the Alexandrian school. Irenæus, as to his method, comes in a line with a comprehensive school of *Catholic Theologians*; but as to the substance of his teaching, with some exceptions, he represents orthodox teachers of all schools.

HIPPOLYTUS has of late taken a prominent place amongst patristic writers. A MS. was discovered in 1857, containing a treatise entitled, *Philosophoumena*, or *Refu-*

¹ Beavan's *Account of Irenæus*, pp. 158-161.

tation of all Heresies. It was at first ascribed to Origen, but, upon careful examination by competent critics, it is now attributed to Hippolytus, Bishop of Portus Romanus, early in the third century.¹ It gives an outline of heathen philosophies, treats of heathen astrology and magic, takes up and examines the different branches of heresy, philosophical and Jewish, and refutes them by tracing them to their origin. In the ninth book there are curious and strange disclosures of matters connected with the Church in Rome; and in the tenth the author gives a confession of his own faith.²

He is chiefly a compiler, borrowing without acknowledgment, and indebted for his theology to Irenæus, whom he follows with little deviation. "He repudiates philosophy almost with Tertullian's vehemence, as the source of all heresies, yet he employs it to establish his own views."³

We must now turn to an author much more original, and much better known, belonging to another class of theologians different in thought and language.

What Origen was amongst the Greeks, TERTULLIAN (who died about A.D. 240) was among the Latins, "nostrorum omnium facile princeps." But Tertullian enjoyed pre-eminence over Origen, and all the other Fathers of the age, in that he was the founder of theology in a new language. The literature of Latin Christianity

¹ See Bunsen's *Hippolytus and his Age*, and Wordsworth's *St. Hippolytus and the Church of Rome*. A smaller work by Taylor, entitled, *Hippolytus and the Christian Church*, founded on the larger works, will be useful to the young student.

² The original work has been edited by Duncker and Schneidewin. Gott., 1859. There is a translation of it, and of fragments from other works by Hippolytus, in Clark's *Ante-Nicene Library*.

³ Schaff's *Hist. of the Christian Church*, vol. I. p. 495.

owes its birth to him. Pagan Rome had blotted out Carthage. Christian Carthage now took precedence of Rome. We hear Punic Latinity raising its voice in Christendom before we catch the Christian accents of that deep rich tongue from any other part of the world. Theology was all Greek till Tertullian made it Latin; in his hands it certainly exhibits those strong features of practical realism which belongs to all things truly Roman. Neander calls Tertullian, *Antignostikos*. The title is just in its largest meaning. For he was not a Gnostic in the Clementine, any more than the heretical, sense of the term. He had no sympathy with the Alexandrians. Plato was no favourite, and he broadly insinuates that the demon of Socrates was of a very questionable character. Tertullian's theology, then, took a different shape from that of Justin Martyr and the other Greeks. If the habits of a Greek sage are seen in Clement, the habits of a Latin lawyer are visible in Tertullian, for he was wont, in his advocacy, to play the part of a special pleader; and his arguments, though honestly adopted, were often of such a character as to raise a suspicion of his not being over scrupulous.¹ The principal works of Tertullian are divided into those which he wrote before he became a Montanist, and those which he wrote afterwards. Neander assigns to the first period, the tracts, *Ad Martyres*, *De Spectaculis*, and *De Idololatriâ*; the two books, *Ad Nationes*; *Apologeticus*; and the treatise, *De Testimonio Animæ*; the tracts, *De Patientiâ*, *De Oratione*, *De Baptismo*, *De Pœnitentiâ*, and *De Præscriptione Heretic-*

¹ Tertullian's *Apology* furnishes illustrations of this. His statements respecting miracles, and the number of Christians, betray a want of careful consideration, and too great anxiety to make out a case.

orum; the two books, *Ad Uxorem*; and the two books, *De Cultu Fæminarum*.

He assigns to the second, the tracts, *De Coronâ*, *De Fugâ in Persecutione*, *Scorpiace*; the tracts, *Ad Scapulam*, *De Exhortatione Castitatis*, *De Monogamiâ*, *De Pudicitia*, *De Fejuniis*, *De Virginibus Velandis*, and *De Pallio*; the five books *adversus Marcionem*, the first of which was written in 208—the only case in which there is explicit evidence of a date; and the tracts, *Adversus Valentinianos*, *De Carne Christi*, *De Resurrectione Carnis*, *Adversus Hermogenem*, *De Animâ*, *Adversus Praxean*, and *Adversus Judæos*.¹

The books of Tertullian which bear most closely on the history of dogmatic opinion are those against Marcion and that against Praxeas. The former, which supply painful illustrations of a virulent controversial spirit, refer to the existence and character of evil, to the origin of human sin in the free will of man, to the incarnation of the Messiah, and to the Divine origin and uses of the Mosaic law. The latter, against Praxeas, constitutes a defence of the doctrine of the Trinity, in opposition to the idea of the three Divine names being simply an indication of offices or operations by one and the same glorious, infinite, and immaculate Being. We shall have occasion to refer to this subject again.

Like Hippolytus, Tertullian, whilst eschewing philosophy, could make use of it for his own purposes, and in his treatise *De Animâ*, where he grapples with Plato, he employs keen dialectics and rash speculations on the side of the corporeity of the human soul; yet he could appeal to tradition like Irenæus.

¹ Neander's *Antignosticus*; see Kaye's *Eccl. Hist.*, illustrated from Tertullian. Kaye's arrangement differs from Neander's.

Though occasionally allegorizing texts which we should take literally, Tertullian was opposed to such a method of interpretation as prevailed in Alexandria; and some of his remarks on the interpretation of parables are sober and judicious, and worth attention in our own times.¹

Tertullian wrote against the Gnostics, thus coming forward as a champion of orthodoxy; but when he became a disciple of Montanus, as already indicated, the disciple drank in the ascetic spirit of his master.

Generally, Montanus and Tertullian have been unfairly dealt with. Montanus, no doubt, was an enthusiast, and imagined himself endowed with supernatural gifts; and Tertullian came to sympathize with him. Both were very ascetic, but there is a bright side to the characters of both. The first seems to have been deeply impressed with the abiding work of the Holy Spirit, and the continued need of His illumination and grace, and the second shared in the sentiment; moreover, both, in an age of laxity, were advocates for strict moral discipline in the Church, an important object, which they damaged by peculiar rules, for example, by forbidding second marriages to the clergy, and by their ascetic temper. It is a mistake to suppose that an ascetic temper generally characterized the Church in the second century, since it is clear that the orthodox found fault with Tertullian for his doctrine of fasting.² The charge of immorality brought against Montanus rests on the authority of Cyril of Jerusalem; and, as Dr. Newman admits, is not satisfactorily borne out by other writers. As regards the notions of Montanus respecting the Paraclete, Dr. Burton remarks:

¹ *De Pudicitia*, §§ 8, 9.

² See *Hist. of the Early Christian Ch.*, by Mossman, ch. 18.

“Montanus distinguished the Paraclete promised by Christ to the apostles from the Holy Spirit that was poured out upon them ; and held that under the name of the Paraclete, Christ indicated a Divine Teacher who would supply certain parts of the religious system which were omitted by the Saviour, and explain more clearly certain other parts which for some reasons had not been perfectly taught.”¹

This Latin Father expressly exhibits the asceticism of those who were not Christians as a stimulus to those who were. He extols continence in pagan virgins—those who tended the vestal fires ; and “ These things,” he adds, “ the devil teaches his own, and is obeyed. He challenges, doubtless, as though on equal terms, the servants of God by the continency of his own.”² If pagan idolaters provoked Tertullian, surely heretics would do the same. He might, he did, protest against the Gnostic condemnation of marriage, and, in a certain way, he acknowledged its sanctity, but still he showed himself under the power of Gnostic asceticism, when extolling the saintliness of celibacy, and insisting on the inferiority of married people. It is quite plain that the influence of Montanus penetrated into the Church system through Tertullian: and of all who departed from Church doctrines, Montanus was most tenderly treated by the Fathers ;³ yet in this liberality they have been greatly exceeded by a modern Catholic of extensive fame.

According to Dr. Newman, Montanus only came a

¹ *Lect. on the Eccl. Hist. of the First Three Centuries*, vol. II. p. 155.

² *Ad Uxorem*, lib. I. § 6.

³ Victor, Bishop of Rome, at first looked favourably upon Montanus, and gave him letters of communion, which he afterwards withdrew, in consequence of statements made by Praxeas.—Tertullian, *Adv. Praxean*, § 1.

little too soon. A few centuries later, and he would have been a saint. Dr. Newman recognizes in him a great forerunner in the path of development. "Not in one principle or doctrine only," he says, "but in its whole system, Montanism is a remarkable anticipation or presage of developments which soon began to show themselves in the Church, though they were not perfected for centuries after. Its rigid maintenance of the original creed, yet its admission of a development, at least in the ritual, has been instanced in the person of Tertullian. Equally Catholic in their principle, whether in fact or in anticipation, were most of the other peculiarities of Montanism—its rigorous fasts, its visions, its commendations of celibacy and martyrdom, its contempt of temporal goods, its penitential discipline, and its centre of unity. The doctrinal determinations, and the ecclesiastical usages of the Middle Ages, are the true fulfilment of its self-willed and abortive attempts at precipitating the growth of the Church. The favour shown to it for a while by Pope Victor is an evidence of its external resemblance to orthodoxy."¹ A thing so like what was realized in Mediæval Christendom, so favoured by some, so kindly treated by most, so zealously embraced and recommended by the eloquent Tertullian, could not fail to have influence, and to help on the consummation which, according to Dr. Newman, it too eagerly anticipated. Imbued with an ascetic spirit from the beginning, the presbyter of Carthage naturally adopted the extravagances of his new oracle, and throwing them into his own writings, transferred them over to the Church, which continued to read and admire his works, after he had become separate from its

¹ Newman's *Essay on Development*, p. 351.

communion. In addition to what Tertullian did immediately, in this respect, he did more indirectly through the influence he acquired over the mind of Cyprian; for no more powerful and popular teacher of asceticism appeared in the third century than the martyr Bishop of Carthage.

CYPRIAN—born about A.D. 200, and beheaded, 258—used to express his admiration of Tertullian by saying, when he asked for his works, “Give me my master.”¹ The effect of this admiration is apparent in his writings; and, in addition to the nourishment of an ascetic temper, derived from that source, “perhaps Tertullian’s Montanism may have shared, as well as the African temperament, in producing Cyprian’s tendency to a belief in frequent supernatural visitations.”² The works of Cyprian include *Epistles*, eighty-one in number, which throw a most interesting light upon the Church life of that period. He produced two apologetic works, the first against heathenism, *De Idolorum Vanitate*, chiefly borrowed from Tertullian and from another author, Minucius Felix; the second against Judaism, *Testimonia adversus Judæos*, consisting merely of Scripture passages, proving our Lord’s Messiahship and Divinity. Cyprian also wrote tracts on the Unity of the Church, the Grace of God, the Lord’s Prayer, Death, Worldly Mindedness, Pride of Dress, Christian Martyrdom, Penitential Discipline, Liberality, and Patience. The enumeration of his books is sufficient to show that his teaching was rather practical than theological. The master ideas of his mind were Church unity and ascetic discipline; and through the enforcement of them he made a powerful impression upon the Christian Church.

¹ Jerome is the authority for this anecdote, *De Vir. Illustr.* c. 53.

² Robertson, *Hist. of the Church*, vol. I. p. 179.

His direct power in shaping the theological belief of Christendom was very small; but his indirect power, through the inspiration of ecclesiastical sentiments of the kind just indicated, which served mightily to influence dogmatic conclusions afterwards reached, was very great. It should be added, that no other of the ante-Nicene Fathers has left such traces of deep experimental piety. He was neither a self-righteous Pharisee, nor a prelate seeking power for his own sake. He toiled, suffered, and died for the sake of the Church, for the sake of his Lord. Happy he who can sympathize with Cyprian in his victory over the world, in his willingness to part with all for Christ, and in his triumphant hope of a blessed immortality!

LACTANTIUS, so called, it is supposed by some, from the *milky* softness of his style (died about A.D. 325), may be included in the ante-Nicene group of divines. He may be numbered amongst the numerous early controversialists, having written on Christian Evidence; but he is chiefly remarkable as a systematic theologian, in this respect resembling Origen. The *Divinæ Institutiones* of Lactantius may be placed side by side with Origen's *De Principiis*. In the first chapter of the fifth book, he plays the part of a critic, and whilst speaking in respectful terms of Minucius Felix, Tertullian, and Cyprian, he complains that suitable and skilful teachers are wanting to set forth acceptably the truths of the Gospel; and therefore he steps forward himself, with not a little confidence, to supply the lack of service. The work is a collection of separate essays, exposing the falsehood of paganism and the insufficiency of heathen philosophy. It also exhibits, in his own approved philosophical fashion, the principles of Christianity. The false worship of the gods, the origin of error,

the false wisdom of philosophers, true wisdom and religion, righteousness, worship, and a happy life—these are topics on which he descants at large; and in an Epitome of the *Institutes*, he explains his object, as including the proof of the following truths—That there is one God, and cannot be more, for which testimonies are adduced from the philosophers and the sibyls; that God is eternal, immortal, holy, unlike the mythological deities; that God is the Creator of men and angels; that, on account of sin, He drove Adam from paradise; that Providence reveals His patience; that the chief good to be sought is found in righteousness and immortality; that the name of Christ is known to none but Himself and His Father; that the nativity is proved from the prophets, also Christ's power, passion, and resurrection; that salvation comes through the death on the cross; that the world was made on account of man; and that, in the last times, there shall be a second advent, and a millennial reign. Besides these main points, practical topics are introduced.

CHAPTER II.

HERETICAL DOGMAS.

SEEDS of error were sown in the time of the apostles.

I. Christian law was exchanged for ascetic rules of abstinence. "Let no man," says St. Paul, "beguile you of your reward in a voluntary humility and worshipping of angels, intruding into those things which he hath not seen, vainly puffed up by his fleshly mind, and not holding the Head, from which all the body by joints and bands having nourishment ministered, and knit together, increaseth with the increase of God. Wherefore if ye be dead with Christ from the rudiments of the world, why, as though living in the world, are ye subject to ordinances, (touch not; taste not; handle not; which all are to perish with the using;) after the commandments and doctrines of men? Which things have indeed a show of wisdom in will-worship, and humility, and neglecting of the body; not in any honour to the satisfying of the flesh."¹ Moreover, Antinomianism appeared. It was wrought into a theory, was excused, was defended. Paul speaks of those who said, "Let us do evil, that good may come," and who slanderously declared this maxim to be in harmony with the Gospel teaching of justification by faith.² He also warned the Ephesians against sophistries (vain, empty words, *κενοῖς λόγοις*),³ by which certain teachers strove to justify certain sins, probably contend-

¹ Col. ii. 18-23.

² Rom. iii. 8.

³ Eph. v. 6.

ing that bodily acts could not contaminate the spiritual man. From Jude and Peter, we learn that ungodly men turned the grace of God into lasciviousness, sporting themselves with their own deceivings, having eyes full of adultery.¹ The Balaamites, and Nicolaitans, probably, held some vile theory in relation to morals;² and the immorality referred to in connection with the last of these was united with pretended inspiration from above and a knowledge of the depths of God, which, with fearful irony, are truly designated "depths of Satan."³

Justin speaks of those who said, that though they were sinners, yet if they knew God, He would not impute sin to them; and, possibly, it might be to such that St. John alludes, when speaking to people who said, "We have no sin."⁴

2. The resurrection was spiritualized so as to exclude the prospect of what Paul described in the fifteenth chapter of the First Epistle to the Corinthians. "Shun," he says to Timothy, "profane and vain babblings: for they will increase unto more ungodliness. And their word will eat as doth a canker: of whom is Hymenæus and Philetus; who concerning the truth have erred, saying that the resurrection is past already; and overthrow the faith of some."⁵

3. And further, from the Epistles of St. John, we clearly gather that some persons speculated on the nature of Christ, so as to deny that He came in the flesh.⁶

¹ Jude 4; 2 Peter ii. 14, 15.

² Rev. ii. 12-22.

³ Irenæus says the Nicolaitans led immoral lives, *Adv. Her.*, lib. i. c. 26. Clement and Epiphanius describe them in a similar way. See Schaff, *Ch. Hist.*, vol. I. p. 232. But Eusebius clears the character of Nicolas, *Hist.*, III. 29.

⁴ 1 John i. 8.

⁵ 2 Tim. ii. 16-18.

⁶ 1 John iv. 1-36; 2 John 7.

These three branches of error relating to law, to the resurrection, and to Christ, spring from one stem. They involve a depreciation of what is corporeal in human nature. They either require the ascetic mortification of the body as a thing merely cumbersome, or they allow the abandonment of it to licentiousness, as a thing totally worthless. Licentiousness and asceticism are contrasts; but it is curious how, like forked branches, they proceed from the same trunk. The human body was thought not fit to be raised, the soul being better without it. A Divine Spirit coming upon earth for the deliverance of man, it was thought, would never assume a body which entails evil and misery. Yet, though in all this we hold a clue available for guidance through the perplexing labyrinth of early error, we must not mistake it for anything like the whole philosophy of primitive heretical opinions; for in them were involved principles and methods of thought beyond what the most learned have been able to elucidate.

No student can fail to recognize in such opinions as these now mentioned the seeds of those elaborate theories which grew up in after times, and which are grouped under the generic name of Gnosticism. And this remark serves to reconcile the idea of those who, like Dr. Burton, trace the existence of Gnosticism up to the first century, with the idea of those who date the beginning of Gnosticism in the second. That a form of sentiment so alien from Christianity should have appeared so soon, may, at first sight, seem strange, but the strangeness melts away when we remember amidst what a storm of excited human thoughts Christianity was born into the world; and the few advantages of some early professors of the Christian name will quite as much help to

account for their rash mistakes, as for their remaining ignorance.

Those who adopted Christianity, not exactly on the negative, yet on only a speculative side—men “vainly puffed up by a fleshly mind,” unimbued with the docile and devout spirit of true discipleship, could be expected to do no otherwise than misapprehend the truth; and many such there were who hung on the skirts of the Christian army, and were merely ecclesiastical camp-followers. Moreover, it should be observed, that, among the heresies of the first age, when the nature of Christ formed a leading subject of speculation, errors on that subject related to His humanity rather than to His Divinity. Some denied that He had a human body, none that He possessed in some sense a Divine Spirit. Those of the heterodox who admitted the reality of His manhood did not deny the union with it of something celestial.

In the second century, a sect called Ebionites cross the path of Church history. Perhaps they derived their name from a Hebrew word signifying *poor*: at any rate, they were, for the most part, Jews, though Gentiles attached themselves to the party. Their system is described as a degradation of Christianity to the level of Judaism; its fundamental principle being the perpetual validity of Jewish law, and its temper being determined enmity to the teachings of the Apostle Paul. Ebionitism branched out into two divisions, compared to the older Deistic and the newer Pantheistic Rationalism of Germany, and also to the two schools of Unitarianism, the English and the American.¹

¹ Schaff's *Church History*, vol. I. p. 214. Dorner's *Doct. of the Person of Christ*, vol. I. pp. 188–217 (Eng. trans., Clark), vol. V. App., by Dr. Fairbairn, p. 446.

Gnosticism, which figures so largely in Church history, requires more attention. As described by some writers, this system appears a mass of atrocious nonsense. On the other hand, some Germans have pronounced certain of the Gnostics to have been profound thinkers. The misfortune is, that we have none of their writings before us, we are dependent for what we know of them on the testimony of antagonists; and hence common sense would lead us to believe, with Lardner, that they were not such utter madmen as is sometimes represented.

Gnosticism may be reduced into three forms: the first, in which a heathen element predominates; the second, marked by a Jewish temper; the third, tinged with Christian doctrine. But all are fundamentally in antagonism with much both in the Old Testament and the New. It would be useless, in a work like this, to crowd the page with Gnostic names; we must refer to works on the subject for details respecting Gnostic teachers. We will simply refer to the peculiarities of Basilides and Valentinus — two conspicuous Gnostic leaders — and then make some remarks on Gnostic theories in general.

BASILIDES, who flourished at the end of the first quarter of the second century, maintained that from the Supreme Good were evolved seven intelligences—understanding, word, thought, wisdom, power, righteousness, and peace. These gave birth to a second order of spirits, and the second order to a third, and so on, to the extent of three hundred and sixty-five orders. God Himself is the Unnameable; but He manifests Himself through this hierarchy of emanations. Those of the lowest heaven, that next this world, framed the earth; the *Archon*, or

ruler of this band, being the God of the Jews. From Himself came the Pentateuch; from His companion angels, the prophecies. Throughout this world, evil gathers over good like rust on steel; but to deliver from evil, to raise men out of the dominion of the Archon, the first-begotten Æon, Nous, or Understanding, descended on Jesus of Nazareth. Basilides "allowed no other justification than that of advancement in sanctification, and laid it down that every one suffers for his own sins. God, he said, forgives no sins but such as are done unwillingly or in ignorance; all other sins must be expiated; and until the expiation be complete, the soul must pass, under the guidance of its guardian angels, through one body after another—not only human bodies, but also those of the lower creatures." "On this principle Basilides even accounted for the sufferings of the Man Jesus Himself."¹

VALENTINUS starts from the eternal, primal Being, and makes thirty Æons emanate from Him in fifteen pairs; λόγος and ζωή, word and life, are thus produced; from them other Æons spring. The ἄνω Χριστός, upper or Heavenly Christ, emanates from the Æon μονογενής—the κάτω Χριστός, lower or earthly Christ, is sent by the Demiurge, or world-maker, "through the body of the Virgin Mary, as water through a pipe;" and is at last crucified, but only in appearance, not in reality. "With Him, Soter, the proper Redeemer, united Himself, in the baptism in Jordan, to announce His Divine gnosis on earth for a year, and lead the pneumatic persons to perfection."²

At the bottom of all this outlandish speculation there lay elements of thought common to them and other

¹ Robertson's *Church History*, vol. I. p. 71.

² Schaff, *Church Hist.*, vol. I. p. 242.

thinkers. They saw the existence of evil, and some other mysterious things which they wanted to have explained. Their maxim was, Not to hinder is to cause. The Being, then, able to prevent evil, but not preventing it, is the cause of evil: who is that Being? They said, It cannot be God: then it follows that the maker of the world must be some other power. The Demiurge, the world-maker, cannot be the only God—or the supreme God. With the dogma before them that permission involves causation, their conscience, which taught them that the true and supreme God must be good, sought relief from its difficulties in the idea of some other god being the creator of this terrestrial system; but while their perplexed consciences drove them in this direction, their reason arose and asserted its right to be heard, and declared the absurdity of believing in more gods than one; so it drove them back to monotheism. Between one system and another, confusion became worse confounded, and the origin of evil remained in as much darkness as ever. One thing, however, they held to; that whether a dualistic or a monotheistic theory were adopted, matter is thoroughly corrupt and impure, and the mother of all evil. Other philosophers before them had the same notion. Hence the Gnostics looked upon the world of material nature as entirely bad. The body is the prison and the foe of the soul. Only in eternal deliverance from matter can the soul be pure and free. The men who mingled Christian names with their speculations, called the God of the Hebrews—the God who, according to the books of Moses, made the world—the evil Demiurge. The recognition in the Bible of creation as very good was their abhorrence. The material portion of man's nature,

they said, was only evil. The soul that descended from the supreme and blessed God was imprisoned in the body by the Demiurge. The Old Testament saints were His slaves. Their whole history was an abomination. Jesus Christ was a good Æon, a pure benevolent spirit, emanating from the primeval fountain of Deity, who came on earth to deliver man, not by living here in a body of His own (how could the Divine be so united with matter?), but by descending into another person, or by assuming a mere fantastic shape. The Gnostics were conscious of the need of a Redeemer, and thus perverted the revelation of the only one. They utterly misrepresented redemption, so far as any of them believed in it. They placed Christianity in opposition to nature, to nature constituted by the Creator—not to fallen nature, but to nature as it was at first, looking on evil as inherent in nature—whereas Christianity is opposed only to the evil now connected with nature, that evil arising out of a departure from its true laws and original constitution. The Christian redemption is not a departure from it as it was at first, but a returning to it in its original excellence and beauty.¹

¹ For literature on the Gnostics, see—

1. Original authorities—(i.) Irenæus, *Book on Heresies*; (ii.) Hippolytus, *Refutation of Heresies*; (iii.) Epiphanius, *Ad. Hær.*; (iv.) Theodoret, *Five Books of Heresies*.

2. *History of Heretics*, by Lardner; particularly Book I. secs. 5, 6, 7, 17, 18; Book II. c. II.

3. Mosheim, *Comment. de Rebus Christianis ante Constant.*, p. 333 *et seq.*

4. Neander's *Church History*, II. pp. 41 *et seq.* 161.

5. Burton's Bampton Lecture, *On the Heresies of the Apostolic Age*.

6. Schaff, *Church History*, vol. I. p. 221 *et seq.*

(See over page.)

Modern critical research has done much toward presenting Gnosticism to us in a more intelligible light than that under which it was received by earlier ecclesiastical historians. It enables us distinctly to see the nature of the contrast between such men as Clement and Origen on the one hand, and Basilides and Valentinus on the other. Both brought philosophy and Christianity into contact with each other; but the relations sought to be established between them were of an essentially different nature. The Fathers endeavoured to Christianize philosophy, to make the latter tributary to the former, to lay the spoils of ancient thought at the foot of the cross, and to glorify the Saviour, as did the wise men of the East, when they presented their offerings of gold, frankincense, and myrrh. But the Gnostics only philosophized Christianity, or rather absorbed into a system of thought, partly of their own creation, and partly derived from Greek and Oriental sources, certain elements drawn from Christian beliefs, which they arbitrarily shaped so as to serve their own purpose. The Fathers appealed to Scripture as the primary source whence they derived their Christian knowledge, and employed what they received in the way of traditionary reports of primitive faith, to support and illustrate what they believed they found in the sacred records. But the Gnostics rejected the Old Testament; some of them maintained that, as the work of the Demiurge, it gave a false colouring to facts, that the patriarchs and saints were men to be reprobated, and that the real worthies were Cain, the

7. Dorner's *Person of Christ*, vol. I. pp. 218, 251 (Clark).

8. Bunsen's *Hippolytus*, 4 vols.

9. Matter's *Histoire Critique du Gnosticisme*.

10. Baur's *Christliche Gnosis*.

men of Sodom, and Korah, with his company ; as to the New Testament, the Gnostics took only such portions as they liked, showing a preference for the Gospel of John, upon which they attempted to fasten mystical interpretations. They appealed to esoteric traditions, and to apocryphal documents, of which were reckoned up a large number.¹ The Fathers, after all, aimed ultimately at bringing out the experimental and practical uses of the Gospel ; whilst the Gnostics attempted to “ solve some of the deepest metaphysical and theological problems,” and looked at the knowledge of such mysteries as the final end of their endeavours. The Fathers, whatever allegorical illustrations they might base upon Scripture, held to the historical facts of the Gospels as the basis of Christian faith ; but the Gnostics treated many of them as mere myths and fables, and distorted them in the most extraordinary way. There is a reality in the writings of the one class missed in the system of the other, of which the highest praise is, that, in its Valentinian form, it presents “ a wonderful structure of speculative, or rather intuitive, thought, and at the same time an artistic work of the creative fancy, a Christian mythological epic.”² Points of resemblance between the Gnostics and some distinguished modern teachers are indicated by one well acquainted with them all. “ God is the unfathomable abyss, locked up within Himself.” Basilides would not ascribe even existence to Him, and thus, like Hegel, starts from absolute non-entity. “ Reduced to a clear philosophical definition, the Gnostic Christ is really nothing more than the ideal spirit of man himself, as in the *Leben Jesu* of Strauss.”³ The

¹ Irenæus, *Adv. Hær.*, lib. I. c. 20, 21.

² Schaff's *Hist.*, vol. I. p. 224.

³ *Ibid.* vol. I. pp. 227—230.

exaltation of philosophy above Scripture, and the substitution of the speculative for the practical, with the imagined for the real, are broad features of this early form of thought, which find a resemblance in some departments of literature at the present time.

There is another system akin to Gnosticism, denominated Manicheism, from Manes, or Manichæus, its author, a person presenting some resemblance both to Montanus and to Mahomet. His scheme was a mixture of Zoroaster's philosophy with Christian truth; and, in Eastern fashion, he reduced the universe to two elements—light and darkness, good and evil—but refrained from the extremely fanciful machinery of Gnosticism. He looked on man as composed of two souls—one light, the other dark—whilst the body, because made of matter, is necessarily evil. He believed that Christ, the great Sun-spirit, came to deliver the better nature of man; and, though excluding all idea of incarnation and atonement, he represented the Holy Ghost as uniting with Christ in the redemption of mankind. He taught that the Saviour had not a material body, but only one appearing as such, and that the object of His coming into the world was to teach men their heavenly original, and to urge them to seek the recovery of lost bliss.¹

With regard to such systems, which adopted certain portions of Christianity, it may be remarked that they had in them a subtle spirit, which perhaps, in spite of controversial opposition, insinuated itself into the dogmatic teaching of the Church, through the constant

¹ See Schaff, *Ch. Hist.*, vol. I. p. 246 *et seq.*, and Robertson, vol. I. p. 190, and the authorities they quote. The *Histoire Crit. de Manichée et du Manichéisme*, by Beausobre, and Mosheim's *Comment. de Rebus Christianis* should be consulted.

discredit they cast on what is material in nature. At the same time, it is observed, that "it was through the Gnostics that studies, literature, and art were introduced into the Church;"¹ and, what is more to our purpose, we may add, that the pressure of heresy on orthodoxy led the teachers of the latter more carefully to examine their own system, more precisely to state their own opinions, and more earnestly to contend for the faith once delivered to the saints. As to Manicheism, it widely spread in the West as in the East, and it for awhile fascinated Augustine, in whose day the Manichees formed a numerous sect in Italy and Africa, some secret members being numbered among the clergy.

¹ Baumgarten-Crusius, quoted in Dorner's *Person of Christ*, vol. I. p. 223 (Clark).

CHAPTER III.

LINES OF GENERALLY ACKNOWLEDGED
CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE.

OF Christian thoughtfulness at the period under review, it may be observed generally, that it took the form rather of religious sentiment than of scientific theology. The distinction between religion and theology, laid down in my introductory remarks, should be kept in view in the present investigation, as it will enable us to reach a more accurate conception of the state of Christian belief in the early centuries than otherwise we should attain.

The Divine inspiration and authority of the Gospel was an object of primary belief, and rested at the foundation of all doctrinal convictions. Whatever uses might be made of philosophy by the most philosophical divines, they never dreamt of its being co-ordinate in its claims to submission with the revelation made by Jesus Christ and His apostles. The Old Testament was regarded with profound reverence, as written by inspired men; and those which are now the canonical books of the New Testament were gradually accepted, and at length placed on the same level of authority. Some writings, at first treated as inspired, were afterwards separated from the undoubtedly apostolic works, though they continued to be employed publicly as well as privately for spiritual edification. Though no theory of inspiration can be discovered in early Christian literature, unless something of the kind be found in Origen, it is manifest that whilst

what is termed the canon of the New Testament was being formed, the idea of inspiration was attached to the substance of apostolic teaching. Tertullian drew an important distinction between the inspiration of apostles and the inspiration common to all believers; and Irenæus alludes to the extraordinary assistance of the Holy Spirit granted to the sacred penmen.¹

Apostolic traditions secured profound attention, but they were regarded as confirmatory, or illustrative, of doctrines found in the sacred books; in other words, to be in a line with Scripture, never to be in opposition to it. The Alexandrian school, though honouring tradition, did not go the length of Tertullian and Irenæus (we place Irenæus last, as a more orthodox and conclusive index of Catholic belief), who spoke as if Christian doctrine could not be ascertained without consulting the mother Churches of Christendom.²

Orthodox Fathers set themselves decidedly against all innovations upon what they held to be apostolic doctrines. Argument and authority—the latter more than the former—were employed on the side of those who claimed to be the Catholic Church; and the interpretation of Scripture rested with its rulers. The writings of the apostles were not forbidden to be read, were not withheld from the people; but individual opinion in opposition to the predominant teaching of the Fathers of the Church was by no means tolerated.

What relates to human nature—or, as it is technically styled, *Anthropology*—came in for a considerable share of notice from the Church theologians. All the

¹ Tertullian, *De Exhort. Castit.*, c. 4; Irenæus, *Adv. Hær.*, lib. III. c. 16, § 2.

² Tertullian, *Præscrip. Heret.*, c. 20; *Adv. Hær.*, lib. III. c. 4.

Greek Fathers insisted upon the individuality and freedom of the human soul, in opposition to fatalism, perhaps, rather than to what we call philosophical necessity; and with regard to sin they dwelt almost entirely upon individual transgression. Heterodox thinkers, as we have seen, supposed that matter is the root of evil; and even Clement of Alexandria ascribed the origin of iniquity to sensual appetites. Tertullian attributed it to impatience, Origen to indolence; and there was a general agreement that the moral mischief of mankind sprung from the human will itself. All Christians were conscious of their sinfulness, and deplored it before God; and the teachers of the Church maintained the corruption of the human race. It was believed that the temptation by the serpent in Eden was a real one; and that the first act of disobedience was a fall from innocence into degeneracy, guilt, and disaster. Death and physical evils were counted to be the effect of Adam's guilt; but the doctrine of an hereditary tendency to evil does not make its appearance in Christian literature so early. Origen thought that the soul had contracted moral stains in a former state of existence; and Tertullian thought the soul propagated itself with all its defects, as matter generates matter; but these were not Church dogmas. In Tertullian, however, we have the earliest use of the term original sin (*vitium originis*); and in a modified sense he imputed original sin to infants; Cyprian acknowledged inherent depravity, and on that ground defended infant baptism.¹

The future, as connected with the end of the world (*Eschatology*), powerfully seized on the convictions and

¹ On all these points see Hagenbach, *Hist. of Doctrines*, vol. I. pp. 154-162.

imagination of the early Church. The second coming of Christ, the resurrection of the dead, the final judgment, as they were prominent themes of contemplation in the apostolic age, so they afterwards remained. The glorious advent of the Redeemer was supposed to be at hand; and the resurrection of the same body as is possessed on earth was taught by most of the Fathers, the Alexandrians excepted. The Hebrew idea of Hades (*Sheol*) penetrated the Christian mind, and the full happiness of the saved, and the full misery of the lost, were referred to the last day. Some Fathers speak of purifying fires hereafter, but not in the Roman Catholic sense of purgatory. Origen, as we have noticed, speculated largely on the future state; but these speculations were his own, and do not represent the established beliefs of Christendom.¹

A millennium, and the bodily reign of our Lord, were generally anticipated.² The Book of Revelation was a favourite study. Justin Martyr speaks of the elect rising from the dead, and spending a thousand years with Christ in the New Jerusalem; but whilst he asserts it as his own opinion, and also as that of others, he adds that some orthodox Christians entertained different views.³ Irenæus adopted a tradition from Papias, that St. John had related a prophecy in reference to the unprecedented fruitfulness of the earth under the millennial reign. The prophecy includes absurd particulars; and though related with much confidence, it is not to be considered as having been generally believed.⁴ Lactantius, at the end of his *Institutes*, largely refers to the last judgment and the millennium, placing the millennium after the judgment,

¹ Hag., *Hist. Doct.*, vol. I. pp. 206, 223.

² Gieseler, *Ecc. Hist.* (Cunningham), vol. I. p. 100.

³ *Dial. Trypho.*, § 80. ⁴ Irenæus, *Adv. Hær.*, lib. v. c. 33.

and dwelling in fanciful illustrations on an age of peace, repeating figures employed in Isaiah and Virgil's *Pollio*. He also cites the *Sibylline Oracles*.

Beyond the details of doctrine just specified, the belief of the period respecting the end of the world attests the thoughts and feelings of Christians, and it has been justly remarked that the renovation of society—what we call human progress—was not a subject of hope or speculation to the heathen world; nor was it so to the believers of the Gospel in early times. “They expected no general revival of society through the purer morality of the Gospel; no fructifying of the blessed seed in the bosom of an effete civilization. For such a progress and result, no time, as they anticipated, would be allowed, for the end of the world appeared to be at hand; the outward frame of law and order was only upheld, in their view, by the continued existence of the empire; stricken and shaken as that framework was, it could not long endure; and on its fall would follow the dissolution of the Divine creation, the conflagration of the universe, the end of all things.”¹

What were the doctrines held with regard to the salvation of men (*Soteriology*), it is very important to ascertain.

Three points require to be studied:

1. *Redemption*. Faith was the root of religious life. The earliest creed is an illustration of this. It has nothing in it propositional; from beginning to end it is personal faith in the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost. The whole collection of early patristic literature shows, that whilst Christ's sacrifice was held and prized, it did not stand exactly in the relation to Christian

¹ Merivale's *Romans under the Empire*, vol. VIII: p. 368.

doctrines which it afterward acquired, for He was thought of more as filling the throne than as hanging on the cross; and if at one time beyond another the faith of the early Christians appeared strong, it was when, as they faced death, they thought of the Lord of life and glory. The theology of the Church is inscribed on the sepulchral slab: "*in pace*," "*in Christo*;" it is pictured in crude sketches of a shepherd carrying home on his shoulders the once lost sheep; but the sufferings and death of Christ in reference to our redemption were by no means overlooked. The passage from the *Epistle to Diognetus*, already given, may be appealed to in proof of this; further extracts from ante-Nicene authors might be cited for the same purpose.

Justin Martyr, who chiefly dwells upon the incarnation and glorious nature of our Lord, speaks of the remission of sins through the blood and death of Christ, according to the teaching of the prophet Isaiah:¹ Irenæus refers to the Lord as redeeming us through His blood, giving His soul for our souls, His flesh for our flesh, and pouring out the Spirit of the Father for the union and communion of God and man:² Clement of Alexandria is even more explicit. He always speaks of redemption as effected by the death of Christ. "Christians are redeemed from corruption by the blood of the Lord." "The Lord poured forth His blood for us to save human nature." "The Lord gave Himself a victim for us." "By His own passion He delivered us from offences, and sins, and thorns of that kind"—in allusion to the crown of thorns placed on our Saviour's head. His interpretation of Isaiah: "The Lord hath laid on Him the iniquity of us all," is, that the Lord sent

¹ *Dial. Trypho*, § 13.

² *Adv. Hær.*, lib. v. c. 1, § 1.

Him as the corrector of our sins. On this account, He is alone able to remit transgressions, being appointed by the Father of the universe to be our Schoolmaster, and alone able to distinguish between obedience and disobedience.¹

Origen, too, sets forth Christ as both priest and sacrifice. "He committed no sin, but became for us sin, through the flesh, that He might bear our sins, and nail them to the cross. The Immortal dies; the Impassible suffers; the Invisible manifests Himself."² With these and other like passages before us, it may safely be affirmed that, in the general belief of Christendom, the death of Christ expressed the love of God; that what He endured was on account of the sins of mankind, and in order to their removal; that He was emphatically a sacrifice for us; that His sufferings were truly vicarious; that He paid a ransom for us; and that through His death He inspires in us eternal life. And here, in passing, we may remark how thoroughly must the facts of our Lord's death and resurrection have been engrafted on the minds of Christians during the second and third centuries; how, as on a central pivot, their religious thoughts revolved around the New Testament history,—a circumstance which those who attack the Four Gospels with destructive criticisms are unable to explain. But our particular duty now is to show the doctrinal significance which the early Fathers attached to the death of our Lord. They, for the most part, regarded it as producing *an effect on us and in us*, as cleansing us from the impurity of sin, and inspiring us with a new and blessed life; but they did not omit to look at it also as producing a change in *our relationship* to certain evil powers in the universe, and to the law and

¹ Kaye's *Clement*, p. 419.

² *Hom. Levit.*, c. III. § 1.

government of Almighty God; and here we come upon one of the difficult critical questions in this part of our history. The term *satisfaction*¹ occurs in the writings of Tertullian; but he means by it satisfaction through a sinner's personal amendment, not through the vicarious sacrifice of Christ; therefore his use of the word throws no light upon what may have been the state of Christian thought at that time respecting the doctrine of satisfaction, as developed by Anselm at a subsequent period—a subject which, in its proper place, will demand our careful attention. At present, we must confine ourselves to some passages in the writings of Irenæus and Origen, bearing upon the doctrine of human redemption through our Lord Jesus Christ. We had better at once cite the words of Irenæus:

“Since the apostasy tyrannized over us unjustly, and though we were by nature the property of the omnipotent God, alienated us contrary to nature, rendering us its own disciples; the Word of God, powerful in all things, and not defective with regard to His own justice, did righteously turn against that apostasy, and redeem from it His own property; not by violent means, as the apostasy had obtained dominion over us at the beginning, when it insatiably snatched away what was not its own, but by means of persuasion, as became a God of counsel, who does not use violent means to obtain what He desires; so that neither should justice be infringed upon, nor the ancient handiwork of God go to destruction.”²

There are two other passages still more obscure, in which the author speaks of the work of Christ in relation to the evil one, saying, how in the beginning he enticed

¹ *De Pœnit.*, §§ 5, 9.

² *Adv. Her.*, lib. v. c. 1 (Roberts's Translation).

man, and got him into his power ; how necessary it was that, through man himself, Satan should, when conquered, be bound with the same chains as those he had bound on others ; how he who led them captive unjustly is justly led captive himself ; and how the falsehood, the apostasy, and the robbery of the devil has been exposed, the Word of God conquering him ; by means of human nature.¹ These passages have been adduced for the purpose of showing that Irenæus held some strange theory, to the effect that satisfaction was made to the devil by the work of Christ ; that the Saviour bought off sinners from the hands of their oppressor. But the words, very obscure in themselves, cannot be stretched so as to cover that absurd theory. *Persuasion (secundum suadellam)* is what Irenæus insists upon as the means of our deliverance ; and the question is, whether the *persuasion* was brought to bear on man, or on the devil ? An impartial consideration of the sentence, just quoted in full, suggests the idea that persuasion here relates to man, not the devil ; that as false and wicked persuasion led men astray, pure and righteous persuasion has brought them back to liberty and peace.² At the same time, it will be seen that the righteousness or justice of the manner in which our salvation has been accomplished receives distinct recognition. Redemption, according to Irenæus, was effected not by force, it was not snatched away ; all was done righteously.

Origen seems to go further than Irenæus, when he says, in his commentary on Matt. xx. 28 : " To whom did

¹ *Adv. Hær.*, lib. v. c. 21—24.

² Archbishop Thomson says, in his *Bampton Lect.*, p. 156 : " It is to lost men, we may be sure, and not to Satan, that the persuasions in question speak." Dorner takes a like view, in opposition to Baur.—*Doct. of the Person of Christ*, vol. I. p. 463.

He give His life a ransom for many—not to God : did He, then, to the evil one? For he exercised dominion over us until the ransom should be given, even the life of Jesus, though he (the evil one) was deceived as supposing he could hold dominion over it.” Here, certainly, we find the germ of a strange notion which we shall meet with again and again in later writers; but let it be observed, that we find it not in Irenæus, who does not go anything like as far as this. Origen starts it, yet rather as a question than as an assertion, a method of writing very common with that original, bold, and inquisitive theologian.

Before leaving this subject, it may be remarked that Lactantius has much to say about the Divine anger against human sin, in his work on the *Wrath of God*; he reasons upon the subject in logical form as against Epicureans and Stoics; but we do not find him in that work saying anything of reconciliation through Jesus Christ: yet, in the fourth book of his *Institutes*, he describes the incarnation, person, sufferings, and priesthood of our Lord, and insists upon His death as opening the way to salvation.

2. *Justification*, so prominent a subject in the writings of St. Paul, could not fail to engage the thoughts of ante-Nicene divines; but the forensic view, as it has been called, is not clearly brought out by any of them. They distinguish, of course, between forgiveness and sanctity, and they speak of justification by faith; but they do not indicate an apprehension of what is involved in modern controversy on the question. They are apt to confound acceptance and holiness; they also insist on the efficacy of baptism, and the merit of martyrdom, so as to undermine the evangelical principles of grace and righteousness. Occasionally a passage occurs, seeming to explain justification as it is explained by later writers;

but the connection in which it stands impairs its effect. For example, few passages seem at first sight so clear as this in Cyprian: "Every one who believes in God and lives in faith is found just, and long since, in faithful Abraham, is shown to be blessed and justified" (*Ep.*, 63). But the drift of the epistle containing the passage is against the use of water unmixed with wine in the Lord's Supper; the passage respecting justification being incidentally introduced in a paragraph intended to show that the bread and wine, brought to Abraham by Melchisedec, prefigured the body and blood of Christ. Melchisedec's cup, says Cyprian, was mixed with wine; so was Christ's. The connection of Cyprian's words, and the general tenor of his epistles,¹ show, that while he believed in salvation by the grace of God, and by that alone, he had not the same theological idea of justification which came to be elaborated by certain subsequent theologians.

Our inquiry here, and throughout our history, is as to what was in point of fact the belief of the Church at a particular period; and we would therefore remark that with regard to individual salvation by grace, the case was much the same as with regard to the redemption of Christ. There was a deep, vital, practical, consolatory sentiment in the hearts of the faithful, that men are saved by grace through faith; but there was not any scientific definition of what is meant by justification as distinguished from sanctification.

3. *Regeneration* was a prominent topic. The tendency of the age was to regard salvation chiefly on

¹ There is a passage in Cyprian's *De Lapsis*, § 12, in which he speaks of the merits of martyrs and the works of the just as of great avail at the last day.

its moral, experimental side; upon what was done *in* man by the grace of God more than upon what was done *for* him. Regeneration is represented by the ante-Nicene Fathers as a great moral change, affecting the heart, life, and character of its subjects. It is an illumination, a purifying, a new birth of the Spirit of God. The strongest language is employed in reference to it. But it is connected, in the opinion of the early Church, with baptism, which was regarded not as a mere rite, not simply as the use of water, but as an operation of the Spirit of God. Tertullian indulges in materialistic views of the subject, and revels in the rite itself; as the bath of salvation, declaring that such as undervalue the water, "are snakes and basilisks, seeking after dry places;" whilst every true Christian is a poor *fish*, following I.X.Θ.Υ.Σ,¹ Jesus Christ, being "born in water, and not safe except when living in water." But this language is exceptional, and can scarcely be taken as an expression of the thought of the age.

Justin Martyr, however, is an admitted Church authority; and he speaks of baptism as the laver of repentance, the washing of salvation, the spiritual circumcision, the instrument of the new birth. Clement of Alexandria also connects regeneration with baptism: "Our transgressions are remitted by one sovereign medicine, the baptism according to the Word. We are cleansed from all our sins, and cease at once to be wicked. There is one grace of illumination; that we are no longer the same in conversation as before we were washed, inasmuch as knowledge rises together with illumination, shining around the understanding, and we,

¹ Initials of the Greek words for *Jesus Christ, God's Son, Saviour*; spelling together the word for *fish*. *De Baptismo*, § 1.

who were without learning, are instantly styled learners, this learning having been conferred upon us ; for we cannot name the precise time, since catechetical instruction leads to faith, and faith is instructed by the Holy Spirit in baptism."¹ It is plain that Clement did not conceive of any magical change effected by the water, or any mere relative change connected with the rite, but a mental and moral change—illuminating and purifying,—which, whilst in some way associated with baptism, is also the result of Christian instruction. He refers in one case to regeneration "as connected not with baptism but repentance."²

As to the doctrine of human liberty on the one hand, and as to Divine predestination on the other, there do not appear to have been any controversies in the ante-Nicene Church like those which have subsequently prevailed. There was a general consensus of thought and expression amongst the Greek Fathers of the period in support of the freedom of the human will, and the Latin Fathers in their own way followed on the same side.³ But then with this ought to be coupled what we find in their writings, as already seen, respecting Divine grace through our Lord Jesus Christ as the source of men's salvation. As to the doctrine of election and predestination, developed by Augustine, it had not at the time come within the circle of theological thoughtfulness ; and it is in vain to seek after passages in the earliest literature of Christendom either for or against the doctrine. It is

¹ *Paedagogus*, lib. I. c. 6. Other passages on the subject are cited by Kaye in his *Account of the Writings and Opinions of Clement*, ch. XI. There is a large collection of extracts from the Fathers in Wickes's *Baptism*.

² Kaye's *Clement*, p. 440.

³ See Hagenbach, *Hist. of Doctrines*, vol. I. p. 148.

well observed, that what Tertullian says on the subject "has a closer connection with the questions agitated in the schools of philosophy respecting fate and free will than with the Scriptures."¹ Tertullian touches, however, on the great controversy when he says: "If nothing happens but what God wills, God wills the commission of crime; in other words, He wills what He forbids."² This Latin Father, however, it may be observed, distinguishes between what God ordains and what God permits, calling the first *pura voluntas*, and the second, *invita voluntas*; ³ in reference to the prediction in Scripture of future events, he says there is no distinction of time in the Divine mind, what He decrees, He regards as already accomplished.⁴

Clement—to go back to a Greek Father—in his comment on the fourth verse of the Epistle of Jude, "who were before of old ordained to this condemnation," remarks, that they were predestinated not to ungodliness, but to condemnation as the consequence of ungodliness. He also makes a distinction between different classes of the "called," saying "all men are called; but to those who obey, the appellation of *κλητοι* alone is given."⁵

But above all other doctrinal themes, the person and nature of Christ (*Christology*) attracted the attention of the ante-Nicene Church. In what relation does He stand to God? All answered, He is Divine. The pre-existence and celestial glory of Christ was in some sense almost universally believed by those calling themselves Christians. Even the Gnostics held the pre-existent nature of the *Æon* Christ; and it cannot be proved that amongst the heretics of the first two centuries any considerable number believed in the simple humanity of our Lord.

¹ Kaye's *Tertullian*, p. 341.

² *De Exhort. Castitatis*, c. 2.

³ *Ibid.*, c. 3.

⁴ *Adv. Marcion*, lib. III. c. 5.

⁵ Kaye's *Clement*, p. 434.

Divines of the Catholic Church dwelt upon Jesus Christ as *Son of God*. The term *Logos* was much used before Origen; after him, *Son of God* became the more common appellation. But the question is, what idea was attached to that term? It appears to me, after all which Bishop Bull and others have written, that the beliefs of the ante-Nicene Church on this subject cannot be reduced to one harmonious system.¹

Inquiries into the person and nature of Christ involved inquiries into the relations of the Divine Father and Son; in other words, the doctrine of the Trinity. The word Trinity, or *Triad*, came into use through Theophilus, Bishop of Antioch (A.D. 181), though not perhaps exactly in the present acceptation of the term.² Tertullian speaks of "*Trinitas unius Divinitatis*." Cyprian also uses the word "*Trinitatem*."³

Doctrine respecting Christ became so involved with doctrine respecting the Godhead, that the former cannot be understood but by paying attention to the latter.

Upon this ineffable subject there ever must be two directions of thought, one pointing to the unity of the Father and the Word; the other, to the distinction between the Father and the Son. They may either

¹ Bull's *Defence of the Nicene Creed*, *The Judgment of the Catholic Church of the First Three Centuries*, and his *Primitive and Apostolical Tradition*, should be studied. Dorner's *Doct. of the Person of Christ*, ranging over the whole field of Christian literature, is indispensable to the student.

² Theophilus, in the second book of his treatise, c. 15, addressed to Autolycus, uses the words, τῆς τριάδος τοῦ Θεοῦ καὶ τοῦ Λογοῦ αὐτοῦ, καὶ τῆς Σοφίας αὐτοῦ. This is said to be the earliest use of the theological term, Trinity.

³ *De Judic.*, c. 21. Cyp., *Ep.* 73.

come into conflict, or they may be harmoniously adjusted. We trace their existence and operation in the ante-Nicene period.

A tendency which dwelt upon the unity of the Word with the Father—sometimes denominated a *Monarchian* tendency—may be regarded as represented, in some measure perhaps, by Justin Martyr, and even by Irenæus, but in a more decided manner by Clement of Alexandria. He does not fail altogether to distinguish between the Father and the Word; but he is more copious upon the subject of their Divine union. According to him, the Word “is the harmony of the Father,” “the rock of the Father,” “the arm of the Lord;” God created the world, and gave the law, and inspired the prophets, and manifested Himself through the Logos. He is the image of God, and Divine worship is due to Him. Yet Clement believed that the Son was inferior to the Father; and therefore, though he prominently brought out the idea of Divine union, he avoided the idea of identification.¹

In connection with this line of thought, we may mention the doctrine of *coinherence*, *περιχώρησις*, or *circumincessio*, founded on such passages as, “The only begotten Son, which is in the bosom of the Father;” “I am in the Father, and the Father in Me.”² Athenagoras insisted upon this view; so also did Dionysius of Rome.³

An idea of thorough identification was reached by Sabellius (about A.D. 250); and so extreme were his views

¹ On the Monarchian tendency, see Dorner, *Person of Christ*, vol. I. p. 260 *et seq.*

² John i. 18; xiv. 11.

³ Passages by these Fathers to this effect are cited by Bull, *Defensio*, Sect. II. c. iv.; and are repeated by Newman, *Arians of the Fourth Century*, p. 173 *et seq.*

on this point, that he was pronounced a heretic, and excommunicated. Unfortunately, we do not possess his writings, and only know him through the works of unfriendly critics. Epiphanius, our chief authority, informs us that Sabellius conceived there were in the Divine nature "one hypostasis and three designations," which he compares to the union of body, soul, and spirit; and intimates that the Sabellians likened the Deity to the sun, its orbicular substance symbolizing the Father, its light the Son, its heat the Holy Ghost.¹ Basil tells us that Sabellius represented the Divine personalities as mere characters or representations.² Amongst modern commentators on his theory, Mosheim observes that Sabellius believed a certain energy or power—a part of the Divine nature—to have been united to the man Jesus.³ Schaff's version of the system of Sabellius is, that the unity of God unfolds itself in three forms: the Father in giving the law—the Son in the Incarnation—the Holy Ghost in inspiration.⁴

Another tendency—that which *distinguished* between the Father and the Word—is represented by Tertullian, Hippolytus, and Origen. We have space only to notice briefly the first and third.

Tertullian wrote against a class of thinkers called Patripassians—extreme representatives of the Monarchian tendency—persons who so identified the Father and the Word, as that opponents make it appear as if the so-called Patripassians believed the sufferings of our Lord were experienced by the Divine nature of the

¹ *Hæc.*, LXII. I.

² *Ep.* 214.

³ *De Rebus*, III. § 33.

⁴ *Church History*, vol. I. p. 293. See also Smith's *Biog. Dict.*, Art. 'Sabellius.' Dr. Newman suggests that there may have been two forms of Sabellianism, the one running into Patripassianism, the other melting into an Emanative theory.—*Arians of the Fourth Century*, p. 120.

Father. Against such a view Tertullian protested with all the fiery zeal of his African temperament. He denounces as absurd and unscriptural the notion that the eternal and unchangeable One could suffer. And he goes on to ask, What meaning can Patripassians attach to the Redeemer's cry, "My God, My God, why hast Thou forsaken Me?" Engrossed with the distinction between the Father and Son, Tertullian seems sometimes to have forgotten what he said about the Divine unity, and to have crossed the orthodox borders into fields the opposite of those where his opponents dwelt.¹

We must not look for consistency in this impulsive writer, nor can we regard him as a safe exponent of Church views. Origen lies under equal, indeed greater, suspicion. He so developed the side adopted by Tertullian as, in the opinion of some scholars, to pave the way which led to Arianism. Origen, as Tertullian had done, used the word *Son* rather than *Logos*, and affirmed that whilst the Father is the absolute, the infinite, the incomprehensible One, "the primal causality," the primal beginning and archetype, the Son is not so: the Father is above the Son, as the Son is above the world. Yet Origen represents the Son as the

¹ A recent writer has indicated the orthodoxy of Tertullian, and says: "It is easy to trace every germ of thought which afterwards came to maturity in the Athanasian Creed. Verse after verse of that famous creed or hymn, whichever it be, might seem to be derived from Tertullian, occasionally reproducing his very language." Mossman's *History of the Early Church*, p. 429. This seems much too strong: but the author cites some significant passages. Augustinian phraseology may be traced in the Athanasian Creed; and no doubt Tertullian's writings had an effect, direct or indirect, upon the Bishop of Hippo.

fulness of the Deity, the reduplication of the Divine glory.¹

Upon this incomprehensible subject it is difficult, if not impossible, for any man of great acuteness and subtlety to proceed far without laying himself open to the charge of heresy. The same passages will be taken by different persons in both a good and a bad sense. Hence the interminable controversies as to the exact opinions of this wonderfully gifted but restless theologian. He certainly indicated a tendency and propounded views which afterwards bore fruit, probably of a different kind from what he would have himself approved. It is quite plain, from our brief review, that, in the mental activity of the Church during the third century, numerous elements of theological thought were held in solution; and that on the subject of our Lord's nature, and its relation to the Godhead, no one definite conviction attained to that position of orthodoxy which came to be occupied by the decisions of the Nicene age. Yet, at the same time, this is plain beyond controversy—that Justin Martyr, Clement of Alexandria, and the rest, on one side, with Tertullian and Origen, with the rest on the other, believed in the Divinity of Christ. They all believed in the fact that He was infinitely more than man, that He was one with God. Their only difference was in the mode of apprehending the mystery.

¹ On the whole of this subject, see Dorner, *On the Person of Christ*, vols. I. and II. To give minute references to authorities would overload the page. Ante-Nicene Fathers spoke of the Son as *generate*, the Father as *ingenerate*; and of the Father as *unoriginate*, a word they scrupled to apply to the Son. Newman, in his *Arians of the Fourth Century*, notices at length variations in the ante-Nicene theological statements, p. 181 *et seq.*

PART II.

FROM THE COUNCIL OF NICÆA
TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.

A.D. 325-730.

CHAPTER I.

FORMATIVE INFLUENCES.

THEOLOGICAL thought, during the period on which we now enter, appears amidst circumstances different from those which previously surrounded it. Paganism, assailed by Christianity from the beginning, had declined in its power and extent, owing to the inroads made upon it by missionary labours in various lands, and to the effects produced, wherever Churches existed, or individual believers were found, by preaching the Gospel, and by quiet religious influence. The relative position of Christians and Pagans, in point of numbers and social importance, in the time of Constantine, was vastly changed from what it had been in the days of the Antonines. Forms of heretical thought, too, had undergone alteration. Gnosticism no longer, as it once did, held possession of a number of minds; it no longer exerted the charm felt in the case of Basilides, Valentinus, and the rest. Philosophical dreams, imported from the far East, no longer haunted the imagination of sceptical and inquisitive thinkers. Persian Manicheism took the place of Gnostic theories, and lurked in corners, possessing a remarkable tenacity of life; it boldly lifted up its head in the fourth century, and required to be met by other tactics than those which had been successful in grappling with the earlier heresy; for it was more subtle, more plausible, and was free from the gross absurdities of its

predecessor. Even Augustine was for a time carried away by its dissimulation. Neoplatonism, too, had made its appearance. It had built a stronghold in Alexandria in the third century; and it carried on its operations until the sixth. The effects of the teaching of Plotinus died (A.D. 262) and Porphyry (A.D. 305) lasted long after they had gone down to the grave. This philosophy was mainly engaged in undermining essential evangelical principles, and in specious endeavours to draw men off from the characteristic doctrines of the Gospel of Christ into cloud-lands of mystic contemplation. Anti-Trinitarian opinions came to the front in the fourth century, giving the Church much trouble, placing it in greater danger than Ebionitism, Gnosticism, and all put together had ever done.

Besides all this movement in fields of thought, the relation in which Christianity stood to the empire came to be greatly altered. By the conversion of Constantine, and by the patronage which he and subsequent emperors bestowed on the Church, the Church found itself in circumstances the opposite of those which had encircled it from the reign of Nero to the reign of Diocletian. Emperors, as they happened to be of Trinitarian or Anti-Trinitarian opinions, caressed their own party, and persecuted theological antagonists. Orthodoxy did not always bask in the sunshine of State favour, but at the beginning of the new era it enjoyed a radiant summer; and though change after change subsequently came, and the clouds returned after the rain, the political weather settled down at length, and became fair and bright over fields cultivated by orthodox divines.

Of course all this change affected the interests of theology. It was now no longer needful to challenge

Paganism after the fashion of Justin Martyr and Tertullian; the age of apologies almost came to an end. Neoplatonism, as well as Manicheism, had to be met in a different way from that which served the purpose of Irenæus and Hippolytus in the Gnostic controversies. The countenance and support of the State, now given to one class and now to another, could not but have an influence—temporary, no doubt—on the struggles of opinion.

This age of external change was also an age of internal development.

The facts which prove and illustrate this development it will be my business to produce. It was a development of scientific thought as engaged upon certain Christian truths. The Revelation in the New Testament was complete. The Canon of Scripture had been closed. Properly speaking, there can be no development *in* the Word of God. Objective truth in the Bible does not grow. It is an accomplished fact, a thing unchangeable. But there is room for abundant development in Christendom; a development of the mind, the heart, the life, the character of man—sentimental development, ecclesiastical development, and theological development. Scientific theology, when sound, is a development of conclusions from Divine premises. Facts and principles are studied, arranged, and systematized, evolved in logical inferences, applied in practical relations. The development is on the human side, not on the Divine; it is human, though under the Holy Spirit's guidance, just as the bursting of the fruit-buds and the opening of fair flowers, the beauties of the summer and the riches of autumn, are *natural*, though all come by virtue of a *Divine* energy.

But there are possibilities of error in all human

development ; the premises may be sound, and the conclusions not so ; original inferences may be correct, but secondary inferences and others more remote may be the opposite. What is revealed may be transformed ; what does not appear in the Bible may be invented.

There were four theological factors at work during the period now under review — Canonical Scripture, the Church System, Ecumenical Councils, and great Theologians.

I. *The Canon of Scripture.*—With the exception of the Epistle to the Hebrews, the two shorter Epistles of St. John, the Second of St. Peter, the Epistles of St. James and St. Jude, and the Apocalypse—the books of the New Testament were acknowledged as authoritative by the Church generally in the second century. “No one at present will deny that they occupied the same position in the estimation of Christians in the time of Irenæus as they hold now.” In the time of Eusebius there were three classes of documents—the *Acknowledged*, the *Disputed*, and the *Heretical*. He “received as Divine Scriptures the acknowledged books, adding to them the other books in our present Canon, and no others.”¹ These all came at last to be acknowledged as authoritative writings ; and the very hesitation with which some of them were received betokens the anxiety, even at that early period, to separate the false from the true, and therefore in the end enhances the value of the evidence derived from their ultimate universal adoption.

To the Word of God was assigned a position of supreme authority by the Nicene Church. Its distinct utterances were held to be conclusive. Amidst conflicts

¹ Westcott, *On the Canon*, pp. 377, 488. Eusebius “was undecided as to the authorship of the Apocalypse.”

of opinion, all parties appealed to it as to the highest court, the final tribunal. What Constantine is reported to have said on that subject at the Council of Nice, expresses the conviction of the theologians of the age: "The Gospels, the apostolical writings, the ancient prophets, clearly teach what we are to believe respecting the Divine nature. Let us then," he added, "drop all contention, and seek from the inspired words the solution of our controversies."¹ The Bible was cited by controversialists as of the highest authority.² And the study of it was commended to the faithful as at once a duty and a privilege:³ but, at the same time, the Church was regarded as the great witness to its genuineness and canonicity. The authority of the Church, indeed, gradually became mixed up with the authority of Scripture, in such a way as to prepare for the authoritative traditionalism of after ages.⁴

II. The *Church system* was a powerful factor, both in the formation and enforcement of theological doctrine. Views of the Lord's Supper had begun to prevail, which, though they by no means amounted to the doctrine of the sacrifice of the mass and of transubstantiation, prepared for those opinions by the mysterious nature

¹ Theodoret, *Ecc. Hist.*, lib. I. 7.

² Decided language on this subject may be found in Athanasius, *Cont. Gent.*, I. i. Augustine, *Doct. Christ.*, I. 37; II. 9.

³ Augustine, *Ep.*, 137; *Doct. Christ.*, II. 42.

⁴ Gratian, in *Cod. Theod. Fide de Cath.*, lib. LXVI., tit. VI. 1, 2. "Nihil aliud præcipi volumus, quam quod evangelistarum et apostolorum fides et traditio incorrupta servat." — Hagenbach, *Hist. of Doctrines*, I. p. 317. Theodosius II. caused the imperial ordinances to be reduced to a complete codex, by jurists employed between A.D. 429 and 438. Gratian, whose decree is cited in the Theodosian Codex, reigned from A.D. 375 to 383. The passage, therefore, may be taken as reflecting Church opinion at that period

and efficacy attributed to sacraments, and by the real Divine presence supposed to exist in the consecrated elements of bread and wine. The Christian ministry had come to be regarded as a priesthood, occupying a position of mediatorship, and possessing exclusive rights of sacramental administration. A hierarchy was growing up out of the original apostolical institution of the Christian pastorate, with ascending degrees of power, and corresponding grades of ecclesiastical nobility.

The constitution of the Christian commonwealth had thereby been greatly affected. The sacerdotal principle had imperilled, if not destroyed, the rights of the laity in the Church, and had put aside, if it had not abolished, the exercise of private judgment. Asceticism had, as we have seen, found its way into Christian minds, and was exerting a subtle but energetic influence, by countenancing celibacy and various self-imposed acts of mortification and austerity. To these was attached an idea of meritoriousness, which ran counter to the principles of the New Testament. Even Monachism had made its appearance, and the corner-stones were being laid of those conventual establishments, which afterwards covered the Eastern and Western worlds. The notion of one spiritual, invisible, and Catholic Church, together with many visible, organized local Churches, had been superseded by different ecclesiastical conceptions; and the idea of one visible universal society, knit together by episcopal and sacramental bonds, was already distinctly evolved in the writings of Cyprian. He had laid down the principle of a Church wide as the world, with every part dependent on a common centre. "She stretches forth her branches over the universal earth in the riches of plenty, and pours abroad her bountiful and

onward streams; yet is there one head, one source, one mother, abundant in the results of her fruitfulness." ¹ The Churches of Rome, Antioch, and Alexandria were esteemed in Nicene times as conservators of tradition, oracles of orthodoxy. They were rising to an ecclesiastical position corresponding with the political ones in which these cities were placed, relative to the provinces of the Roman empire, and to the Roman empire at large. It was impossible that such a state of things could arise without greatly affecting the development of theological opinion. It would not affect one class of doctrines so much as it would affect another. Abstract conceptions of the Divine nature would not come under its influence so much as sentiments in reference to the way of salvation, and the operations of Divine grace. The latter could scarcely be preserved from a determining bias and direction in harmony with the predominating Church system; and the particular views which this system would tend to form, it would also materially help to enforce and propagate, through the authority of the priesthood and the administration of discipline connected with it: heresy—by which is to be understood any opinion opposed to the teaching of the Church—being under the special ban of the ecclesiastical authorities.

III. *Councils* were the offspring of the Church system. Provincial Councils were early held—being assemblies, Church parliaments, so to speak—composed of bishops and presbyters, and sometimes deacons.² They consulted respecting divers affairs, and bound the people by their decisions. No Divine authority at first was claimed for these assemblies. They took their place in the Church

¹ Cyp., *De Unit.*, § 5.

² Eusebius, *Eccl. Hist.*, VII. 28.

as expedient institutions. That they were formed on the model of political meetings, for which the Greeks furnished notable examples, is a common and well-sustained opinion.¹ But in the fourth century we reach a new era in the history of Councils. Provincial Councils continued to be held; but above them in rank and authority rose the *Ecumenical* or Universal Councils, so called because they were composed of bishops coming from different parts of the empire, and therefore were considered to represent the faith of the Church at large. The meeting at Jerusalem in apostolic times, as recorded in the fifteenth chapter of the Acts, is often referred to as a precedent for these ecclesiastical gatherings; but between it and them such obvious differences are apparent that they can never be properly placed under the same category.

The first Ecumenical Council was held in the year 325, at Nicæa, a town on the eastern bank of the lake Ascanius in Bithynia. About two hundred and fifty bishops, accompanied by presbyters, deacons, and others, crowded within its gates. The Emperor Constantine provided horses and mules for their conveyance, and during their stay entertained them at the expense of the State. They held their meetings in a church, with an open Bible before them. When they had closed their conferences there, they assembled in the royal palace. The emperor, seated in a golden chair, was addressed in a glowing panegyric on his attention to ecclesiastical affairs. A creed was drawn up and signed, to be enforced by imperial authority. Constantine gave the fathers a banquet. "None of the bishops were absent," says Eusebius. "Guards

¹ Mosheim, *De Rebus ante Christ.*, p. 264. Matter, *Histoire du Christianisme*, I. 136.

and soldiers drawn up in order, with naked swords, kept the vestibule of the palace, and through the midst of them the men of God passed without fear, and entered the inner hall. Some sat with the emperor himself, others occupied couches on either side. Any one might have thought it a picture of the kingdom of Christ, and a dream rather than a reality."¹

The second Ecumenical Council was held at Constantinople in the year A.D. 381; but, though called Ecumenical, it really consisted of only one hundred and fifty bishops, belonging to the Eastern empire. The third was convened at Ephesus, A.D. 431, and was composed of about two hundred bishops. The fourth (A.D. 451) met at Chalcedon, the modern Scutari, opposite Constantinople. There were present six hundred bishops, some say six hundred and thirty. The fifth was gathered in Constantinople in A.D. 553. The sixth, also meeting at Constantinople, belongs to the year A.D. 680. The doctrinal decisions of the most important of these Councils will be given as we proceed. In the mean while, it may be generally remarked—though the remark is almost superfluous—that the decisions arrived at in these assemblies could not but guide and shape theological opinion at the time, and long afterwards; and let it not be forgotten that the decisions thus reached were enforced by imperial authority. But above the influence of Councils themselves must be ranked that of the men who appeared in the midst of them, and guided their decisions, and of other men who in their writings inculcated certain doctrinal views.

IV. *Distinguished theologians* now claim our attention—to a few of whom alone will our space allow

¹ *Eusebii De Vita Constant.*, III. 15. A long description of the Council will be found in Stanley's *Eastern Church*.

more than a very cursory, sometimes only a nominal, reference.

Amongst the most eminent divines at Nicæa, were Alexander of Alexandria, Eustathius of Antioch, Macarius of Jerusalem, Marcellus of Ancyra, Eusebius of Nicomedia, and Eusebius of Cæsarea. But above them all, if not in influence over the Council, yet in influence over the Church afterwards, arose ATHANASIUS (A.D. 296–373). Though diminutive in person, young in years, and not admissible to a seat or a vote, he “evinced more zeal and insight than all, and gave promise already of being the future head of the orthodox party.”¹

Maligned and persecuted to an extraordinary degree after the Council was over, this champion of orthodoxy left behind him a reputation for devoutness, fortitude, purity of life, and even moderation in conduct towards his opponents, which, now that clouds of prejudice and misrepresentation have been blown away, shines on the page of history, and commands the respect and even the admiration of those who differ from him in some of his opinions. Of his consummate abilities there cannot be a doubt. Erasmus assigns to him the high quality which St. Paul specifies in his characteristics of a Bishop, “*apt to teach*,” being, as he says, lucid, acute, careful, and expressing himself in a manner fitted for instruction. Athanasius escaped certain faults as a teacher to be found in some of the most celebrated Fathers; and Gibbon speaks of his “unpremeditated style either of speaking or writing” as “clear, forcible, and persuasive.”²

The two Cyrils were also conspicuous divines. CYRIL.

¹ Schaff, *Hist.*, vol. III. p. 627.

² Gibbon, *Decline and Fall*, vol. III. p. 217, Milman’s Edit. See Art. on ‘Athanasius,’ *Smith’s Biographical Dictionary*.

of Jerusalem (A.D. 315—386) was author of a series of Catechetical Lectures, consisting of an exposition of the Church creed, really forming a system of orthodox theology as it was developed in his day. A moderate man, and averse to speculation, he fell under the suspicion of some zealous partisans on the Athanasian side; but his writings furnish no proof whatever of his holding heterodox opinions. CYRIL of Alexandria (bishop A.D. 412—444) was a different man from his namesake. His life appears in a most unamiable and even unrighteous light; though vaunting his orthodoxy, he has been accused of heresy, and though a most active and influential teacher in his day, his works now are pronounced almost worthless.

The fame of JOHN CHRYSOSTOM, A.D. 347—407, successively Bishop of Antioch and Constantinople, rests on his eloquence as a preacher and his labours as an expositor—labours more remarkable, in my opinion, for popular impressiveness and practical force than for accurate exposition of the meaning of the New Testament—though it must be admitted, as a very great merit, that he avoided the practice of allegorical interpretation. As a doctrinal theologian, he does not take rank with some others of the same period; but his influence as a pastor and a preacher gave great effect to all his teaching.

Two Gregorys appear as prominent theologians of the fourth century. GREGORY of Nazianzum (A.D. 329—389), son of a distinguished bishop of the same name, was famous for his learning, eloquence, and zeal for the Nicene Creed. His friendship with Basil, Bishop of Cæsarea, forms one of the most beautiful episodes in ecclesiastical history, and is well worthy of the student's attention.

He was a poet as well as a preacher ; and his doctrinal discussions are marked more by pulpit rhetoric than by profound reflection or argumentative force. Something like a system of doctrine may be found in his *Oration on Theology*—the first being directed against the Eunomian Arians ; the second being occupied with the being and nature of God ; the third and fourth dwelling on the generation of the Son ; and the fifth relating to the Holy Spirit. The arrangement of topics, so far, corresponds with that in Origen's *De Principiis*. GREGORY of Nyssa (A.D. 331–394), the younger brother of Basil, as “a pillar of orthodoxy was only inferior to his brother and his friend ;” and he appears among the most active and influential members of both the first and second Councils of Constantinople. Amongst his works are some which exhibit a systematic treatment of divinity. A discourse *On the Formation of Man*, in thirty chapters, is a treatise on man's creation, his relation to “the palace of the world,” and his powers and capacities—the author indulging his imagination on this subject somewhat after the manner of John Bunyan in his description of Mansoul. Gregory of Nyssa also takes up the history of the Fall, and then dilates at great extent upon the resurrection of the body. He also gives us lectures on the Lord's Prayer, and a work against the Eunomian Arians—thus resembling his brother. His *Catechetical Discourse* is a sort of Manual for Catechists, showing them how to fulfil their office, and indicating Scripture proofs of the Divinity of Christ and the Holy Spirit, and of the means of salvation purchased by the Redeemer's death. Baptism and the Eucharist come in for ample discussion, and the doctrine of a real presence in the latter is plainly asserted.¹

¹ See c. XXXVII.

Our list might be enlarged, but we must pass from East to West.

There we are met by HILARY of Poitiers, who died about A.D. 368. He fought his way through intellectual difficulties before he reached the full apprehension of the truths of Christianity, and in his case, reason, illuminated by religion, won a great victory. He commenced, like some others, with a vague faith which did not suffice to meet his spiritual wants. Then, inspired by an absorbing desire to know God, he found in the sublime words recorded by Moses, "I AM THAT I AM," a revelation of the Infinite One such as he had not apprehended before. It satisfied his intellect and his heart. The Christian Scriptures opened up to him the doctrine of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, as engaged in the salvation of fallen creatures. He wrote a treatise on the Trinity, a very elaborate work in twelve books. The first is a copious prologue; the second takes up the subject in a general way; the third relates to the Eternal Sonship; the fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh deal with the Sabellian and Arian heresies; the eighth proceeds with the doctrine of our Lord's consubstantiality; the ninth discusses the union of His Divine and human nature; the remaining three answer objections.¹ Hilary energetically resisted the inroads of heresy on the Gallic Church, and reproduced in Latin the thoughts of Athanasius and other Greek theologians. It is said by a German critic, "Hilary holds a most important place in the development of Christology, and his massive analysis contains fruitful germs which in succeeding centuries have been only in part developed; profound and comprehensive thoughts, the stimulating and fertilizing power of which reaches down even to our

¹ The work fills 450 columns in Migne's edition.

own time; nor need our time be ashamed to learn from this ancient master, as well as from other teachers of that age.”¹

AMBROSE (A.D. 340-397), once Prætor of Upper Italy, was forced into the episcopal chair of Milan; and he brought to bear upon his diocese that habit of maintaining discipline which he had learned in his secular offices. His character, in some of its lights and shades, may be seen in the following eulogium: “With voluntary poverty he associated the strictest regimen of the ascetic spirit of his time; accepted no invitations to banquets; took dinner only on Sunday, Saturday, and the festivals of celebrated martyrs; devoted the greater part of the night to prayer; to the hitherto necessarily neglected study of the Scriptures, and the Greek Fathers, and to theological writing; preached every Sunday, and often in the week; was accessible to all, most accessible to the poor and needy; and administered his spiritual oversight, particularly his instruction of catechumens, with the greatest fidelity.”

The works of Ambrose may be divided into annotations; theological and moral treatises; and miscellanies, including sermons, epistles, and hymns. His principal dogmatic works are on Faith, the Holy Spirit, and the Incarnation, in which he goes over the usual Nicene ground of discussion respecting the unity of God, and the Divinity and eternal generation of the Son. He contends that our Lord had a human body, mortal like ours, and a human soul, rational like ours.

HIERONYMUS, or JEROME (A.D. 340-420), rises above the other Latin Fathers in learning and critical skill. With all his faults, he stands unrivalled as a translator and

¹ Kling, quoted in Schaff, *Ecc. Hist.*, vol. III. p. 961.

expositor; and to him belongs the honour of forming, by means of his Vulgate version, the Latin language of mediæval Christendom. A sentence in his preface to Isaiah gives point to this commendation, and holds him up as an example to ourselves: "He who does not know the Scriptures does not know the power and wisdom of God; ignorance of the Bible is ignorance of Christ." His epistles present a lively image of his own times, and afford ample materials for the historian in search of picturesque characters and incidents.

He wrote a life of Paul the Hermit, containing the most marvellous stories, and another of Malchus, a captive monk, who related to the author an account of his sensational adventures. Jerome plunged into controversy with Jovianus and Rufinus, and evinced an unpardonable violence and bitterness against these and all other antagonists. The Benedictine edition of his works extends to five volumes folio; but it includes no systematic treatises on Christian doctrine. His opinions must be gathered from his commentaries, epistles, and controversies.

AUGUSTINE (A.D. 354—430), whose writings fill eighteen volumes in the Benedictine edition (1807)—a profound and subtle thinker, a keen and bold logician, yet with a mystical element in his capacious mind—was a courageous advocate of the doctrines of grace, and a forcible preacher, as well as eminent bishop. His faults were those of his age—asceticism and intolerance; his influence, great in his own day, continued to affect, perhaps in an unparalleled degree, the conclusions of thinkers throughout the Middle Ages; and the overthrow of the dominion of Aristotle in the Church at the time of the Reformation left that of Augustine almost untouched.

Through Luther, Calvin, and others, the moulding power of this great man's thoughts has been handed down to modern times; and still, directly and indirectly, he is shaping the dogmatic opinions of many in the Church of Christ. It is impossible to estimate his theology without studying the history of his heart—that history which he vividly records in his *Confessions*.¹ There we see his anguish for sin; his longings for deliverance; his bondage for a while to the errors of Manicheism; his trial of Pláto; his conversation with friends; his prayers and cries under the fig-tree in his garden at Milan; and the effect produced at last by a child's voice repeating *Tolle lege*, as his eyes fell on the Epistles of Paul, from the reading of which he saw that the putting on of Christ was the secret of salvation. Believing that God leadeth the blind by a way they know not, we should recognize a connection in the case of Augustine between experience and theology, between spiritual life and doctrinal thinking, and discover, in the best part of his writings, not a mere scholastic theory, but an evangelical faith, born in a struggle between life and death.

VINCENTIUS, a monk, of *Lérins*, or Lirinum, hence generally known as Vincentius Lerinensis (died about A.D. 450), requires to be mentioned, not on account of any contribution he made to the literature of either particular doctrine or of systematic theology, but because, in his *Commonitorium*, he laid down the famous Canon: "Ut id teneamus quod *ubique*, quod *semper*, quod *ab omnibus* creditum est,"² "That we maintain what has been believed everywhere, always, and by all." The

¹ Particularly the sixth, seventh, and eighth books.

² *Com.*, c. 2; Migne, *Pat.*, vol. L. p. 640. The *Commonitorium* has been translated by Dr. John Stock, 1879.

treatise was composed about A.D. 434, just after the Council of Ephesus, and was intended to be a general safeguard against heresy; but it is amongst the curiosities of human opinion, that the man who laid down this law, so eagerly taken hold of by certain divines,¹ sensible of the difficulty of applying it, is himself charged with being a semi-Pelagian: passages in the *Commonitorium* being alleged as evidence of this.

As, unlike most other of the writers now enumerated, Vincentius will not come under our notice again, it is convenient here to remark, that he sought to reconcile with the principle of the Church's unchangeable faith a theory of development, which has since been maintained by others who profess adherence to his maxim.² He contends that there may be an advance which is not change, but only increase; as when a child becomes a man he does not lose his identity. At first the limbs are small, then they become large; but they remain the very same limbs they were before. Their number is the same; their uses are the same. If they were altered into types of a different species, or if their number were multiplied, the body would be destroyed or become monstrous. So Christianity follows the laws of growth.³ There is a sense in which, no doubt, this illustration may be accepted and applied to legitimate developments of theological science, such as are indicated in previous passages of this work. How exactly Vincentius would have applied his rule to doctrines broached in after ages, it is impossible to say; but assuredly he would have found

¹ *Tracts for the Times; Records of the Ch.*, No. xxv. p. 5.

² See not only Newman's *Doct. of Development*, but also the Abbé Blanc's *Cours d'Histoire Ecclesiastique*, Sect. v. Art. 5, "Loi des transitions."

³ *Commonit.*, c. 23-30.

it amazingly difficult to harmonize certain dogmas, afterwards authorized by the Church, with the standard of what has been believed everywhere, always, and by all.

GREGORY *the Great* must not be omitted in our enumeration, as he is the "Fourth Doctor of the Catholic Church"—Ambrose, Augustine, and Jerome being the other three: Born in or about A.D. 540, he died in 604. Yet though of pre-eminent fame, he was more an expositor, and a writer of sermons, dialogues, letters, and hymns, than a systematic or scientific divine. His Homilies on the Book of Job, in which he finds a threefold sense, are historical, mystical, and practical, rather than doctrinal, though numerous dogmatic passages occur, running close to the lines struck out by Ambrose and Augustine.

CHAPTER II.

THEOLOGICAL RESULTS.

FOREMOST amongst the theological developments of the age was the *Athanasian controversy*. There is a great deal in its external history unpleasant and repulsive. The interference of Constantine was far less that of an earnest searcher after truth than that of a shrewd statesman seeking to reconcile contending parties, with the hope of managing them for his own purposes. There were political intrigues on both sides mixed up with the dispute from beginning to end. The Arians made it a personal matter, seeming to be chiefly anxious to damage the character of Athanasius. The Athanasians often manifested a bitter disposition in opposing the Arians. It is wearisome to read accusations and replies relating to circumstances which have nothing to do with the main question at issue. Opponents had little respect for one another's persons, and civil disturbances occurred in connection with the angry strife. The Arians on one occasion marched about the piazzas of Constantinople at night singing hymns; the Athanasians, with silver crosses and wax tapers, went out to meet their rivals; a struggle ensued, stones were thrown, blood was spilt, and the riot disturbed and frightened the peaceful citizens.

Turning to look closer at the disputants, one can see in them the faults of human nature. Like controversialists in other ages, not excepting our own, some were stern, apt to be dogged; some rash, apt to be changeful;

some peace-loving, apt to seek quietude at the price of truth. All were, in the heat of argument, prone to charge their own inferences upon their antagonists, and so to make them responsible for much more than they were prepared to admit. Yet, to take no higher view, there is something to redeem the controversy in the thought of what is counted its reproach. "What strife about ideas!" is the utilitarian's taunt. Be it that Nicene polemics were about ideas; that is a sort of contention showing the superiority of men over animals. Dogs will fight for a bone; only intelligent beings will contend for ideas. But they ill understand the Nicene controversy who see in it a question of mere ideas; much less do they perceive what it was, who call it mere logomachy. It had to do with a fact—an infinitely important fact, if there ever was one.

ARIUS—an old man in A.D. 336, described as austere and ascetic—said that Christ was a creature; that He had not existed from eternity; that there was a period when He was not. He "perceived beyond all question, that from the very conception of a creature an infinite distance must be inferred between him and the Creator; nor did he shrink from expressing this."

The following extract from a letter of Arius to Eusebius of Nicomedia, explains his view: "But we say and believe, and have taught, and do teach, that the Son is not unbegotten, nor in any way unbegotten, even in part; and that He does not derive His subsistence from any thing subjacent; but that by His own will and counsel He has subsisted before time, and before ages, as perfect God, only begotten and unchangeable, and that He existed not before He was begotten, or created, or determined, or established. For He was not unbegotten.

We are persecuted because we say that the Son had a beginning, but that God was without beginning. We repeat it—for this we are persecuted, and also, because we say that He is from nothing. And this we affirm, because He is neither part of God, nor of anything subjacent.”¹

Turning from this statement of the opinions of Arius, we cannot do better than at once open the *Orations* of Athanasius against the Arians. After an introduction we find him citing extracts from a work entitled *Thalia*, in which Arius maintains that God *became* a Father, and the Son did not always exist, but arose from nothing; that He was created, that He was made, that we might be made by Him; that He was not very God, but was foreign in substance from the Father; that the Son does not know the Father, and does not know Himself. This occupies the second chapter. In chapter III. Athanasius states the Catholic doctrine: “We say very Son of the Father, natural and genuine, of His proper substance, wisdom; only begotten, and the true and only Word of God is He; not a creature or a work, but the proper offspring of the Father’s substance. Wherefore He is true God, of one substance (*ὁμοούσιος*) with the Father; while other beings, to whom He said, ‘Ye are gods,’ had this favour or privilege only from the Father, by participation of the Word through the Spirit.” The Son ever was and is, and never was not. The Father being everlasting, His Word and His wisdom must be everlasting. In chapters IV., V., VI. Athanasius proceeds to contend that the Son is eternal and uncreated. He refers in his proofs, first to direct texts of Scripture; then he proceeds to support the doctrine of the Son’s eternity by insisting on the nature

¹ The expression is *προσκειμένου τινός*, *Theodoret*, lib. I. c. v.

of sonship itself. The word Son, he says, is to be understood in a real sense. Christ is God's offspring; and as eternity is the nature of the Father, so it is the nature of the Son. The generation of the Son is regarded by Athanasius, not as a passing act, but an eternal and unchangeable fact in the Divine essence. Eternity evidently appeared to him, not as mere unending duration, nor even as unbeginning existence, but as perfect, absolute, infinite, and unchangeable nature or essence. The Son, he maintains, participates in the whole nature of the Father. If the Father be eternal in His nature, so also is the Son. Further proof of the Son's eternity is drawn from Scripture passages indicative of His consubstantiality, as Creator; as One of the blessed Trinity; as the Wisdom of God, the Word of God, and the image of God. Men are not real fathers and real sons, Athanasius says, but shadows of the true; the essence and type of such relationships is Divine.

Chapters VII., VIII., IX., X. contain answers to objections. They are couched in an abstract, metaphysical style, and are sometimes very difficult to understand. In reply to the question, "Why does not the analogy of human parents and sons apply to the Divine case, *i. e.* that sons are born *after* their parents?" he says, The force of the idea of sonship lies in con-naturality, not in succession; time is not involved in the notion of sonship; it is adventitious, and it does not attach to God at all, because He is superhuman. After noticing difficulties, Athanasius returns to Scripture arguments in support of his main position.

The Divinity and Incarnation of our blessed Lord constituted, in the thoughts of the Nicene Church, the central fact of Christianity; and Athanasius stood forward

as the champion of the Redeemer's proper Godhead. While Arius asserted the inferiority of the Son to the Father, Athanasius asserted His equality, and for the expression of this fact used the word *ὁμοούσιος*. This term became the watchword and badge of the orthodox party. The expression seems to us uncouth, though it would not appear so to Greeks; certainly it is not found in Scripture; it looks like an attempt to define what is undefinable; but taking it as the symbol of the Deity of the Lord Jesus, we recognize under it a truth, which, apart from metaphysical refinements and dialectic disputes, is plainly written on the pages of the New Testament in connection with the fact of His sacrifice and mediation. There are persons who talk flippantly of the controversy as employed about a mere scholastic term;¹ but that only shows how very unphilosophical some pretended philosophers can be; for the controversy was really no less than this—Was Christ a creature, or was He uncreated? Was He God, or one of the works of God? A whole universe lies between the two views.

This dispute was the development of doctrinal tendencies previously existing. The Logos had been the central idea of scientific theology, so far as such theology existed among ante-Nicene Christians. The Greek Fathers, who had speculated and argued upon the matter and attempted to define with exactness the Divine nature of Christ, had leaned some to one mode of expression and some to another. Terms and illustrations at least akin to, or identical with, the Arian, were employed by some, while terms and illustrations akin to, or identical with, the Athanasian, were employed by others.

¹ See below, p. 111.

Historians, as already noticed, connect Arianism with Origenism; but it is remarkable that the Arian party did not affiliate themselves to the great Alexandrian teacher. They do not appear to have appealed to his authority till thirty years after the rise of their heresy; while Athanasius called Arius an imitator of Paul of Samosata. Origen has been defended against the imputation of preparing the way for Arian opinions, on the ground that he is "the very first writer to detect for us and to denounce the Arian tenet at least sixty years before it openly presented itself to the world."¹

No doubt in this, as in other cases, manifold influences concurred in producing a single result. Judaizing tendencies, especially as they operated in the Church of Antioch; the schools of the Sophists, encouraging habits of disputation; Alexandrian speculations, fed and nourished by a spurious Platonism; the principles of the eclectic sect, and their aversion to theological mysteries—these and other influences were favourable to such a system as Arianism proved itself to be; and they probably contributed more or less to originate and to inspire it.² Moreover, Arius and his followers were greatly aided in their enterprise by imaginative cleverness, technical distinctions, and appeals to popular judgment, "which is often destitute of refinement and delicacy, and has just enough of acuteness of apprehension to be susceptible of sophistical reasonings."³

Athanasius's system was a scientific and definite development of the doctrine of Christ's Divinity, as generally believed by the Fathers. With regard to *many* of them, it has been satisfactorily proved by Bull, that

¹ *The Arians of the Fourth Century*, by Dr. Newman, p. 131.

² *Ibid.* ch. I. §§ 1-4.

³ *Ibid.* p. 110.

their views were substantially expressed in the Nicene Creed. According to most convictions of Scripture teaching, that teaching was followed in the main by the great Nicene and ante-Nicene Fathers, but many persons will disapprove of their speculative way of treating the subject of the Trinity.

Two Greek words, *οὐσία* and *ὑπόστασις*, frequently occur in the controversies of that day relative to the nature of the Father and the Son: because of their being equivalent to each other, and yet employed as indicating different ideas, considerable confusion and apparent contradiction arose. Athanasius used *ὑπόστασις* as equivalent with *οὐσία*, meaning *substance* or *essence*. He dwells much upon the consubstantiality of the Son, or the identical essence of the Son and of the Father; and to denote this he employed the word *ὑπόστασις*. He puts together the two words as denoting the same idea, saying, "As there is one origin, and therefore one God, so one is that *οὐσία καὶ ὑπόστασις*."¹ The word *ὑπόστασις*, in the sense of *person*, does not occur in the works of Athanasius; neither does the Latin equivalent, *persona*, occur in the earlier works of Augustine. How he came to adopt it in that sense, he describes in his work on the Trinity.² He was overcome by necessity, being required to use some terminology to indicate the distinction between Father and Son; and no other appearing so good as this, he adopted it. Chrysostom also employed this kind of phraseology, distinguishable from that of Athanasius. "He uses the word *substance*, *οὐσία*, to

¹ *Orationes quatuor contra Arianos*, IV. 2. See what Newman says on this question, *Arians of the Fourth Century*, Appendix, note iv.

² Lib. v. § 9; VII. § 4.

designate the essential nature; and *person* (*ὑπόστασις*), the personality of the Godhead; and he points out that words which relate to the *οὐσία*, as 'Lord' and 'God', are applied to all the Persons; whereas the other terms, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, indicating distinction of personality, are each applied to one Person only in the Godhead."¹

It ought to be stated, that the language of the Arians sometimes approximated closely to that of the Athanasians; but a Greek intellect could detect the difference between them: in some cases, however, Arianism asserted itself boldly without the least disguise, and no attempt was made to soften heterodox opinions. Aëtius and Eunomius, for example, expressed the distinction between the Father and the Son so strongly as to declare the Son unlike the Father (*ἀνόμοιος κατ' οὐσίαν*), whence those who adopted such phraseology came to be called *Anomæans*.

Beside the Arian and the Athanasian parties, there was a third class, if that may be called a class which was composed of very different characters. We refer to the semi-Arians, as they are commonly termed. The only bond of union that existed amongst them was a negative one; they all disapproved, more or less, of the course pursued by Athanasius. Many of them had a strong personal dislike to the man; but they were far

¹ Stephens, *Life of Chrysostom*, p. 419. A want of precision in language with regard to this subject is noticeable in connection with the Council of Alexandria. There, it appears, were some who spoke of three *ὑποστάσεις* in the Deity, and some only of one *ὑπόστασις*—the former using the word in the sense of person, in opposition to the notion of a nominal Trinity; the other, as synonymous with *οὐσία*, in opposition to Arianism: both parties were pronounced orthodox.

from being all opposed to his opinions substantially considered. Some of them, indeed, seem to have been anxious for a compromise. Without being earnest theologians, they became mixed up in political intrigues which disgraced the controversy.

Eusebius of Nicomedia was chief amongst them. He espoused the cause of Arius, although he subscribed the Nicene Creed. He adopted the word *ὁμοιούσιος*, "homoiou-sian," "like," in distinction from *ὁμοούσιος*, "homoou-sian," "the same."

Gibbon remarks, in the 21st chapter of his *History*, that this word, chosen to express the mysterious resemblance between the Son and the Father, bears so close an affinity to the orthodox symbol, that the profane of every age have derided the furious contests which the difference of a single diphthong excited between the *Homoousians* and the *Homoiousians*. This remark, taken by itself, might convey to some the idea that the word *homoiousian* was the common Arian symbol, as the word *homoousian* was the common orthodox one. But this idea is not correct. Indeed, if the whole paragraph in Gibbon be read, it appears that he did not intend to convey it. A similar word is used in reference to Christ's nature even by Athanasius;¹ and Gibbon relates with a sneer that Hilary, Bishop of Poitiers, endeavoured to prove, that by a pious and faithful interpretation, the *Homoiousian* may be reduced to a consubstantial sense. No doubt the term may be so interpreted; and in a sense very nearly approaching the Nicene symbol it was adopted even by Eusebius of Nicomedia. Semi-Arians—not full Arians—employed it as a badge, and

¹ See note (l) respecting the word *ὁμοιότητα*, p. 311 of the Oxford translation of Athanasius's *Treatises*.

some semi-Arians assimilated themselves closely to the Athanasian party. Eusebius, it should be stated, objected to the anathema of Nicæa against Arius, not because he differed from the doctrine as settled at Nicæa, but because he doubted whether Arius really held what the anathema imputed to him.¹ We are now speaking of opinions, not of character. The character of Eusebius of Nicomedia will not bear investigation: still the word which he and others used did not necessarily bear a heterodox sense. Certainly it was not distinctively Arian in its meaning. Indeed, the term *ὁμοιούσιος* was objected to by the decided Arian party rather than by the Athanasian; and at the second Council of Sirmium (A.D. 357) the former rejected the homoiousian as well as the homoousian doctrine.² At a synod assembled at Ancyra (A. D. 358) the homoiousian doctrine was confirmed, and the Arian rejected.³

The courtly historian, Eusebius of Cæsarea, was classed amongst the semi-Arians, for he often sided with that party, though he signed the Nicene Creed. If we may use modern language, we might say of the divisions at that time, that Athanasius and the bishops who agreed with him were the Extreme Right—and Arius and his friends the Extreme Left; whilst the Left Centre was represented by Eusebius of Nicomedia, and the Right Centre by Eusebius of Cæsarea.⁴

Before terminating this account of the Nicene controversy, it is proper that we should say a word respecting the doctrine of the Holy Spirit. There is but a brief

¹ *Sozomen*, lib. II. c. 16.

² Hil., *Opera*, II. 465; *De Syn.*, § 11.

³ Epiph., *Hær.*, 73.

⁴ See Hefele, *Councils*, vol. I. p. 285. Cyril of Jerusalem and other non-Athanasians are saints in the Roman Calendar.

reference to it in the Creed, indicating that it did not occupy such a prominent place in the thoughts of the Church as was filled by the doctrine of our Lord's Divinity. Athanasius distinctly affirms the hypostatical character and proper Deity of the Holy Ghost. He refers to passages of Scripture, and also adduces this argument: "How can that which is sanctified by nothing but itself, and which is itself the source of all sanctification for all rational creatures, be of the same species of being, the same kind of essence, with that which is sanctified by another than itself?" In other words, how can the Holy Ghost, who sanctifieth the human soul, be of the same nature as the soul itself? It must be higher and nobler. In and by the Holy Ghost the creature, he says, obtains communion with God, and participation in the Divine life; but this could not be the case if the Holy Ghost was Himself a creature.¹

The Athanasian controversy produced numerous creeds and counter-creeds. Those on each side resembled each other. But it is needless here to do more than notice two, which stand out beyond all others on the orthodox side for value and importance. The first of these is the world-known Nicene Creed. "We believe in one God, Father Almighty, Maker of all things visible and invisible: and in one Lord Jesus Christ, the Son of God, Only-begotten of the Father, that is, of the essence of the Father, God of God, Light of Light, Very God of very God, begotten, not made; of one essence with the Father, by Whom all things were made, both in heaven and earth: who for us men, and for our salvation, came down, and was incarnate, and was made man, and suffered,

¹ For further information on this subject see Schaff's *Hist.*, vol. III. p. 663.

and rose again on the third day, and ascended into the heavens, and shall come again to judge the quick and dead. And (we believe) in the Holy Ghost. But the Holy Catholic and Apostolic Church anathematizes those who say that there was a time when the Son of God was not; that He was not before He was begotten; that He was made from things which were not; that He is of another substance or essence; that He was created and is liable to change.”¹

This was the grand manifesto of doctrine, issued by the Council of Nicæa, and a standard of orthodoxy down to this day.

But another creed of later date, the same in many respects, not the same in other respects, though frequently taken to be identical with it, requires our attention. It has been called the Nicæo-Constantinopolitan Creed. Much obscurity hangs over its origin. Bingham and others have hastily despatched the subject by saying that the Nicæo-Constantinopolitan Creed is “no other but the Nicene Creed, with the addition of such articles as were always used by the Church in the interrogations of baptism, though not inserted in the particular form used by the Nicene Council.” This statement is unsatisfactory.

The Council of Constantinople, noticed on a former page, at which this creed is said to have been adopted, was held in the year A.D. 381. Its history is very perplexing. Seven canons are the only unquestionable record of its proceedings known to exist. In the first of these it is said, “The Holy Fathers have declared that the creed of the 318 Fathers, who assembled at Nicæa, of Bithynia, be not abolished, but that it remain firm.”²

¹ See the original Creed in Socrates' *Hist.*, lib. I. c. 8.

² *Codex Canonum Ecclesiæ*, edited by Lambert, p. 27.

Not a word is said of any alteration or addition; the Nicene Creed is simply confirmed. The account of the revised creed as originating at Constantinople depends on the unsupported statement of a deacon, named Aëtius, made by him seventy years afterwards, at the Council of Chalcedon, A.D. 451. That statement seems open to grave suspicion;¹ and it is probable that the creed does not come directly from that Council, or from either of the Gregories, to whom some have ascribed it; but that additions were gradually made to the Nicene symbol, according to orthodox views developed in the course of the controversy.²

The creed denominated the Nicæo-Constantinopolitan runs as follows:

“We believe in one God the Father Almighty, Maker of heaven and earth, And of all things visible and invisible: And in one Lord Jesus Christ, the only-begotten Son of God, Begotten of the Father before all worlds (*æons*), Light of Light, Very God of very God, Begotten not made, Being of one substance with the Father; by Whom all things were made; Who for us men, and for our salvation, came down from heaven, and was incarnate by the Holy Ghost of the Virgin Mary, and was made man: He was crucified for us under Pontius Pilate, and suffered and was buried; and on the third day He rose again according to the Scriptures, and ascended into the heavens, and sitteth on the right hand of the Father, and cometh again with glory to judge the quick and the dead; of Whose kingdom there shall be no end.

¹ The whole subject is carefully discussed in Dr. Swainson's learned and able *History of the Nicene and Apostles' Creeds*, Chapter VIII.

² Schaff's *Ch. Hist.*, vol. III. p. 667.

And in the Holy Ghost, the Lord, the Giver of life, Who proceedeth from the Father, Who with the Father and the Son together is worshipped and glorified, Who spake by the prophets. In one holy Catholic and Apostolic Church. We acknowledge one Baptism for the remission of sins ; we look for the Resurrection of the dead, and the life of the world to come. Amen."

Upon bringing the so-called Nicene and Nicæo-Constantinopolitan Creeds together, certain things are worthy of notice. The difference between them consists both in omissions and additions. The words, "*that is of the essence* [*οὐσίας*] *of the Father,*" and "*God of God,*" which occur in the first creed, are dropped in the second ; and the damnatory clause with which the first terminates is omitted in the second. Again, in the latter, "*was incarnate by the Holy Ghost of the Virgin Mary,*" "*under Pontius Pilate,*" "*according to the Scriptures,*" "*sitteth on the right hand of the Father,*" are new expressions. So is all which follows the name of the Holy Ghost. The resemblances are obvious. The word Trinity occurs in neither of them. Nor is there any word introduced expressive of the idea of *person* ; the word *ὑποστάσεως*, used in the damnatory clause of the Nicene Creed, being equivalent to *οὐσίας*, and meaning what is commonly understood by the term essence, or substance. The word *ὁμοούσιον*, *of the same substance*, is employed in both. The *filioque* clause, as it is called, "*proceeding from the Father and the Son,*" was adopted at the Council of Toledo, A.D. 589. The words, "*God of God,*" omitted in the Nicæo-Constantinopolitan Creed, are introduced in the version of that creed contained in the English Book of Common Prayer. So also is the expression *filioque*, "*and the Son.*"

It was an appropriate appendix to the controversy respecting the relation of the Son to the Father, that attention should be turned to the relation of the Son to humanity: the Son of God being at that period the grand subject of theological reflection.

APOLLINARIS, a friend of Athanasius, about A.D. 362, being ejected from the Church of Laodicea by its Arian Bishop, pushed his view of the Divinity of Christ to such an extreme, that he believed it superseded in Him the existence of a human soul, at least, of a reasonable soul. He held that, by the Word being *made flesh*, we are to understand, that He simply took upon Himself a human body; moreover, Apollinaris maintained that the body of Christ came from heaven, and was free from the imperfections of our fleshly nature. At the Council of Constantinople, A.D. 381, already noticed, amongst the heresies anathematized in the first canon is "that of the Apollinarians;" and this really is all we know of the proceedings of the Council against this particular opinion. The orthodox Emperor Theodosius enacted rigorous laws for the punishment of the Apollinarians; but it is uncertain whether or not they were enforced.

NESTORIUS, elected Bishop of Constantinople in A.D. 428, zealously opposed the doctrine which merged the human in the Divine nature of our Saviour, and vindicated these words, used by his friend Anastasius, in a sermon preached in the metropolitan church, "Let no one call Mary Mother of God, for she was a human being; and it is impossible that God should be born of a human creature."¹ To speak of the Virgin as Mother of God (Θεοτόκος), had become, to some extent, a practice in the Church; but this Nestorius disapproved, though he

¹ *Socrates*, VII. 32. The word used is *ἄνθρωπος*.

steadfastly adhered to the Nicene Creed. On account of his anxiety to distinguish between the Divine and human elements in Christ, he was accused of dividing the one Redeemer into two persons; and on this account he was condemned, first at the Provincial Councils of Alexandria and Rome, in A.D. 430, and next at the General Council of Ephesus in A.D. 431; where, however, only about two hundred bishops were present. Articles selected out of the writings of Nestorius were pronounced "horrible and blasphemous"; and the Fathers exclaimed, "Anathema to the heretic Nestorius, and to all who refuse to anathematize him!"

Next appeared EUTYCHES, A.D. 448, who, whilst expressing his assent to the exposition of doctrine given at Nicæa and Ephesus, added, he did not consider it taught that Jesus Christ was made of two natures hypostatically united, nor did he believe that the Word had received flesh from heaven. He confessed that He who was born of the Virgin Mary was perfect God and perfect Man, but had not flesh consubstantial with ours. At the Council of Chalcedon, A.D. 451, Eutyches was accused of heresy. In explanation he said, "I confess that our Lord was of two natures before the union; but after the union I confess one nature." The Fathers in Council on hearing this, rose on their feet, and exclaimed, "Anathema to him!" He was deposed from the priesthood, and all who held communion with him were exposed to excommunication.

The orthodox doctrine on the subject of our Lord's person is expressed in the definition of the Council; but it is too long to be quoted here. The substance is, that Jesus Christ is true God and true man, as to His Deity consubstantial with the Father, as to His man-

hood consubstantial with us; and it distinctly calls the Virgin, Mother of God.

The disgraceful proceedings connected with this controversy; the scenes of violence at the Council of Ephesus, giving it the merited name of the Council of Robbers; together with the bewildering metaphysical distinctions in which the discussion abounded, have produced a disgust with the whole affair which has prejudiced many, so as to blind them to what is really interesting and important in the controversy. It was a conflict of the inquisitive, understanding on the one side with uninquiring faith on the other. The understanding, busy with logical definitions, and faith, representing mysteries so as to make them appear not only above reason but opposed to it—two tendencies lying deep in the mind of man—account for many theological phenomena. In this controversy, as in many since, those who gloried in the mystery, and rebuked the men so fond of defining the undefinable, did themselves express the mystery under certain terms, which they would not allow to be altered, and bound it, so expressed, on the consciences of others; thus laying themselves open to the charge which they brought against their opponents. But there were not wanting wisdom and moderation in the views of some engaged in the strife; for Leo of Rome showed that “the only important thing was, that the union of the two natures should be maintained without being confounded.” It was, however, the practical Roman, not the metaphysical Greek, who said this. The whole was a development of that activity of thought which at the time centred in the person of Christ; nor is it difficult to connect the whole with earlier modes of thinking—the one party, that which dwelt most on the mystery, appealing to the

language of the Church, before any theological controversy had arisen; the other party—that which chose to explain the nature of the union—carrying out the speculations of Tertullian and Origen, who were the first to maintain the existence in Christ of a human mind as well as a human body.

The doctrine of Eutyches obtained a strong hold on the Eastern Church, and continued to exist under the name of Monophysitism: indeed, it survives to this day in an Oriental sect, denominated Jacobites, from a leader named James. It took two forms—one, that the Divinity was the sole nature of Christ, the body being a mere phantasm; the other, that as body and soul constitute one man, so Divinity and humanity became one compound nature in Christ.

Neale, in his work on *The Eastern Church*, gives a table of the divisions and subdivisions of Monophysitism, amounting to seven branches of the first division, and six of the second: two of the seven springing into three minor ramifications, and one of the second into no less than nine.¹

Out of the controversy referring to the person of Christ arose another referring to the will of Christ. How did His complex constitution, it was asked, affect His power of volition? If He had a Divine nature and a human nature, should it be said that He had two wills, or one? Hence, in the seventh century, we meet with a sect denominated Monothelites; the name, of course, indicating that they believed our Lord possessed but a single will; but, according to the most careful accounts, it would appear that this was not the case, but rather, that they thought, whilst Christ, by virtue of His two natures,

¹ *Ch. of Alexandria*, II. 9.

had two wills, one of them was the supreme controlling will. The Monothelites repudiated all connection with the Monophysites, believing that Christ had a human soul, with a power of choosing, which was not inoperative; yet that there was, in a certain sense, one will and one operation of will in Christ.¹ Some, it is said, intended no more than that there was a perfect harmony and union of will in Him. Others, that the two powers were amalgamated, that the human will was the instrument of the Divine. There was a further distinction, one party holding that the resignation of the human will to the Divine was voluntary; another holding that such resignation was necessary, as consequent upon the union of the two natures.

It is distressing to find a controversy like this, turning upon a question mysterious and insoluble,—and often degenerating into the use of unintelligible words,—mixed up with political and ecclesiastical partisanship, yet such is the case; and we are glad to quit this thorny and unprofitable path of history, by citing the decision published at the Sixth General Council, held at Constantinople, A.D. 680: “There are two natural wills and two natural operations, without division, change, or conversion, antagonism, or confusion. The human will could not come into collision with the Divine, but was in all things subject to it.”²

¹ Mosheim's *History*, translated by Murdoch, with Supplementary Notes by Dr. Reid, p. 257.

² Hase, in his *Church History*, gives a condensed view of the external aspects of the controversy, p. 131. Hardwicke's *Church History of the Middle Ages*, p. 69, supplies a good idea of both the circumstances and substance of the controversy. For a philosophical view of the conflict, see Neander, *Hist.*, vol. v. p. 227.

It may, however, before we pass on, be well to observe, that the Gospels in their presentation of the life of Christ give the impression of one undivided personality. His acts are combined in a perfect whole. His life is not a conflict between contending powers, elements, or principles; but it is a beautiful harmony, in which the human and Divine, though distinguishable, are never in opposition. There are, however, utterances by our blessed Lord which present Him under two aspects;¹ and the question accordingly is suggested, Was the centre of His personality human or Divine? Did He think and act from a human stand-point or a Divine one? Did the Divine completely control the human? or did the human originate volitions and acts under the guiding light and power of the Divine? or was sometimes the one and sometimes the other the case? As these inquiries arise, who can dare to pursue them? What firm footing is there in such a mysterious sphere of speculation? There are abysses on both sides. For my part, I do not venture to proceed, but would rather rest content with a simple faith in our Lord's Divinity and humanity, in His one undivided personality, and in the perfect harmony of His whole nature and character. We find the subject of our own will an inexplicable puzzle; how much more the will of Christ!

The doctrines discussed at the Nicene period, and in the two succeeding centuries, continued throughout, and later still, to be formulated in rules of faith, adopted by Councils and Synods; but much more important than any other formulary of doctrine, next to the Nicene symbol, in its earlier and later forms, was the famous document which goes by the name of the *Athanasian Creed*. It

¹ John xvii. 24-26; Matt. xxvi. 38-40.

has been satisfactorily proved, over and over again, that the great Alexandrian Father had nothing to do with its production, except through his advocacy of doctrines which are expressed in its well-known articles. Its origin and history we have no room, and indeed no business, to discuss in the present work, and can only state the conviction, abundantly established by learned research, that it cannot be of earlier date than the eighth or ninth century. It should be studied in connection with the creeds already cited, and it is therefore inserted here, according to the received text.¹

THE ATHANASIAN CREED.

Whosoever he is that would be saved : first of all it is needful that he hold the Catholic Faith.

Which Faith except a man shall preserve in its integrity and purity : without doubt he shall perish for ever.

I.

And the Catholic Faith is this : That we worship one God in the Trinity, and the Trinity in Unity ;

Neither confusing the Persons : nor separating the Substance.

For the Person of the Father is one, the Person of the Son another : and the Person of the Holy Spirit another ;

But the Godhead of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit is one : equal glory, co-eternal majesty.

Such as the Father is, such is the Son : such is the Holy Spirit ;

The Father uncreate, the Son uncreate : the Holy Spirit uncreate ;

¹ I take it from "*The Athanasian Creed*," a letter written by Dr. Swainson, and published in 1870, by Rivingtons. To the great work of that eminent scholar, entitled, *The Nicene and Apostles' Creeds*, 1875, I refer the student, as the best help to the full understanding of all questions relative to the three creeds.

The Father unlimited, the Son unlimited : the Holy Spirit unlimited ;

The Father eternal, the Son eternal : the Holy Spirit eternal ;
And still not three eternal : but one eternal ;

As also not three uncreated nor three unlimited : but one uncreated, and one unlimited.

So likewise the Father Almighty, the Son Almighty : the Holy Spirit Almighty ;

And still not three Almighty : but one Almighty.

So the Father God, the Son God : the Holy Spirit God ;
And still not three Gods : but there is one God.

So the Father is Lord, the Son Lord : the Holy Spirit Lord ;
And still not three Lords : but one Lord.

Because as we are compelled by Christian truth : to confess severally each one person as God and Lord,

So are we forbidden by the Catholic Religion : to speak of three Gods or Lords.

The Father is made of none : not created, nor begotten ;

The Son is of the Father alone : not made nor created but begotten ;

The Holy Spirit is of the Father and the Son : not made nor created nor begotten but proceeding.

There is then one Father, not three Fathers ; one Son, not three Sons : one Holy Spirit, not three Holy Spirits.

And in this Trinity there is nothing before or after : there is nothing greater or less ;

But the whole three Persons are co-eternal together : and co-equal.

So that in all things, as has already above been said : the Unity in Trinity and the Trinity in Unity ought to be worshipped.

He therefore that would be saved : let him thus think of the Trinity.

II.

But it is necessary to eternal Salvation : that he also believe faithfully the Incarnation of our Lord Jesus Christ.

It is then the right faith that we believe and confess : that our Lord Jesus Christ, the Son of God, is God and Man.

He is God of the Substance of the Father, begotten before all

times ; and He is Man of the Substance of His mother, born in time ;

Perfect God, perfect Man : of a reasonable soul and human flesh subsisting ;

Equal to the Father, as touching the Godhead : inferior to the Father, as touching the manhood ;

Who, though He be God and Man : yet is not two, but is one Christ ;

And one, not by changing of the Godhead into flesh : but by taking up of the Manhood into God ;

One altogether ; not by confusion of the Substance : but by the oneness of the Person.

For as the reasonable soul and flesh is one Man : so the God and Man is one Christ.

Who suffered for our salvation : descended into hell, on the third day arose again from the dead ;

Ascended into heaven, sitteth at the right hand of God the Father Almighty : from thence He shall come to judge the quick and the dead.

At whose coming all men have to rise with their bodies : and shall render an account of their own proper deeds ;

And they who have done good deeds shall go into eternal life : but they who have done evil deeds, into eternal fire.

This is the Catholic Faith : which except a man shall have faithfully and steadfastly believed, he shall not be able to be saved.

Upon comparing this with the previous creeds, several points present themselves worthy of notice in reference to the history of theological opinion.

There is in it a development of doctrinal principles asserted at Nicæa and Constantinople. The articles run on the same lines as were laid down by the Church Fathers of the fourth and fifth centuries ; but they are drawn out to a greater length, and contain propositions on subjects not introduced into the preceding formularies. There is not only doctrinal expansion, but doctrinal addition. Nor can we help detecting in it a blending of

Latin with Greek elements of theological thought. Of its Latin origin there can be no doubt ; the Greek copies are of late date, and are translated from Western documents. Augustine and others had used expressions and made statements, combined together in this notable composition. The orthodox doctrine of the West is here collected and summarized ; but there is in it a subtlety of conception, and a precision of style, which we cannot help attributing to Greek intellects and the study of Greek style. Latin theologians, unassisted by the controversies and writings of the Eastern Church, could hardly have produced a document so wonderfully remarkable for its depth and force, for its analytical skill, its comprehensive range, and its delicate accuracy of language. Whatever may be thought of its dogmatic conclusions, it must be regarded by every candid literary critic as a masterpiece of theological ability. It grasps the questions which had been at issue in Constantinople and Alexandria, and gives unmistakeable expression to orthodox convictions of the Divinity of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ. At the same time it clearly recognizes a distinction between the words *substance* and *person*, which had been interchangeably used by Athanasius and other Greek Fathers. Indeed, the distinction is so palpable, that whilst there can be no doubt that the authors of the earlier and the later compositions were substantially of one mind in point of doctrine, the phraseology of the one is opposed to that often used by the framers of the other. Whereas the Nicene Fathers spoke of one hypostasis, the *Quicumque vult*, as it is often called, from its opening words, speaks of three (*αἱ τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις*) ; it should be noted, however, that, as the earlier declares the Son is of one substance with the

Father, so the latter declares He is God, of the substance of the Father. The Nicene says, ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ πατρὸς ; the *Quicumque*, in its Greek form, has precisely the same words. Another thing which strikes us, on comparing the two, is, that in the latter we have not only the doctrine of the Son's Divine nature, but the use of the word *Trinity* (τριᾶδι), as well as the expression αἱ τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις, *the three Persons*. Nothing exactly corresponding with this occurs, in point of phraseology, in the symbol of Nicæa, though that sets forth in substance what we understand by the doctrine of the Trinity. The word had come into full theological use at the time when the *Quicumque* originated. Further, it is worthy of notice, that it expands the orthodox doctrine reached through the Monophysite controversy. It takes up, in its second grand division, that which we do not find within the corners of the Nicene Creed, namely, the question as to the nature of the union between our Lord's Divine and human natures. He is declared to be God and Man, yet not two—one altogether, not by confusion of the Substance, but by oneness of the Person. The Eastern Monophysite conflict, which arose after the great Nicene controversy, has thus left on the Western Confession the visible marks of its action, and it indicates an advanced stage in the progress of European theological reflectiveness. But, what is very curious, no trace can be found in it of the influence of the Monothelite branch of the Eastern polemical discussion. This fact cannot weigh as an argument for its early date, against the demonstrative evidence, gathered from so many sources, in support of its later origin ; but it may be taken as a proof that the West at the time felt no deep interest in that subtle Eastern disputation. It does not

appear to have ever occupied much of the attention of Latin theologians. John IV. (A.D. 641), and Martin V. (649), did, indeed, condemn the Monothelite heresy, as it was termed; and the Synods, called by them for the purpose, used the strongest anathematizing language against Monothelite heretics; but it was rather a furious fulmination aimed at distant antagonists, than any profound investigation into an impalpable question, which could not have the same fascination for a Latin priest as it had for a Greek monk. On comparing the two Confessions of Faith, we are further struck with the intensely metaphysical and controversial character of the last. It is interesting and grateful to a devout mind to recognize, in the Apostles' Creed, the simple religious affirmation of belief *in* the Father, *in* the Son, and *in* the Holy Ghost. It expresses childlike trust in the Divine Lord, Saviour, and Sanctifier. It is the utterance of filial love and devotion. The Nicene Creed, though decidedly definitional, and making an effort to fix at once the union and the distinction between the Father and the Son, is also personal. The Constantinopolitan form does not lose that characteristic. In both, the Church joins to declare its faith in the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost. A devotional element remains. The faithful, as on their knees before the throne of Heaven, confess their trust. But it is otherwise with the *Quicumque vult*. Further than the Nicene, it plunges into scientific controversy. It deals with logical propositions in a critical spirit, and having announced conclusions elaborately worked out, in a hard, dry tone of intellectual care and precision, it reserves all feeling for an outburst of dogmatic authority and merciless condemnation of those who will not submit. "Who-soever he is that would be saved, first of all it is needful

that he hold the Catholic Faith, which Faith except a man shall preserve in its integrity and purity, without doubt he shall perish for ever." And then it winds up its own dogmatic decision with the words: "This is the Catholic Faith, which except a man have faithfully and stedfastly believed, he shall not be able to be saved." Athanasius, in his own writings, did not anathematize the Arians. The Nicene Council did; but it only used the word *anathematize*, whatever it might mean; the damnatory clause it contains is omitted in the new and revised Constantinopolitan edition; but the *Quicumque* uses the most terrific phraseology, and consigns to everlasting perdition all who should refuse to accept its elaborate definitions. It has been called a psalm rather than a symbol; so regarded, the imprecatory element in it is very strong, and it becomes a kind of theological war-song; the damnatory lines of which might have been appropriately sung in chorus through the streets of Alexandria, at moments when the fourth century conflict there reached its highest pitch. It reveals what must have been an approved tone of theological thinking in the early portion of the Middle Ages.

As to these controversies respecting the nature of God and of Christ, we may be allowed to remark, that the attention of the student should be especially called to three important words—*substance*, οὐσία; *person*, ὑπόστασις; and *Trinity*.

The word *substance*, etymologically regarded, means that which stands under, that which underlies phenomena; and οὐσία signifies being, or essence, the inward nature, of which qualities are the manifestation. We may apprehend the fact that the universe is something more than phenomenal, that it has a real foundation; but

this is quite a different thing from comprehending exactly what this foundation is. That we cannot discover, and it follows *à fortiori* that we cannot discover what constitutes the essence or ground of the Divine existence. Discussion, then, as to the Divine substance, and the consubstantiality of the Son with the Father, *if we attempt to go further than the revealed facts of the case*, are discussions about things totally mysterious.

The history of the Latin word *persona*, and the Greek word *πρόσωπον*, which comes nearest to it, is curious. *A mask, a character on the stage, visage, countenance*, are explanations of these terms given in dictionaries. The first two are not dignified significations. *Hypostasis*, as we have seen, was at one time used as equivalent to substance, and afterwards employed to denote person, as distinguished from substance. If the etymology of *persona* and *πρόσωπον* associates derogatory thoughts with the sacred subject before us, the history of the term *hypostasis* introduces great confusion. Indeed, the application of the word in the Greek Athanasian Creed *literally* contradicts what some of the Nicene Greeks said, when expressing their orthodox belief. Moreover, the use of the word *person*, in relation to the Divine Being, unless it be most carefully considered and confined, is liable to the charge of obscurity, inasmuch as God is spoken of as a Person; and the Father, the Son, and the Spirit included within the infinitely glorious Godhead, are also denominated Persons. The fact is, the terms person and personality are theologically employed in different senses from that in which they are commonly employed. The word person, in reference to a human individual, has not the same meaning as when referred to the Divine Being; nor does the word personality carry

the same signification, when applied to the united Divine nature, as when applied to the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. The word person can be used only in a qualified sense when employed to denote the revealed distinction in the Godhead. What the exact nature of the distinction is we do not know, we cannot know, though the fact of the distinction, as plainly presented in Scripture, we fully recognize. Apprehend it we can; comprehend it we cannot. Mysteriousness encompasses this part of the subject no less than that of the Divine substance or essence, just noticed.

The word *Trinity* expresses the synthesis of Christian faith respecting the threefold distinction in the Godhead. It recognizes, so to speak, a synthesis of facts. Distinctions in the Godhead actually exist, and are mutually correlated. So far as they are apprehensible, they come under a common form of thought and a common formula of expression. The fact of the existence of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, we can apprehend and believe, though the nature of their essence, and their exact correlations, we cannot describe or understand.

The theological terms which have passed under our consideration are subjected to severe criticism. Some persons object to them, because they do not believe in truths which the terms are designed to indicate; others, who devoutly embrace those truths, may raise a question as to whether they are best for the purpose contemplated; to which it may be replied, they have been sanctioned by such long usage that it is now impossible to supersede them; that a thorough reconstruction of theological terminology is an Utopian idea; and that the wise course seems to be to use such words with a careful recognition of the extent to which they are applicable.

There is another point requiring notice before we leave the subject now under review. The relation of the Holy Spirit to the Father and the Son became an interesting question to the great Nicene divines. "The Latin Fathers," says Bishop Pearson, "taught expressly the procession of the Spirit from the Father and the Son. . . . And the Greek Fathers, though they stuck more closely to the phrase and language of the Scripture, saying, that the Spirit proceedeth from the Father, and not saying that He proceedeth from the Son; yet they acknowledged, under another Scriptural expression, the same thing which the Latins understand by procession, viz. that the Spirit is of or from the Son, as He is of and from the Father; therefore, usually when they said He proceedeth from the Father, they also added, 'He received of the Son.' The interpretation of which words, according to the Latins, inferred a procession, and that which the Greeks did understand thereby was the same which the Latins meant by the procession from the Son, that is, the receiving of His essence from Him. That as the Son is God of God by being of the Father, so the Holy Ghost is God of God by being of the Father and the Son, as receiving that infinite and eternal essence from them both. This being, then, the general doctrine of the Eastern and the Western Churches, differing only in the manner of expression, and that without any opposition, Theodoret gave the first occasion of a difference, making use of the Greek's expression against the doctrine both of Greeks and Latins; denying that the Holy Ghost receiveth His essence from the Son, because the Spirit, saith he, proceedeth from the Father, and is the Spirit which is of God. But St. Cyril, against whom he wrote, taking small notice of this objection, and the writings of

Theodoret, in which this was contained, being condemned, there was no sensible difference in the Church for many years concerning this particular.”¹ The second General Council, in the words which it added to the Nicene Creed, said only, that the Holy Ghost proceedeth from the Father ; but in the West, the procession of the Spirit from the Son came to be inserted in the Church creeds, as we have seen in that of Toledo, in A.D. 589. From Spain the definition made its way into France ; but a controversy sprung up before the end of the eighth century. At Friuli, in 796, Paulinus maintained that it was expedient to admit the Toledo addition, because heretics were whispering the denial of the Spirit’s procession from the Son. At the Synod of Aix-la-Chapelle, in A.D. 809, complaint was made of a monk who had attacked some pilgrims who believed in the double procession ; and the addition to the creed received a distinct approval. Charlemagne sent to Leo III. to ask confirmation of this step. He expressed approval of the doctrine, but objected to any alteration of the creed ; and he is reported to have set up two silver shields in St. Peter’s, containing the Constantinopolitan Creed, in Greek and Latin, without the addition. But Nicholas I. (A.D. 858) and following popes admitted the *filioque* clause. Photius, the Greek Patriarch, complained of this ; and the eighth General Council (Constantinople, A.D. 869), so-called by the Latins, condemned the clause, and insisted on its being excluded. “And so,” says Pearson, “the schism between the Latin and the Greek Churches began, and was continued, and never to be ended, until those words are taken out of the creed.”²

¹ Pearson, *On the Creed*, p. 324.

² *Ibid.*, p. 326. See Robertson, vol. III. p. 159.

CHAPTER III.

THEOLOGICAL RESULTS (*continued*).

A DISPUTE appears in the fourth and fifth centuries respecting *human sin* and *Divine grace*, the most important of the period, next to the Athanasian controversy just reviewed.

If the latter ought to be regarded in connection with the speculative genius of the Greek, no doubt the former, relative to the Divine and the human will, should be connected with the practical bent of the Latins. The question, what is the condition of humanity, and what is the exact relation to it of the redeeming love of God, is one perfectly natural to people of Roman habits; but the manner in which the question came to be answered was influenced by causes deeper than any found in the character of races, or in the idiosyncrasies of souls. Such questions presented themselves to the mind of one of the most extraordinary men that ever lived, and received their answer before any controversy arose on the subject, save that which went on in his own agitated soul. The theological system of Augustine was in substance fully formed, and the conclusions which have ever since been identified with his name were reached and recorded before Pelagius came out as a preacher of heresy. Polemical discussion tended to set Augustinianism in sharper relief; such is ever the effect of counter-argument. But too often what in the process is gain to science is loss to religion.

PELAGIUS, a British monk, born in the middle of the fourth century, was distinguished by his intellectual ability and by his ascetic virtues. He was a pure-minded and upright man, knowing "neither the depths of sin nor the heights of grace." He had "a contracted mind," an earnest purpose, but "no enthusiasm for lofty ideals." He studied Greek theology, and was much imbued with its spirit. In his mental idiosyncrasy, his moral and religious habits, his education, and his rigorous self-rule as a monk, we detect guiding impulses to his opinions of Christianity, the main factors of his famous theology. Here, as in a thousand instances, we see how personal influences combined in the inspiration of theological convictions. We notice how the man had been trained, and how he had trained himself, to believe as he did. The bent of his thoughts comes out in a letter he wrote: "As often as I speak concerning moral improvement, and the leading of a holy life, I am accustomed first to set forth the power and quality of human nature, and to show what it can accomplish."¹

A lack of spiritual feeling, of humble, hearty trust in God as the fountain of good; a lack of that filial reliance upon a Father in heaven through His incarnate Son, and the presence of a rigid formal righteousness as a ground of hope—these were characteristic of this theologian, and stamped their impress on his distinctive theology. As to the human will, he believed that freedom is the highest good. A will capable of doing what is right, or of doing what is wrong, is essential to our service and accountability to God. An ability to disobey is the necessary counterpart of an ability to obey. Man is a self-determining moral agent, with the power of

¹ *Epistle to Demetrius*, c. 2.

good and evil, of life and death, within his hands. There is in us the possibility of either ; one and the same thing may be a root of all kinds of virtue, or a root of all kinds of wickedness. Pelagius leaves the freedom of humanity in a condition of indifferent equipoise towards the opposite poles of the moral universe. According to him, " the human will is, as it were, the eternal Hercules at the cross road, who takes first a step to the right, then a step to the left, and ever returns to his former position." Pelagius, indeed, acknowledged the power of habit ; but beyond that he seemed to know of nothing which touched the freedom of the will. He maintained that it received no bias from anything external to itself.

As to ability, he considered man to be now the same as Adam was before the fall. Adam was created in a state of thorough freedom, and man is born in the same state. There is the same power to do right now as at the beginning. Pelagius speaks of three elements in human goodness—power, volition, act ; the first pertaining to our nature ; the second to our will ; the third to our conduct. Divine grace is reduced by him to the bountifulness of God in nature, to the gift of a supernatural revelation in Scripture, and to the bestowment on individuals of pardon for past sins. And here it is worthy of notice that he speaks of this as a *justification*—a declaring of any one righteous. Also he allows a gracious strengthening of the human will through the power of instruction and example ; and he seems to go beyond this by saying : " In those not Christians, good exists in a condition of nakedness and helplessness ; but in Christians it acquires vigour through the assistance of Christ." He also distinguishes between different stages of human improvement in a way which involves an idea

of special love and mercy under the evangelical dispensation. There was righteousness, he says, under nature; and righteousness under law; now there is righteousness under the Gospel, which he styles *justitia gratiæ*. Grace thus modified, Pelagius pronounced an external help (*adjutorium*); and he went so far as to admit, under the pressure of controversy, that the grace of God in Christ is necessary every moment for every act.

It is plain that in such a system of opinions no place could be found for any *special* work of the Holy Spirit on the souls of individuals, for renewal and sanctification; nor for a predestinating purpose on the part of God, such as is meant by the doctrine of election.¹

The conversion and spiritual life of AUGUSTINE are, as indicated already, to be carefully considered in connection with the study of his opinions. They grew out of his experience under the light of Scripture and the teaching of the Church. We know a great deal more about Augustine's doctrine than about that of Pelagius. There are in existence works by the former expressly devoted to the refutation of Pelagianism, and more to the development of what are commonly styled doctrines of grace. He argues, reasons, declaims, on this theme with inexhaustible energy and fervour. He cites Scripture, employs logic, refers to facts, pours out his own

¹ It should be stated that we have no complete work by Pelagius. We only know him through extracts and representations made by his opponents. We obtain more information respecting his conclusions than his arguments. Augustine's works must be examined to ascertain the opinions of Pelagius. Wiggers' work on *Augustinianism and Pelagianism* is valuable; but it must be remembered that the English translation differs considerably from the German original, criticism and addition being introduced by the translator. See also Neander, *Hist.*, vol. IV. pp. 313-40; Schaff, vol. III. p. 285 *et seq.*

experience—all in defence, illustration, and enforcement of the grace of God as free, sovereign, and irresistible.

A succinct account of Augustine's faith, which he delivers as the faith of the Catholic Church, on the points involved within the Pelagian controversy, may be found in his 217th Epistle.¹

“We know, that before men were born into this world, they had no other wherein they did either good or evil. . . . But, descending from Adam according to the flesh, they partake, by their birth, of the poison of that ancient death which he became subject to by his sin ; and that they are not delivered from eternal death, except they are regenerated in Jesus Christ through His grace.

“We know, that the grace of God is not given, upon the account of any merit, either to infants, or to men that are come to the age of reason.

“We know, that grace is an assistance afforded for every action, to those that have attained to the age of reason.

“We know, that it is not given to all men ; and that those to whom it is given, receive it, without having deserved it by their own works, or by their will ; which appears particularly in infants.

“We know, that it is out of God's mere mercy that it is given to those to whom it is given.

“We know, that it is by a just judgment of God that it is not given to those to whom it is not given.

“We know, that we shall all appear before the judgment-seat of Jesus Christ, that every one may receive either reward or punishment, according to what he shall have done in the body, and not according to what he should have done had he lived longer.

“We know, that infants shall not receive recompense or punishment, but according to what they shall have done in the body ; that is, whilst they were in the body ; that is, according as some have been regenerate, and others not.

“We know, that eternal happiness is ensured to all those that die in Jesus Christ ; and that nothing is imputed to them of what they might have done, had they been alive.

¹ Condensed by Dupin, *Hist.*, v. 163 ; it is worth while to introduce it here before we proceed further.

“ We know, that as many as believe in God, believe willingly, and by an action of their free will.

“ We know, that we ought to pray unto God for those that believe not, that they would believe.

“ We know, that whensoever any of these embraces the faith, we are to give God thanks sincerely, and from the bottom of our hearts, as being an effect of His mercy, and that when we do it, as we are wont to do, we perform a duty incumbent upon us.”

To look for a moment at Augustine's notions of freedom : he believed in spontaneity and self-activity, and that both sin and holiness are quite voluntary ; but he thought that Adam, by freely choosing evil, fell under the bondage of sin—in which state the human will remains. Divine grace sets man free by bringing him into the service of God. *Deo servire vera libertas est.* “ Evil,” he says, “ is removed not by removing any nature or part of a nature which had been introduced by evil, but by healing and correcting that which had been vitiated and depraved. The will, therefore, is then truly free when it is not the slave of vices and sins. Such was it given us by God ; and this being lost by its own fault, can only be restored by Him who was able at first to give it. And, therefore, the truth says, ‘ If the Son make you free, ye shall be free indeed ; ’ which is equivalent to saying, If the Son shall save you, ye shall indeed be saved. For He is our Liberator, inasmuch as He is our Saviour.”¹

The view entertained by Augustine relative to human sin requires particular attention. Athanasius before him regarded it as of a negative character, and represented it as consisting in human ignorance and indolence.² Similar representations are found in Basil and

¹ *De Civit.*, lib. XIV. 11.

² *Cont. Gent.*, 4.

Gregory of Nyssa.¹ Augustine so far agrees with Basil and Gregory, that he *makes sin to consist in privation*:² he carefully attributes its origin to man, and not to God, and expressly distinguishes between God's predestination, which relates to His operations; and God's foreknowledge, which extends to what He does not Himself effect—including all good under the one head, and all evil under the other.³

In his controversy with Pelagius he unfolds his theory of *original sin*, which forms one of the leading characteristics of his theology, and lies at the basis of his notions respecting Divine grace. He held that man was created in the image of God; with a will inclined and determined to holiness. This inclination was a supernatural gift, so as to render Adam's holiness not his own meritorious product in any sense. All finite holiness is the result of a Divine operation upon created nature. In this state, Adam was not subject to death in any form. But with this blessed condition of existence there was coupled the possibility of originating sin—of creating it, in fact, *de nihilo*. Adam was free in his inclination to do good; that, however, was not enough for his state of probation. He must also be capable of doing wrong, else his probation would have been unreal. But though having the power to do wrong, he was bound not to use the power. By using the power, he sinned. In exercising that power, Adam created evil entirely in and by himself. He originated it out of nothing. Man

¹ Hagenbach, *Hist. of Doct.*, vol. I. p. 291.

² Müller, *On Sin*, vol. I. p. 288.

³ *De Prædestinatione Sanctorum*, c. x. "Prædestinatio est quæ sine præscientiâ non potest esse; potest autem esse sine prædestinatione præscientiâ."

was the author of it, not God. Had Adam passed through his probation safely, he would have become incapable afterwards of all evil; but not having done so, he is now unable to originate holiness, and recover himself from his state of apostasy.¹

Augustine affirmed, "We were all in that one man who lapsed into sin, through the woman who was made from him, previous to his transgression. The particular form in which we were to live as individuals was not assigned to us man by man; but the seminal nature existed from which we were to be propagated."² Again and again he affirms that all were one in Adam; in him all have sinned, even infants; they were in him by virtue of his innate power which produced them; the life of the one man contained whatever was developed in his offspring.³

These statements, and a great many others made by Augustine, must be studied in the light of that realistic philosophy which he adopted, which was fully developed by the schoolmen, and which we shall endeavour to explain in a future chapter.

Human *nature* was regarded as a reality distinguishable from human *persons*. Human nature, according to this view, apostatized; and the consequence appears in the apostasy of individuals. Nature comes before individuals, and makes an individual what he is. But Augustine distinguished between human nature as created by God, and human nature as it became subsequently through sin. Sin, he said, did not belong to man's original nature. All sin is a violence done to

¹ This account is gathered from various passages in Augustine.

² *De Civitate*, lib. XIII. 14.

³ *De Peccat. Meritis*, lib. III. c. 7.

nature. Sin belongs to the fall ; and he preferred to use the phrase, *peccatum originale*, to the phrase, *peccatum naturale*. He did not consider that man had lost the Divine image entirely. "There is good," he remarks, "which deplores lost good ; if there were no good in nature, there would be no sorrow over evil."¹

In connection with his theory of humanity, we must take his theory of grace.

Grace, according to Augustine, is *necessary* for every good act, or thought, or word. It is *unmerited*. It is *freely given*, and precedes all Christian virtue. Grace towards man, in its very nature, is something bestowed on the unworthy. To him who at first wills not, grace comes that he may will ; grace follows, that he may not will in vain. Grace also is *irresistible*, including the gift of final perseverance. Further, it is *progressive* ; and a distinction arises between prevenient, preparing, co-operating, and perfecting grace.

Augustine's doctrine of predestination flows from his doctrine of grace. Tertullian, Ambrose, and Jerome taught a conditional predestination ; Augustine an absolute one, including both the end and the means—in short, the whole recovery of man, from the first inspiration of spiritual life to the consummation of bliss in heaven. He argued that salvation is of God, and that God knows and determines beforehand all which He actually accomplishes. Consequently, the salvation He effects in time must have been purposed from eternity.²

Although there are distinct dogmatic declarations in Augustine on the points we have noticed, yet there is

¹ Shedd, *Hist. Doctrines*, vol. II. p. 83. He supplies references, which, on examination, are seen to bear out his remarks.

² See *De Gratiâ Christi. De Gratiâ et libero arbitrio*.

truth in the remark of Dr. Hampden, that we seek in vain for any positive expressions "by which an exact theory of Divine and human agency, in their relations to each other, may be enumerated." His opinions cover so wide a space, are presented in such a variety of forms, are in some places so qualified and guarded, whilst in others they appear bold and rash, and exhibit such subtlety and many-sidedness of thought—to say nothing of his *Retractations* of what he had once affirmed—that a theory consistent in all respects cannot be gathered from his writings. Dr. Hampden goes on to say that what he remarked "is evident in the fact that the orthodox, the Jansenist, the Thomist, and the Jesuit all equally refer to the authority of that Father."¹

The same writer also observes: "That the influence of Augustine on the theology of the Middle Ages was very great, and that he contributed much to the general belief in predestination. Predestination, regarded as the sole primary cause of all our actions, as they are moral and Christian,—as they have any worth in them, or any happiness,—was asserted in that theology in the most positive manner; though different doctors varied in further explications of its nature. But reprobation, as it implies a theory of the moral evil of the world, I think I may say confidently, is no part of the system."²

Perhaps, in a question so open to controversy as the opinions of Augustine, it may be well to give a further summary of them by a competent and impartial historian. Canon Robertson remarks: "Augustine, in one of his early works, had laid down that predestination is grounded on foreknowledge—an opinion which had been commonly held in the Church. As his views on the subject of grace

¹ *Bampton Lect.*, p. 163.

² *Ibid.*, p. 180.

became developed, he had been led to teach a more absolute predestination; but it was not until the Pelagian controversy was far advanced that he set forth distinctly, and in connection with the rest of his system, those doctrines as to predestination which have entered so largely into the controversies of later times. The occasion for his treating the subject was given by a report of serious dissensions which took place about the year A.D. 426 at Adrumetum, where some monks, on the ground (as they supposed) of one of Augustine's epistles, disturbed their brethren by denying the freedom of the will and a future judgment according to works. On this Augustine wrote a letter, in which he laid down the necessity of believing both in the Divine grace and in the freedom of the will. 'If there be no grace of God,' he asks, 'how doth He save the world? if there be no free will, how doth He judge the world?'—and he devoted two treatises to the examination of the points in question. In these books he still maintained the freedom of man's will; but he held that this essential freedom was not inconsistent with the existence of an outward necessity controlling it in the prosecution of its desires. Our will, he said, can do that which God wills, and which He foresees that it will do; will, therefore, depends on the Divine foreknowledge. God had from eternity determined to rescue some of human kind from the misery brought on us by sin. The number of these is fixed, so that it can neither be increased nor diminished; even before they have a being they are the children of God; if they deviate from the right way, they are brought back to it; they cannot perish. As God, being almighty, might save all, and as many are not saved, it follows that He does not will the salvation of all—a tenet which Augustine laboriously

tried to reconcile with St. Paul's declaration that He 'will have all men to be saved, and to come unto the knowledge of the truth' (1 Tim. ii. 4). The elect are supplied with all gifts which are requisite for bringing them to salvation, and grace works irresistibly in them. The ground of their election is inscrutable—resting on the secret counsel of God. He does not predestine any to destruction; for His predestination regards such things only as He Himself works, whereas sin is not His work; but He knows who are not chosen and will not be saved. These perish either through unforgiven original sin, or through actual transgression. That they have no portion in Christ is no ground for impugning the Divine justice; for if God do not give grace to all, He is not bound to give it to any; even among men, a creditor may forgive debts to some, and not to others. 'By giving to some that which they do not deserve, God has willed that His grace shall be truly gratuitous, and therefore real; by not giving to all, He shows what all deserve. He is good in benefiting the certain number, and just in punishing the rest. He is both good in all cases, since it is good when that which is due is paid; and just in all, since it is just when that which is not due is given, without wrong to any one.' Those who are lost deserve their condemnation, because they have rejected grace either in their own persons or in that of the common father."¹

Many who concur with Augustine in his general views of grace, will shrink from his predestination theory; but others will recognize and admit in such views as his a Divine election, which is the primal cause of faith and obedience, rather than an effect arising out of faith and obedience. At the same time, they may decline to adopt

¹ Robertson, *Hist. of the Christian Church*, vol. II. p. 161.

his mode of presenting the doctrine of Divine decrees, and object to certain dogmas he blended with his system.

Independent a thinker as Augustine was, yet he was open to extraneous influences, which considerably modified his opinion. That philosophy which produced the realism of the Middle Ages is seen, as already noticed, in his representation of humanity. He regarded it as being folded up in Adam, without (if we may use his metaphysical phraseology) the forms of the essence being distributed.¹ In his occasionally confounding what is purely natural with what is really sinful may be detected the working of asceticism; and the great defect in his system—his leaving the pardon of sin after baptism dim and indistinct—shows how decidedly the notion of sacramental efficacy ruled his mind. We do not believe that he would ever have maintained the opinion which he did, that infants who die without baptism are unsaved, unless he had been driven to do so by the tyranny of the same principle. If there ever was a man who, to devout feeling and habits of mystical contemplation, united the utmost logical consistency and intrepid courage in avowing conclusions,

¹ A writer in the *British Quarterly Review* (vol. VI. p. 250) observes of Augustine: "He conceived of the relation of Adam to his posterity as an actual incorporation of that posterity in his person, in consequence of which his acts became theirs; and the results of his acts were regarded as belonging as much to each of them singly as to him. Thus in the *City of God* (XIII. 3-14), 'When that pair received the Divine sentence of condemnation, the whole human race were in the first man, which by the woman were to pass into posterity. We were all in that one, as we were all that one who fell into sin. Not as yet was the form created (here we see the Aristotelian), and distributed to us singly in which we were individually to live; but the nature was now seminal from which we were to be propagated.'" See also *De Peccat. Meritis*, etc., lib. I. c. x.; *Retract.*, lib. I.

it was the Bishop of Hippo. With an unflinching step he could walk down into the darkest mysteries, even as with an eye unblenched he could gaze up at the most dazzling wonders. Calmly he stood in the midst of the universe, and pointed to objects the most awful, believing them to be in harmony with the righteousness of God, a harmony which the endless resources of his logic were employed to establish. Sometimes, we find, the saint is stronger than the dialectician; and, appalled in his ratiocinations by what he felt to be opposed to the character of the perfect One, he retreated with horror from the edge of an abyss; and turning his face to the effulgent throne of wisdom and goodness, he exclaimed with filial love, "Let God be true, and every man a liar." To other themes besides the Trinity may be applied his beautiful story of the child with a shell striving to empty the sea into a cavity dug with its tiny hand.¹

A modification of Pelagianism took place under the influence of Augustine's opposition.

JOHN CASSIAN (A.D. 360-433), contemporary with Chrysostom and Augustine, and described as a disciple of the former, took a leading part in this direction. He rejected many of the errors of the British monk, and affirmed the universal sinfulness of man, the introduction of evil through the fall, and the necessity of Divine grace for human recovery. But he denied Augustine's doctrine of election, and his views of special and irresistible grace.

¹ It is curious to notice that a similar story is told of the renowned scholar, Alanus de Insulis, of the eleventh century. As he was going to preach on the Trinity, he saw a boy trying to empty a river with a shell, who told him he should fulfil his task before Alanus had explained the Trinity. It shows how the legends of one age were turned into facts by another.

As to humanity and salvation, he struck out a middle path, maintaining that man is morally sick, but not morally dead; that he needs a physician, but must co-operate with his healer in order to his being restored to spiritual health. Respecting Divine grace, though he used strong expressions touching its necessity and power, and believed that sometimes it anticipates the human will and overcomes it—as in the case of Matthew the publican and Saul the persecutor—he said, that in other cases, and indeed usually, the human will is the determining influence, and he cites as examples the prodigal son, Zacchæus, the penitent thief, and Cornelius the centurion.¹

FAUSTUS, Bishop of Rhegium (died about A.D. 484), took a line of thought resembling that of John Cassian. On the subject of original sin he approached nearer to Augustine; but his ideas of Divine grace are represented as less spiritual.² The doctrine of predestination in an absolute form he denounced as fatalistic and heathenish. He distinguished between predestination and foreknowledge, and believed that our blessed Lord died for all men.

It is time now to turn attention to certain opinions, at the period under review, respecting the doctrine of *the Atonement*.

Two questions were asked—Was the death of Christ *necessary* for human salvation?—and, How did His death *operate* in reference to the Divine government of the universe?

As to the first question, Athanasius remarks: “Sup-

¹ Cassian's opinions on these points are found in the thirteenth of his *Collationes*. See art. on Cassian in *Dict. of Christ. Biography*.

² Wiggers' *Augustinianism*, p. 287.

pose that God should merely require repentance in order to salvation? This would not in itself be improper, did it not conflict with His veracity. God cannot be untruthful, even for our benefit. Repentance does not satisfy the demands of truth and justice. If the question pertained solely to the *corruption* of sin, and not to the *guilt and ill desert of it*, repentance might be sufficient. But since God is both truthful and just, who can save, in this emergency, but the Logos who is above all created beings? He who created men from nothing could suffer for all and be their substitute.”¹

“The Logos,” he proceeds to say, “saw our condemnation and misery under a broken law. He saw how unseemly, or out of place (*ἀτοπον*), it would be for us to escape the law except through fulfilling or satisfying it, and, at the same time, how out of place it would be if the Creator should leave His rational creatures to perish. As He saw the ever-swelling tide of evil, and that all men were in bondage to death, He had compassion on them, and assumed a body, not by a physical necessity of nature, for His essence is spiritual.” The necessity was moral. Athanasius everywhere treats the first and second creation as closely connected, and considers that for the sake of harmony it was requisite that He, and He alone, through whom the Father created the world, should redeem the world. It is, however, apparent that all along this great theologian was thinking more of the Saviour’s person and nature than of His specific work. He wrote no treatise on the atonement itself, but referred to the redemption effected by Christ in works on the Incarnation. He thought more of the Logos than the Lamb, more of the Son of God than of the High Priest

¹ *In Incarn.*, c. VII.

of our profession, more of the Incarnation than the Crucifixion, more of a reasonable necessity for an atonement arising from the constitution of things than of any legal necessity springing from the guilt of mankind. Augustine took up the same subject, but not with the force and precision of the Greek Father. He remarks, that they are foolish who say the wisdom of God could not liberate man otherwise than by the Divine assumption of humanity, and the suffering of a Redeemer at the hands of sinners.¹ But then he also observes, that, if the question be asked, whether there was no other way whereby God could deliver man save the incarnation and suffering of our Lord, it is not enough to say, this is a good way; it should also be shown, not indeed that no other was open, but that no other was suitable. Augustine held that the death of Christ, in one sense, was not necessary; that in another it was. His idea seems to have been, that it was not *naturally* necessary that God should do as He did, but it was *morally* necessary that He should do what was best. Hilary insists on the necessity of Christ's death much in the same way as Augustine. According to him, the necessity is not to be sought in the nature of the Redeemer, but in the condition and wants of the redeemed. As Christ gave Himself up of His own free will, the nature of the necessity must be regarded as ethical. This statement by the Gallic divine occurs in his work on the Trinity, showing, what appears both in Athanasius and Augustine, that the theology of the cross at that time grew out of the theology of the incarnation.²

As to the other question, How did the death of Christ

¹ *De Agone Christiano*, c. 11.

² *De Trinitate*, XIII. 10, 11, 57, 61.

operate in connection with the Divine government?—it is sufficiently plain, that the Fathers at this, as at an earlier period, looked at the effect of the atonement chiefly on the side of its moral influence, in restoring and renewing man : still the other side received attention.

And here we come again upon a line of thought struck out at an earlier period by Origen more boldly than by Irenæus. It is remarkable that in the age now under review, the doctrine of Devils and Demons occupied much attention ;¹ and in connection with it, Gregory of Nyssa argued, that men by sin had come under the dominion of the evil one ; that Jesus offered Himself to him as a ransom for the sake of delivering others ; that the crafty spirit assented to this, because he valued Him as a captive above all the rest, and then found himself deceived, inasmuch as he could not retain the Divine Victim within his power. It was a kind of deception, for Jesus veiled His Divine nature, and Satan did not perceive it under the appearance of human flesh ; it was a sort of *jus talionis*—the devil, having deceived man at the beginning, was now outwitted himself.² This outwitting of the devil became a favourite subject in after times, and in various grotesque forms occurs in the legendary literature of the Middle Ages. Ambrose, too, speaks of a fraud which befell the adversary, through the crucifixion of Christ in weakness, before His resurrection with power.³ Rufinus took up and carried out the same idea ; but Gregory, in his *Morals on the Book of Job*, exceeds all others in the space he devotes to the character and work of the father of evil, and in the gross conceptions he formed of the victory over him achieved by the Lord. Commenting on Behemoth, in the

¹ See Hagenbach, *Hist. of Doct.*, I. p. 347. ² *Orat. Cat.*, c. 22–26.

³ Ambrose, *Com. Luc.*, quoted in Hagenbach, vol. I. p. 352.

40th chapter, he says, that Christ took Satan, as it were, with a hook, that He assumed a body in order that Behemoth might aim thereby at the Saviour's destruction, and that when the devil seized the bait, he lost us, whom he was then justly holding, because we had surrendered ourselves to him ; and could not secure the Divine Victim, who was more than a match for diabolical power and cunning. The old Serpent perished through that which he swallowed. Behemoth knew indeed the incarnate Son of God, but not the plan of our redemption. This absurd kind of rhetoric, however, it should be remembered, was employed for popular effect, and did not pretend to a place in scientific theology. Gregory of Nazianzum represents men as under the dominion of the wicked one, and asks if a ransom be paid to the possessor of a captive, to whom was a ransom paid in this case, and for what reason ? " To Satan ? But it would be a shame to think so, for in that case the robber would be paid for his robbery. Is it, then, to the Father ? Here, it might be asked, how could that be, since God did not hold us in bondage ? And how can we say, that the Father delighted in the blood of His only Son, since He would not accept the sacrifice of Isaac ?" ¹ It is clear, from this passage, that Gregory did not adopt the idea of a ransom to the power of evil, and he adds : " Is it not evident that the Father received the ransom, not because He demanded or needed it, but on account of the Divine Government or Economy (*δι' οἰκονομίαν*), and because man is to be sanctified by the incarnation of God ; that having subdued the tyrant, He might deliver and reconcile us to Himself by the intercession of His Son ?"

Yet Gregory allows some artifice in the contest with Satan, for he says, Christ assumed the form of man, in

¹ *Orat.*, XLV.

consequence of which the adversary imagined he had only to do with a mortal like ourselves, whereas the power and glory of God dwelt within Christ.¹ And even Athanasius, who, according to some, was the first to propound the notion of a debt paid to God, has something to say of the devil in connection with it, for he remarks, "Christ offered His human nature as a sacrifice for all, and fulfilled the law by His own death, and thereby also destroyed Satan's power."² Augustine avoids any gross view of the atonement, but he falls in with other theologians of the period so far as to say, that God the Son, being clothed in human nature, subjected even the devil to man, not by violently seizing anything from him, but by righteously overcoming him. He also speaks of the latter subjecting to himself the human race, and reigning in the hearts of unbelievers; and he declares, that through faith in Christ, which is confirmed by His death and resurrection, and through His blood which was shed for the remission of sins, multitudes of believers are released from the domination of the evil one, are united to Christ, and, under His headship, grow up through His Spirit to be faithful members of His mystical body. This he gives as an exposition of our Lord's words, "Now is the prince of this world cast out." Christ predicted, what He foresaw, that after His passion and glorification, many throughout the world would believe in Him, within whose hearts the devil had been, and from whose hearts, through their faith, he would be cast out;³ thus, in connection with a distinct acknowledgment of Christ's blood being shed for the redemption of sins, this great Latin Father recognized the deposition of the enemy of man from his usurped

¹ *Orat.*, XXXIX.

• ² *De Incar.*, c. VI.

³ *Tractatus Johannes*, LII.

dominions ; in other words, Augustine connects spiritual emancipation with Divine forgiveness.

Whilst there are these unsatisfactory attempts at a theory of the atonement, in its relation to the Divine government of the universe—some of them repulsive to modern thought—passages are found in the patristic writers, at this time, which indicate how fully convinced they were of the vitally important religious truth, that Christ Jesus died as a ransom for us. Athanasius declares—that the death of the Logos was a ransom for the sins of men, and a death of death : that, laden with guilt, the world lay under the condemnation of the law ; but the Logos took the judgment up into Himself, and suffering in the flesh for all, He bestowed salvation on all. That although not weak, He took upon Himself our weakness ; although not hungering, He hungered, and sacrificed Himself for our salvation.¹

One side of human salvation was early unfolded in the thoughtful consciousness of the Church. A doctrine of regeneration, connected with the idea of baptismal efficacy, is exhibited by the Nicene and earlier teachers ; but the other side is dimly and confusedly discerned. Man's position towards that law which is the standard of rectitude, and towards that Judge who is the fountain of righteousness and the foundation of order, as well as the change of that position in the believer's history, so that his guilt is put away, and he is counted righteous, were not more clearly apprehended by the Latins, with their definite notions of law, than by the Greeks, whom we might have expected to be slow in appreciating the evangelical view of man's legal relations. There cannot

¹ Passages to this effect are found in his *Orations against the Arians*.

be found in the Nicene authors any statements, formal and sustained, relating to the doctrine of justification, either in harmony with the definitions at Trent, or in strict accordance with Protestant formularies.

The question is not, Did they believe in *a* doctrine of justification by faith; but, What did they mean by that justification? Did they distinguish between the forensic and moral views? Isolated passages may be culled, some looking one way, some another; but no consistent, thoroughly worked out view on the subject can be discovered in their writings.

Cyril, in his *Catechetical Lecture on Faith*, dwells on its experience and its moral effect; and Augustine shows that faith is something far beyond mere historical credence. "The devils," he says, "believe Christ to be; but they do not believe in Christ. For he who believes in Christ both hopes in Christ and loves Christ. Any one who has faith without hope or love believes Christ to be; but he does not believe in Christ. Who, therefore, believes in Christ, through believing, enjoys the coming of Christ to him, and in a certain way is united to Him as a member of His body."¹ There is a decided passage in Cyril's Lectures, as it regards our acceptance with God, where he says: "If thou believest that the Lord Jesus is the Christ, and that God hath raised Him from the dead, thou shalt be saved, and translated to paradise. Do not disbelieve the possibility of this, for He who, in the holy Golgotha, saved in one hour that believing thief, will also save thee, if thou wilt believe."² Yet there is nothing here which might not be said by a person who confounds justification with sanctification. We read much in Augustine of the grace of justification, and of justification

¹ *Sermo.*, 144.

² *Lect.* v. 6.

by faith. Some sentences in his works may bear an interpretation according with views termed evangelical ; but the method of taking detached passages irrespective of others pointing a different way, and without noticing views on correlative points, can never lead to a correct apprehension of theological opinions. Augustine speaks of the grace by which we are justified as identical with the infusion of the love of God. He contends, that God justifies the ungodly person, not merely by pardoning the evil he commits, but also by imparting love, that he may turn from evil and do good through the Holy Ghost. Speaking of the thief on the cross, as believing with his heart unto justification, the Latin Father immediately explains it by adding that the man's faith wrought by love, which arose in his heart, though there could be no time for its manifestation in his conduct. The same author tells us, that we are justified by the grace of God ; that is, made just, *justi efficitur*. Once more, he refers to justification as imperfect in common Christians, and perfect in the martyrs.¹ Further, on the same subject—turning from Augustine—we see that in the Canons of the Council of Carthage, in A.D. 418, against Pelagius, it was decreed that whosoever should say that the grace by which we are justified, through Jesus Christ our Lord, avails only to the remission of sins already committed, and is not also an aid against their commission, should be anathematized. Again, in the same decrees, the grace of justification is alluded to as the grace by which we fulfil Divine commands.² While all this was consonant with a doctrine of justification by faith, and with *the*

¹ *De Gratia Christi*, 31. *Contra Julianum*, lib. II. c. 165. *Retract.*, II. 33. *Sermo.*, CLIX.

² *Canon IV.*, v., VI. Wiggers' *Augustinianism*, p. 172.

doctrine of salvation by grace, such statements show that there could have been no consistent maintenance of the distinguishable connections of faith, first, with Divine forgiveness, and secondly, with man's renewal.

There are sentences in Basil and Ambrose which come nearer to the Pauline doctrine, as apprehended by Evangelical Protestants; yet these sentences are found amidst matter abounding in what such persons would deem inconsistent with just views of the Gospel of Christ. "For this," says Basil, "is the true and perfect glorying in God, when a man is not lifted up on account of his own righteousness, but has known himself to be wanting in true righteousness, and to be justified by faith alone in Christ."¹ But, if the context be duly considered, it seems very doubtful whether Basil actually intended any such thing as the doctrine of justification by faith alone.

Some strong passages on justification by faith may be found in Chrysostom;² yet, in connection with his comments, the student must also look at that Father's Homilies on Repentance. Ambrose repeats St. Paul, that through faith alone the ungodly are justified with God; but he also speaks of covering our errors with good works and confessions.³ Jerome declares, "We are just when we confess ourselves sinners; and our righteousness comes not of any merit of our own, but of God's mercy; for the Scriptures say, God hath concluded all under sin, that He might have mercy upon all; and this is the highest righteousness of man, that whatever he has of virtue, he should not think it his own, but God's

¹ Basil, *Homil. de Humil.*, xxii.

² See *Hom.* VIII. on the Epist. to the Romans.

³ In *Epist. ad Rom.*, IV. and *Ep.* LXX.

who gave it.”¹ Here, the first part of the passage seems to contain the forensic view; but the second part glides into an experimental and spiritual strain, without any clear distinction between the two aspects of salvation.

One cannot help seeing in what we have noticed the effect of the Church system. That system did not prevent the development of the doctrine of the Trinity, and of certain views of Divine grace; but a consistent view of a sinner's acceptance through faith, and a clear distinction between this and spiritual renewal by the Holy Ghost, must be impossible where the ecclesiastical dogmas of the fifth and sixth centuries are upheld. An exclusive human priesthood, a new birth by baptism, and the meritoriousness of fasting and celibacy, must supply a distorting medium through which evangelical light can struggle only in subdued rays or in fitful flashes.

It may not be irrelevant here to remark, that the comparatively small amount of attention paid by some of the Fathers to what may be called evangelical points, is really a significant sign of the character of their theology. Their omissions, as well as their assertions, are instructive. Where they do not contradict each other, they may differ from each other. Certainly a different tone pervades the writings of Chrysostom from that which we find in the works of Augustine. The latter eagerly lays hold of truths which the former allows to slip through his fingers. For example, Chrysostom has little to say on the words, “By grace ye are saved through faith;” and when he dilates on God's kindness towards us, through Jesus Christ, it is chiefly

¹ *Hieron. adv. Pelag.*, lib. i. c. 3.

to show that martyrdom may well be endured for His sake.

What *lies in the future* continued to arrest the thoughts of theologians. As time rolled on, the expectation of Christ's immediate appearance lost its hold more and more on Christian minds in general; and gross conceptions of the resurrection and its consequences were deprecated by Augustine; ¹ but Jerome went so far as to maintain, that the body raised from the grave will be substantially the same as it is now, saying that blood and bones and nerves are essential to a human frame, and that even the hairs of the head will be restored.² Origen's idea of final restoration lost ground; and the prevailing opinion pointed to *everlasting* punishment—though some believed in different degrees of suffering, as well as in different degrees of blessedness. Augustine argued that the word *αἰώνιος*, in the twenty-fifth chapter of Matthew, must have the same meaning in relation both to life and punishment. Chrysostom, and even Pelagius, also maintained the perpetuity of future suffering. "It is superfluous," says Hagenbach, "to quote passages from other Fathers, inasmuch as they all more or less agree."³ The notion of purifying fires at the last day gave place, after the time of Origen, to a doctrine of purification by some means between death and resurrection. Ambrose spoke of all Christians passing through a fiery ordeal at the last day;⁴ Hilary coincided in some such an opinion and Augustine remarks, that if it be said venial worldliness will be consumed in the fire of tribulation here or hereafter, he will not contradict it, because it may be

¹ *Civ. Dei.*, XXII. 11—21.

² Hagenbach's *Hist. of Doctrines*, I. p. 377.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 383.

⁴ *Com.*, Ps. xxxvii.

true."¹ This notion came to be so developed by Gregory the Great, that he has been called the Inventor of Purgatory. He certainly lays it down as a doctrine to be believed, that for minor faults there is a purgatorial fire before the day of judgment; and he also teaches a deliverance from that painful discipline, by means of intercessory prayer and the oblation of the saving sacrament. He founds his idea of the pardon of sin in a future world on what our Lord says in Matthew xii. 31, and then develops it into forms of thought purely imaginative.

Yet, though definite statements may be found in both Ambrose and Gregory, which have been used in support of later dogmas, it should be stated that the writings of these men contain passages which prove that they had not reached that fixity of opinion on the subject of a purifying discipline hereafter, which we find crystallized in the Roman Catholic doctrine of Purgatory. Ambrose speaks of the Christian's death as any Protestant might do. "We shall go where there is a paradise of joy—where Adam, who fell among thieves, has forgotten to weep over his wounds; where the thief rejoices in the kingdom of heaven; where are no clouds, no thunder, no lightning, no storms of wind, no darkness, no night, where neither summer nor winter will vary the seasons; where no cold, or hail, or rain, nor the need of sun and moon and stars, shall be known; but God alone will be the light thereof."² And even Gregory, though more advanced than Ambrose in the direction of later views, treats the subject now under consideration in a vague

¹ *De Civ. Dei*, XXI. 26; but on this subject, as on some others, Augustine is not always consistent.

² *De Bono Mortis*, 12.

and general way. Unlike some of his contemporaries, he believed the dissolution of all things was approaching, when the sun would be darkened, and the globe dissolved; then referring to the twilight before the day-dawn, he speaks of the end of this world as merging into the commencement of the world to come. He compares the sufferings of the future, including spiritual anguish before the coming of the Judge, to the trembling of the earth before the final conflagration.¹

Sacraments rose in the estimation of the Nicene theologians. The Lord's Supper, from the beginning, even regarded simply under a commemorative aspect, had a dogmatic signification, and pointed to three fundamental doctrines—the Divinity, the Incarnation, and the Atonement of Christ. The very reverence thus inspired, when under the influence of excited imagination, would perhaps lead to erroneous conceptions of the nature of the elements; at all events, erroneous conceptions were formed at an early period. Strong language was used respecting baptism, as we have seen already; and coming down to Augustine, we find him declaring that those who underwent the holy rite were cleansed every whit; that little ones were renewed by grace; that original sin in their cases was laid aside, the old man being put off, and the new man put on. Yet such statements must be qualified by his assertion, that whatever baptism might do, it would not ultimately avail without inward holiness; and that love alone makes the difference between the sons of God and the devil's children. Opinions as to the Lord's Supper were in advance of those previously entertained, though they were sometimes of a highly sacramental

¹ *Dial.* IV. 41.

description.¹ Cyril of Jerusalem told his catechists that they might be sure the body and blood of Christ were given in the Eucharist; that what seem only bread and wine are not really so.² Chrysostom exhorted his congregation not to look at the consecrated elements as though they were but material substances; they were not, he said, subject to common physical laws, but were absorbed without waste into the body of the participant. Yet, though such language be very decided, we do not apprehend that Cyril and Chrysostom believed in the doctrine of transubstantiation, as defined at a later period, but were only incautiously proceeding along a line which prepared for the ultimate scholastic development.

Ritualistic worship contributed to the expansion of sacramental doctrine. The *Canon Gregorius* commenced with commending the people's gifts and offerings to the acceptance of God; then followed prayers for the king and the bishop, with a commemoration of our Saviour's deeds and words in celebrating the Eucharist; after which came an oblation of the sacraments, as a sacrifice of bread and wine, and a petition that they might be presented by the angels on the altar of heaven. Next followed a commemoration of the departed faithful, and prayer for communion with them.³ A passage occurring in a homily on the Prodigal Son, printed in the works of

¹ It is scarcely possible to speak of the priesthood in loftier terms than those employed by Cyprian, *Epist.* LIX., LXVI.

² *Cat. Lect.*, XXII.

³ Palmer's *Orig. Lit.*, I. 123. The text of the Gregorian Canon is restored by Bunsen in his *Hippolytus*, vol. IV. p. 492, sq., and in his *Christianity and Mankind*, vol. VII. It has been thought impossible to restore the text; but Bunsen gives apparently good grounds for his own conclusions. See also Palmer, *Orig. Lit.*, I. 112. Bunsen endeavours to show, not quite satisfactorily, that early Oriental

Chrysostom, but probably written by Severianus, a Syrian bishop, informs us "that the choristers of the Holy, Holy, Holy, had on their shoulders flying wings of linen, in imitation of the angels,"¹ to which, perhaps, reference is made in the Liturgy ascribed to Chrysostom—"they who mystically imitate the cherubim." The same Liturgy details elaborate ceremonies, such as piercing the Eucharistic bread with a spear, also censuring, lifting, kneeling, bowing, kissing. The Liturgy, however, as we have it, is of later date; but in Chrysostom's time there was much pomp in Byzantine worship.

In closing this rapid review of theological doctrine at the period of the fall of the Roman Empire, it is proper to recognize the continued existence, and at length a decided revival, of mystical theology. Between the third and sixth centuries it waned considerably. Great divines, such as Chrysostom and the Gregorys, and such as Augustine and Ambrose, traversed a different path of Christian thought, expounding and enforcing fundamental dogmas in an orthodox way; but in the middle of the sixth century we find works deeply imbued with the spirit of a Christianized Neo-Platonism exerting a wide and deep influence on religious opinions. They pass under the name of DIONYSIUS the Areopagite, but are cited, it is said, for the first time A.D. 531, in a letter written by Isidore, Bishop of Maronia, which relates a conference held at Constantinople by order of Justinian. From that moment, these writings circulated with

liturgies exhibit a sacrifice for the people, even the faithful themselves—that is, spiritual sacrifices, not a sacrifice of bread and wine.—*Hippolytus*, vol. IV. p. 187.

¹ Bunsen's *Hippolytus*, vol. IV. p. 198.

rapidity, and began to affect the doctrinal sentiments of the day. That they were composed by the Dionysius mentioned in the Acts, has been maintained by very few. Modern scholars justly deny their genuineness, and are at a loss to determine when and where they originated. They included, besides a few letters, treatises on *Mystical Theology*; *The Divine Names*; *The Celestial Hierarchy*; *The Ecclesiastical Hierarchy*.

The place which these remarkable writings occupy in the history of theological literature has been represented in different ways: one critic, Baumgarten-Crusius, believes that they were meant to oppose and overturn Gnosticism by exhibiting a rival and superior system of spiritual agencies, through a transfer of the Greek mysteries to Christianity; a theory which would refer them to the third century, at which period there is no evidence of their existence; and another critic, Engelhardt, with great probability, regards these works as a new development of the Neoplatonic philosophy, the pagan side of which Proclus had set himself to unfold.

The *Mystical Theology* seems to supply a key for the interpretation of the other books. The doctrines laid down in it have been thus condensed: "All things have emanated from God, and the end of all is to return to God. Such return—deification, he calls it—is the consummation of the creature, that God may finally be all in all. A process of evolution—a centrifugal movement in the Divine nature—is really substituted for creation. The antithesis of this is the centripetal process, or movement of involution, which draws all existence towards the point of the Divine centre. The degree of real existence possessed by any being is the amount of God in that being—for God is the existence in all things. Yet He Himself

cannot be said to exist, for He is above existence. The more or less of God which the various creatures possess is determined by the proximity of their order to the centre.”¹ God is described as without limitation, identical with goodness, the basis of life and felicity, and, like the sun, pouring His vivifying beams over all existence. More worthy conceptions of Him, we are told, can be formed by a process of negation than in another way ; for as the imperfections of created nature do not exist in the Creator, they must be stripped off from every thought of God, as the ideal of perfect beauty is embodied in sculpture by chipping off one piece after another from a block of marble.

The treatise on *Divine Names* contains an inquiry into the Divine attributes, and the revelation of them in various ways ; and here we meet with a remarkable illustration of prayer, which is compared to a rope thrown from a rock, by which mariners who, while seeming to draw the rock toward them, are really themselves approaching the rock. The nature of evil is also discussed, and pronounced to be no real existence, but only a defect. Christology like that of the New Testament can nowhere be discovered in these treatises, the human appearance of our Lord being set forth simply as the restored perfection of humanity, before destroyed by the sins of men.

In the *Celestial Hierarchy*, Scripture names of angels are distributed in three classes—the first including thrones, cherubim, and seraphim, the second, powers, dominions, and virtues, and the third, angels, archangels, and principalities ; the writer, in commenting upon them, enters into regions of pure imagination, where he indi-

¹ Vaughan's *Hours with the Mystics*, vol. I. p. 93.

cates how strongly his mind was imbued with mystical notions of the universe.

In the *Ecclesiastical Hierarchy*, parallels occur between the heavenly hosts and the orders of the Church ministry ; deacons, whose office is to purify, priests, whose business is to illuminate, and bishops, who perfect what has been begun by others, form an ascending scale, corresponding with angelic agencies ; and thus, with much really rationalistic, there abounds much of the High Church element.

The effect produced by these writings was very great. It may be traced throughout the literature of the middle ages, especially after John Erigena translated them from Greek to Latin. Dionysius is cited with reverence by Peter Lombard and Thomas Aquinas ; Albertus Magnus commented upon his works ; Tauler and Savonarola have been claimed as his disciples ; and Dante, Spenser, and Milton are placed within the sphere of his inspiration.¹

¹ The works of Dionysius were edited by the Jesuit, Balth. Corderius. Paris, 1615. There is a French translation of them by L'Abbé Darboy, 1845. The article on him in Herzog is good ; that in the *Dictionary of Christian Biography* is better.

PART III.

FROM THE DEVELOPMENT OF SYSTEMATIC
THEOLOGY TO THE FULL DEVELOPMENT
OF SCHOLASTICISM.

A.D. 730-1060.

CHAPTER I.

EASTERN DIVINES.

VIGOROUS and active as the theological spirit had been in the East, before and during the fifth century, its decline afterwards is manifest, save as we find it struggling to exist in the Monophysite and Monothelite controversies. Nevertheless, in the seventh century, we light upon the revival of an old heresy in a new form. Gnosticism and Manicheism retained a hold upon many Oriental minds when the palmy season of these systems had passed away ; and in Armenia, about A.D. 653, there lived a man of Manichæan descent, who cherished the traditions of his family, and, after becoming acquainted with the Gospels and with the Epistles of St. Paul, incorporated with the Christian faith some old Manichæan principles. His name was Constantine, and he called himself Silvanus ; others who imbibed his tenets assumed the names of Titus, Epaphroditus, and Timothy. This indicated their interest in the writings of the apostle ; and, through their reverence for him, they received the denomination of Paulicians. They revived the antipathy to the Apostle Peter, which had existed at an early age ; and yet, it appears, they honoured the Apostle James as well as the Apostle John. They rejected, it is said, the Old Testament, and held the eternity of matter, and the existence of two Gods—the one full of darkness and fire, Creator of the world ; the other glorious and good, Lord of the life to come. The old notion of a soul imprisoned within the body is conspicuous in Paulicianism ; to the

identification of matter with God was added the denial of our Lord's real incarnation, the rejection of Christian sacraments, the refusal to recognize any order of ministers, and the most determined opposition to the use of the cross and of images in Christian worship. But the Paulicians revered the Book of the Four Gospels, as containing the words of Jesus Christ. They assumed to themselves exclusively the title of Christians, and fixed on the Western Church the name of Romans. In all this, there was not so much any new theological development as a strange mixture of heterodoxy and orthodoxy, with a revulsion of feeling against the superstitions of the West. It is difficult to find in them much resemblance to the Apostle Paul.¹

Orthodox theologians of Greek Christendom may be reckoned up in considerable numbers, but only a few are redeemed from oblivion. John of Damascus, Theodorus Abucara, Photius, Patriarch of Constantinople, Nicolaus of Methone, and Nicolaus of Thessalonica, alone require notice in this limited review. Many of the Eastern Mediævalists were chiefly, if not entirely, commentators, biographers, annalists, and collectors of legendary stories.

JOHN OF DAMASCUS (who died about A.D. 754) wrote an exposition of the Catholic faith—a mere compilation, in which, according to his own admission, he put down nothing of his own, but only presented what he had selected from the "good and wise." Athanasius, Basil, and the Gregorys, Chrysostom, Cyril, and others are laid under contribution; and from these sources, exegetical and philosophical, as well as theological, matter is copiously drawn; the results not being presented in a

¹ The Paulician opinions have given rise to much controversy. See *Histories* by Mosheim, Gieseler, and Robertson.

harmonious or consistent form. The Divine existence, the Trinity, the creation—including angels, the fall of man, the person of Christ, baptism, faith, the Eucharist, the Virgin Mary, and the Scriptures, are discussed after an illogical order, in a treatise, consisting of four books, entitled, an *Accurate Exposition of the Orthodox Faith*.¹ It is sufficient to notice that John of Damascus, whilst repudiating with Gregory of Nazianzum the idea of paying a ransom price to the devil, repeats the prevalent notion of a fraud practised on Satan, whom he oddly represents as caught by the bait of God's hook, when seizing on the body of Christ crucified; and as himself destroyed by that sinless One. Looking at the moral side of the atonement, after dropping the rhetorical extravagance now noticed, the Damascene remarks, how the Son of God, by His participation of our nature, has raised us to the sphere of the incorruptible and abiding: how, by and in Himself, He has renewed man in the image of God, and through His resurrection has delivered mortals from the realm of the transitory; and, finally, how by awakening the knowledge of God in our souls, as well as by discipline, patience, and meekness, He has redeemed us from the power of the devil.²

THEODORUS ABUCARA flourished in the beginning of the ninth century, and is to be distinguished from his namesake, Bishop of Caria, in Thrace, with whom he is often confounded. Abucara is an Arabic name, signifying father or bishop of a small place in Syria, called Cara, or Charran. He wrote no fewer than forty-three polemical

¹ It may be found in the works of John of Damascus, edited by Michael le Quien, Paris.

² Ritschl, *Critical History of the Christian Doctrine of Justification and Reconciliation*, p. 21.

treatises, directed against Mohammedans, Jacobites, and Nestorians. In a work on *The Incarnation*, he aims, with a truly Greek instinct, at precision of language respecting this mysterious subject, carefully distinguishing between the word *God* as denoting the Trinity, and the word as denoting the Second Person, who alone assumed human nature; this author also maintained that the Divine Person was unaffected by the sufferings experienced by the man Christ Jesus. In an essay on *Philosophical Terms*, aimed at the Jacobite heresy, he dwells upon a variety of abstract expressions, such as "individuality," and "hypostasis" or "person," remarking that "hypostasis," "person," and "individual," are not to be employed as convertible terms in relation to the Divine nature of Jesus Christ, and to the Holy Spirit; for neither of these, he remarks, can be spoken of as if they were human individuals; and it is mischievous to use words which would mean there were three Gods, instead of words meaning that there is in the Godhead a Trinity in unity¹

PHOTIUS OF CONSTANTINOPLE (died about A.D. 891) is to be placed "in the highest rank amongst Byzantine writers. His position as one of the great promoters of the schism between the Eastern and Western Churches gives him an almost equal eminence in ecclesiastical history; and his position, striking vicissitudes of fortune, and connection with the leading political characters of his day, make him a personage of importance in the domestic history of the Byzantine empire."² His *Myriobiblion*, or

¹ The works of Theodorus Abucara are contained in vol. v. of the *Bibliotheca Patrum*, De la Bigne, Paris, 1575: and in vol. iv. of the second edit., 1589. Also in the *Lectiones Antiquæ* of Canisius, 1604, vol. iv.

² Smith's *Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography*, art. "Photius of Constantinople."

Bibliotheca, in two hundred and eighty divisions, is a vast repository of erudition, containing notices of classical and ecclesiastical authors and works—in fact, a “prototype of our modern critical reviews.”¹ Amongst the epistles of Photius is an encyclical, on various theological topics, particularly the procession of the Holy Ghost—the great question in dispute between the Eastern and Western Churches. A production entitled *Amphilochia* is admitted, even by an unfriendly censor, to be “a work filled with vast and varied learning, and very needful for theologians and expositors of Scripture.” But it would seem that the contributions made to theological literature by this extraordinary person, who wonderfully combined industry as an author with activity as an ecclesiastic, amounted to little if anything more than a repetition of old Greek formularies of thought touching the Trinitarian and the Monothelite controversies. As to the latter subject, it is handled in the seventh question of the *Amphilochia*, entitled, in the Latin version, *De Christi Voluntatibus Gnomicis*. Photius distinguishes between different kinds of wills, and places the human will of our Lord in absolute subjection to His Divine nature.²

NICOLAUS OF METHONE, in the Peloponnesus, where he was archbishop, and lived probably in the twelfth century, entered into controversy with the Latin Church, and is also mentioned as an opponent of Neo-Platonism; but he appears to have stepped over the limits of theological dissertation usually observed by Eastern divines, and to have taken up questions chiefly discussed in

¹ Robertson, vol. III. p. 421. *The Myriobiblion* was published by Immanuel Becker, 2 vols., Berlin, 1824 and 1825.

² The *Amphilochia* has been published in fragments at different times. See Smith's *Dictionary*, art. “Photius.”

the West. He deviates from the line pursued by John of Damascus relative to the effect of our Lord's death. He drops the idea of Satan being deceived by the method of our salvation, and approximates to "another and more scientific view, according to which the plan of redemption was enforced with logical necessity from certain Divine and human relations."¹ Indeed, it is thought he came to conclusions somewhat similar to those which we shall find hereafter were reached by great divines of the Latin Church, in the eleventh and twelfth centuries; and it is also considered that he did so on grounds of his own, independently of what was going on in another part of Christendom; but it would surely be a remarkable coincidence that an Eastern theologian, within a century after the publication of a singularly original work by a Western divine,² should, left to himself, have hit upon somewhat the same track of thought on a subject which, at the time, does not seem to have much exercised Greek intellects. Nicolaus, according to Ullmann, "agreed with Anselm" (of whom we shall have much to say), "principally in endeavouring to demonstrate that the Redeemer must needs have been God and man, but differed from him in this, that Anselm referred the necessity of the death of Jesus to the Divine holiness, while Nicolaus brought it into connection with the dominion of Satan over sinful men." It should be added, that another critic, Ritschl, thinks Ullmann has overcharged his representation, and that the theory of Nicolaus of Methone has no historical connection with Anselm, but is derived from the tract on the *Incarnation* attributed to Athanasius.³ Certainly the

¹ Hagenbach, *Hist. of Doct.*, vol. II. p. 32.

² Anselm.

³ *Hist. of the Christian Doct. of Justification and Reconciliation*, p. 20.

words from Nicolaus, cited by Baur and Hagenbach, do not appear sufficient to carry out the conclusion of more than a very general resemblance between the Greek and the Latin divines, inasmuch as they go little further than asking the question, Who is able to release the world from its slavery?—and then giving as an answer, that it must be one without sin; and as God only is sinless, He alone can deliver us; and to do so, He must assume our nature, and so become susceptible of death.¹

NICOLAUS CABASILAS, Archbishop of Thessalonica, who lived about 1350, wrote a work on the *Life of Christ*, in which,—though described as treating principally of baptism, the last unction, and the Eucharist,—the author approaches much nearer to Anselm than does his namesake of Methone, for the following train of reasoning has been gathered from this treatise: That men can make no reparation to the injured honour of God; but that the Divine man, alone competent, on whom lay no obligation, graciously undertook the task; that consequently we are, in the first place, freed from imprisonment through the death of Christ, who bore for us the punishment of the law; and, in the second place, we become friends of God and righteous persons through the efficacy of His death, for not only did the Saviour reconcile us to the Father, but He imparted to us the power of becoming children of the Most High. The former, adds Nicolaus, was effected by uniting our nature to Himself; the latter is accomplished through the power of the sacraments.² Such is the doctrine of the Thessalonian divine, as expounded by Ritschl.

¹ Hagenbach, *Hist. of Doct.*, vol. II. pp. 33–38.

² A Latin version of the *Life of Christ* was published in 1604, and is reprinted in the *Bibl. Patr.*, xxvi. p. 836. Ed. Lugd.

CHAPTER II.

WESTERN DIVINES.

THEY recognized the authority of Holy Scripture, but blended with it that of Fathers and Councils, whose teaching was regarded as conclusive. To depart from their decisions was perilous in the extreme. The age of development became a standard for the age of traditionalism. No sufficient distinction appears to have been made between the Divine ideal and the human apprehension of truth. The Church was supposed to be possessed of the mind of God. That mind, of course, was regarded as being in the Scripture; but it was also regarded as having divinely entered the intellects of such men as Ambrose and Augustine. Streams struck out of other rocks than God's Word were believed to have run into the reservoirs of the Church; and to these, rather than the sacred fountain at once, religious teachers were wont to repair. That fountain stood in the distance; and from magnificent vessels placed before it the faithful sought to draw living water.

Guizot justly remarks, "From the epoch at which we are now, the essential character of the theological spirit is, never to examine things in themselves, but to judge of all ideas by their relations to certain determined principles. The theologians in this respect have played the same part in modern Europe as was played by the juriconsults in the Roman world. The Roman juriconsults did not examine what we call the general principles of law, or natural law; they had for their point of departure

certain axioms, certain legal precedents ; and their skill consisted in subtilly unravelling the consequences, in order to apply them to particular cases as they presented themselves. Thus the Roman juriscōsults were logicians of admirable ingenuity and accuracy, but they were never philosophers. The theologians of the Middle Ages were similarly constituted ; they applied themselves to the same kind of work, and attained the same excellences—namely, accuracy and logical subtlety ; and fell into the same faults—namely, want of attention to facts themselves, and of any feeling for reality.”¹

And as with theological discussion, so also, and even to a greater extent, it was with Biblical interpretation. A measure of originality appears in the comments made upon Scripture by the Nicene and later Fathers ; but “about the seventh and eighth centuries this originality disappears: the oral or traditionary teaching, which allowed scope to the individual teacher, became hardened into a written tradition, and henceforward there is a uniform, invariable character as well as substance of Scripture interpretation.

Perhaps we should not err in putting Gregory the Great as the last of the original commentators ; for though very numerous commentaries on every book of Scripture continued to be written by the most eminent doctors, in their own names, probably not one interpretation of any importance would be found in them which could not be traced to some older source. So that all later comments are in fact catenas, or selections from the earlier Fathers, whether they present themselves expressly in the form of citations from their volumes, or are lections upon the Lesson or Gospel for the day ;

¹ *Lectures on Civilization*, vol. II. p. 363.

extempore, indeed, in form, but, as to their materials, drawn from the previous studies and stores of the expositor."¹

Nevertheless, in theological dissertations, though independent appeals to the Bible were neglected, though free thought according to Protestant notions could not be allowed, scope remained for mental activity; first, in discovering metaphysical grounds for ideas handed down by the Fathers; secondly, in the illustration of what those distinguished men had taught. Any conclusions *against* their doctrines was heresy; an appeal to Scripture in support of such conclusions would have been futile; but reasonings in support of what they had taught, and developments of their oracular decisions, while, on the one hand, they gave play to active intellects, were, on the other, within the landmarks of strict orthodoxy.

It is a grave mistake to imagine that mediæval divines were mere passive recipients of what they found in volumes on their scanty shelves. Not merely a photographic process went on when certain minds were opened to receive the light. No philosopher ever examined a sunbeam with more care than they analyzed sentiments to them as celestial as any sunbeams. The amount of thought they expended on their studies surpasses what is commonly supposed. Many, no doubt, were barren copyists, tracing line for line, like the merest drudge in the Abbey scriptorium. A few, however, could, as in calligraphy so in their glosses, illuminate what they copied. The mediæval Latins in this respect form a contrast to the mediæval Greeks. From the latter the busy, thoughtful habits of their fathers had

¹ *Catena Aurea*, Oxford, vol. I., pref. p. ii.

departed ; their literature, like their art, was stiff and stereotyped ; but Latin literature gave signs of budding life, though biting frosts held back the spring.

BEDE, the monk of Jarrow (A.D. 674—735), crosses the edge of division between this and the former chapter, and claims notice, not as a historian, but as his writings bear on theology. He was a commentator of the allegorical class, and gave proofs of ability in critical exegesis ; but beyond this he attempted a reconciliation between science and the Bible, by propounding a curious system of cosmography, and by striving to harmonize it with the history of Moses and the other sacred writers ; thus anticipating a kind of literature which has become rather abundant in these days ; but his name is more associated, though but slightly, with the history of dogma through stories which he tells of visions relating to purgatory, showing advance in the development of that idea. Probably such visions fixed that idea more firmly upon common minds, especially those possessed of imagination ; and hence it may be well to give an extract from a story he relates, in order to exhibit it, not as anything worthy of being called theological instruction, but as something in that rude age which served to promote a theological purpose. Speaking of a certain holy man named Fursey, Bede says he had visions of God, and that "when he had been lifted up on high he was ordered by the angels that conducted him to look back upon the world. Upon which, casting his eyes downward, he saw as it were a dark and obscure valley underneath him. He also saw four fires in the air not far distant from each other. Then, asking the angels what fires those were, he was told they were the fires which would kindle and consume the world. One of them was of falsehood, when we do not fulfil that

which we promised in baptism, to renounce the devil and all his works. The next of covetousness, when we prefer the riches of the world to the love of heavenly things. The third of discord, when we make no difficulty to offend the minds of our neighbours even in needless things. The fourth of iniquity, when we look upon it as no crime to rob and to defraud the weak. These fires, increasing by degrees, extended so as to meet one another, and being joined became an immense flame. When it drew near, fearing for himself, he said to the angel, 'Lord, behold, the fire draws near me.' The angel answered, 'That which you did not kindle shall not burn you; for though this appears to be a terrible and great fire, yet it tries every man according to the merits of his works; for every man's concupiscence shall burn in the fire; for as every one burns in the body through unlawful pleasure, so when discharged of the body he shall burn in the punishment which he has deserved.'"¹

ALCUIN (A.D. 735–804) is described as a man "with a mind doubtless more active and extensive than any around him, except that of Charlemagne; superior in instruction and intellectual activity to any of his contemporaries, without elevating himself much above them by the originality of his knowledge of ideas; in a word, a faithful representative of the intellectual progress of his epoch, which he outstripped in all things, but without ever separating himself from it."² His activity appears in collecting and restoring ancient MSS., reviving public schools, and imparting instruction by writings of his own. In none of his works does he manifest originality; he chiefly compiles what he has to say out of

¹ *Bede's Hist.*, lib. III. c. 19.

² Guizot, *Lectures on Civilization*, vol. II. p. 230.

previous writings, and by so doing claims commendation for learning, and a faculty for communicating what he had learned. He probably wrote what are called the *Libri Caroli*, intended to vindicate the moderate side in the controversy about images, and which differ to some extent from the papal authority of that day; but he is said to have become more contracted in his views as age advanced, and to him is ascribed the inspiration of a reverence for Rome in the minds of the Franconian clergy.¹ What concerns us here is Alcuin's character and contribution as a theologian. In this respect his merits are inconsiderable.

Amongst his letters to Charlemagne, his patron and friend, we find one written in the year 796, in which he gives an outline of theological study. "The method," he says, "I think, should be that which the blessed Augustine has laid down in his book *On the instruction of the simple-minded*." Students, he thought, should first be taught the general facts of the soul's immortality, a future life, and the everlasting duration of our destiny. From natural Alcuin advances to revealed religion; but his treatment of this is most unsatisfactory. The pupil, he says, should be told for what crimes and sins eternal punishment with the devil and his angels will be inflicted, and for what good actions he will be rewarded in the presence of Christ with eternal glory. Alcuin, moreover, recommended a careful inculcation of faith in the Holy Trinity and in the coming of Jesus Christ for the salvation of mankind. In this very meagre outline the writer merely falls back upon the example of Augustine, whom in fulness he attempts not to follow. Alcuin scarcely ever appears to rise above the low level

¹ Herzog, *Cyclop.*, art. "Alcuin."

indicated in the above passage. He wrote commentaries full of allegorical and moral meanings, after the manner of more gifted predecessors ; he prepared liturgical works for the use of the clergy in Divine offices ; and he engaged in controversy relative to the nature and person of our blessed Saviour. *Adoptionism*, as it is called, which found at the time a good many advocates, appears to have been a revival of Nestorianism, and consisted in the idea of our Lord, regarded as man, being the *proper* Son of David, and only the *adopted* Son of God. The Divine and human natures in our Lord were regarded as so separate, that the Divine appears dwelling within the human after a manner somewhat similar to that in which the Spirit of God dwells in the hearts of Christian believers. Indeed, it would seem that one of the teachers of this opinion, a Spanish bishop named Felix, compared the Divine adoption of Christ's humanity to that of the Divine adoption of Christ's true disciples ; only he said the relation was superior in its degree. Against Adoptionism Alcuin wrote a distinct work in seven books, and also a letter to the bishops of Southern France, in all of which he took the orthodox side, maintaining the doctrine of the incarnation as taught in Scripture and explained in the writings of those Fathers who had opposed such phases of opinion as were grouped under the name of the Nestorian heresy.¹

Besides these theological treatises, Alcuin wrote a body of Church divinity, entitled *De Fide Trinitatis*, following in the steps of Augustine, and also a dissertation, *De Processione Spiritus Sancti*, defending the Western dogma, that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the

¹ Hardwick's *Middle Ages*, p. 67 ; Robertson, *Hist.*, vol. III. p. 153.

Father and the Son, against the distinctive idea of the Eastern Church, that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father only.

GOTTSCHALK, who died A.D. 870, was in early life a monk of Fulda, under the guidance of a distinguished theologian, Rabanus Maurus; afterwards he became an inmate of the Cloister of Orbais, in the diocese of Soissons in France. He appears to have been a devout and earnest thinker, exceedingly zealous for the doctrine of salvation by grace, in this respect keeping close to Augustine; for, with pungent views of sin, he looked for acceptance with God through the work of Christ alone, and clung with invincible tenacity to the redemptive power of the gospel. But he seems to have been very one-sided, as men of strong views are apt to be. His opinions were narrow and rigid, and he showed himself a theorist of adventurous temper. He did what his great master in theology had not attempted to do. Augustine's theory of predestination had looked simply on the side of redemption and grace. Gottschalk pushed out the theory on the other side, that of reprobation; and he held that the Divine decrees included both salvation and perdition. He believed that God foreknew before the ages whatever was about to be done, and comprehended all within the range of His plans and purposes. Yet it has been argued that Gottschalk meant to indicate the different relations in which God stands to good and evil—ordaining the first, and only permitting the second. Neander says, "He referred God's predestination not to sin, but only to good, but foreknowledge to sin and good at the same time; and goodness as an object of the Divine predestination he defined as twofold—the blessings of Divine grace and the decisions of Divine

justice."¹ But it appears that Gottschalk so comprehended both within the lines of the Divine will, that when he was called upon to confess that God only *foresaw* evil, but *predestinated* good, he declined to accept that representation. He had evidently a metaphysical turn of a very subtle description; and those who are familiar with controversies on these profound and perplexing subjects will be slow to conclude what his opinions really were from the reports of antagonists. He aimed at a systematic and comprehensive view of the Divine government; and regarding it as extending over the whole universe, he endeavoured to find among the objects it controls a place for the existence of evil as well as the existence of good. And there can be no doubt of his having held this opinion, that all for whom Christ shed His blood were predestinated to salvation, and are infallibly brought to the enjoyment of life eternal; and that those for whom the Son did not assume a human body, and did not pour out His life-blood, the Father was unwilling to save, because He foresaw they would be the worst of sinners, and therefore He decreed them to eternal punishment.²

Gottschalk was opposed by RABANUS MAURUS, who after leaving Fulda became Archbishop of Mayence. He, like other orthodox teachers of the period, believed in the doctrine of Divine decrees; but he carefully distinguished between predestination and foreknowledge, and on that ground entered the lists against the zealous predestinarians. But HINC MAR, Archbishop of Rheims, proved a still more formidable antagonist; for, not satisfied with taking up his pen, he caused Gottschalk to be

¹ *Church History*, vol. VI. p. 272.

² See *Gottschalk's* statement to Rabanus; Gieseler, vol. II. 50. Compare Neander, vol. VI. 271, with Hardwick, *Middle Ages*, p. 173.

imprisoned, and having refused him the viaticum, remarked after his death that he had gone to his own place. Amulo, Archbishop of Lyons, wrote against Gottschalk; but Remigius, the next who occupied that see, took part with the persecuted theologian. He contended that Gottschalk had been misrepresented; yet, whilst leaning a little to the theology of the accused, he was willing to leave the question in debate to be settled by a council of the Church. Hincmar, irritated by any defence of his antagonist, returned to the charge, and his party asserted afresh the opinions opposed by Gottschalk. After further contention a synod assembled at Valence in A.D. 855, when universal redemption was treated as a great error; and it was declared that the sin of man was an object not of Divine predestination, but only of Divine foreknowledge; further, that whilst amongst the multitude of the redeemed some were saved unto eternal life, because through the grace of redemption they remained faithful, others, because they were unwilling so to remain, would by no means attain to the plenitude of salvation and the enjoyment of everlasting blessedness.

We have to notice next a far different theologian from either Gottschalk or Hincmar.

JOHN SCOTUS ERIGENA (A.D. 810—877) was no cloistered monk, but a man who mixed with the world, who was boon companion with Charles the Bald, and could crack jokes with the monarch at table. He read Greek and studied Plato, and built up a pile of transcendental philosophy. Erigena employed himself in translating some of the writings of the so-called Dionysius the Areopagite,—the translation is included in Erigena's works; and the influence of the writer on Erigena is apparent to every one who compares the productions of

the two. Erigena devised a theory of the universe in which God appears first and last—the fountain whence all being flows, the ocean into which it finally rolls. He grappled with the problem of God and nature, and the relations between them, in a Neo-Platonic fashion, reviving the ideas of the Alexandrine school respecting the identity of subject and object, and the resolution of personal individuality into a phenomenon of the absolute. In his *De Divisione Naturæ*,¹ a work in five books, containing a dialogue between a master and his disciple, Erigena divides the universe into what creates and is not created;

¹ We here subjoin a notice of Erigena's work by a theologian of a very opposite school, one who had no sympathy with mystic or transcendental speculations.

"The Treatise on the Division of Nature," says Dr. Hampden, "is an extremely curious monument of his peculiar genius, and of the times when it was composed. It is perhaps the most scientific development of the system of pantheism which has ever appeared. It regularly deduces all existence from the reality of the Divine Being—the only nature according to him that has any proper objective reality. Viewed as a whole, it illustrates the vast but delusive power of the ancient metaphysics as an instrument of speculation, the ingenuity and subtlety with which the thread of connection is carried through the series of phenomena giving the plausibility of a real Divine philosophy. The dryness of the abstract disquisitions pursued in the work requires no ordinary patience of attention to go through its details. But it is not unworthy of that attention on the part of those who would fully study the history of the human mind or the state of opinion in the Church of the ninth century."—*Scholastic Philosophy considered* (Bampton Lecture), p. 416.

I would add that the study of Erigena is most interesting in connection with the speculations of what is called the Christian pantheistic school of the present day. If in any sense Erigena can be called a pantheist, his pantheism was very different from that cold, metaphysical theory which often goes by the name. Erigena clearly distinguished between *that which creates and that which is created*—a distinction fatal to pure pantheism.

what is created and creates ; what is created and does not create ; what neither creates nor is created. By the first he means God the Creator ; by the second, the principles or primordial causes of things ; by the third, the effect of those causes ; and by the fourth, God, as the end of all created being. This remarkable work is intended to prove created natures will return one day into those not created, and that at the end of the world there will remain nothing but God and the principles of all things in Him, as before the creation there was nothing but God and those principles.

His speculations in the third book often run in a vein of mysticism, and he insists strongly upon all things having been eternally in the Word of God, for which he cites the words of St. John : "All things were made by Him, and without Him nothing is made ;" but the fundamental theme of his first book, that which creates and is not created, involves a distinction between the Creator and the created ; and at the opening of the fourth book he describes the Deity as a superessential nature (*superessentialis natura*), as the creative cause of all things, and as a coessential Trinity in three subsistences.¹ For this reason he can hardly be called a pantheist, in the usual acceptance of the term.

The connection of Erigena's ideas with those of Neo-Platonism appears from their nature as well as from their history. Links may be traced between the Irishman and philosophers of the second century ; further, there may be noticed an approach in his theory to Indian speculations on the absorption of the world in Brahma. And this Oriental dream, in the case of Erigena, blends with other elements of thought, drawn from Plato and

¹ *De Divisione Naturæ*, III. § 8 ; IV. § 1.

Aristotle, from Augustine and Dionysius. Not only is he the recipient of varied metaphysical influences, he also anticipates, but in some respects only, modern theories propounded by Spinoza, Descartes, and Hegel. All this is very remarkable. Worthy of careful study is this man, in the heart of the Middle Ages speculating upon the universe in a tone of mystic rationalism not unlike certain speculatists of our own age. Yet while Erigena's book on the *Division of Nature* is full of thoughts such as have long agitated Germany, and are now agitating England, there is a mediæval stamp on his work from beginning to end. He never openly and plainly repudiates tradition, never sets its authority at defiance, any more than he does that of Scripture. He continually cites the Old and New Testaments, and he also speaks of truth as transmitted by the Fathers for the use of after generations, and he frequently quotes them, especially Gregory and Augustine; indeed, it is with an apparent horror of heresy that Erigena cites the words of the latter: "We do not communicate in the sacraments with those whose doctrines we disapprove."¹ Yet he found or made a loophole by which to escape

¹ *De Divinâ Prædest.*, c. I. § I.

The English reader may see a pretty full account of Erigena's *Division of Nature* in Sharon Turner's *History of England during the Middle Ages*, iv. 492; also Guizot's *Hist. of Civ.*, ii. 383. For the information of those who may wish to procure the original works of Erigena, it may be stated that they form volume cxxii. of the *Patrologiæ Coursus Completus*, published in Paris, 1853. Professor M. St. René Taillandier, of Strasbourg, published in 1843 an interesting monologue, *Scot Érigène et la Philosophie Scholastique*. In the first chapter he briefly but distinctly traces various influences which contributed to the production of Erigena's philosophical theology. Matter, in his *Histoire du Christianisme*, refers to a still unedited work by this author on the *Intuition of God*.

from patristic conclusions, and even from Scripture statements; for he said that both the Fathers and the sacred writers employed to a large extent, in consideration of human weakness, figurative language, which requires to be explained on philosophical principles, that is to say, according to the writer's own private speculations. It was a fundamental principle with this author, that there are not *two* studies—one of philosophy and another of religion, but one single comprehensive study—true philosophy being true religion, and true religion being true philosophy.

Yet for what he regarded as the genuine meaning of Divine revelation he professed, and no doubt felt, a deep reverence. "O Lord Jesus," he exclaims, "no other reward, no other blessedness, no other joy do I ask of Thee than that I may understand purely, and without any error through fallacious theories, Thy words which have been inspired by the Holy Ghost! For this is my highest felicity, and the end of perfected contemplation, because nothing beyond it can the rational and purest soul discover. For as we can seek nothing elsewhere more suitable than Thy words, so we can find nothing more clear (*apertius*) than what is in them. There Thou dwellest, and there Thou introducest those who seek and love Thee. There Thou preparest spiritual feasts of true knowledge for Thine elect, and there, entering in, Thou ministerest unto them. And what, O Lord, is Thy passing through but an infinite ascent by degrees in the contemplation of Thee? Thou enterest into the intellects of those who seek and find Thee. Thou wilt be found in Thy *Theophanies*, where, as in mirrors, Thou wilt meet there minds that understand Thee. Thou wilt not always suffer them to understand what Thou art *essentially*, but

what Thou *art not*, and because Thou art. Thou wilt not be found of them in Thine own superessential nature, in which Thou transcendest and surpassest all human intelligence wishing and striving to comprehend Thee. Thou affordest, therefore, to Thine own Thy presence after an ineffable mode of manifestation ; Thou passest over them by the mysterious loftiness and infinity of Thine essence.”¹

Besides the philosophical work on the division of nature, John Erigena wrote a treatise on predestination ; and here again the philosopher, no less than the theologian, makes his appearance. He asks, “What is the purpose of true philosophy but to exhibit the rules of true religion, whereby we humbly adore and rationally seek God, who is the first and supreme cause of all things? Whence it follows that true philosophy is true religion, and true religion true philosophy.”²

The treatise on predestination is aimed at Gottschalk, whose narrow system this critic ascribes to ignorance of Greek learning. He objects, on metaphysical grounds, to the idea of God’s predestinating and God’s foreknowing the future, because to Him all things are present ; but, he says, if such expressions are allowable, then it must be admitted that Divine predestination is eternal. Predestination, he remarks, relates to what is good, not to what is evil, which he contends is Augustine’s idea rightly understood. He asserts the freedom of the will, and that sin is only the absence of righteousness, and punishment the defect of bliss. God is neither the author of sin nor of punishment ; the first being the corruption of our nature, the second the consequence of that corruption. Fire is not needful as penal suffering, for the misery

¹ *De Div.*, lib. v. (*Opera*, 1010).

² *Div. Prædest.*, c. I. § 1.

of pride and other passions are torment enough. Knowledge and ignorance are with this divine the two main elements of human excellence and human degradation. "Inasmuch as there is no bliss but eternal life, and eternal life is the knowledge of truth, there is no other bliss than the knowledge of truth." This position he supports by quoting the words, "He who loveth Me is loved by My Father also; and I will love him, and manifest Myself unto him." "This is life eternal, that they may know Thee, the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom Thou hast sent." "And so," he adds, "if there be no misery but eternal death, then eternal death is ignorance of the truth, and there is no other misery than the ignorance of truth; where, therefore, ignorance of truth exists, life does not exist. But where there is no life, it is necessary there should be continual death. If things be so, who shall dare to say that God is the predestinator of punishment, unless he dares to assert that God is the author of ignorance, whilst from Him comes all intelligence?"¹ This passage affords a fair specimen of Erigena's method of reasoning; and it is apparent at a glance that in this strain there was a good deal to offend his orthodox friends, whilst he contended against one whom they counted a heterodox foe. He proceeded on philosophical ground, which led him into paths where Hincmar and others were not at all disposed to follow him. The current spirit of the age, whilst it mingled philosophy with religion, kept philosophy in subjection to religion; but Erigena, whilst apparently like others in this respect, was really changing the relationship between the two subjects, and bringing religion into subordination to philosophy.

¹ *Div. Prædest.*, c. XVII.

Erigena's *De Divisione Naturæ* was condemned by Pope Honorius, and, on its publication by Gale in 1681, was inserted in the index of forbidden works ; but some of Erigena's theological writings have, I believe, been held in esteem by Roman Catholic divines.

It must not be forgotten that he, in some of his philosophical speculations, but especially by his translation of "Dionysius the Areopagite," was a precursor of mediæval mysticism as well as scholastic realism. Spiritual kinship with him, in this respect, has been claimed on behalf of Bernard, Hugh and Richard de Victor, Bonaventura, and Gerson.

"The mystics," remarks M. St. René Taillandier, "like the scholastics, attached themselves to John Scotus Erigena. The translator of St. Dionysius the Areopagite, the enthusiastic thinker who had developed mystical doctrines, could not help influencing all who formed during the Middle Ages such a mighty family, scaling, as they said, up to the summits of contemplation."¹

"It is Scotus Erigena," this critic also remarks, "who is the legitimate ancestor of these mystical monks, of whom Richard of St. Victor is the most earnest representative. The principal characteristics of this school at which I take a rapid glance are those which first appeared in him. I would not say that they rest entirely with a single founder ; this mysticism comes from other sources. Its origin is in Christianity itself, and its nourishment has been derived from the living well-springs of St. Augustine ; but if it be hidden in the writings of the Bishop of Hippo, it took in the Middle Ages a more distinct form. It is in the writings of Scotus Erigena that we see it more clearly disengaged to pass from

¹ *Scot Érigène et la Philosophie Scholastique*, p. 216.

him into the period which followed. The physiological study of the spiritual affections, care to regulate the transports of thought, prudence to restrain perilous tendencies, and in the doctrine of union with God a decided maintenance of individual personality,—here we have the general traits of the mysticism of Scotus, developed by Hugh and St. Bernard, and raised to its highest value by Richard of St. Victor, who bequeathed it without reserve to his successors St. Bonaventura and Gerson.”¹

“I repeat it,” adds Taillandier, “Scotus Erigena, the father of scholasticism, the precursor of so many great spirits who have done honour to the Church, was destined to become an object of suspicion to his own descendants, and to the eager researches of a school unworthy of him, which seized illegitimately from him the power of his name and works. He is never cited by some who evidently attach themselves to his philosophy, and he is followed by men that misrepresent him; so that after a superficial examination, a deceived historian can completely misrepresent St. Bonaventura, and say, that if the doctors descended from St. Augustine and from St. Anselm, the preachers from St. Gregory and from St. Bernard, and the mystics from St. Dionysius the Areopagite and from Richard of St. Victor, all the occult doctrines of the Middle Ages, all the extravagances of the pantheists, mystics, and Manicheans belong to Scotus Erigena.”²

John Erigena was a many-sided man, and his writings present a curious combination of theological elements. A profound reverence for Scripture and a frequent appeal to its authority may be thought logically inconsistent with

¹ *Scot Erigène et la Philosophie Scholastique*, p. 225.

² *Ibid.* p. 231.

submission to Church traditionalism. So also rationalism and mysticism appear to many as antagonistic systems or principles; yet all four may be detected as co-existent and co-operating in the ingenious and often perplexing speculations of this most remarkable author.

Contemporary with John Erigena was HAYMO, a monk of Fulda, chosen bishop of the picturesque city of Halberstadt, on the borders of the Hartz district. Though he joined in the condemnation of Gottschalk,—a significant circumstance in the life of such a man,—he wrote in an evangelical strain, commended by Milner in his *Church History*. “By the book of life we ought to understand the Divine predestination, as it is written, The Lord knoweth them that are His.” “Man of himself departing from God, returns not of himself to God; God works all in all: by which words human arrogance is removed, since without the Holy Spirit our weakness can effect no real good, whether great or small.” “We are not only unable to perfect any good without Divine grace and mercy preceding and following us, but not even to think any. For the grace of God prevents us, that we may be willing, and follows us, that we may be able. Every good that we have, the good will, and the good work, is not from ourselves, but from God.”¹

We see that the ninth century could boast of a group of singularly active intellects in different countries, as we think of the names which have just passed under review, especially the English Alcuin, the Syrian Theodorus Abucara, the Greek Photius, the German Gottschalk, the French Hincmar, and John Erigena the Irishman. The last three of these plunged into the controversy just

¹ Milner's *Ch. Hist.*, vol. III. p. 255.

indicated on the metaphysical subject of predestination ; and whilst that controversy was going on, another, touching the metaphysical aspects of the matter of the Eucharist, occupied the attention of a wide circle of divines, scarcely less keen in their dialectic ability. Paschasius Radbert, elected Abbot of Corbie in A.D. 844, wrote a treatise *On the Body and Blood of the Lord*, in which he maintained that after consecration, though the appearance of bread and wine continued the same, nothing else was really present than the flesh born of the holy Virgin.¹ He accounted this a miracle, and cited in support of his view stories of other miracles, whilst claiming to be an exponent of the Catholic faith touching the Lord's Supper. But Rabanus Maurus and others denied this claim, and objected to the notion of any *material* change—any change beyond that which is spiritual—as an entire novelty. The chief of Radbert's opponents was Ratramnus, a monk of Corbie. He entered on the examination of two questions: Are the body and blood of Christ *really* present or figuratively present? Is it the same body as was born of the Virgin, died on the cross, rose from the grave, and ascended to heaven? To the first question he replies, "It is evident that bread and wine are figuratively the body and blood of Christ. According to the substance of the elements, they are after consecration what they were before, for the bread is not Christ substantially. If this mystery be not done in a figure, it cannot be called a mystery. The wine, also, which is made the sacrament of the blood of Christ by the consecration of the priest, shows one thing by its outward appearance and combines another inwardly ; for what is there visible outwardly but only the substance of

¹ C. I. 10.

the wine? These things are changed, but not according to the material part; and by this change they are not what they here appear to be, but are something else besides what is their proper being. For they are made spiritually the body and blood of Christ; not that the elements be two different things, but in one respect they are, as they appear, bread and wine, and in another the body and blood of Christ." Again, he says afterwards, "A little before His passion He was able to change the substance of bread and the creature of wine into His own body, which was to suffer, and into His blood, which was afterwards to be shed." To the second inquiry Ratramnus answers, "The body of Christ in which He suffered is one thing, and the blood which was shed for the salvation of the world is one, yet the sacraments of these things have obtained their names, so that they are called the body and blood of Christ, since they are so called on account of their resemblance to the things which they denote."¹ We prefer leaving Ratramnus to speak for himself; and on a careful consideration of his words, the reader perhaps will be at a loss to determine exactly what the opinion of this mediæval writer was on its positive side. That he rejected Radbert's theory is very clear; that he could not have had any such notion of the change in the Eucharist as is defined by the word *transubstantiation* is also plain; but what he positively meant by the bread and wine being "*made spiritually* the body and blood of Christ" is by no means obvious. We might conclude that he intended to say that the elements became spiritual figures; but afterwards we come upon the expression "able to change the *substance* of bread and the *creature* of wine into His own body;" yet before that, we find him

¹ *De Corpore et Sanguine Domini*, English translation, Oxford, 1838.

distinctly saying, "The bread and wine are *figuratively* the body and blood of Christ."

Two of the writers engaged in the predestination controversy cross our path as we examine this controversy about the Eucharist. Hincmar supported Paschasius; but it is doubtful how his language is to be interpreted; how much is to be taken as plain statement, and how much as mere rhetoric—a difficulty which continually meets us as we strive to sift polemical writings on this question.¹ John Erigena is said to have composed a book on the Eucharist; but some quotations, professedly from his work, correspond with passages found in Ratramnus. Gieseler thinks Erigena did not compose a treatise of this kind; but Christlieb supposes that he might have given an opinion on the two questions in a short letter to Charles the Bald, who is said to have proposed them; and that hence the book of Ratramnus, which first appeared anonymously, might come to be regarded as Erigena's.² This, however, is mere supposition. From his *De Divisione Naturæ*, and from an imperfect commentary on St. John first brought to light by M. Ravaisson in 1849, "it would seem his view of the sacrament was connected with a belief that the Saviour's body was changed after the resurrection into a reasonable soul, which is everywhere present." In Erigena's exposition of Dionysius the Areopagite, says Canon Robertson, he speaks against those who hold the visible Eucharist to signify nothing beyond itself.³

Quite outside the circle of this disputation in the ninth century, we meet in the tenth century with the famous Saxon letter and homilies of Ælfric, in which he

¹ Robertson, *Hist.*, vol. III. p. 349.

² *Ibid.*, III. 348.

³ I cannot find the words in the *Versio Operum S. Dionysii*.

declares that the bread and wine, daily hallowed by the hands of the priest, "in ghostly mystery," are not bodily so, they are not the self-same body as that in which Christ suffered; nor is the holy wine "the Saviour's blood which was shed for us in bodily thing, but in ghostly understanding. Both be truly that bread His body, and that wine also His blood, as was the heavenly bread which we call manna that fed forty years God's people."¹

These controversies have a special interest for those who attach importance to Church authority; and therefore the works just cited have become battle-fields for many modern polemics; and every student of theological opinions must cherish a laudable curiosity respecting the subject; yet those who base their religious belief upon the exclusive authority of Holy Scripture will not consider any important practical consequences to be involved in the historical conclusions reached, as they leave untouched all vital convictions immediately derived from the records of revelation. If we may anticipate a little, it may be here observed that at a still later date the Eucharistic controversy reappeared in France. BERENGAR, Archdeacon of Angers (A.D. 1040), in a vacillating fashion, and with repeated contradictions, maintained what were deemed heterodox opinions touching the Eucharist. He contended for a change in the elements without any destruction of their substance, and admitted the presence of the Lord in a supernatural manner to every believing soul in the administration of the ordinance; but some who followed him denied the presence in any sense whatever. In his final recantation Berengar acknowledged a

¹ *A Testimonie of Antiquity shewing the ancient faith in the Church of England*, etc., published under the auspices of Archbishop Parker.

substantial change wrought in the sacrament; the expressions forced upon the persecuted man indicating the Church doctrine at the time, and clearly admitting a change in the substance of the elements.¹

Amongst the theological names connected with the predestinarian and eucharistic disputes of the ninth century, one already mentioned requires notice on another account.

RABANUS MAURUS, Abbot of Fulda (A.D. 822), Archbishop of Mayence (847), was a most industrious author, and a man of great religious influence. He took a part in the predestinarian controversy, opposing Gottschalk with all his might; and in the eucharistic controversy he opposed Radbert; but the work by Rabanus Maurus which we wish to notice now for a moment is his *De Universo*, in twenty-two books, of which about five only relate to ecclesiastical and theological subjects. As to theology, which alone concerns us, he treats of the Trinity, and that chiefly in reference to the different names of the Father and the Son, also explaining what is revealed in reference to the Holy Ghost, and insisting upon the Western doctrine of His procession from the Father and the Son. Afterwards he takes up the names assigned to angels, and the signification of the names borne by patriarchs and prophets.² In the course of his etymological remarks he shows himself a debtor to Isidore and Bede, and indicates a taste for inquiry into the meaning of words, not without a special value at that period, when realism played so important a part in the realms of thought, preparing for controversies to be noticed hereafter. Rabanus

¹ See passages quoted in Gieseler, vol. II. p. 103. *Acta Berengarii*, p. 761; Gieseler, vol. II. p. 110.

² Dupin, *Ninth Century*, p. 160.

Maurus was a pupil of Alcuin ; so also was Fredegis of St. Martin of Tours, who seems to have anticipated to some extent the conflict between realism and nominalism at a later period. He debated the question whether *nothingness* be a reality or not, determining that question in the affirmative, because any name denotes *a certain thing*, and the Holy Scripture speaks of *a creation from nothing*. He endeavoured to prove that darkness is a real substance, and cites the words in Genesis—that darkness rested on the face of the waters ; that God separated the light from the darkness ; and that in Egypt there was a darkness that might be felt. This and much more looks like mere verbal trifling, such as prevailed abundantly in the days of Fredegis ; but when we brush away the dust of verbiage resting on his writings, it seems that he, like Rabanus Maurus, was making preparation for the coming combat between Realists and Nominalists. More was suspected to underlie such a contention than some cautious scholars liked to anticipate ; and we read of a learned clerk who asked the monks of Reichenau, if they were for Aristotle, who did not believe in universals as Plato did. Here the obscure correspondent was treading on the edge of a volcano, which in the twelfth and following centuries burst into flames ; and, as if aware of it, he proceeded to say of these Greek masters of philosophy, “ They were both of such authority that it was difficult to prefer one to the other.”¹

In the ninth century, besides the theologians already named, there lived one outside their sphere who has made a mark on history deeper than any of them.

CLAUDE, Bishop of Turin, died A.D. 839. A Spaniard by birth, he possessed much of the Spanish character.

¹ Matter's *Histoire*, II. 278-283.

Some passages of his writings anticipate the doctrines of the Reformation. He taught the supreme authority of Scripture, insisting that human writings were to be read, as Augustine says, "not with a necessity of believing, but with liberty of judging;" that the communion in the sacrament is the communion of faith; that it is folly and sacrilege to worship images; that there is no mediator between God and man but the man Christ Jesus; that no Church should be dedicated to saints or angels; and that relics ought not to be venerated and honoured in the way they were.¹

"On coming to Turin," he says, "I found all the Church contrary to the Word of truth, full of images and abomination. And because I began to destroy what the people worshipped, they opened their mouths against me so furiously, that unless God had assisted me I had been overwhelmed. We do not think, said they, the image we worship is Divine; we only honour it for the sake of Him whom it represents. To whom I replied, that if after leaving the worship of idols they had taken to the worship of the images of saints, they had but changed names. If men be adored at all, it is better to do it when they are living than when they are dead; when they bear the image of God, not when, like stocks and stones, they have neither sense nor reason. If the cross is to be worshipped because Christ was suspended on it, virgins should be worshipped because His mother was a virgin; mangers should be adored because He was laid in a manger; and swaddling bands should be revered because, when He was born, He was wrapped in swaddling bands. Hear, ye simple among the people; and ye fools, when will ye be wise? who make pilgrimages to Rome, and seek the

¹ Allix's *Albigenses*, p. 93.

intercession of the apostle. Every one is bound to believe God when He speaks, how much more when He speaks with an oath, saying, 'If Noah, Daniel, and Job were in the midst of it,' if there were as much sanctity, as much justice, as much merit in these saints of yours as in them, 'they should liberate neither son nor daughter.'" Claude says, too, that no one may trust to the merits and intercessions of saints.

Claude's idea of apostolic succession is thus briefly expressed. "Certainly he is not to be called apostolic who sits in the apostle's chair, but he who fulfils the apostle's office. Of them who hold the place but do not discharge the office, the Lord has said, 'The Scribes and Pharisees sit in Moses' seat.'"

It may be added that contemporary with Claude was AGOBARD, Archbishop of Lyons (A.D. 813-841), who denounced the corruptions of his day, and asserted that to worship images is folly, and that relics ought not to receive religious honours.

In the tenth and eleventh centuries the stream of Augustinian theology, it would seem, may be traced in the writings of some obscure authors. "Let no man," says Ausbert, cited by Milner,¹ "attribute to the teacher that he understands from his mouth; for unless there be an internal teacher the external one labours in vain. The Jews heard Christ preach in one manner, the apostles in another; those to judgment, these to salvation; for the Spirit taught these in the heart what those heard outwardly by the ear. Unless the Lord shine into the heart of the hearer, the teacher labours in darkness." Other passages with "an evangelical ring" in them may be culled from authors of that age, though we must not lose sight

¹ *Church Hist.*, vol. III. p. 299.

of the mass of Church theology in which they are imbedded; and if we may for a moment cross the line between West and East, it is pleasant to find the study of the Bible enforced on the laity by Theophylact, Archbishop of Bulgaria (died A.D. 1112). "Say not that it belongs only to persons professedly religious to read the Scriptures. It is the duty of every Christian, particularly of those who are in the midst of secular employments; they need the greatest help, as they live in a tempest. It is for thine own interest that thy children be well versed in Scripture; thence they will learn to reverence their parents."¹

In the tenth century too, as in the ninth, we hear mutterings of complaints and even bursts of indignation against Rome. Arnulph, Archbishop of Orleans, who presided over a council at Rheims A.D. 991, echoed what had before fallen from the lips of Claude and Agobard.

"Once we had our illustrious Leos, our Gregorys the Great. The whole Church, it is true, was willing to submit to the control of such men; but now shall it be decreed that to the popes of our time, monsters of iniquity, ignorant of Divine and human learning, unnumbered servants of God scattered through the world, distinguished by knowledge and piety, shall be compelled to submit? What do you think of him who, seated on his lofty throne, glitters in gold and purple? If destitute of love, and inflated only with knowledge, he is Antichrist sitting in the temple of God, and showing himself that he is God."²

¹ *Church Hist.*, vol. III. p. 299. Milner in his *Ch. Hist.* cites other authors whom he recognizes as of an evangelical stamp; but his chronological arrangement is confused.

² Letters in *Act. Syn. Rhem.*, c. 28. Gieseler, vol. II. p. 81.

There cannot be much doubt that the influence of Claude upon his flock, perpetuated for years amongst their posterity, prepared for that revival and reformation of religion which appeared in the twelfth century. It is probable that his influence reached the Vaudois Christians of later times. The resemblance between their sentiments and those of Claude, and the contiguity of the valleys to the city of Turin, seem to point to some sort of connection between them, perhaps very remote. It is true that in the ecclesiastical writers of the tenth and eleventh centuries there is no notice taken of these people; but traditions of their antiquity would indicate their early existence. The silence of historians respecting them till the twelfth century, when all the circumstances of the case are taken into consideration, is by no means sufficient evidence to the contrary. The retired situation of the Alpine valleys, the scenery which skirted them, so calculated to inspire freedom of thought, the simple nature of the episcopacy which obtained in the country, so free from hierarchical magnificence and pomp, and the tolerant government of the House of Savoy, in whose dominions the valleys were situated, contributed to render them a fit retreat for a faithful remnant, free from reigning corruptions, and averse to the power of Rome.¹

We may here add, besides the Vaudois, there were in North Italy other dissentients from Rome. About the eleventh century there poured in an influx of foreigners who had for centuries maintained religious opinions opposed to the reigning Church. We have met with the Paulicians, who originated in the East in the seventh

¹ The *Noble Lesson* has often been cited in proof of the antiquity of the Vaudois Church; but a MS. of that work recently brought to light shows it to belong to the fifteenth century.

century, and seen how their creed held in solution a good deal of Manichæism. For a long while they had been meek, patient, and submissive ; then, goaded on by persecution, they fled to arms, and on the field of battle defended their rights. Paulician exiles settled in Bulgaria, and thence, through commerce on the Danube, they spread south and west, and made their appearance not only in Lombardy and Italy, but also in Switzerland and France. They diffused their tenets wherever they went, sowing seeds of dissent from Rome, or watering such seeds already sown. The corruptions of the Church must have predisposed many for the reception of reformatory doctrines, and have greatly contributed to their ultimate success. These people, and probably others whose origin might be independent of them, but who before the end of the eleventh century emerged from obscurity and attracted the notice of ecclesiastical powers, were known by a variety of names—applied in scorn ; such as *Cathari*, Puritans, and *Patarini*, i. e. low-bred people. Those who lived in the neighbourhood of Albi, in the south of France, received the name of Albigenses.¹ To distinguish accurately between different shades of opinion which prevailed among these sects is now hopeless, for they have left no monuments of their own, and their enemies in

¹ The opinions of the Albigenses, in comparison with those of the Waldenses, present a thorny question into which I cannot enter. It has been discussed by Gieseler, Neander, Schmidt, and Maitland. My own opinion is that the record of the Inquisition of Toulouse, 1307—1323, decides the question as to the orthodoxy of the Waldenses and the heterodoxy of the Albigenses. The record is preserved in the British Museum. In it 92 persons are set down as *Valdenses*, and 495 as *Heretics*. The opinions attributed to the Heretics are different from those described or professed by the Valdenses. See Maitland's *Eight Essays*, p. 182.

many instances, there can be no doubt, have greatly misrepresented them. But this much appears certain, that the so-called *Cathari* and the so-called *Albigenses* were different from the Waldenses. Manichæism, or Dualism in some form appears to have been held by the former, and they regarded the Son of God as the highest angel, and the Holy Ghost as inferior to the Father. The God of the Old Testament was rejected, the incarnation was denied, and the history of the Redeemer was explained on a docetic principle; yet the New Testament is said to have been an object of veneration to these people,—and they are further described as believers in absolute predestination, and as disbelievers both in the efficacy of water baptism, and in the doctrine of transubstantiation. Rejecting the rites of the Roman Catholic Church, they had ceremonies of their own.¹

The tenth century was a period of great religious excitement, owing to an idea that the end of the world was at hand. It had been a tradition with Biblical commentators that the millennium spoken of in the twentieth chapter of the Revelation was a spiritual dispensation, to expire with the tenth century of the Christian era. As that term approached, the minds of people turned towards it with hope or terror, according to their spiritual experiences and character. The devout hailed what lay beyond with joy, the worldly were filled with dismay and horror. Speculations about Antichrist were mixed up with the prospect of final doom. The origin of Antichrist, the meaning of his name, and the time of his appearance attracted attention. It was thought by some that Babylonia would be his birthplace, and Chorazin or

¹ Mosheim, *Eccles. Hist.*, pp. 385, 425, 478; Robertson, *Hist.*, vol. v. p. 311, etc.

Bethsaida the scene of his education. An opinion was entertained that he would spring from a virgin, or be the offspring of a bishop and a nun. But there were persons who believed that one of the popes would turn out to be Antichrist; and into this channel of prophetic interpretation the anti-papal current of sentiment at that time appeared to flow. It is curious to find, however, that the clergy opposed calculations as to the end of the world, and laboured to persuade the laity that there was no reason to expect its immediate occurrence. It was contended that the very expectation itself was a *primâ facie* argument against its being fulfilled, for as building and worldly business were in some places suspended through the prevalent alarm, such a season could not be what the Lord had predicted when He said, "As it was in the days of Lot; they did eat, they drank, they bought, they sold, they planted, they builded; but the same day that Lot went out of Sodom it rained fire and brimstone from heaven, and destroyed them all. Even thus shall it be in the day when the Son of man is revealed."¹ The Abbot Abbo opposed the common idea. "When I was a youth," he relates, "I heard a sermon preached before the people of Paris about the end of the world. In that sermon it was said, that as soon as the thousandth year had ended Antichrist would come, and soon afterwards the universal judgment. To the best of my power I opposed this preaching from the Gospels, the Apocalypse, and the Book of Daniel."²

The taking of Jerusalem by the Saracens was explained, on the other hand, as a confirmation of the

¹ Luke xvii. 28-30.

² *Baronii Annales*, anno 1001. The life of Abbo has been published by Bouquet in his *Historians*, tome x.

coming end. "In the year of our Lord 1009, through God's permission, the land of Judæa was invaded by the unclean Turks. Jerusalem was taken, and the glorious sepulchre of Christ our Lord fell into their hands. This happened in the eleventh year of Robert, King of the Franks, when Basil and Constantine were Kings of the Greeks, and Henry Emperor of the Romans. At that time many of the Jews *barbarized* through fear. In the year following, when those events were reported throughout the world, fear and grief filled the hearts of most people, since they imagined that the end of the world had arrived; and the better disposed, turning the occasion to profit, seriously addressed themselves to the reformation of their lives."¹

As to the interpretation of prophecy, it seems to have been in a very unsettled and discordant state, for we find Herbert de Losinga, Bishop of Norwich, saying, about the end of the eleventh century, "No place is inaccessible to Satan. Satan has been loosed for a thousand years—a furnace of trial for us, if so be we be not burnt up in it as straw, but purified as gold."² And here I shall be forgiven for adding from the same writer a passage in one of his familiar letters, in which, oddly enough, referring to an animal he had borrowed of a brother bishop, he says, "I have kept your palfrey; but the most righteous Judge will restore him to thee one day in a flowery plain at that last great Jubilee, when unto all men all that has been theirs shall be restored." "Was he a millennarian," asks his editor, "and did he

¹ Narrative of W. Godell, Bouquet's *Historians*, x. 262. See further illustrations in Maitland's *Apostolic School of Prophetic Interpretation*, pp. 300-307.

² *Life and Letters of Herbert de Losinga*, i. 205.

hold the personal reign of Christ on a regenerated earth?"

Passing from this scanty notice of prophetic interpretations and ideas, and returning to a chronological arrangement, we may mention two more names of anti-papal reformers, in addition to those already cited.

HENRY THE HERMIT signalized himself in the twelfth century as a popular preacher, who combated much of the popular religion of his day, in the course of his missionary tours in Provence and Lausanne. His name has been blackened by grave charges, but perhaps his chief offence was that he unsettled public opinion on theological points.

PETER DE BRUIS was a man of the same class, and violently condemned masses, altars, prayers for the dead, and the veneration of crucifixes. It would appear that he opposed the baptism of infants, in this respect resembling other reformers in those days.¹ He met with a martyr's fate, and died in the flames; and it is important to find Bernard bearing testimony to the effects of this person's endeavours in the numbers which he drew off from the communion of the dominant Church. "There are a great many churches without people, a great many people without priests, a great many priests despised by the people, and a great many Christians without Jesus Christ. The churches are become like so many synagogues, the sanctuary is divested of its sanctity, the sacraments are looked upon as profane things, the festivals lose their solemnity, men die in their sins without absolution, and without receiving the communion. Baptism is denied to infants, they deride prayers and sacrifices for the dead, and the invocation of saints, the excommunication of

¹ Dupin, XII. p. 87.

bishops, the pilgrimages of devotion, and the consecration of the holy chrism and the holy oils ; and, in a word, a general contempt is cast on the ceremonies and customs of the Church.”¹

It has been common to confound together all the religionists of the Middle Ages who stood aloof from the Church of Rome ; but there is good reason to believe that they greatly differed from one another ; some adopted very erroneous opinions ; in some political aspirations were predominant ; but no reasonable doubt can be entertained respecting the orthodoxy and piety of PETER WALDO, who lived in the latter half of the twelfth century. He procured a vernacular version of the Scriptures—imperfect, no doubt—at the hands of two ecclesiastics, it is said, and then circulated it as widely as possible. A language called the *Romance* was spoken by Waldo’s neighbours and countrymen, different from the language spoken in the provinces of Gaul, when Jerome prepared the Vulgate translation. Waldo’s Romaunt translation included the four Gospels and other parts of the sacred volume ; and by their circulation, rather than by attempts at ecclesiastical reform, he sought to promote a revival of religion.

¹ Dupin, XII. p. 87.

PART IV.

FROM THE FULL DEVELOPMENT OF
SCHOLASTICISM TO THE REFORMATION.

A. D. 1060-1518.

CHAPTER I.

SCHOLASTIC DIVINITY. 1060-1224.

WE are apt to confound the different centuries of the mediæval period. Dark they were compared with the preceding and following ages, but not so dark as to be without an "auspicious gleam," like a summer midnight in northern latitudes. Whatever be the exact date fixed upon for the rise of scholasticism, it flourished in a very decided form before the end of the eleventh century. It is curious to notice how the schoolmen, then and afterwards, managed to perform their evolutions, how without breaking bounds they contrived to take so much vigorous exercise. Resistance to a growing spirit of inquiry proved useless. "Efforts put forth were desultory and irregular. They were the results of individual enterprise and courage; like the voyages of mariners pushing out to sea, not knowing where the tide and winds might drive them. Now a principle was established according to which human reason might freely expatiate. The liberty of commenting and discussing without limit might be indulged, provided the intellect confined itself within the range of established authorities."¹ Any question might be discussed which did not infringe upon the principle that tradition was in some sort a form of Divine revelation, that Fathers and doctors were authorized expounders of Christ and the apostles.

¹ Hampden's *Bampton Lect.*, p. 46.

No doubt a number of idle and absurd questions were discussed ; but scholastic studies must not be ranked altogether under such a category.

Most conspicuous amongst the questions canvassed in the schools is that which relates to general and individual existences. The philosophies of Plato and Aristotle have been distinguished as a science of realities and a science of names, and the distinction is correct to a certain extent ; but Plato's realities were not all so real as he and his disciples supposed ; and Aristotle's science of names was deeper than grammar or logic could fathom. The two philosophers produced a powerful effect on the Christian Church. The ideas of Plato laid hold of the mind of the Fathers ; the logical formulas of Aristotle at a later date moulded the shape of theological systems ; and the former continued to influence the speculations of philosophers and divines long after the latter had become a predominant power in the expression, the conflict, and the arrangement of opinions. Eventually the influence of Aristotle led to conceptions of general and individual existences different from the doctrines of Plato. Questions about them had early occupied the attention of metaphysical thinkers. Porphyry, in his introduction to Aristotle's *Categories*, touched but left unsolved the inquiry, "Whether genera and species exist in nature, or are only conceptions of the human mind ; and, on the supposition that they exist in nature, whether they are inherent in the objects of sense or disjoined from them."¹ This subject, passed over lightly by Alexandrian philosophers, irresistibly fixed itself on the minds of later metaphysicians, especially those of the theological order,

¹ Dugald Stewart, *Philosophy of the Human Mind*, vol. I. p. 168 ; Ueberweg's *Hist. of Philosophy*, vol. I. p. 365.

and came to play a conspicuous part in the mediæval history of the human mind. Augustine, as we have seen, proceeded upon the principle that human nature, as distinguished from human individuality, has a real existence. Individuals were regarded by him as substances in the fullest sense; but species and genera, *i. e.* distinct characteristics predicable of races, or of the entire family of man,—in other words, the sum total of peculiarities distinguishing one class of beings from another,—he also treated as having actual existence, though in a secondary sense. This idea of a real existence of species and genera obtained amongst metaphysical theologians down to the eleventh century; other than individual entities occupied men's thoughts as realities, deeper and more important, because more enduring than that which is material or personally intellectual. The existence of a common nature as distinguishable from the members of the human family, the existence of truth and goodness as distinguishable from the thoughts and virtues of particular persons, this was firmly believed; and the realism, or idealism, thus embraced had ramifications spreading over wide fields of reflection. To the universal ideas of being and unity these thinkers attributed reality. "Quite ignorant of the Platonic method, quite ignorant of the battles Plato had to fight with Parmenides and his school, in order that the name or notion of being might not be substituted for being itself, they taught it as a part of the science of logic—the science of names and notions—that universals have a life and a reality of their own."¹

We now proceed to notice the writings of a most distinguished realist who made some valuable contributions to metaphysical theology, reserving what we have

¹ Maurice's *Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy*.

to say relative to the controversy between realists and nominalists until we reach the author who is generally regarded as the founder of this later school.

ANSELM (A.D. 1033—1109) is better known to English readers as a champion of the Church against William Rufus than as a great metaphysician and theologian; but it is in the latter capacities that he is most illustrious. He is counted by some as the founder of scholasticism, being the most distinguished realistic philosopher of the eleventh century; and undoubtedly one great object of his life was to harmonize philosophy with religion by subjecting the former to the authority of the latter. It was not philosophy which induced this extraordinary man to study religion; it was religion which led him to devote the powers of his richly-gifted mind to philosophy. Like Augustine, he was taught by experience. Beautiful is the story of his spiritual life, how in the solitude of the cloister at Bec, in Normandy, he thought and prayed, and longed after God; and the seeds sown in his heart at Aosta, in Italy, by his mother germinated and bore holy fruit. With childlike imagination, whilst playing at the foot of the Piedmontese Alps, he had looked on the snow-peaks at sunrise and sunset as God's white throne, and had dreamt that he ascended celestial heights, to be fed with angels' food by his Divine Father's hand; and, when the early clothing of such thoughts fell off, he contemplated and adored with manly mind and heart the Author of his being and the Redeemer of his soul.

The contributions which Anselm made to theological science were numerous and important. He found himself amidst an age of intellectual activity, when the powers of human reason were being vigorously developed, and when the demands of human reason were

deemed most pressing, in connection with religious beliefs. He sought the aid of reason in support of religion. He felt sure that as the human mind and the gospel of Jesus Christ were both Divine gifts, they could not be at variance, but must be capable of reconciliation, and contain in them a profound harmony manifest to an inquirer who brought them into fair comparison with each other.

1. He began by studying the relations between faith and reason ; and he earnestly insisted upon the necessity of faith. In philosophy he considered that all true conclusions flowed from the constitution of the human intellect, that fundamental beliefs, ineradicable convictions, were lying at the basis of all science ; and as to religion, he believed that faith constituted its basis—religious faith, in his apprehension, being not a mere intellectual exercise, but something closely connected with the human will, and with the moral state of man ; hence he contended that no condition of thought and feeling could be regarded as Christian faith which did not produce fruits of holiness. A vital practical faith he connected with human reason as a prerequisite for its right exercise in reference to religious truth. Such faith, therefore, he taught, must come before there can be any proper understanding of Divine things. His famous dictum was, *We must believe that we may understand*, not understand that we may believe. The profoundest truths must first be accepted by faith, in order that they may be afterwards examined and discussed by reason. Such examination and discussion, he says, ought to follow ; for it betrays negligence to believe and then not to aim at understanding what is believed. Yet, as a genuine Roman Catholic, he thought that reason must

not inquire whether that which Scripture and the Church have taught be true. No; such truth in his view ought to be submissively admitted; and reason could only be allowed to investigate the grounds on which truth ultimately is found to rest. He taught that reason could not make a Christian man more or less sure, it could only illuminate that of which he was previously convinced. Religious faith rests entirely on authority—the authority of the Bible, the authority of the Church. Doubts and objections are foreclosed; and whilst reason may exercise itself within prescribed limits of ecclesiastical teaching, it must not take one step beyond. So Anselm brought all his philosophy into subjection to faith, and faith he identified with submission to the Church.¹

2. He was absorbed in reflections on the existence of God; and he aimed at constructing a scheme of natural theology which should meet the demands of reason and harmonize with the philosophy of his age. Anselm's argument on this subject is very subtle, and it is difficult to make it intelligible. It may be represented as twofold. First, in accordance with his realistic philosophy, he believed that ideas in the mind have a Divine foundation; and he claimed as a postulate that the mind can create nothing, but only perceive what is divinely revealed in some way; and that which is so perceived must be true. There is in man an original and indestructible idea of God. It is natural, and must come from God Himself; with such an origin, therefore, it must be true. Secondly, he adduced an ontological proof in the following form: God is the most perfect of beings, than whom nothing greater can be conceived. Now that which has actual

¹ *Proslogium*, c. I.; *Cur Deus Homo?* lib. I. c. I. See Ueberweg, *Hist.*, vol. I. p. 380.

existence is superior to that which is barely conceivable; therefore, from the idea of such a Being must follow the conviction of His actual existence. Because, otherwise, He would not be the most perfect of beings, than whom nothing greater can be conceived, for it would remain possible to conceive something greater still, namely, this very Being as actually existent. These arguments, in their scholastic form, will have little weight with modern thinkers; but in revised and modified ways they have been used down to the present day. We shall meet with them in a future stage of our historical review, and at present I pass them over with the remark, that as minds are so variously constituted, and as one kind of evidence commends itself to one class, and a different kind to another, *a priori* or abstract reasoning may bear with great force on some understandings, whilst it fails to convince others. The necessary intuitions of the intellect, when they are ascertained, present facts obviously bearing on this fundamental controversy, and must be taken into account; nor can it be overlooked that *a posteriori* inductions, bearing upon the signs of intelligence and will, as causes of natural phenomena, need to be supplemented by abstract considerations somewhat of the same character as those of Anselm. Anselm believed that God is subject to no law but what is in Himself. His will is law; yet Divine freedom has reference only to what is good. The doctrine that a thing is right because God wills it, must not be understood to mean, that if God were to will what is essentially wrong, His will would turn injustice into righteousness. God cannot lie; thus the rightness of what He wills cannot be extended to what would be unbecoming to His holy nature.¹ Arbitrary

¹ *Cur Deus Homo?* lib. I. c. 12.

forgiveness he places amongst acts unbecoming the Ruler of the universe.¹

3. He systematically handles, in a treatise devoted to the purpose, the subject of original sin. In it he asserts the depravity of human nature, and shows that moral evil has its seat in the will; and he also maintains that penalties are inflicted only when disobedience has been voluntary. He inquires why and in what way sin descends to infants. It is not through a necessity founded in creation, but it results from the propagation of an apostate nature, in consequence of the fall of our first parents. Like Augustine, Anselm believed that the whole race was seminally in Adam, and that all his posterity sinned in and with him. The common nature which existed in him becomes distributed among his individual descendants. Consequently, sin in the nature of Adam is not identical with sin in the conduct of persons who form his posterity. The former is *original* sin, the latter is *actual* sin. But though he strenuously taught the transmission of moral evil from generation to generation, he declared that there is a sense in which no one can bear his parent's sin, and in his conclusions on this subject, he contended against those who think that infants ought not to suffer on account of Adam's disobedience.²

4. No one could more zealously extol the riches of God's love than did Anselm. Every creature, he says, exists by virtue of it. It is diffused through all the operations of creation and providence in manifold modes

¹ Anselm works out his argument for the existence of God in the *Proslogium*. See outline of it in Neander, vol. VIII. p. 200; Rémusat, *Saint Anselm de Cant.*, p. 463 et seq.

² See *De Conceptu virginali, et originali peccato*, and *De libero arbitrio*.

and forms. Whatever we have we must ascribe to it, not to our own merits; and no creature can render to the Almighty and all gracious One anything which His free goodness has not first bestowed. The law can never justify. We are saved by grace; and where sin abounded, there grace did much more abound. Man is unable to begin, or to preserve, or to perfect anything which is good without God. All good works are God's gifts. Obedience is through His grace. A man who falls into sin cannot be restored but by Divine power. Conversion is wrought by the Holy Spirit, and it is not in a sinful being to convert himself. This mighty change is the most wonderful of all operations; indeed, the renewal of a soul is a more surprising miracle than the resurrection of a body.¹ Such sentences are freely scattered over Anselm's works, and they indicate his habitual recognition of the necessity, the efficaciousness, and the free bestowment of the gifts of redeeming love. Tenaciously he held the theory of a priesthood in the Church, and the necessary administration of sacraments, and the doctrine of baptismal regeneration; but he held that they were only channels through which Divine grace flows into the souls of sinful men.

5. Predestination, our author says, is scarcely an accurate expression in reference to the Eternal, as with Him all is present; there is no past, no future. Knowledge, determination, calling, justification, glorification are acts of the Divine mind and will, beyond the conditions of time and succession. They are from eternity. Prescience and predestination are harmonious; indeed the one is

¹ These sentiments occur in different works. See pp. 128, 215, 171, 263, 236, 130, 131, 54, 263, and 121 (large numerals) of *Anselmi Opera*, edit. Migne.

involved in the other. Prescience is the result of predestination. Foreknowledge is not derived from things which are to exist, but things which exist are derived from foreknowledge; otherwise things would exist independently of God, and would be a source of knowledge to His infinite mind. In a certain sense God may be said to predestinate evil, for He permits it, He does not hinder it—hence it happens. The predestination of good is very different. The existence of what is real and substantial must be from God; and as all which is good must be real and substantial, it proceeds from God. Evil is a negation, the absence of good, and therefore is not from God. All actions may be said to have a Divine cause, inasmuch as the power to act is a Divine gift. The substance of the act is from Him; the quality or privation of good in the performance of the act is not and cannot be from Him. The power to act is an instrument which may be used or misused for different purposes. For its misuse the Creator of the instrument is not responsible. Hence Anselm says predestination is consistent with human freedom, a position which, though it be true and consistent with fact, he fails, with all his metaphysical acuteness, to place in a clear and distinct light. Indeed, much of his argumentation is founded on verbal subtleties and equivocations, which can satisfy very few persons in the way they seem to have satisfied him. At any rate, he believed in the Divine predestination of events; and his endeavour was to find a philosophical method of reconciling with this the free action and responsibility of human beings. He grappled with the most ancient and the most profound of puzzles, and failed only where others have done so.¹

¹ *De Concord. Præs. Dei*, etc., quæst. I., II., III., IV., V., VI., VII.

6. As to the atonement, Anselm went below the question, What has redemption done for us? He asked, Has it not a bearing on the Divine government, and on the interests of the universe, as well as on our own personal welfare? He prosecuted a line of thought which had been opened at a much earlier period, and had been pursued to some extent by Athanasius and Augustine. A profound discussion of the subject is contained in his dialogue entitled, *Cur Deus Homo?* Anselm could not admit the idea of a ransom having in any way been paid to the evil one. A ransom is due only to God. Sin is the denial of the Divine due; it is injustice, it is the withholding of rights belonging to the Lord of the universe. Though such a state of things be permitted, still it is perfectly intolerable. That God should be robbed, and not repaid, is what cannot be endured. God cannot suffer His honour to be permanently violated. If it be so, then man cannot be saved without something being done to vindicate and support Divine claims. If sin be forgiven, some satisfaction must be made for it. But the greatness of sin is overwhelming, man himself cannot restore to the Almighty what he has taken away by his offences. What he cannot do must be done by another, if he be saved at all. And only One can make the needful satisfaction—the God-man.¹ This

¹ Ritschl thus expounds Anselm in the *Hist. of Christian Doctrine*, etc., p. 27 :

“If the value of the satisfaction is to exceed in value the whole universe, that is to say, the whole of that which is not God, then the satisfaction must be given by one who himself is greater than the universe. But only God Himself is greater than all which is not God; therefore God alone can give the satisfaction. But inasmuch as, properly speaking, man ought to give it, it can on that account only be achieved by God as man, or by Him who is at once perfect God

idea Anselm works out at length. He determines on *a priori* grounds what is essential to a sufficient satisfaction ; concluding that he who makes it must be perfect God and perfect man ; must be of the seed of Adam, and must assume humanity from a virgin, must have two natures in one person, must be innocent and free in himself from the penalty of death, must have life in his own hands, and die *ex sua potestate*, must partake of human infirmities, and when he dies must by his death prevail over the number and magnitude of our offences.¹

His work is a piece of logical argumentation throughout. It could not, indeed, have entered into the mind of any one ignorant of the gospel. This Anselm implicitly acknowledges in his fundamental principle, "First believe, then understand." Faith was at the bottom of his dialectics. He consciously employed himself in analyzing a truth taught by inspiration. Yet though his process of thought was actually excogitated from a ground of faith, he did not formally recognize it in his reasonings. He did not proceed from fact to theory, but rather from theory to fact. He did not say, There is in Scripture the doctrine of satisfaction for sin through the atonement of Christ, therefore there must be a necessity for such satisfaction. But, on independent grounds, he contended there must be a satisfaction, in the nature of things it is indispensable ; therefore such a satisfaction has been provided.

This kind of discussion has often been repeated since

and perfect man, without mingling or changing of the two natures in the peculiarity of the person. Now this is realized in the incarnate Word of God."

¹ *Cur Deus Homo* ? lib. II. cc. 6—14.

Anselm's time ; but whatever may be the value of it in some respects, it is assuredly defective in this : it is confined to the satisfaction of Divine righteousness without taking into account the moral bearing of redemption, namely, slaying the enmity of the human heart. Anselm dwelt on a much-neglected view, and that view needs to be kept in mind ; but another view ought ever to be coupled with it—that a vital union with the Redeemer, dying to sin through faith in Him, and living to holiness through the power of the same faith, is an essential part of the process of salvation. It is curious that in one part of his writings the author introduces an illustration very pertinent to the purpose now indicated. Speaking of a costly pearl falling amidst filth, he asks, Can it be replaced in the owner's casket unwashed and defiled ? He employs the figure inappositely, for the purpose of showing the need of a satisfaction to Divine justice ; it appropriately applies to the moral renewal of the soul redeemed by the mediation of Christ.

It should further be noticed that the main stress of Anselm's argument goes to show the necessity of the *Incarnation* for the redemption of man. Indeed, the title of his great work indicates this—*Cur Deus Homo?* With an affluence of reasoning, Anselm insists upon this aspect of Christian doctrine ; but he says *comparatively* little respecting the death of Christ. He alludes to it occasionally in his treatise ; but his thoughts respecting the subject turn chiefly on the voluntariness of the death of Christ, and the relation in which His death stood to those who crucified Him.¹ He does not bring out explicitly what is generally understood by the sacrificial, the propitiatory, the atoning effect of the death of Christ,

¹ Lib. I. c. 9 ; II. 15, 17.

but discusses the subject under subtle forms of thought and a scholastic style of expression unfamiliar to modern theologians. In other parts of his writings, however, he speaks of the Lord's death as the means—the necessary yet voluntarily undertaken means—of our salvation ;¹ and in one of his *Meditations* touchingly recognizes as, “placed before our very eyes, the price of redemption, the death and blood of our Redeemer, as shed for the remission of our sins.”²

But at the very time that Anselm was dwelling upon subjects which seemed sufficient to satisfy the cravings of the human soul for acceptance with God and the enjoyment of spiritual blessings, the current theology was flowing in other channels. Of this we have a remarkable instance in the life of his contemporary and friend HERBERT DE LOSINGA, Bishop of Norwich³ (A.D. 1095–1119), who, when Matilda, the Queen of Henry I.,—“*Molde the Good*,” as she used to be called,—approached her end, sent to her for guidance and comfort a long prayer, addressed not to that Saviour whose work Anselm had attempted to illustrate, and in whom no doubt Herbert sincerely believed, but to the Apostle John ; thus indicating how the intercession of saints was made to divert attention from the intercession of the Saviour. “Before all other saints,” he teaches her to say, as she kneels before the fourth evangelist, “have I chosen thee alone ; yea, I have chosen as my advocate him whom I hear to have been beloved before all others. Obtain thou pardon for mine negligences, and lighten thou, with thy visitation, the burden of my soul, which hath well-nigh cast away hope.

¹ *Opera*, 222.

² *Ibid.* 213.

³ He was made Bishop of Thetford in 1091, but in 1095 the see was removed to Norwich.

And oh, in lightening these my cares, thou blessed John, see that thou have on thy side, as thy companions, all thy friends, whom by my naughty life I have procured to be mine enemies.”¹ In this prayer St. John is extolled as “a virgin, and a son of the virgin;” and we find even Anselm addressing the same person in these words: “This is a special privilege of thy virginity, because, as a virgin, thou wast elected by the Lord and more beloved than the rest on this ground. Now, therefore,” Anselm adds, addressing a suppliant, “O virgin, draw nearer to the Saviour, and delay not to claim for thyself some portion of this sweetness. But if thou art not able to walk in this more excellent way, leave the breast of John where he inebriates himself with the wine of gladness in contemplating the Lord’s Divinity, and run thou to the breasts of His humanity, and there suck the milk which may be the nourishment of thy soul.”² It is well observed with reference to the prayer Herbert prepared for the queen, and it also applies in a measure to the quotation from Anselm: “The piece has great historical interest, from the witness which it bears to the deep corruption of faith and worship which had eaten like a gangrene into the Church of that period. Here, alas, is that overlaying of Holy Scripture with legends and fables of man’s invention, that indelicate and almost prurient recognition of virginity as the queen of Christian virtues, taking precedence of them all in the favour of God and the veneration of man, and that reposing of confidence in the intercession and patronage of saints, and particularly of the blessed Virgin, which constitute the virus of the

¹ *Life and Letters of Herbert de Losinga*, vol. I. p. 312. The whole prayer is given.

² *Meditationes*, xv. Opera, vol. I. p. 231.

Roman system, and which in this country, three centuries later, ensured its downfall.”¹

The towering form of Anselm has cast a shadow over one of his contemporaries, pronounced of late “in some respects an equal.”² We refer to HILDEBERT, Archbishop of Tours, who died about 1135. He wrote a treatise on morals, *Moralis Philosophia*, and introduced the maxims of Cicero, Seneca, Horace, and Juvenal. Up to that time morals and theology had been inseparable; ethics were interwoven with the doctrines of Divinity; to know the will of God constituted the whole theory of the subject. Hildebert made a bold attack on the orthodox opinion. He concluded, in anticipation of much later systems, that morality is based on the principle of expediency, that virtue is advantageous, that honesty is useful; at all events, this was what his writings seem to have amounted to. It was a great innovation. It broke away from ancient dogmas and convictions; and if it attracted some, it shocked others. How to reconcile conclusions of this order with established ideas was no easy matter. The new philosophy prescribed a strange medley of daring rationalism with a lingering reverence for tradition.³ It was a rising habit of thought. Hence bold assertions had often to be followed by direct retractions, where subtle sophistries were insufficient to meet the difficulty.

If, with Tennemann, we reckon the commencement of scholastic philosophy from the ninth century, then the first period runs on to the eleventh century; and during the whole of it realism was in the ascendant. Alcuin

¹ *Life and Letters*, edited by Goulburn and Symonds, vol. I. p. 302.

² Hardwick, *Middle Ages*, p. 276.

³ Matter, vol. III. p. 213.

was a realist. John Scotus Erigena was a most decided realist, reviving Neo-Platonism, and carrying out realistic views in those speculations which have obtained for him the name of pantheist. And Anselm ever proceeds along realistic lines. Indeed, down to the eleventh century the realistic philosophy was all-powerful with metaphysicians and divines. Then came the famous JOHN ROSCELLIN, Canon of Compiègne; and with him, according to Tennemann, the second period in the history of the scholastic philosophy commences. He entered, after an original manner, into the inquiry propounded by Porphyry on the subject of universals. Following, indeed going beyond, Aristotle, he concluded that being and unity are only attributes, and not substances. Whether or not he was the first to strike out this line of thought, he has won for himself the distinction of being the founder of nominalism, as opposed to realism. Genus and species, he taught, were not real essences, or types, or moulds of things, but words or names invented to express the thoughts of men in reference to the classification of objects and instances.

We may sum up an account of realism and nominalism thus. The doctrine of Plato, or at least the doctrine ascribed to him by Aristotle,—that universals have an independent existence apart from individual objects, and that they exist before the latter,—has been denominated *extreme realism*, and may be reduced to the formula *universalia ante rem*. The Aristotelian opinion, that universals, while possessing indeed a real existence, exist only *in* individual objects, is the doctrine of moderate realism, expressed by the formula *universalia in re*. Nominalism teaches that only individuals have real existence, and that genera and species are merely subjective

combinations of similar elements, united by the aid of one and the same conception ; that through conception similar objects are included under one and the same word, which word we employ to express a corresponding totality of objects. Now of this nominalism there are two varieties, according as stress is laid on the nature of the conception or on the meaning of the word. When stress falls on the *conception*, this mode of looking at the subject is called *conceptualism* ; when the stress falls on the *word*, this way of regarding it is called extreme *nominalism*. The formula of nominalism is *universalia post rem*.¹ Some critics on this branch of history prefer dividing opinions into the two classes of realistic and nominalistic, subdividing each into two branches ; but the more common method is to arrange the schoolmen under three denominations : realists, nominalists, conceptualists.

“All these leading types of doctrine appear, either in embryo or with a certain degree of development, in the ninth and tenth centuries ; but the more complete expansion and the dialectical demonstration of them, as well as the sharpest contests of their several supporters and also the development of the various possible modifications and combinations of them, belong to the period next succeeding.”

Concealed under a veil of grotesque mediæval embroidery, we have in realism features of thought the same as in the philosophy of Coleridge ; and in nominalism we recognize a phase of speculation uncovered by Locke and his disciples.

Roscellin (A.D. 1018) was more a metaphysician than a theologian ; but he comes out under the latter aspect in

¹ Ueberweg's *Hist. of Philosophy*, vol. I. p. 366.

a letter which he wrote on the subject of the Trinity, to which he applied his nominalistic scheme. If, as that scheme asserts, only individuals have a real existence, then the three persons of the Godhead alone have a substantial being. The *unity* of the Godhead is but a name. The Trinity is the reality of the Divine nature. "He asks why three eternal beings are not to be assumed to exist, seeing that the three persons of the Godhead are eternal." He regarded the question as one of names; taking person and substance as identical terms. He was not inclined to heresy, but desired to hold fast to the Christian faith and to defend it, believing that he was in accord with the teaching of the Church, "since he everywhere used the word *substantia* in the sense of that which has an independent existence, in which sense it may be employed to translate the Greek word *hypostasis*, which confessedly is used in the plural with reference to the three persons. His language was indeed at variance with what had become the established terminology of the Church; for in the latter the term *substantia* was always employed as the equivalent of the Greek word *οὐσία* (being, substance), and was therefore only used in the singular, in order to express the unity of the essence of the Divine persons. This usage necessarily became all the more invariable, since *οὐσία* has the same double signification as *substantia*."¹

To anticipate a little, we may here observe that WILLIAM OF CHAMPEAUX (who died A.D. 1120), a decided upholder of the reality of universals, entered upon a course of argument opposed to that of Roscellin, and applied it to theology. He contended that the distinction between man and man—as between Peter and Paul, for

¹ Ueberweg, vol. I. p. 375.

example, two individuals of the same race, both having the universal attribute of humanity—does not apply to the distinction between the persons of the Trinity. For, he said, the humanity of one man is not, strictly speaking, *identical with the humanity of another man*; it is only *similar*; but this kind of distinction, he urged, could not exist in the persons of the Godhead.¹ These discussions, both on the realistic and nominalistic sides, indicate the extremely subtle thought—some may think it more correct to say the extremely subtle use of words—which characterized the intellectual activity of the period. No doubt to people in general at the present day the whole dispute is unprofitable, perhaps scarcely intelligible; but the schoolmen, to whom these points of argument were clear enough, considered that important theological issues depended upon the dispute, complicated as it was with their conceptions of man and God, of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. And it is plain enough that on the sides both of realists and nominalists such speculations as those just described were endeavours to reconcile philosophy and religion, by making the former tributary to the latter. Religion came first, philosophy second, and the second was kept in subordination to the first; but a different phase of thought will appear on turning to the controversy between Abelard and Bernard.

¹ Ueberweg, vol. I. p. 377.

CHAPTER II.

SCHOLASTIC DIVINITY—*continued.*

THE position of PETER ABELARD (1079–1142) in reference to the realistic controversy has been carefully determined by Cousin.¹ According to him, Abelard was neither a nominalist nor a realist, but a conceptualist equally removed from the two opposite extremes. He insisted upon the significance of ideas, maintaining, on the one hand, that they do not occupy some supersensuous sphere; and, on the other, that they are not mere words, for the human mind, which forms and uses them, cannot be satisfied with nullities. The strength of this acute thinker appears in conflict with both the metaphysical schools of his day, but not through the maintenance of any well-defined intermediate system.

Being a man of immense intellectual ambition, with little spiritual feeling in the earlier part of life, he was scarcely qualified to reach the deepest principles of the gospel.

1. Instead of holding, with Anselm, that the inquiry into Divine questions requires a moral preparation, and that the true starting-point is faith in Divine authority, he treated the matter chiefly as an intellectual affair, and, in opposition to Anselm, proceeded on the principle that *we must understand in order to believe*. Anselm

¹ *Fragments Philosophiques*, par V. Cousin, p. 226. Dugald Stewart was of opinion that Reid's doctrine of ideas coincided nearly with that of the conceptualists.

subordinated reason to faith ; Abelard placed faith in subjection to reason. Here an immense difference appears, indeed, a direct antagonism. Anselm was an apostle of authority, Abelard an apostle of reason. As the former followed the path beaten by earlier dogmatists, the latter struck out a new one, in which we shall find he had followers afterwards. But Abelard was inconsistent, as all scholastic rationalists were, more or less. Though in his famous book, *Sic et non*, he quoted numerous passages from the Fathers indicating a contrariety of opinion among them, and so favouring a latitude of belief, he never openly and avowedly questioned their authority. Whatever he might think, he remained silent on that point. He distinguished between Scripture as necessarily true,¹ and other writings as worthy of being consulted, without deserving implicit acceptance ; but this clue, which might have led him out of a labyrinth, he never used for such a purpose. He departed from tradition without openly opposing it. Reason was his mistress, and, after the manner of a knight errant, he was willing to break a lance with any one in honour of her.

2. He brought his logic to bear on his views of the Divine nature. Nominalism said there is nothing which truly exists but the individual ; individuals alone are realities. According to that doctrine, the three persons in the Trinity, if realities, are individuals ; if not individuals, they are only names. The scholastic realist attacked that representation, and sought to place the nominalist on the horns of a dilemma—to terrify him with Tritheism on the one side, and Sabellianism on the other. He insisted that to choose between them was inevitable ; that

¹ Abelard wrote an exposition of St. Paul's Epistle to the Romans, and habitually appealed to Scripture.

there was no alternative but to accept heresy in one way or another as the results of nominalism. The scholastic conceptualist, represented by Abelard, shrunk from regarding the three persons of the Trinity as individual realities. He maintained that God is only one individual; and he resolved the Trinity into the omnipotence of the Father, the wisdom of the Son, and the love of the Spirit; thus constructing a purely philosophical theory on the subject. If the nominalist sacrificed the unity of God to the reality of the three persons, the conceptualist sacrificed the three persons to the Divine unity. One philosopher was Tritheistic, the other Sabellian. Abelard's notion was that the doctrine of the Trinity, as he expounded it, is a conception of reason independent of revelation, and as such apprehended by ancient philosophers.¹

3. Abelard's philosophy further modified his views of sin. He did not believe in the actual existence of human nature as distinguished from individual existence, and therefore did not believe in original sin, after the manner of Anselm or Augustine. He maintained sin to be simply an attribute of individual personality.

4. In relation to the work of grace, he thought that the first degree of faith is determined by the force of rational argument; but still he maintained that the seat of religion is in the heart, and that out of rational faith there proceeds, by the power of the Holy Spirit, the confidence of religious convictions respecting things unseen. Abelard contended for the doctrine of disinterested love, saying, "Whoever seeks in God not Himself, but something else, does not in reality love Him, but that other

¹ These views are expressed in his *Introductio ad Theolog. Christ.*, Introd. I. p. 985. Neander, vol. VIII. 225.

thing."¹ Abelard set aside the objective aspect of the atonement, and dwelt upon its moral influence. Anselm considered that Divine justice is the cause of an atonement being made. Abelard attributed it entirely to the love of God. Mercy is free to forgive on repentance. There is no need of a satisfaction. The object of the incarnation and death of Jesus Christ is to produce repentance. Yet Abelard attributes a good deal to the intercession of the Redeemer;² and he helped on the reaction against the notion of satisfaction being made to the devil by the death of Christ. Regarding the death of Christ simply as a manifestation of Divine love, he thereby struck at the root of the strange theory which had fascinated many minds. His view was defective, but it thoroughly undermined the idea of paying a price to the evil spirit for the ransom of mankind, or of gaining a victory over him by some sort of deception.

Abelard's views were one-sided in a different direction from that of Anselm; but it must be admitted that he saw truth in some quarters where, in his age, it was not commonly discerned. He died in reconciliation with the Church, and in his latter days manifested sincere piety, with deep repentance for the sins of early life.

It may be observed, in passing, that JOHN OF SALISBURY (died 1180), a pupil of Abelard, but unlike him, was a great admirer of the ancient philosophers, and an antagonist of the mere logical studies of scholasticism; yet

¹ Neander, vol. VIII. p. 127.

² This is stated by Shedd, *Hist. Doct.*, vol. II. p. 287, who refers to Abelard's *Com. ad Rom.* "Anselm develops the thought of a reconciliation of God in the death of Jesus Christ by means of legal conceptions; Abelard, the thought of a reconciliation of men with God in respect to the moral disposition of the parties towards each other."—Ritschl, p. 24.

he himself discussed metaphysical methods, and all sorts of questions—respecting substances and forms, matter and movement, time, space, number, and the first beginnings of things.

But a more important person here awaits attention. BERNARD (A.D. 1091—1153) was a totally different man from Abelard. In contrast with the rationalistic temperament of the one comes out the gushing affection of the other. Bernard's theology is steeped in an evangelical spirit, and indicates an estimate of Divine grace in agreement with the teaching of Augustine. He exhibits "a decided opposition to the speculative, and as deep a love for the contemplative or mystical theology." He does not travel over philosophical lines at all, but keeps to the beaten paths of religion. He appears as a preacher, not as a schoolman. His writings consist chiefly of a large collection of sermons and letters, among which, with much relating to ecclesiastical questions and monastic affairs, numerous passages of a doctrinal description may be found; but these must be looked for chiefly in his treatises on grace and free will, and the errors of Abelard.¹

His standpoint, as opposed to that of Abelard, appears in the following passage: "While Abelard," he said, "professes to explain all things by reason, even those which lie beyond the limits of reason, he fights at once against faith and reason; for what is more contrary to reason than through reason to seek to soar above reason? and what is more contrary to faith than to refuse our belief to that which we cannot attain by reason? Mary is therefore commended because she believed without inquiry; and Zacharias is therefore punished because

¹ *Opera*, Paris, 1845, tom. II. 18-63.

he would not believe until he had inquired.”¹ Bernard thus appears occupying the ground taken by Anselm. At the same time he held fast hold of Church tradition.²

Bernard arraigned Abelard, in his book on Abelard's errors, for the heterodox views he had promulgated on the doctrine of the Trinity, and in doing so reiterated the teaching of Athanasius. He also combated Abelard's views as to the possibility of remitting sin by a sovereign act ; but he did not dwell on the *necessity* of a satisfaction, as Anselm had done. He looked with some favour on the old notion of a Satanic claim, chiefly in deference to certain portions of patristic teaching ; but “ he only so far gives adherence to it, that he in the same breath superadds the altogether diverse thought of a satisfaction to God, which Christ, as the Head, gave for the body the Church when He bore its sins in His death.” He contended earnestly that Christ came into the world not only to *instruct*, but to *redeem*, and that in the work of our salvation Divine justice as well as Divine mercy is illustrated.³

No one else in his day came out more distinctly, or so distinctly, on the subject of imputation. He explains the passage in which Paul says, “ If one died for all, then were all dead,” by remarking that the satisfaction of one was imputed to all, as one bore the sins of all. The Head makes satisfaction for the members ; Christ for the body.⁴ On the doctrine of justification he wavers between the objective and subjective view. In one place he says, “ No one is without sin. Sufficient for all justification to me is the faith that He is gracious to me

¹ *Life of St. Bernard*, by Neander, translated by Wrench, p. 157.

² *De Error. Abelard.*, c. v.

³ *Ibid.* c. VII.—IX.

⁴ *Ibid.* c. VI.

against whom I have sinned. All that He has agreed not to impute against me is as if it had never been. Not to sin is God's righteousness; God's forgiveness is the righteousness of man." Again, "Whosoever is contrite for sin hungers and thirsts after righteousness; let him believe on Him who justifies the ungodly, and, justified by faith alone, he shall have peace with God." Here Bernard distinguishes between justification and sanctification. But in another passage he confounds the two. "Fear goes before, that justification may follow after. Perhaps, then, we are called in fear, and justified through love. The just man lives by faith, but without doubt through that which works by love."¹ He contended for free will, and maintained that grace operates through free will; for no one, he says, is saved against his will; the will consents to the grace of God. In transforming our perverse wills grace unites itself with them, enters into them. From God comes the beginning of salvation, and by Him it is carried on.² Grace, he says, influences the will without destroying its freedom. Destroy free will, and there is no subject for salvation. Set aside grace, and there remains no sufficient cause of salvation.

Bernard wrote a remarkable book on the four stages in the progress of love, in which spiritual fervour burns in every page; and in one of his sermons on the Canticles there is a passage which distinctly reveals the man, and shows how his theology was bathed in spiritual affection. "Dry is all nutriment of the soul if it be not anointed with this oil. When thou writest, nothing touches me if I cannot read Jesus there. He is the only

¹ Sermons XXII. and XXIII. ; Neander, vol. VIII. p. 293.

² *De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio*, cap. I. Upon this work of Bernard see Ritschl, pp. 95-99.

true remedy. When did ever hardness of heart, indolence, or ill-will abide the presence of this holy name? If, for example, I name Jesus as man, I present to myself the meek and lowly of heart, the man radiant with all virtue and holiness, the same who is also Almighty God, who can heal by His example and strengthen by His grace. Of all this the name of Jesus at once reminds me.”¹

There is a great deal in a passage like this which critics will call mysticism; and objections of a literary kind may be urged against some of the expressions employed. Nor, in looking at the whole controversy between Bernard and Abelard, can it be denied that the views of the latter were less heretical in some respects than the former represented; even in some things Abelard seems to have been logically right. Yet the conviction returns, most important to be cherished in the study of theology, that logic is not the only or the chief factor in producing correct conceptions, and that the heart must have play as well as the understanding, that the affections of a soul saved by grace must be allowed scope in the determination and maintenance of doctrinal truth.

“In the theology of Bernard reason has a place, but not the right one.” “He is not prepared to admit the great truth that if reason yields to faith, and assigns itself anywhere a limit, it must be on grounds satisfactory to reason. . . . Faith with Bernard receives the treasure of Divine truth, as it were, wrapped up (*involutum*). Understanding may afterwards cautiously unfold the envelope, and peep at the prize, but may never examine the contents first, to determine whether it shall be received or not.”²

¹ *In Cant.*, ser. xv. § 6.

² Vaughan's *Hours with the Mystics*, vol. I. p. 117.

CHAPTER III.

SCHOLASTIC DIVINITY—*continued.*

WORKS denominated *Sentences* and *Summæ* were written at this time, the former consisting of passages from patristic writers, the latter claiming the character of original compositions, treating of theological topics in systematic form.

The *Quatuor Libri Sententiarum* of PETER LOMBARD, who died A.D. 1164, are conspicuous in the catalogue of scholastic volumes, and they won for the author a renown which, though different from what it was six or seven hundred years ago, has at the present time by no means expired.

“It is,” says Dean Milman, “an elaborate compilation of passages from the writings of eminent Latin doctors; a tissue stiff with antique embroideries, and displaying the ingenuity of the artist who has so curiously wrought the patchwork into a whole. He introduces little reasoning of his own, only enough to give a consistency to his citations, and he avoids all reference to the opinions of heathen philosophers. He seems throughout on his guard against the suspicion of exercising the privilege of thinking for himself too far, endeavouring to show that he followed received opinions rather than his own speculations.”

This was the fashion of the age, and the glory of literature; and it is curious to contrast in this respect the fashion of our own age, and the glory of contemporary

writers, for now the chief object sought and the chief praise enjoyed is that of originality. Everybody who aims at making a mark in the republic of letters strives, sometimes with immense agony, to strike out a course which, perhaps he only fancies, has not been pursued before. The main characteristic of Peter's achievement is that he reduced the whole array of acknowledged opinions into systematic shape; preceding divines had gone over a wide range of topics, but Peter was the first to gather them all up, and to present them in logical order and sequence. It was the beginning of those vast dogmatical structures which, in complicated bulk, have been compared to the huge cathedrals of Gothic architecture.

The first part of the *Sentences* is devoted to the subject of the Holy Trinity; the second, to the creation of bodily and spiritual existences; the third, to the incarnation of the Eternal Word and correlative themes; and the fourth, to sacraments and sacramental signs.

In the first part, after discussing mysterious questions relative to the Divine nature and personality, he takes up the subject of Divine knowledge, foreknowledge, providence, predestination, will, and power; and inquires in what respect predestination and prescience differ from each other. He replies that predestination is a preparation for grace, and cannot operate apart from prescience; but prescience is quite possible apart from predestination. For through predestination the Almighty foresees the good which He intends to do Himself, and also foresees—simply foresees—the evil which others, not Himself, will accomplish. He predestinates to eternal life those whom He chooses; the rest He reprobates, because He foresees that they will sin and incur eternal death. After this

explanation he concludes that none of the predestinated can be lost, and none of the reprobate can be saved, and that therefore the number of the elect can neither be increased nor diminished. Following Augustine, he maintains that grace is the result of predestination, even that grace by which we are justified, by which we are helped to persevere in a holy life, and by which also we shall at last be beatified; and that as it regards reprobation, a distinction is to be made between iniquity and its punishment—iniquity has not been predestinated, only foreseen, but iniquity being foreseen, punishment is predestinated as the consequence.

In the second part we have disquisitions touching angelic natures—those that remain perfect and those that fell; also respecting good angels, whether they have been confirmed by grace, so that it is impossible for them to sin, and whether they possess a corporeal as well as spiritual essence; moreover, he discusses the creation of mankind, the nature of the soul, the fact of the fall, and the origin of evil. The relation of Adam to his posterity, and the consequences entailed by his offence, are treated at large, Peter all the way through walking in the footsteps of his great master, the Bishop of Hippo.

The third book takes up, besides the Incarnation, which is presented in the orthodox way, the meritorious work of Christ for us men and for our salvation. But on this point we find comparatively little. Fifteen sections are devoted to the incarnation, and five to what is generally understood by the atonement. Here he considers whether it was necessary that Christ should suffer and die, or whether in some other way men could have been delivered; the only division which goes to the heart of

the question, namely, what our Lord did to secure redemption, is put in this form, "how by Christ's death we are delivered from the devil and from sin." From the devil and from sin, Peter says, we are delivered by the death of Christ, because, according to Paul, in Rom. v., "we are justified by His blood," *in sanguine ipsius justificati sumus*: and inasmuch as we are justified, we are freed from sin and released from Satan, who held us captive in the chains of sin. Much follows respecting deliverance from sin and Satan; but nowhere is the idea introduced that this has been effected through a satisfaction made to the evil one. The deliverance throughout is mainly treated as moral, and the power of the atonement is exhibited as consisting in the manifestation of the love of God, through which love is excited in our hearts towards Him. But Peter does not finish without recurring to the old idea of Gregory the Great and others, of a bait or snare being laid for Satan.¹ He still chiefly looks at the whole subject from a moral point of view, and when speaking of Jesus Christ as a Mediator, he remarks, "We were enemies to God because our sins were inimical to His righteousness; and so our sins being dismissed, the enmity is at an end, and we, whom He justifies, are reconciled to the Just One." Still some of his expressions may be made to cover a further meaning, and to include forgiveness as well as purification; as when he says, "Christ is called Mediator, in that coming between God and man He reconciles them to each other. He reconciles by taking the offences of men out of the sight of God,

¹ "Tetendit ei muscipulam crucem suam; posuit ibi quasi escam sanguinem suum. Ille autem sanguinem suum fudit, non debitoris, per quod recessit à debitoribus. Ille quippe ad hoc sanguinem suum fudit ut peccata nostra deleret."—Lib. III. dist. XIX. 1.

whilst He blots out the sins at which God was offended and which made us His enemies.”¹ Peter also represents Christ as bearing the punishment of our sins; but he admits that some other method of salvation might have been possible, though a better cannot be imagined.²

The nature of faith is handled in the third book, and three kinds are pointed out—*credere in Deum, vel Deo, vel Deum*. The first means to believe that what He has said is true, which kind of faith the wicked have. The second, to believe in His existence, which also the ungodly do. The third, to believe so as to love and obey; and by this faith the sinner is justified, as his faith begins to work by love, for they only are good works which are performed from love to the Almighty. Love is the work of faith. The faith which devils and false Christians have is a quality of the mind, but it is ineffectual, because without charity or love. After connecting faith with love, he goes on to connect it with hope, quoting from the eleventh chapter of Hebrews: “Faith is the substance of things hoped for, the evidence (*argumentum vel convictio*) of things not seen.”³

The fourth book is taken up with prelections on the sacraments, baptism, confirmation, the Eucharist, penance, unction, ordination, and marriage. With respect to the Eucharist this scholastic divine has much to say. He believed and taught what had been for some time a prevalent doctrine, namely, that the bread and wine after consecration become truly the body and blood of Christ; but his language on the subject is by many supposed to go further than the point which, according to a careful examination of his *Sentences*, I

¹ Lib. III. dist. XIX. 6.

² Dist. XX.

³ Dist. XXIII. 4, 7.

find that he actually reached. He says distinctly that the real body and blood of Christ are present on the altar, and that the substance of the bread becomes His body, and the substance of the wine becomes His blood ; but then he adds, "If it be asked what kind of change this is, whether formal or substantial or otherwise (*qualis sit illa conversio, an formalis, an substantialis, vel alterius generis*), I am not able to define it." He states how it seems to some to be a *substantial* change (*substantiam converti in substantiam*), and how others oppose that view ; for himself he says, It is a mystery of faith to be well believed, but not capable of being well investigated and defined.¹ But he subsequently ventures, though with caution, and even timidity, to allow that the accidents of bread and wine, such as taste and weight, remain without their previous basis (*sine subjecto*), because no substance is there now, except the body and blood of the Lord, which is not affected by these accidents.² This is going as far as possible without using the word *transubstantiation*. That word, in reference to the eucharist, occurs in an exposition of the Canon of the Mass, professing to contain the opinions of Peter Damiani; and Stephen, Bishop of Autun (A.D. 1112-1136), represents our Lord as saying, "*Panem quem accipi in corpus meum transubstantiavi.*"³ And the word in one of its forms came to be authoritatively sanctioned and enforced in the Lateran decree of 1215 ; such words as *transition* or *translation* (*transfertur*) having been previously employed.

¹ Lib. iv. dist. XI. 1, 2, 3.

² Dist. XII. 1.

³ Robertson, vol. v. p. 411. Gieseler, vol. II. p. 331. He says Hildebert of Tours was the first who made use of the term *transubstantiatio*.

At the same time Peter Lombard closely connected the idea of a sacrifice with the eucharistic celebration, remarking that what is offered and consecrated by the priest may be called a sacrifice and oblation, because it is the memorial and representation of the true sacrifice and the holy immolation made on the altar of the cross.¹

As to penance, we find this writer maintaining that it consists of three parts—the compunction of the heart, the confession of the lips, and the satisfaction of the life in good works; and when discussing the question if confession to God alone be sufficient without confession to a priest, he decides that it is not sufficient, if there be an opportunity for making the other kind of confession; but as to priestly power, he concludes that it is only declarative, and that absolution avails so far as it agrees with the Divine judgment.²

Such, then, are some of the distinctive characteristics of this eminent schoolman, which we have thought it proper to state at some little length, because his work became a text-book for subsequent divines, and his influence on theological thinkers long afterwards was very great. In concluding what we have to say of him, it may be remarked, that as to his manner of teaching, he presents a striking contrast to his predecessor Peter Abelard. That philosopher, “whether pyrrhonist or more than pyrrhonist, had left” theological as well as other questions “in all the confusion of strife; he had set Fathers against Fathers, each Father against himself, the Church against the Church, tradition against tradition, law against law. The Lombard announced himself as the mediator, the final arbiter in this endless

¹ Lib. iv., dist. xii.

² Lib. iv., dist. xvii., xviii.

litigation; he would sternly fix the positive, proscribe the negative or sceptical view, in all these questions."¹ Abelard was a doubter, Lombard was a believer—but not a believer like Bernard. He had none of the warmth and glow of his orthodox and evangelical contemporary. He reasoned as a schoolman, coldly and dogmatically; whereas Bernard had resisted Abelard as the modern popular preacher grapples with scientific rationalists.

Summæ and *Sententiæ*, epitomes and citations, became the order of the day, few of them adding anything, either in form or substance, to previous theological dissertations. Perhaps an exception should be made on behalf of ALANUS DE INSULIS, a Parisian doctor (died A.D. 1202), who wrote a work entitled, *Ars Catholicæ Fidei ex rationibus naturalibus demonstrata*. He carefully guards against being thought faithless to authority, by saying that Jews and Mahomedans would not submit to the Bible and the Church, and therefore such persons required to be met by rational arguments, that so they might be made obedient to authority. Forthwith he proceeds by definitions and demonstrations to establish the existence of God, and even the doctrine of the Trinity, saying there are three causes which concur in the formation of substances—matter, form, and the combination of the two. Matter he attributes to the Father, form to the Son, and combination to the Spirit. In this way Alanus fancied that the Trinity may be proved.

On the other hand, there were writers in those days who had no sympathy with these appeals to reason, and looked upon them as a virtual surrender of the faith; whilst they themselves pursued the simple, old-fashioned method of searching the Bible to prove what is true.

¹ Milman's *Latin Christianity*, vol. VI. p. 438.

Gauthier, Canon of St. Victor, signalized himself in this way, opposing Abelard, Peter Lombard, and others of that school. Simon of Tournay, David of Dinant, and Amalric of Bena, who will be noticed amongst the mystics, were of the same class with Gauthier.

The second period of the scholastic philosophy, according to Tennemann, as we have seen, extends from the end of the eleventh century, when the great dispute began between nominalists and realists, to the middle of the thirteenth century, and includes Roscellin, Abelard, Bernard, and Peter Lombard. During this time a struggle was going on between realism on the one hand, and conceptualism and nominalism on the other; philosophy being held in check more or less by the authority of religion. But the third period opened under the exclusive dominion of realism, the advocates of the new school being driven from the field as aiding and abetting heresy; but the relative position of religion and philosophy became somewhat changed, philosophy, if in some cases not supreme, taking a higher relation to religion than it had done before.

At this crisis two circumstances occurred which require some notice before we pass any further. First, the erection of new universities, a result of the impulse given to a desire for intellectual culture, provided increased means and opportunities for the study of theology. The Emperor Frederic founded the university of Naples A.D. 1224; Robert, a native of Sorbonne, in Champagne, founded at Paris, in 1250, the university which still bears the name of his birthplace; Charles of Anjou, in 1265, founded a school at Rome. Universities at Padua, Ferrara, and Piacenza were afresh provided

for Italians. Lisbon became furnished with a seminary of learning; and Bologna, as well as Paris, entered on a new career of prosperity, and attracted within the walls of those cities numbers of Germans, who had then no large educational institutes of their own.

Secondly, a revival of the study of Aristotle distinguished this epoch. Aristotle had long been known to Western students in general only through translations by Victorinus and Boëthius. Then came Arabic versions, circulated in the Saracenic schools of Spain, versions in which much foreign matter was mingled with the genuine writings of the Stagyrite. Pantheistic tendencies were attributed to works of this description, and this brought them into disrepute. Abelard's fondness for the study of Aristotle served to increase the unpopularity of the latter for a while amongst orthodox divines; and Bernard looked on him with great suspicion. Aristotle's metaphysical and philosophical works were forbidden at Paris in A.D. 1215; and Gregory IX., in 1231, excluded them "until they should have been examined and purged from all suspicion of errors." Yet the dialectics of Aristotle held their ground. But a reaction not long afterwards took place. His genuine writings on metaphysics, psychology, and ethics were translated from the Greek, free from Mussulman expositions, and were found to be of a very different character from what had been before supposed by certain orthodox teachers.¹ The philosophical doctrines, as well as the dialectic forms of the Greek sage, made their way amongst professors in the universities, and obtained a decided triumph, forcing the Platonism of the earlier scholastics, which they derived from Augustine

¹ On the question as to how the scholastics became acquainted with Aristotle, see Ueberweg, vol. I. p. 430.

and other Church Fathers, into the background. Aristotle was exalted on high as the great master of human thought. A poem was written on *the life and death of Aristotle* by a Cologne theologian; and some even called this great philosopher the precursor of Christ.

In connection with these two circumstances particularly characteristic of the period before us, a third may be mentioned, originating at an early date, but perpetuated down to the twelfth century and afterwards. We allude to the neglect, or rather the condemnation, of classical studies. The revived fame of the Stagyrice came not on account of his belonging to the illustrious band of Greek authors. The classic poets, both Greek and Latin, were under a theological ban. All commendable reading nearly was confined within the channel of divinity. Philosophy was held in honour because—almost if not entirely because—it linked itself closely to sacred truths and sacred speculations. Homer and Virgil were differently regarded. Jerome describes himself as warned in a heavenly vision against Cicero, though Cicero was a philosopher as well as an orator; and the Latin Father tells us how he came to the conclusion, “Lord, if ever I possess profane books and read, I will confess to having denied Thee.”¹ Alcuin too tells a story how, when a boy in bed, he was attacked by demons for reading the classics, and how he vowed, “If I continue to love Virgil more than the Psalms, may I undergo such chastisement.” Lovers of the classics, notwithstanding, by stealth or through ingenious excuses, sometimes managed to dip into proscribed volumes. Not daring to remain in Egypt, they would, it has been amusingly remarked, spoil the Egyptians; avoiding heathen alliances, they would capture

¹ *Epist. ad Eustochium*, XVIII.

a heathen woman in war, and marry her, after shaving her head and paring her nails; and though not making a dinner off the writings of Cicero, they ventured to make out of him a dessert afterwards.¹ But rebukes and protestations in reference to such liberties continued to occur; and we find Herbert de Losinga, Bishop of Norwich, who died A.D. 1119, relating to two young students a vision he had beheld, somewhat after the manner of Jerome, in which a venerable lady reproved him for being busy with the fictions of Ovid and Virgil. "Unseemly is it," said she, "that Christ should be preached and Ovid recited by the same mouth; nor can that heart set forth the truth of the gospel aright which makes search into the shameful impurities of the poets; he cannot be pure from the pollution of sin who delights himself in a song which celebrates sins."² Herbert de Losinga's letter ends with the following passage: "Wherefore, my beloved sons, I took counsel thenceforward to look over the sacred books, to search into the sage maxims of the holy Fathers, to alter the misshapen proportions of my studies, and to bring back my way of life and my actions to the impress and character of the truth. Henceforth I will speak to you of Christ only, I will write to you of Christ; by my words and by my letters will I imprint Christ on your minds, doing this one thing especially, and for the sake of that doctrine refraining from propounding to you any other." This last resolve of a mediæval Churchman, wisely interpreted, is well worth the attention of modern candidates for the Christian ministry.

It was under these circumstances that the third period

¹ Maitland's *Dark Ages*, pp. 171-187.

² *Life, Letters, and Sermons of Herbert de Losinga*, vol. I. p. 45.

of scholasticism opened, and ALEXANDER HALES, the Irrefragable Doctor, ran his distinguished career. He was an Englishman, called Hales because he was educated in the monastery of Hales, Gloucestershire. He entered the Franciscan order, and taught at Paris, where he died A.D. 1245. Alexander was the first scholastic who became acquainted with the whole circle of Aristotelian philosophy, and first used it in theological service. He also was acquainted with the works of Avicenna. The doctrine of realism appears in his writings; but he regarded universals not as independent essences apart from God, but as existing in the Divine mind. They are the types of things, and are also identical with Divine efficient causes.

Hales' great work is his *Summa Universæ Theologiæ*,¹ and, like the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard, it is divided into four books. But, unlike his predecessor, he is far more than a laborious compiler; for, after what was then an original fashion, he made use of "philosophical doctrines for the demonstration of theological dogmas."² The first book consists of seventy-four questions touching God and the Trinity; the second embraces one hundred and eighty-nine questions relative to creation, to angels, to man, and to sin; the third comprises eighty-three questions respecting redemption, the person of Christ, the law, and grace; the fourth contains one hundred and fourteen questions suggested by the sacraments of the Church. Discussions under these heads, somewhat rambling, it would appear, include all sorts of metaphysical and verbal subtleties, often with regard to that which is most mysterious and unintelligible. Many of his questions

¹ Printed at Venice 1475, Nuremberg 1482.

² Ueberweg, vol. I. p. 433.

are frivolous, some very objectionable. Quotations of all sorts—Biblical, patristic, and classical—are introduced; and the attempt is made to reconcile the Fathers in instances where they are most discordant. The method pursued is often so subtle and sophistical as to make the difference between black and white very small. Whatever might be the effect of the Aristotelian revival on some minds in the way of driving Platonism into the background, it would seem that Hales, after all his study of Aristotle, was rather Platonic than Aristotelian in some parts at least of his philosophy, but he was fond enough of Aristotelian formularies. He confessed imperfect knowledge, insisted strongly on the need of a revelation, and maintained that only through grace can the pure in heart see God. The perception of spiritual truth, according to Alexander, depends upon the moral state of the affections rather than the exercise of reason.¹ He reckons evil as that which contributes to manifest the harmony of the universe. "By comparison with evil the good shines forth more conspicuously in its own essence."² And in relation to grace and works, he suggests that "the goodness of God shines forth in this, that in communicating Himself to man He imparts to him not only single operations of grace, but also the capacity in a certain sense of independent co-operation;"³ a position which, however guarded, is a very dangerous one.

ALBERTUS MAGNUS (A.D. 1193–1280) wrote such a number of works that they fill twenty-one folios.⁴ His *Summa Theologiæ* is a scholastic system after the approved method.

In the writings of this schoolman the scholastic method

¹ Quoted by Neander, *Eccl. Hist.*, vol. VIII. p. 182.

² *Ibid.* p. 249.

³ *Ibid.* p. 265.

⁴ Lyons, 1651.

attained its highest point. He differed from Alexander Hales, and would not concede that man is without power to discover truth, and that it can be reached only through purity of heart. But though in a certain sense he might be said to be thus rationalistic, he earnestly contended that the faith of the Church was in strict accordance with reason; upon the authority of its teaching he relied, from its dictum he declined to swerve. Church doctrine transcends all human philosophy, and is the embodiment of the highest reason. The Vulgate was with Albert the authentic Word of God. To the Fathers of the Church he attributed the gift of inspiration. The metaphysics of Aristotle are said to have influenced his theology; a Neo-Platonic element is detected in his theory of emanations from the first principle of all; in his doctrine of original sin, through our descent from Adam, he expresses the grossest conception of the existence in him of all his posterity. It is justly said "the real value of what he accumulated is of small amount." His theology is indeed an accumulation of ideas from all sources, good, bad, and indifferent, and his chief if not only merit is that of enormous industry; the accounts given of his voluminous writings do not indicate that he made any valuable contributions to theological science.¹

¹ Ueberweg, vol. I. pp. 436-440. See article on "Albertus Magnus" in Herzog, *Encyclop.*

CHAPTER IV.

SCHOLASTIC DIVINITY—*continued.*

THOMAS AQUINAS, or Thomas of Aquino (A.D. 1224–1274), “Doctor Angelicus,” as he was styled, ranks chief amongst the theologians of his day, and he will ever remain illustrious for his penetrating and comprehensive intellect, and for his indomitable industry. His works were published in seventeen volumes, 1576; in twenty-three volumes, 1660. They include the *Catena Aurea*, a commentary on the four Gospels; original expositions; a *Commentary* on the Sentences of Peter Lombard; *The Truth of the Catholic Faith*; part of *The Government of Princes*; and controversial pieces against the Greek Church.

His wonderful work, the *Summa Theologiæ*, is divided into three parts. The first treats of God—Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, descending to the consideration of men and angels. The second is twofold, the *prima secundæ* and the *secunda secundæ*, in which he dwells upon the final end of man, the nature of man, and the sin of man, the new law of the gospel, and the operations of Divine grace. In this he dilates also upon virtues and vices, and takes up the subject of prophecy. The *tertia pars* of the *Summa* is devoted to Christ’s redemptive work, in connection with the nature and efficacy of sacraments—a significant arrangement, indicative of the strong belief of the mediæval Church that sacraments are channels through which redeeming love flows into sinful souls.

Amidst a large amount of error we discover numerous sound theological principles. Doctrines of importance are clearly asserted by this acute and laborious schoolman, and defended against objections with patience enough to astonish modern disputants. Any one who will take the trouble to turn over the pages of his huge volume, will see how few theological controversies there are with regard to which this subtle and comprehensive thinker has not something to say. The dialëctician is plain enough in the minuteness with which he dissects propositions, and the skill with which he binds them together; the realist philosopher is not less visible in the conclusions at which he arrives; but, infinitely better, the believer in Christ is also manifest, in accordance with the well-known story: he fancied he heard the Master say, "Thou hast written well of Me, Thomas; what shall be thy reward?" "To have more of Thyself," he replied.

In the *prima pars* he inquires into the nature and boundaries of theology, and bases the science upon a Divine revelation, the contents of which, though undiscoverable by reason, are, when made known, proper subjects for inquiry and for defence. He discusses the Divine existence, the Divine attributes, God's will, and God's providence. On the Trinity he is almost more diffuse, even more minute than on the sole original Godhead. The most microscopic eye can hardly trace the exquisite and subtle distinctions, the thin and shadowy differences of words, which he creates or seizes. When he enters upon the thorny theme of predestination, he does not leave it until he has exhausted all which human knowledge can supply. His views are Augustinian.

Aquinas connects predestination with what is good,

prescience with what is evil. Predestination he holds to be the cause of grace and glory; but reprobation is not the cause of sin.¹ "The scholastic distinction between *pœna* and *culpa* should be particularly noticed in reference to the question of reprobation. The schoolmen would not admit a predestination of guilt, for this would have argued the presence of evil in the Divine mind."²

In the *prima secundæ* he goes fully into the subject of man's sinfulness, raising inquiries in his usual way, then answering them; after which he examines what may be said in opposition to his answers. Some of his inquiries are very vain and fruitless; as, for example, whether, if Adam had not sinned, and Eve alone had transgressed, that would have involved posterity in the evil of original sin. He decides that it would not.³ He maintains the negative nature and origin of evil, and the voluntariness of transgression; in this he follows Augustine with some modification. He represents sin as entailed on posterity by Adam's fall, and minutely discusses the extent of the physical evils thereby produced. He implies, where he does not assert, the connection between Adam and his posterity, but he does not dwell upon it at any great length; he has, however, much to say about venial and mortal sin, already an important point in the casuistry of the Church. There are not so many salient points in Aquinas' doctrine of sin as might be expected, and he lags behind his master Augustine in some of the redeeming aspects of his thoughtfulness on this subject.⁴

The doctrine of merit obtains much attention. Apart

¹ See *Prima pars*, quest. XXIII. for the whole discussion.

² Hampden's *Bampton Lect.*, p. 495. See also p. 180.

³ *Prima secundæ*, quest. LXXXI. art. 5.

⁴ The questions respecting sin in the *prima secundæ* range from quest. LXXI. to LXXXIX.

from grace Aquinas denies that man has any merit, but through grace he is admitted to the privileges of Divine sonship, and so acquires a kind of merit. The schoolmen distinguished between the merit of *congruity* and the merit of *condignity*: the former was the merit of fitness—in the common sense of the word, no merit at all—the latter was the merit of desert, which we commonly mean by the expression; Aquinas and others taught, that though man can have no merit in the way of desert looking at him as a fallen being, there may be merit in him of that kind, when he is regarded as in a state of grace. For through redemption he is placed in a new relation to God; and then, whilst having no claim on God in and of himself, he obtains a claim through that meritorious Saviour to whom he is livingly united. It is not only congruous that he should receive a reward, but, through Divine grace and Christ's work, he is really worthy of it. But merit of condignity in the highest sense, absolute merit *in oneself*, belongs only to Jesus Christ.¹ So far from regarding the doctrine of Divine grace as opposed to his doctrine of human merit, Aquinas viewed the second of these as a consequence of the first. In his estimation human merit resulted from Divine grace. The logical consequences drawn by Protestants from some of his perilous propositions he would have denied, and the practical abuses springing from the dogma in after times would, one might suppose, looking at his character as well as his opinions, have called forth his indignant protest.

In connection with the scholastic doctrine of merit there arose the idea of works of supererogation, which

¹ *Prima secundæ*, quest. CXIV. art. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. See Hagenbach, vol. II. p. 63; and Hampden's *Bampton Lect.*, p. 245.

had a root in Aquinas' distinction between counsels and precepts—the latter being obligatory on all, the former not so, but only accepted and carried out because of superior excellence of character. The merit in the one case was supposed to be far greater than in the other. Hence flowed the notion of good works by eminent saints, kept in store for the rest of the Church, and available to such as purchased them. The sale of indulgences was the fruit of this fatal idea.

Aquinas places repentance under the head of commutative justice, being a compensation for offences committed. "To the reduction of the subject under the head of penal justice may be ascribed, in a great measure, the unscriptural notions and unholy practices which grew up in the Church in regard to the expiation of offences and their respective criminality."¹ Repentance, meaning by that a change of mind, is slightly noticed by Aquinas.

He inquires into the nature of justification, and discusses the subject at great length. Following Peter Lombard in the order of his topics, he takes up this point before he approaches the doctrine of redemption through Jesus Christ, and consequently fails to bring out the connection between a sinner's acceptance with God and what has been accomplished on his behalf by our Saviour. It may serve to illustrate the way in which Aquinas treats the subject as a whole, to enumerate the series of questions which he proposes to answer. First, whether justification be the remission of sins. Secondly, whether for this remission the infusion of grace be needful. Thirdly, whether for it the exercise of free will is requisite. Fourthly, whether the exercise of faith be required. Fifthly, whether there must be a volition

¹ Hampden's *Bampton Lect.*, p. 248.

of the mind against sin. Sixthly, whether the remission of sins ought to be numbered amongst those things which are essential to justification. Seventhly, whether justification be instantaneous or progressive. Eighthly, whether the infusion of grace be first in the order of nature amongst those things which are necessary for justification. Ninthly, whether justification be the greatest work of God. And tenthly, whether it is a miraculous operation.¹ We have not space to give the answers of this illustrious schoolman to all these questions. It is sufficient to state that he begins by saying justification is the remission of sins; then he argues that infused grace is required for the purpose; then he connects with justification the exercise of free will and faith; and then he insists upon the hatred of evil as a further prerequisite. Afterwards he speaks of the remission of guilt as *the completion of justification (quæ sese habet in justificatione tanquam ejus consummatio)*. He proceeds to remark that justification is instantaneous, not because pardon is so, but because the infusion of grace is so. Though justification at first is described as the remission of sins, it is plain, from what follows, that this remission is not the beginning, but the end or consummation of it, for which, from first to last, the infusion of grace operating upon the will is the main causative power.

In the *secunda secundæ* he handles the subject of faith, which he regards under a variety of aspects, as being a principle of life and righteousness, and a spiritual power imparted to the soul lying at the root of all Christian virtues.² And we may here remark, in relation to Divine

¹ *Prima secundæ*, quest. CXIII. art. 1-10.

² *Secunda secundæ*, quest. 1-8.

grace, that the metaphysical doctrine of realism stamps his views with a characteristic impress which none can mistake. He does not use the word to indicate the general fact of a gracious influence being exercised on the hearts of men by the Holy Spirit, but to designate what he and the schoolmen in common regarded as something positive and substantial in the nature of God, capable of being distinctly defined, and of being divided into a number of properties or parts.

The incarnation and redemption of Christ are taken up fully in the third part of the *Summa*. Respecting the incarnation, he holds the views approved by the Church. To the theology of the atonement he made some contributions. Besides concluding in favour of the necessity of an atonement, as others before had done, maintaining that no other mode of redemption could be adopted if Scripture prophecy and the claims of Divine justice were to be taken into account, he opens up some new views. He combines a notion of deliverance from the devil with the Anselmic conception of a Divine satisfaction, and says that Christ is a twofold Redeemer, liberating us from the power of the evil one and reconciling us to Almighty God;¹ but "he recognizes the redemption of men from sin and from the devil only as a consequence of the reconciliation of men with God, which was brought about by means of Christ's death."²

Aquinas brings out more prominently than had been done before the priestly office of Christ, and the abounding merit of His sacrificial sufferings; for Anselm had thought more of the incarnation and the obedience of

¹ *Tertia pars*, quest. XLVIII., XLIX.

² Ritschl's *Doctrine of Reconciliation*, p. 6.

Christ than of His death as a satisfaction for sin.¹ In reference to what Christ endured on the cross Aquinas runs into fanciful particulars, and the idea of a superabundance in the Redeemer's merit² was so pushed as to make it contribute to the papal theory of supererogation. At the same time, Aquinas distinguishes between the *sufficiency* and *efficacy* of the Saviour's work, regarding its intrinsic value as infinite, and its application as limited. As to the need of the atonement, he deemed it necessary for saving mankind, both because it had been preordained, and also because it was required as a satisfaction to Divine righteousness.³

He goes beyond Anselm when he distinguishes between the *satisfaction* and *merit* of Christ's death, teaching that by it He not only made a satisfaction for human guilt, but earned for us a title to eternal life.⁴ To him also belongs the theological distinction between our Lord's *active* and *passive* obedience; and further, he alludes to a connection between the Redeemer and the redeemed, as resembling that between the head and the members, by which union grace in Him is communicated to them, and thus they form a spiritual unity. Thus to the principle of substitution Aquinas adds another very important one, that of a mystical fellowship between the Saviour and His Church.

Aquinas followed the practice in his time established of regarding the sacraments as seven in number, believing that though Christ instituted only baptism and the Lord's

¹ *Tertia pars*, quest. XXII.

² "Non solum sufficiens sed etiam superabundans satisfactio pro peccatis humani generis."

³ *Tertia pars*, quest. XLVI.—XLIX.

⁴ On the doctrine of Aquinas respecting satisfaction and merit, see Ritschl, pp. 51-59.

Supper, He virtually prepared for the rest. He explained the *form* as well as the *matter* of sacraments. "Interpreting," says Dr. Hampden, of the scholastic philosopher,—and his words apply to Aquinas,—“interpreting those passages of Scripture which speak of things made by the Word of God, as denoting expressly the creative efficacy of the second person of the Trinity, he connected the communication of *forms* to matter with the Word of God throughout; that is, he conceived the Divine words uttered to carry that mystical creative force which belonged to the Divine Word as existing in the Trinity.¹ Hence it was that certain words accompanying the celebration of a sacrament were said to be the form of a sacrament. In a manner analogous to the original formation of all things by the Divine Word acting on matter, it was conceived that the sacred words pronounced by

¹ *Tertia pars*, quest. LXXVIII. art. 4.

Art. 5 runs thus: “Et ideo aliter dicendum est, quod sicut prædictum est, hæc locutio habet virtutem factivam conversionis panis in corpus Christi: et ideo comparatur ad alias locutiones, quæ habent solum vim significativam, et non factivam, sicut comparatur conceptio intellectus practici, quæ est factiva rei, conceptioni intellectus nostri speculativi quæ est accepta a rebus: nam voces sunt signa intellectuum secundum philosophum. Et ideo sicut conceptio intellectus practici non præsupponit rem conceptam, sed facit eam; ita veritas hujus locutionis non præsupponit rem significatam, sed facit eam; sic enim se habet verbum Dei ad res factas per verbum.”

“We may see,” says Dr. Hampden, “from this last passage particularly the connection of transubstantiation with the scholastic theory of the Trinity. The Word of God is the Divine conception expressed, and by its utterance carrying creative efficacy: so also the words of consecration are the Divine conception going forth actively, and bringing down Christ with transforming power to the creatures of bread and wine.”—*Bampton Lecture*, p. 535.

the priest came with power to the element or matter, and imposed on it a mystical or sacramental form. Thus a sacrament has been described as consisting of matter and form: the matter being the water, or the bread and wine; or in confirmation the chrism; in penance the contrition of the penitent;—the form the particular words of consecration uttered by the priest. Hence too the use of the word *element* itself to denote the consecrated bread and wine; these being viewed, like the four imagined elements of the material world, as the bases of the sacred natures into which they were transformed. A certain matter and certain form are thus considered as indispensable to a sacrament.”¹ In connection with this subject, it is worthy of notice that Protestants, even Puritans and Nonconformists, who shrink with horror from the scholastic doctrine of the real presence, still commonly retain the use of the old scholastic term *elements* as descriptive of bread and wine in the Lord’s Supper.

As hinted already, and this is important, the subject of sacraments is taken up in the *Tertia pars* of the *Summa Theologiæ*, immediately after Aquinas has unfolded the redemptive work of Christ; and he exhibits baptism and the Lord’s Supper as *media* by which the blessings of redemption are conveyed to mankind.

¹ *Bampton Lecture*, p. 335. It may be noticed here that the word *sacramentum* is by mediæval writers used in a very loose and varied sense. The meaning seems to be something outward, yet something which that outward aspect does not exhaust. It is applied to Old Testament types, symbolical rites, events in Christ’s life, doctrinal mysteries, indeed almost anything that is profound. See a copious note on the subject in the *Life and Letters of Herbert de Losinga*, vol. II. p. 21. *Sacramentum* was especially taken to mean an oath, pledge, engagement. See Halley, *Congregational Lecture on Baptism*, Lect. 1.

He was zealous in maintaining the efficacy of sacraments, as appears in the third part of his *Summa*. Forgiveness is by him connected with baptism. Every baptized person is justified. Children as well as adults, he says, are made members of Christ by baptism.¹ It is obvious that such a view must affect the idea of justification, since it tends to make it appear a magical benefit, and whilst blending forgiveness with sanctification, it takes away the proper and distinctive character of both.

The subject of the eucharist, as might be expected, largely occupies the attention of this great schoolman. Question after question is taken up and debated. Whether in the sacrament the body of Christ be really present, or is only there by figure and sign ; whether the substance of bread and wine remains after consecration ; whether it be annihilated or resolved into its pristine elements ; whether in the sacrament, after consecration, the accidents of bread and wine continue, and whether the change be instantaneous. The first of these he answers by affirming the real presence ; the second he meets by a decided negative—the substance of the material elements does not remain ; to the third he replies that there is neither annihilation nor resolution, but a stupendous conversion into the real body of our Lord by miraculous operation ; as to the fourth, he says that the accidents continue without the substantial form as the means of exercising faith in Christian believers ; the last he meets by maintaining that this Divine mystery is not a matter of degrees, of more or less, and therefore the change may be regarded as instantaneous.² The disquisition is very

¹ *Tertia pars*, quest. LXIX. art. 6.

² Aquinas has eight questions on the subject. *Tertia pars*, quest. LXXV. art. 1-8. I have condensed the discussion.

minute, and the phraseology scholastic ; but although he uses the words *substantia* and *conversio*, he gives no succinct definition of the change under the word *transubstantiatio*. The idea is given, but not the exact phrase, afterwards so common. A number of other points are started, some trivial and even absurd ; as, for instance, whether the body of our Lord enters into an animal who by accident swallows the consecrated bread. Peter Lombard had raised this inquiry, and answered it in the affirmative. Aquinas does the same, only he says the animal partakes *accidentaliter*, not *sacramentaliter*. In reference to the sacrifice of the mass Aquinas expatiates at great length ; and here he plunges into several sets of intricate discussions, through which it is impossible here to follow him, except to say that he believed the offering of Christ on the cross to be commemorated and repeated on the altar.

Proceeding to another subject, that which relates to what is technically termed *eschatology*, we find Aquinas treating it very copiously. He indulges in strange conjectures as to the resurrection of the body, and asserts that the final judgment will be carried on mentally, because a verbal trial would occupy too long a time. Christ will appear in the body which He had on earth, but so glorified in form as to strike His enemies with dismay. The Angelic Doctor includes the idea of purgatory in this part of his discussions, but he wavers as to the question how material fire can affect disembodied souls. He thinks that all men do not enter purgatory ; the truly pious go to heaven, the decidedly wicked sink into hell. In heaven, he says, there are degrees of blessedness and glory, and the inhabitants are not disturbed by compassion for the lost ; and the torments of

the latter consist in useless repentance. Besides hell and purgatory, he recognizes a *limbus infantium*, where children are sent who die unbaptized; and a *limbus patrum*, where abode the Old Testament saints to whom Christ went and preached.¹

Before closing this account of Thomas Aquinas, there is another work of his which deserves some notice. The *Catena Aurea* is a commentary on the four Gospels collected out of the works of the Fathers, after the manner indicated in a former chapter.² In this *Catena* Origen, Cyprian, Athanasius, the Gregorys, Chrysostom, Ambrose, Augustine, and many others are introduced, in no haphazard way, but with an ingenuity which makes the whole series of passages appear as if they were the composition of one person, names only being inserted at the beginning of the quotations, to show what author is being employed. The numerous pieces are admirably dovetailed, or rather they constitute a beautiful specimen of mosaic from end to end; and the work certainly must be allowed to furnish a far more connected and flowing style of exposition than is generally found in modern commentaries. Not only are Biblical notes and explanatory homilies employed, but theological treatises are laid under contribution, so that the *Catena* becomes decidedly dogmatic in matter and form; for this reason it is proper to notice it in these pages. Indeed, it may be said that, taken generally, the drift of the book is far more doctrinal than either practical or experimental.

The preface to St. Matthew is a succinct but well-arranged essay on the title and substance of the four

¹ *Tertia pars*, supplem., LXXV., LXIX. Quotations are collected in Hagenbach, vol. II. pp. 129-140.

² See Part III. Chapter I.

Gospels, the emblems of the evangelists, their difference, their harmony, and, above all, the sublimity of their doctrine—consisting in its pre-eminent authority, its sublime force, and the loftiness of its freedom. Under the Old Testament, quoting from Augustine, Aquinas writes, “because of the promise of temporal goods, and the threatening of temporal evils, the temporal Jerusalem begets slaves; but under the New Testament, where faith requires love, by which the law can be fulfilled, not more through fear of punishment than from love of righteousness, the eternal Jerusalem begets free men.”¹ Doctrinal discussions occur in connection with certain texts, around which there had long glistened and there still burn the fires of controversy. For instance, in commenting upon the Gospel of John, Aquinas presents, in reference to the first chapter, a dissertation on the Divinity of our Lord. Amongst the annotations in the third chapter may be found a full assertion of the doctrine of baptismal regeneration; and that favourite tenet of mediæval Christendom is pressed into service even in the comment on the sixteenth verse: “God so loved the world, that He gave His only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in Him should not perish, but have everlasting life.” Chrysostom is quoted, saying, “Because God is merciful, instead of judgment He grants an internal remission of all sins by baptism, and even, after baptism, opens to us the door of repentance, which had He not done all had been lost.”² Upon the sixth chapter—after quoting from Chrysostom the words, “By bread” (*i. e.* the bread which came down from heaven) “is meant wholesome doctrine and faith in Him or His body, for these are the preservatives of the soul”—the

¹ *Catena Aurea*, Oxf., vol. I. p. 7.

² *Ibid.*, vol. IV. p. 117.

compiler takes occasion to unfold the doctrine of transubstantiation, and—using the language of Augustine and Theophylact—Aquinas says, “This meat and drink (*i. e.* the body and blood of Christ) is such that he that taketh it not hath not life, and he that taketh it hath life, even life eternal. For it is not the flesh of man simply, but of God; and it makes man Divine by inebriating him as it were with Divinity.”¹ The sacramental theory in this and in other mediæval theologians lies at the basis of all Scripture interpretation and all doctrinal statement; it is not merely a distinct opinion, but a kind of atmosphere everywhere breathed, and through which every object is looked at.

Notwithstanding the fame and influence of Thomas Aquinas, he met with opposition. One noted schoolman challenged certain points in his system. This was DUNS SCOTUS (A.D. 1308), “Doctor Subtilissimus.” He wrote a work entitled, *Theologorum Principiis in Tertium et Quartum Librum Sententiarium Quæstiones Subtilissimæ*; and in it he tracks the steps of former philosophers and divines, especially Thomas Aquinas, whose theology receives a severely critical treatment at his dexterous hand.

A fundamental principle in the philosophy of Aquinas was that the intellectual and moral nature of a being controls the will; a fundamental principle with Duns Scotus was that the will is superior, and is the moving agent in the whole realm of spiritual nature, Divine and human. The first of these theologians taught that what is right is not based upon will, that God commands what is good because it is good; the second contended that what is right is founded on will, and that good is good because God commands it.

¹ *Catena Aurea*, vol. IV. p. 241.

Aquinas taught that the will is determined by the understanding and the affections; Duns Scotus insisted on its sovereignty, holding that it has power to choose without any determining ground. In short, he advocated a liberty of indifference.

Aquinas affirmed the doctrine of predestination in the Augustinian sense. Duns Scotus adopted an idea of human moral action not much removed from Pelagianism. Of course, as a Church theologian, he did not deny the need of Divine grace, but he denied the need of that grace which is prevenient—grace to come beforehand and initiate the work of salvation. He thought it is in the power of man's will to begin to love God supremely.¹ In harmony with this opinion, his view of justification is chiefly subjective. Justification is described as a real change in us, not in the forms of faith and hope, but in that of love to God and our neighbour; but he acknowledges that it is of a complex character, including the forgiveness of sin.² To admit any one to eternal life, he says, must be taken to mean that the Almighty finds him worthy of reward because of his present disposition. The change has not its origin in the Divine will, which is immutable, but in our will.

In reference to the incarnation of our Lord, it may be noticed that a question was raised as to whether the Word or Son of God would have become incarnate if sin had not entered into the world. Aquinas seems at one moment to lean in the affirmative direction, but at another he decides the negative to be more probable. Duns Scotus, however, felt inclined to adopt the affirmative.³

¹ *Theologorum Principiis*, lib. I. dist. xvi. quest. 3; lib. II. dist. xxvi. ² *Ibid.*, lib. I. dist. xvii. quest. 3; lib. IV. dist. xvi.

³ Hagenbach, *Hist. Doctrines*, vol. II. p. 47; also Ritschl, p. 48.

Duns Scotus denied the doctrine of Anselm and Aquinas respecting the absolute necessity of the atonement, and insisted upon its relation to our deliverance as being simply of Divine appointment, and as availing just so far as God pleased to accept it on the sinner's behalf. The Divine will, not the moral nature of the Divine Being, he regarded as the fundamental ground of redemption, and said that God might have accepted a different provision, or He might have dispensed with an atonement altogether.¹ This view of a mysterious subject seems to have been derived from the notion of merit entertained by Duns Scotus, for merit he defined as anything for which he who accepts it is bound to give something in return.² Aquinas regarded "the infinitude of Christ's satisfaction as arising from the intrinsic nature of His work as estimated by the Divine standard. Duns understands the infinitude of Christ's merit to arise from the immeasurableness of its outward efficacy when estimated by the human standard. In this way Duns finds himself unable to concur in the statement of Thomas, that the *sufficiencia* of Christ's work exceeds the *efficacia* of its intrinsic value, counterbalancing the sins of the whole world, while yet its operation is restricted to believers."³ He considered Christ as having in Himself treasures of grace and virtue, which He communicates to believers through their spiritual union with Him; and he described faith according to the first verse of the eleventh chapter of the Epistle to the Hebrews; on the whole subject he has much to say, and what he says exhibits the subtlety for which he was renowned.⁴

¹ *Theol. Princip.*, lib. III. dist. xx.

² *Ibid.*, lib. III. dist. xviii. quest. i. See also lib. III. dist. xx.; dist. xix. ³ Ritschl, p. 64. ⁴ *Theol. Princip.*, lib. III. dist. xxxi.

He denied the infinite demerit of sin, yet admitted that an offence against God is greater than an offence against man; but the word *infinitude*, from the very nature of the idea, he affirmed to be inapplicable to an act committed by a finite creature; and with the notion of sin as infinite disappears that of infinite punishment. It may further be remarked, that this divine inculcated the doctrine of the *opus operatum*, defining a sacrament as conveying grace by its own virtue, so that no mental exercise is required, but only that the mind abstains from placing a bar in the way of Divine operation.¹

As an opponent to Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus is very apt to be regarded as a rationalist arguing against authority. This, however, is not the fact. He is not found to be a doubter. He does not walk in the same path as Abelard, discussing the *Sic et non*, and setting up one thing against another. He is as dogmatic a theologian as his great contemporary Thomas. The object of some of his demonstrations is to establish the authority of Divine revelation; and of course he did not deny, or even question, the authority of the Church. Nor was he in philosophy a nominalist any more than Aquinas, though his realism differed from that of his rival—in a way, however, which it is difficult to describe. The grand distinction between the two theologians lies in the position they assigned to the will, whether Divine or human. Moral perfection lies at the basis of the will of God, said one. That will is the foundation of all morality, said the other. The atonement is the result of a moral necessity, said the first. It is a mere enactment of the will, said the second. Virtue in man is the result of the will, controlled by spiritual motives and affections, said Thomas.

¹ Lib. iv., dist. i.—x.

It is the result of spontaneous volition, or volition guided by calculations of expediency, said Scotus. A difference in moral philosophy was thus added to a difference in scientific divinity.

The followers of these theologians arranged themselves in two distinct and antagonistic schools. The quarrels between them, though both were realists, became as fierce and furious as the quarrels between realists and nominalists. The Thomists and the Scotists were two sects who carried on a long warfare, the dispute often becoming unintelligible; and what was lost in reason and religion was made up by passion and prejudice. To make the feud more bitter, the Dominican friars ranged themselves under the banner of Thomas, because he was a Dominican; and the Franciscan friars followed the standard of Scotus, because he was a Franciscan; thus rivalry between two orders intensified their intellectual strifes.

Contemporary with Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus was ROGER BACON (A.D. 1214–1292), called Doctor Mirabilis, the wonderful doctor, more of a philosopher than a theologian, and therefore not claiming from us so much notice as his vast intellectual superiority deserves. He had in him the genius and courage of a reformer, and in science anticipated several modern discoveries. But more important than any details of knowledge was the true philosophical spirit appearing in his *Opus Majus*, which induced him to push the principle of free inquiry into all spheres of human thought, and which made him an advocate for reform in all branches of science.

On looking into his works it is surprising to discover how many theological references and allusions appear from beginning to end. His reverence for the Scriptures

was profound. He uses the strongest expressions respecting the Bible as the depository and standard of truth, saying, with Augustine, that what is true may there be found, and what is contrary to truth is there condemned. He quotes Ambrose to the effect that in Christ are all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge, that he who knows Him needs to seek nothing more, for He is perfect virtue and perfect wisdom. What is sought elsewhere, Bacon remarks, will here be found. And as Sacred Scripture affords this knowledge, it is clear that it includes all truth; that what is contrary to it is error, and can have nothing but the name of wisdom. He has much to say on the subject of Scripture in connection with human knowledge; and, amidst allegorical interpretations and theological positions characteristic of the age, he contends for the close connection between religion and science.¹

He looked upon Divine revelation as the most precious source of human knowledge, without which all that man can discover would fail to serve the highest purpose of his existence. In Bacon's musings on revelation and nature, and on faith and reason, he went so far as almost, if not quite, to touch the renowned argument of Bishop Butler on the analogy between natural and revealed religion. He saw difficulties in the one, and difficulties in the other; in short, things incomprehensible by reason in both these worlds of human thought. "To him," he acutely remarks, "who denies the truth of the faith because he is unable to understand it, I will oppose in reply the course of nature, and as we have seen it in examples."² Here we have the pith of the *Analogy*. A sentence in Origen is drawn out into a treatise by the profound and

¹ Part II. c. 3 and 8; Jebb's edit. of *Opus Majus*, pp. 24-37.

² *Opus Majus*, p. 476.

patient reasonings of the English bishop; also a condensation of the same method is found in the writings of the English friar. "These and the like," Bacon goes on to say, "ought to move men, and to excite them to the reception of Divine truths. For if in the lowest objects of creation truths are found before which the inward pride of man must bow and believe, though it cannot understand, how much more should man humble his mind before the glorious truths of God."¹

One great aim of Roger Bacon was to bring theology and science into harmony with each other. It is curious to find in the fourth part of his original treatise how he insists upon mathematics as necessary to the understanding of Divine things, as the geography and chronology of Scripture, ecclesiastical subjects, the certification of faith and the correction of the calendar. And in working out his plan, which covers more than seventy folio pages, his references to Scripture are most numerous. He had no idea of science and theology being two distinct fields of investigation; he considered them as inseparably connected. With him all heresy was unphilosophical, and, one might almost say, all false philosophy was heretical.

Bacon has been regarded as a reformer before the Reformation; but it must not be supposed that he openly denied any dogmas of the Church, as did John Wycliffe and Martin Luther. It would be difficult, perhaps, to find a passage in the writings of this remarkable man plainly contradicting mediæval theology; but numerous instances can be cited indicative of views which tended to undermine the ecclesiastical system of the age. He said that saints as well as philosophers

¹ *Opus Majus*, p. 476.

had fallen into error, that Augustine and Jerome had to retract at one time what they held at another, and that Paul resisted Peter because he was to be blamed; and these statements were put forth, not in a cautious and guarded manner, but so as to appear very offensive to many Romish theologians.¹

He nowhere repudiates Church authority, indeed, he speaks of it as proceeding from God; but he opposes "false and arrogant authority, springing from thirst of power and the ignorance of the multitude." Of the Fathers, as of philosophers, he says, "They have not only permitted us and advised us to change what is humanly imperfect, but have set the example of doing so with their own teachings. Had they lived until now, they would have improved and changed much more."²

Bacon's intimacy with Robert Grossetête, Bishop of Lincoln, has been often noticed. The fact, however, is disputed by some; but it is difficult to understand how the belief of such a friendship could have got abroad as it did, if there had been no foundation for it; besides, there seems nothing improbable in the fellowship of two such inquisitive minds, two such independent persons; and of the renowned bishop, the friar speaks with profound respect.³ Grossetête was, indeed, more practical than speculative, more of a churchman than a theologian or a philosopher; but he took the patriotic and what may be called the liberal side in the ecclesiastical politics of his day, and resisted decidedly the encroachments of the papal see upon the rights and privileges of the English Church. Though

¹ *Opus Majus*, p. 10.

² Herzog, art. "Bacon."

³ Robertson, *Church Hist.*, vi. 476. He cites as authority Bacon's *Minor Works*.

Bacon, as a Franciscan, and therefore, by the rules of his order, an obedient servant of the Pope, was pledged to the maintenance of Romish claims, yet it is quite possible, looking at the independence of his mind and character, that he had sympathies with such a man as Grossetête in his opinions on contemporary ecclesiastical questions. The schoolmen showed wonderful ingenuity in reconciling what might appear to us glaring inconsistencies ; and one would not wonder to find Friar Roger agreeing with Bishop Robert, and at the same time contending that his views were in perfect harmony with the obligations of his order ; just as, no doubt, he had a way of reconciling what he said about the Saints, the Fathers, and the Apostle Peter with a perfectly orthodox submission to the authority of the Church and the Bishop of Rome.¹

Another man of singular character, and of great original genius, appeared in the middle of the thirteenth century, who, on account of some peculiarity in his theological views, demands our notice. RAYMOND LULLY (A.D. 1234-1315), a native of Majorca, was a Franciscan friar, and over his name many brethren of his order have fought earnest battles with their rivals the Dominicans—the former maintaining that he deserves canonization, the latter regarding him as a heretic and magician.

In early life the victim of strong passions, he afterwards became distinguished for pious affections and missionary zeal ; for he visited Cyprus, Armenia, and North Africa, with the design of spreading the gospel. At the same time he manifested great activity of mind in the study of theological subjects, chiefly with a view to

¹ I have here introduced some passages from a volume recently published by the Religious Tract Society, entitled *Worthies of Science*.

the conversion of Mohammedans. He had much to say of the great art (*Ars Magna*), as he called it, described as "a mechanical logic calculated to solve all questions without any study or reflection on the part of him who should use it."¹ It seems to have been intended to do the sort of work in philosophy which a calculating machine is meant for in arithmetic—how, after having looked into the best explanations, I am totally unable to understand. Hence by some the name of Raymond Lully is looked upon as synonymous with absurdity; but on closely considering what he taught, we shall find that such treatment is unjust. Ueberweg speaks of him with no great favour, and Tennemann has little to say on his behalf; but Neander, with characteristic candour and patience, alludes to him again and again, and brings out his opinions in a manner very intelligible. Lully laid down as a postulate, "If thou believest not, thou canst not understand"—in this respect resembling Anselm, and then urged, what is plain enough, that to attain to faith we must get rid of prejudice. Faith is not a natural impossibility, because the minds of believers and unbelievers are essentially the same. Knowledge and faith are harmonious, and God is the object and satisfaction of both.² The end for which minds have been created is that with all their powers they may refer themselves to God.³ But an absolute knowledge of the Almighty is impossible; so also is an absolute knowledge of the human soul. Faith in revelation stands with firm foot on solid ground; reason can only soar upwards on her wings to higher objects;⁴ but after all reason and faith help one another, and between them may be

¹ Tennemann's *Manual*, p. 250.

² Neander, *Ch. Hist.*, vol. VIII. 195. ³ *Ibid.* 197. ⁴ *Ibid.* 193.

harmony and good-will. These are some of the elementary principles which Raymond lays down. Then, entering upon mysterious themes, he speaks of God the Father as the *principle* of all existence, of God the Son as the *medium* of all existence, and of God the Holy Ghost as the *end* of all existence.¹ Treading ground familiar to us now-a-days in controversy respecting miracles, he refers those who refuse to admit anything supernatural to the creation of the world as the greatest of all Divine marvels.² Like Thomas Aquinas, he distinguishes between what subsists in God Himself and what is manifested in temporal evolutions, employing a distinction between mediate and immediate agency to explain the doctrine of Divine predestination. Predestination with this theologian is founded on foresight; the salvation of Peter and the perdition of Judas being the result of their own conduct. Neither predestination nor foreknowledge, he asserts, can carry with them any constraint.³ He ventures to speculate on the incarnation of the Eternal Word as essential to the perfection of the universe as well as to the salvation of man; and here again this mediævalist treads on modern ground.⁴ He describes faith as a Divine gift; but how it stands related to justification does not appear from Neander's account of Lully's writings.⁵ Neander adds that "the works of Raymond Lully are rich in ethical matter, particularly his work on the contemplation of God."⁶

THOMAS BRADWARDINE, Archbishop of Canterbury (A.D. 1290-1349), was a very different man from Duns Scotus and from Raymond Lully, and wrote a book intended to correct the Pelagian tendencies of the

¹ Neander, vol. VIII. 233.

² *Ibid.* 244.

³ *Ibid.* 257.

⁴ *Ibid.* 292.

⁵ *Ibid.* 297.

⁶ *Ibid.* 307.

Scotists ; it is entitled, *De Causâ Dei contra Pelagium*. Bradwardine was a mathematician, and his skill in applying mathematical forms of reasoning to a theological controversy has called forth the admiration of several critics. He liked to deal with principles, hypotheses, and corollaries, but then he could also declaim with considerable eloquence : and sometimes his meditations become devout colloquies between the soul and God, so as to remind the reader of Augustine's Confessions. Bradwardine complains of contemporary theologians, saying that eight or nine hundred prophets of Baal might be reckoned against one servant of Jehovah ;¹ and that the whole world was engaged in following Pelagian errors. In his work he reasons out the perfections of the Almighty on abstract *à priori* grounds, and deduces eternity, unchangeableness, immensity, and other infinite attributes as necessary consequences flowing from the true conception of God. In the course of his treatise, when he enters on subjects immediately relating to Pelagianism, he expresses many devout sentiments of a decidedly evangelical cast, contending most earnestly against the dogma of human merit, and ascribing all goodness in man to the operations of Divine grace, after such a manner as to dig down to the foundations of the favourite scholastic distinction between the merit of condignity and the merit of congruity. He did not repudiate all idea of merit, nor did he repudiate all idea of liberty, but he subordinated both to the supreme grace and power of God, to which he held his ideas of merit and liberty to be by no means repugnant.² His maxim was that human freedom is conditioned by Divine necessity,

¹ Pref. to *De Causâ*.

² Lib. II. 2 ; lib. III. c. 1.

The will of God leads, the will of man follows. He excluded the common distinction between foreknowledge and predestination, and regarded foreknowledge as identical with, or as necessarily included in, predestination. To foreknow anything without predestinating it, he argues, would be inconsistent with the Divine perfection and the Divine independence.¹ Sometimes his arguments are characteristically scholastic. To act, he says, is more than to be; and as no creature can exist without God, so no creature can act without God. God is the cause of existence and of activity.² He pushes this idea of Divine causality to the greatest length, and in one of his corollaries says that nothing inferior, only that which is superior,—namely, the will of God,—is a necessary antecedent; and things which are, become what they are from a certain necessity naturally preceding them. From his one-sided corollary other one-sided corollaries of a most perilous description might be easily drawn; and this is one of the great defects of the good man's teaching. The strong predestinarian flavour of the whole work goes beyond the taste of most modern Calvinists.

It would seem, from Chaucer's *Canterbury Tales*, that metaphysical arguments touching freedom and necessity were not unknown beyond the circle of the schools. Points of this kind were discussed in the parliamentary armies during the civil wars, and equally difficult controversies were agitated in the market-place and street corners of Constantinople in the time of the Gregorys. So likewise, at an intermediate period, a company of pilgrims on the way to Thomas Becket's shrine might hear, in the midst of a familiar apologue on the folly of

¹ Lib. I. c. 15.

² Lib. I. c. 4.

listening to flatterers, a reference to Archbishop Bradwardine's speculations :

“Whether that Goddes worthy foreweting
Straineth me needly for to doe a thing,—
Or elles if free choice be graunted me
To do that same thing, or do it nought,
Though God forewot it, er that it was wrought ;
Or if his weting streineth never a dele
But by necessitie condicionale.”¹

WILLIAM OF OCCAM (died A.D. 1347) marks the commencement of the fourth period in the history of scholasticism. He was a Franciscan, and a theological disciple of Duns Scotus, and proved the most formidable antagonist of realism which it had ever been the lot of that philosophy to encounter. Catching the spirit of energetic thought, free inquiry, and bold reform which in so many ways swept over Europe in the fourteenth century, he attacked the metaphysical system which claimed a real existence for universal ideas. Not satisfied with any modified theory, he carried his assault beyond all outworks into the citadel itself, and demanded the surrender of the whole system of realistic belief which preceding schoolmen had laboriously built up. He denied that ideas had any existence whatever except in the human understanding, which contemplated them under the form of words, basing his denial upon these grounds—that universal ideas are first unnecessary, and secondly absurd ; his distinctive arguments displaying ingenious exercises of the logical faculty. He was stronger on the negative than on the positive side of his undertaking, and seems to have failed in working out a theory of

¹ Chaucer, *The Nun's Priest's Tale*.

intellectual generalization ; but he made such an inefaceable mark as the opponent of realism, that by common consent he bears the name of Nominalist. He said the universal exists as a representation in the human mind ; but outside of the mind it is only a word or a sign, conventionally pointing to general resemblances. If, on the one hand, nominalism swept clean away from off the floor of human thought a great deal of rubbish piled up there in the form of realism, it, on the other hand, by turning so much attention to mere words, brought into play an enormous amount of logomachy. The epoch of victorious nominalism was also that of verbal subtleties carried to the most frivolous and useless extent ; and some of the ludicrous stories told about scholasticism belong to that page of its history. It was then in a state of decline, sinking into the imbecility of old age. Nor can pure nominalism appear to patient and persevering thinkers anything like a satisfactory explanation of the phenomena of human thought in connection with the material and spiritual universe, as created by the infinite and eternal Mind, in which there must have ever been ideas, types, or forms—whatever we please to call them—of all the classes of individual existence.

Occam applied his nominalistic theory to theological studies. He carried up his idea of individualism into his conception of the Divine nature, saying that the knowledge which God has of things is a knowledge of concrete individual objects, since they alone really exist—a conclusion which presents insuperable difficulties. Respecting the human will and the origin of moral distinctions, Occam followed Duns Scotus, maintaining that the former is absolutely free, and that the latter spring from

the Divine will. A belief in the existence of God he regarded as capable of rational proof; but in this he deviated from the principle which was the guiding light of his theology. Philosophy he handed over to reason. Divinity he relegated wholly to revelation. The doctrine of the Trinity and its related truths he considered to be beyond the sphere of human judgment. They were subjects for faith, and authority for them was to be sought in the Bible and in Church traditions. He made a formal separation between science and religion, so that it may be said he reached and laid his hand upon what had been only distantly approached before — a severance between philosophy and theology. Such a severance had been attempted again and again, and as resolutely resisted by the leaders of religious thought; but now came one who boldly set his foot upon a line of demarcation, pronouncing one side human, and the other Divine. That line he drew differently from what it had been drawn before, when endeavours were made after some distinct boundary lines. Occam circumscribed the theological subjects of rational investigation. True conceptions of the character of God, he thought, could be based only on Divine teaching; and to the same source he referred all correct notions of Christianity. Roger Bacon and others had aimed at a union between all science and all religion, as some thinkers at the present day strive to bring all forms of knowledge into harmony. To this proceeding Occam was opposed. He took the lead in inculcating the lesson now also common, that human inquiry and Divine revelation have to do with different provinces — that the one is the domain of reason, the other of faith. Some of Occam's followers represented the two spheres of thought as so different

that a proposition might be philosophically true and theologically false.¹

In the controversy between the Thomists and Scotists, as we have seen, theological questions were complicated with disputes purely personal. The rivalry of mendicant orders made a strife about religious doctrines all the more bitter. Now in the case of the nominalist struggle, led on by Occam, with the old realists, there arose a new and different complication: divinity was plunged into the gulf of politics. In the fourteenth century the Papacy and the Empire were at war with each other. Guelphs and Ghibellines were mortal foes. Occam attached himself to the Ghibellines. He thus became identified with the cause of prince and people against the cause of Papacy and Rome; in fact he took a side with Philip le Bel against Boniface VIII., with Louis of Bavaria against John XXII. The banner of civil liberty was raised on the one hand, that of submission to ecclesiastical authority on the other. Nominalist doctrines thus came to be patronized by Imperialists; realistic opinions remained with adherents of the Pontiffs.

Very different from William Occam was RAYMOND DE SEBONDE. Respecting him, we learn from Tennemann that he taught at Toulouse about A.D. 1436. In his *Liber Creaturarum sive Naturæ* he asserted that there are two books given by God to man—the book of nature and the book of Scripture. The first is contained in the works of creation, including orders of existence, amongst which man himself is chief; and the second is given in Holy Writ to supply the defects of the first, and because man knows not how to read that original record through the

¹ For Occam's philosophy and theology see Tennemann, p. 252, Ueberweg, pp. 460-4, and Mosheim (Reid's Edit.), p. 504.

blindness of his understanding. The first book, he says, cannot be falsified, but the second can; nevertheless, each volume has the same origin. Nature is not sufficient without revelation, and no one can read the Divine wisdom in the open book unless illuminated from God and cleansed from original sin. The pagan philosophers, though they attained to scientific knowledge, could not reach the knowledge which leads to eternal life.

Montaigne translated Raymond's work under the title of *Natural Theology*, and tells us, in his *Essays*,¹ that his father a few days before his death lighted on this volume, and gave it him to translate; and, adds the Frenchman, "I found the conceits of the author to be excellent, the contexture of his work well followed, and his project full of piety." Thus a book written by a nominalist schoolman of the fifteenth century was thought worthy of a place in French literature after the revival of letters.

Dugald Stewart, in his preliminary dissertation to the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, misapprehends the drift of Sebonde's argument through confiding in Cotton's inaccurate translation of Montaigne. "The object of Sebonde's book," remarks Hallam, "according to himself, is to develop those truths as to God and man which are latent in nature, and through which the latter may learn everything necessary, and especially may understand Scripture, and have an infallible certainty of its truth."²

Pausing for a moment, and looking back upon our review of mediæval times, we are reminded of what has repeatedly appeared on these pages, namely, that different streams of theological doctrine have flowed almost, if not quite, uninterruptedly through Christendom

¹ B. II. c. 12.

² *Introduction to Lit. of Europe*, I. 191.

from the earliest times down to our own. We may call them, for want of better terms, the Philosophical, the Evangelical, and the Catholic. Very considerable differences have existed in the teachings of those who may appropriately be included in any one of the classes denominated after these several forms of opinion. The Philosophical divines are not all alike, nor are the Evangelical, nor are the Catholic. Yet each division is marked by features characteristic and distinctive. A certain kinship may be traced between the ante-Nicene Fathers, Clement and Origen, and the mediæval metaphysicians, Erigena and Abelard. So likewise between Augustine and Bradwardine; whilst Aquinas, as a representative advocate of Church authority, comes in obvious succession to Irenæus. The Reformation on the one hand, the Council of Trent on the other, did not destroy, did not interrupt, the operation of such theological tendencies. They are active still, as they ever were, and so far the mediæval age is repeating itself in the nineteenth century.

CHAPTER V.

POPULAR THEOLOGY.

IT is not to be supposed that the refinements and subtleties of thought, indicated imperfectly in these pages, had much hold, except at particular junctures, upon the minds of men in general, if indeed they were apprehended by them at all. But in the middle ages, as ever, there existed, outside the schools, a kind of theology which interested the mass of the people, fastened on their convictions, mingled with their experiences, and, to a great extent, shaped their lives. What was it? Where is it to be found? Not in the folios of Aquinas and Duns Scotus, but in popular sermons, in ecclesiastical art, which covered Europe, and in other productions which we proceed to notice.

1. Preaching was subordinate to liturgies and the service of song. In Charlemagne's time few clergymen were capable of informing their flocks on religious subjects, and he commissioned Paulus Diaconus, A.D. 782, to collect homilies out of the writings of the Fathers to be read to the people, or to be studied as models of popular instruction. Discourses had been mostly delivered in Latin, but the great father and founder of European civilization enjoined the use of the vernacular in addresses from the pulpit. For the most part, productions of this kind were very poor; but justice has not been done to some of them. To go back beyond the time of Charlemagne, there was a preacher in the

seventh century, Eligius, Bishop of Noyon, whom Mac-laine, Dr. Robertson, and others have represented as teaching people that nothing else was necessary to make a man a Christian than that he should go to church, and repeat the Creed and the Lord's Prayer; but any one who will take the trouble to read the sermon they refer to, as it is found in D'Achery's *Spicilegium*,¹ will discover that this mediæval preacher was by no means so bad as that. "Beloved, it will not profit you," he said, "to receive the Christian name if you do not cultivate Christian practice. Christian profession avails a man only when he preserves in his mind and exemplifies in his conduct the precepts of Christ; that is, who does not steal, nor bear false witness, nor tell falsehoods, nor commit adultery, nor hate any man, but loves all even as himself; who does not render evil to his enemies, but rather prays for them; who does not excite strife, but, on the contrary, promotes peace."² The sermon is lamentably defective as an exposition of religious truth, but it is not wanting in moral exhortations.

The following extract from the same preacher is still more decisive: "Have Christ in your heart, and His sign on your brow. The sign of Christ is a great thing—the cross of Christ; but it only avails those who keep the commandments of Christ. Let no man deceive you; he who doeth righteousness is righteous, he who committeth sin is of the devil; and no sin, whether adultery, theft, or lying, is committed without the co-operation of the devil. Let no man deceive himself; he who hateth one man in this world loses all that he offers to God in good works;

¹ There has been much controversy about this sermon. See Dr. Reid's edit. of Mosheim, p. 251, note by the Editor.

² *Spicil.*, tom. II. p. 87.

for the apostle does not lie when he addresses to us those fearful words (1 John ii. 9; iii. 15): 'Whosoever hateth his brother is a murderer,' and 'is in darkness.' By brethren we must here understand every man, for in Christ we are all brethren. Despise not, therefore, the poor, or the bondman; perhaps he is better before God than thou art. Strive that ye may be separated from the devil, and united to God who has redeemed you. Let the heathen wonder at your conduct; and even if they ridicule your Christian life, let not that disquiet you; they will have to render an account to God. Wherever ye may be, be mindful of Christ in your intercourse, for He says, 'Where two or three are gathered together in My name, there am I in the midst of them.'"¹

Down to the beginning of the thirteenth century two kinds of preaching are noticeable, called *declaring* and *postillating*. The first produced an essay or oration on some particular subject, with no text prefixed, but only an announcement of the theme. The second resulted in expositions or running comments on a paragraph of Holy Scripture. The practice, still almost universal, of discoursing on some single verse, or some few verses, is said to have begun about the thirteenth century; and the divisions and subdivisions of a discourse so introduced and suggested originated in scholastic methods of theological treatment. Roger Bacon condemned the custom. "The greater part of our prelates having but little knowledge in divinity, and having been little used to preaching in their youth, when they become bishops, and are some-

¹ Neander's *Denkwürdigkeiten aus der Geschichte des christlichen Lebens*, translated in part under the title of *Light in the Dark Places*, p. 108.

times obliged to preach, are under a necessity of begging and borrowing the sermons of certain novices who have invented a new way of preaching by endless divisions and quibblings; in which there is neither sublimity of style nor depth of wisdom, but much childish trifling and folly unsuitable to the dignity of the pulpit. May God banish this conceited and artificial way of preaching out of His Church, for it will never do any good, nor elevate the hearts of the hearers to anything that is great or excellent.”¹

ANTONY OF PADUA, who died A.D. 1231, and who sympathized with the famous Francis of Assisi in his love for the animal creation, was one of the most popular preachers of his age. Churches were thronged at day-break, shops were closed, highways were forsaken, and the eloquent monk had to address immense multitudes in the open air. Some of his congregations were reckoned at the number of 30,000; and wonderful effects were attributed to his oratory. It was certainly of a singular description, mystical and allegorical in the extreme, as appears from an example in which the preacher compares moral excellences to the different parts of a vessel.² Compassion he calls the sail; brotherly love the rudder; the mercy of God the anchor; humility the starboard side. Then he speaks of eight rowers, adding, “By these eight, if the ship be prepared and adorned, it will be borne onwards in a right course to the benediction of the eternal heritage, and will attain the harbour of rest.”

He allegorizes the fleet of Solomon after the following fashion: “This is the fleet of Solomon, which through the sea of this world goes to Tarshish, that is, to those

¹ Wood's *Hist. Oxon.*, pp. 58, 59; Henry's *Hist.*, vol. VIII. pp. 182-5.

² See Neale's *Mediæval Preaching*, p. 236.

who search out the joy of this world that they may rejoice in it. By the gold is set forth human wisdom ; by the silver, philosophic wisdom ; by the elephants' teeth, doctors who masticate that strong food, the Word of God, for little ones ; by the apes that imitate human actions, but live like beasts, we understand those who have come from among the Gentiles to the faith, and seem to hold it in word, but deny it in deed ; by the peacocks, whose flesh if it be dried is said to remain imperishable, and who are vested with beautiful feathers, are signified perfect men who are so tried by the fire of tribulation that they are decorated and painted with various virtues. These are brought from Tarshish, that is, from the various waves of the sea of this world, by the preachers of the Church to the true Solomon, Jesus Christ."¹

Most of Antony's illustrations are far-fetched, and his style is abrupt and confused, owing, perhaps, to the circumstance that we possess only notes rather than copies of his discourses. He at times distinctly denotes the divisions of his sermons, quite in consonance with later custom ; and in preaching on the Syrophenician woman he considers, *first*, the gracious visitation of the Physician, " Jesus went forth ;" *secondly*, the devout supplication of the petitioner, " Have mercy on me, O Lord ;" *thirdly*, the perfect restoration of the patient, " Be it unto thee as thou wilt."

JOHN BONAVENTURA, whom we shall meet with again, was another remarkable preacher. A mystical divine, blending with what was theological not a little of transcendental philosophy, he carried an intense allegorical habit into his popular expositions of Scripture. For a sermon on Christmas eve he takes for his text,

¹ Neale, p. 238.

“To-morrow, by that time the sun be hot, ye shall have deliverance,” or, as he read it, “salvation.” The heat of the sun is the love of Christ, which compelled Him to become our Saviour; and the fervour of that love is set forth in four particulars: His incarnation, His giving Himself in the eucharist, His passion, and His bestowment of the Holy Ghost.

The following passage is taken from what seems to be another and distinct discourse on Psalm lxxxvi. 17: “Show me a token for good.” “A good sign is the resurrection of Christ; for it is the sign of His glory in heaven, the sign of His mercy in the world, the sign of His victory in hell, the sign of His justice in judgment. The resurrection, therefore, of Christ is the sign of His glorification, and of ours by Him; it carries the rod of Aaron into the tabernacle of the testimony, that it may be laid up for a token. Notice how while the rods of the magicians remained in their dryness, the rod of Aaron flourished;” here the preacher confounds together two distinct miracles: the one which changed the rod of Aaron, the other which changed the rod of Moses. —“Whence both himself and his children were exalted,” which Gregory expounds of the resurrection of Christ. “For the flesh of Christ was dried up at His death; dried up because of the loss of blood and the giving up of the ghost. But by the blossom the glory of the rising body is signified. The Psalm (xxviii. 7, LXX, Vulg.) reads, ‘My flesh hath flourished again.’ Now Christ might well say, ‘I am the flower of the field.’ A garden flower is private property; a field flower is common to all. Thus Christ belongs to all. Some, however, say that by the flower of the field is meant a certain little flower of a deep red colour which has five leaves, as Christ had five bleeding wounds.

Aaron signifies Christ, the great High Priest. The dry rod then flourished when the dead flesh of Christ rose again. And this is the sign of the exaltation of Aaron and his sons, that is, of Christ and Christians in eternal glory. The other rods may signify our hearts, which remain continually in their hardness and dryness. 'Can these dry bones live?' But in the last day they shall flourish in beauty through the glory of the resurrection."¹ This passage is a curious example of the rough, broken, disjointed style in which the sermons of that day are jotted down; of the uncritical and incorrect use made of Scripture; and of the lawless manner in which the habit of allegorizing ran riot.

A strange mixture of the doctrine of Divine grace and the doctrine of human merit pervades these homilies; and Bonaventura ends the second of them, after a comment on Jonah as a sign to the Ninevites, by saying, "For as, after the sign given in Jonas, Nineveh was converted by him; so after the resurrection of Christ the world, which is signified by Nineveh, was converted by Him and His apostles. For from that time the world could truly believe in Him, and hope in Him, because it heard that He had so mightily risen."²

ALBERTUS MAGNUS was a preacher as well as a scholastic divine, and it is said that amidst his laborious studies he repeated the whole Psalter every day. He became Bishop of Ratisbon A.D. 1260; and some idea of how he preached in that old city on the Danube may be gathered from the following odd fragment of a discourse on the Second Sunday in Lent, upon "Jesus departed from the coasts of Tyre and Sidon." "Lord Jesus Christ, Son of David, have mercy on me, for sensuality (the

¹ Neale, p. 260.

² *Ibid.* p. 262.

daughter of my reason) is sore vexed by the devil (of pleasure, cupidity, and curiosity) ; and though Thou art not sent to take away trials of faith, but rather to bring again the sheep which were lost through temptations of Satan, to the pure thoughts and holy affections of the house of Israel (the faithful soul that contemplates God), yet send her away, because she hindereth and crieth after Thy disciples (that is to say, the virtues), saying, ‘ Help me.’ And although it is not meet to take the children’s bread (that is, vexation, temptation, correction, and tribulation) and to cast it to the dogs (that is, to the voluptuous, luxurious, and impotent), who bark (that is, murmur in tribulation), and bite the stone of pleasure, which they think to be bread ; give me, O Lord, a sinner, like a humble whelp, to receive ardently and thankfully, as far as my little power goes, of the crumbs of tribulation which fall from the table of the passion of my lords (Thy saints), that my daughter may be set free from the devil of lust.”¹

These were all Churchmen of the Catholic type. Let us now turn to the sermons of ABELARD, the rationalist. Some may be surprised to find how much he resembled the former in his preaching. “ Whether, therefore, Christ is spoken of as about to be crowned or about to be crucified, it is said that He went forth ; to signify that the Jews, who were guilty of so great wickedness against Him, were given over to reprobation, and that His grace would now pass to the large extent of the Gentiles, where the salvation of the cross, and His own exaltation by the acquisition of many peoples, in the place of the one nation of the Jews, has stretched itself out. Whence, also, to-day we rightly go forth to adore the cross in the open plain, showing mystically that both the glory and the

¹ Neale, p. 272, slightly altered.

salvation was departed from the Jews, and had dilated itself among the Gentiles. But in that we afterwards returned to the place whence we had set forth, we signify that in the end of the world the grace of God will return to the Jews; namely, when, by the preaching of Enoch and Elijah, they shall be converted to Him. Whence the apostle: 'I would not, brethren, that ye should be ignorant of this mystery, that blindness in part is happened unto Israel, until the fulness of the Gentiles shall be come in; and so all Israel shall be saved.' Whence the place itself of Calvary, where the Lord was crucified, is now, as we know, contained in the city, whereas formerly it was without the walls. 'The crown wherewith His mother crowned Him in the day of His espousals, and in the day of the gladness of His heart.' For thus kings are wont to exhibit their glory when they betroth queens to themselves, and celebrate the solemnities of their nuptials. Now the day of the Lord's crucifixion was, as it were, the day of His betrothal; because it was then that He associated the Church to Himself as His bride, and on the same day descended into hell, and setting free the souls of the faithful, accomplished in them that which He had promised to the thief: 'Verily I say unto thee, To-day shalt thou be with Me in paradise.'"¹

We must add an example of the clearer strain of teaching adopted by BERNARD. He remarks, "All our sufferings and chastisements are caused by our natural will, and this being annihilated, suffering and chastisement must be annihilated with it. Self-will is unbounded in its strivings—yea, the whole world would not suffice for it; it would extinguish the very being of God, inasmuch as it includes a wish that He were not wise, and holy, and

¹ Neale, p. 135.

Almighty, so that He might not have the power or the inclination to see or punish sin." Again, "It is fit thou shouldst believe that thy sins can only be blotted out by Him against whom alone thou hast sinned, and who is exalted above all evil ; but yet to this thou must add the special belief that thine own particular sins are forgiven through Him, and that is the witness of the Holy Ghost in thine heart ; and thou must also needs have the testimony of the Holy Ghost in thine heart touching eternal life, that thou shalt through Divine grace attain to the same." Once more, "There is no sin greater than to despair of the forgiveness of sin, for God is kind and merciful, plenteous in mercy, ready to forgive. His very nature is goodness, His property is to have mercy ; for He hath mercy on whom He will have mercy, and whom He will He hardeneth. But mercy He draws from His own nature ; condemnation is a work to which we in a measure compel Him." ¹

¹ Neander's *Life of St. Bernard*, translated by M. Wrench, p. 247. Some new examples of mediæval preaching have just been published in the *Life, Letters, and Sermons of Herbert de Losinga, Bishop of Norwich*, already mentioned. Edited by Dr. Goulburn and H. Symonds.

Neale, in his vol. on *Mediæval Preaching*, says (p. xxiv. of the Introduction), "One thing seems next to certain, that the great preachers of those times, whenever they did use the vernacular language, spoke in it extempore ; for who would take the trouble of committing his thoughts to a dialect so barbarous that perhaps it could not be written with precision, and so fluctuating that it was certain to be unintelligible within half a century ? The *sermones ad populum* of the eighth, ninth, and tenth centuries, then, must either have been translated into Latin by some of the disciples of the author from their remembrance of what he had actually spoken, or by the writer himself from his recollection of the general scope and aim of the discourse. Those sermons which were addressed *ad clerum*, or to members of a monastery, would be spoken in Latin, no doubt."

2. The popular theology of these times receives illustration from art as well as from pulpit discourses. The revival of art in the twelfth and following centuries indicated the religious excitement of the times, and expressed forms into which thoughts thus produced in the public mind were moulded and fashioned. An immense number of churches appeared, grand in style, harmonious in proportion, beautiful in detail, and altogether full of imagination and sentiment. Nature was laid under contribution; the precious things of heaven, the precious things of the dew and of the deep, the precious fruits brought forth by the sun, the precious things put forth by the moon, the chief things of the ancient mountains and the lasting hills, were types according to which men worked in rude ways and with childlike wonder. History and fable, traditionary story and legendary verse, dreams of monsters and dragons and all unnatural things, lent their aid for the stimulation and guidance of curious and quaint craftsmen.

Sermons of all kinds were composed in stone. Cruciform cathedrals, pointed arches, roofs cut in wood, or carved in stone, had symbolical meanings; doctrines were typified here and there in sculpture and painted glass, sacred history grew out of the columns, and private biographies were recorded in the sculptured sleepers with folded hands. On the exterior of Chartres Cathedral, it is said, there may be recognized in the numerous statues the scientific and theological system expressed in the *Speculum Universale* of Vincent de Beauvais.

If the popular religious thought of the period is ever to be understood, then to the relics of art which both expressed and influenced it there must be applied a kind

of study it has not yet received—not that which proceeds from antiquarian curiosity, or artistic taste, or ignorant veneration for all that is mediæval, but such as pertains to a keen power of spelling out human thoughts from signs at which some may laugh, and others sneer.

Illustrations of popular theology may be detected in many a mediæval church on the Continent. A hand issuing from heaven, or an entire human form with a papal or imperial crown, represents the Father; the Son in various modes may frequently be recognized; also the Holy Ghost under the symbol of a dove. Much of this betrays the coarse materialistic ideas entertained relative to the Divine Being—the different crowns, papal in Italy, imperial in Germany, pointing to the strange complications of religion with politics. Images of the crucified One called attention to His sufferings, more perhaps with reference to His physical agony than His atoning sacrifice. The tree of knowledge with the serpent, in contrast with our Lord's cross, indicated the consequences of the fall as met by Divine redemption. Statues of the Virgin in growing numbers, however, manifest how much the popular mind was occupied by thoughts of her as the mediatrix between the sinner and his Judge—that Judge being her Son, to whom she was represented as appealing in attitudes of pity and intercession. The height to which saints also were exalted is shown by a parallel in painting between Christ and St. Francis; and legendary heroes and heroines challenged and received the homage of the multitude. St. Christopher was the friend of travellers, St. Nicholas of sailors, St. Margaret of mothers; whilst France invoked St. Denis, Venice St. Mark, and Spain St. James. Persons and incidents meant originally, it may be, to shadow forth the gracious attributes of the

Divine Guardian, Helper, Healer, and Patron, came to be regarded as historical realities, indeed as ever-present powers. The Campo Santo at Pisa and the walls of churches in Florence still testify to the common conception of future punishment exhibited to the people; yet sometimes they are so grotesque that they seem adapted to harden or amuse rather than to alarm or edify. The division between monkish virtues and those of other men met the worshipper as he walked into church or chapel; and he saw chastity, obedience, and poverty canonized with special glory in connection with monastic orders, whilst the so-called theological and cardinal virtues were distributed over the walks of common life. It was a popular conviction that there existed two kinds of moral excellence—one for the clergy, another for the laity; and so whilst heretics were burnt for disturbing the Church by differences of opinion, the Church was rent in twain by its doctors and disciples through setting up distinct standards of Christian morality.

3. Poetry as well as art illustrates popular mediæval theology. There is one poem above all others belonging to the time now under review which materially helps us to conceive of popular religious opinion, at least amongst Italians—Dante's *Divina Commedia*. Whatever might be the chief design of the Tuscan bard—whether or not to veil ecclesiastical and political opinions under the magnificent imagery his genius had at command—it is quite clear that he indicates certain theological ideas which were present to his mind. His favourite teachers were St. Augustine, St. Gregory, St. Anselm, St. Bernard, Peter Lombard, the good brother St. Thomas (*Il buono fra Tommaso*),¹ and the popular mystic St. Bonaventura.

¹ This expression occurs in the *Convito*, IV. 30.

At the same time, it is remarkable that he passes over in absolute silence Raymond Lully, Duns Scotus, William Occam, and others suspected by orthodox divines as being tainted with heresy.¹ In the Vision of Hell there are nine circles, the eighth divided into ten gulfs, in the ninth of which schismatics and sources of division appear.² In harmony with this, Dante's cantos in the Vision of Paradise are imbued with the Catholic faith of the period. Christ is seen triumphant in heaven. As He ascends He is followed by His virgin mother. She is glorified above saints and angels. The Divine essence is revealed to the celestial hierarchies. From God's presence flows the river of light. The souls of the blessed under the Old and New Testament are on thrones. The fall of Adam is repaired by redemption through Christ. Faith, charity, grace, merit are set forth according to the doctrines of orthodox schoolmen. Finally, St. Bernard supplicates the Virgin Mary on behalf of Dante. The whole poem shows what a large place was occupied in his mind by thoughts of a future existence: hell, purgatory, heaven, these absorb his attention and swallow up what he paints of earth and time; men and things are depicted in relation to the infinite future—to it they point, there they find their issues. Yet with all this—and it is most remarkable—this orthodox Catholic is an inveterate anti-papist. He is opposed to Rome and the existing successors of St. Peter. He speaks of "turning the shepherd to a wolf," and adds—

"For this,
The gospel and great teachers laid aside,

¹ *Dante et la Philosophie Catholique*, par M. A. F. Ozanam, p. 215.

² *Hell*, canto XXVIII.

The Decretals, as their stuff margins show,
Are the sole study. Pope and Cardinals,
Intent on these, ne'er journey but in thought
To Nazareth, where Gabriel oped his wings.
Yet it may chance, ere long, the Vatican,¹
And other most selected parts of Rome,
That are the grave of Peter's soldiery,
Shall be delivered from the adulterous bond."²

In the *Divina Commedia* we have the theology, and with it the ecclesiastical convictions, of the most distinguished layman of his age. It is going too far to say, as Villemain does, that Dante puts into the mouth of Bonaventura an explication of the subtle difficulties of theology.³ Rather it may be said that, without going into minute details of mediæval controversy, the poet gives a general layman-like view of his own religious beliefs; and they are of the kind we have intimated. Dante appears as a believer in dogmatic orthodoxy as taught by the Church; and at the same time he appears as a determined anti-papist; and in this respect, we are persuaded, he may be justly looked upon as representing a large class in his own day—men of culture and thoughtfulness, public spirit and political sympathies. An orthodox Ghibelline, strong in religious opinion, equally strong in political purpose, such was Dante; and such was many and many an Italian.

4. Yet another source of information touching the popular theology of the middle ages may be found in the Latin hymns of the Church. Every one knows *Dies iræ, dies illa*, and has felt the grandeur and pathos breathed

¹ Perhaps he refers to the death of Boniface VIII., or, as some think, to the transfer of the court from Rome to Avignon.

² *Paradiso*, canz. IX. 128-137. (Cary's Trans.)

³ *Cours de Litt. Française*, I. 352.

throughout those unparalleled metrical lines. They sprung out of the excitement relative to the approaching end of the world. The hymn may be found in no less than forty-three different versions, a proof of its universal adaptation;¹ and it rung in the dying ears of Goethe like "blow following blow of the hammer on the anvil;" a proof of its extraordinary power on minds of sensibility. This hymn, sung or heard by multitudes who knew enough of Church Latin to understand it, must have awakened thoughts plaintive, solemn, devout, and singularly free from that alloy of superstition and error so common in mediæval religious literature. Here we catch a glimpse of the better side of the popular religion; and the glimpse becomes still more satisfactory when we turn to other hymns, such as *Salve mundi salutare*: *Deus homo Rex cælorum*: and *Urbs beata Hierusalem*: not to mention others. They relieve the mind of the student who has been depressed by contemplating mediæval superstitions. Hussite hymns, and the hymns of the Bohemian brethren, sung at great festivals and at special ecclesiastical solemnities, were many of them excellent, and must have ministered to the spirit of devotion; but some of the early German hymns "were too frequently destitute of all religious fervour or poetic value." Minne-songs, adapted, as one might say, to religious worship, were often little better than burlesques.² Shadows as well as lights fall upon our path as we follow the interesting and instructive story of ancient hymnology.

5. Another source of illustration may be introduced, different from the rest, on that account all the more

¹ Trench's *Latin Poetry*, p. 277.

² Kurtz, *Hist. of the Church*, pp. 423, 459.

pertinent, because it serves to show the mixed, heterogeneous, indeed *bizarre* character of the mediæval popular theology. Vincent of Beauvais wrote, as we have mentioned, the *Universal Mirror*, in three parts: the first *natural*, touching the works of creation; the second *doctrinal*, expounding the truths of religion in connection with a *résumé* of the existing sciences; and the third *historical*, reciting various events in the annals of the world. It is described as a work calculated to meet the wants of laymen; and that it did so was its distinguishing merit, for it brought together the scattered knowledge of the day, and bound it up with the cords of theological belief as then held in the predominant Church.¹ It is not wandering away from our subject further to cite the strange and startling romances of the day, such as *The Court of Paradise*, in which angels, patriarchs, martyrs, virgins, and others are described as assembled before God the Father, chanting the praises of love; while Jesus Christ, the Virgin Mary, and souls delivered from purgatory are introduced on the occasion. Much of this literature tended to degrade religion, and to foster a spirit of irreverence, without improving public morals; nor should the fact be overlooked that it also tended to produce feelings hostile to the clergy, especially the monkish orders. At the same time, other popular works were written of a beneficial tendency, of which one example has been singled out as worthy of commendation—*The Instruction of a Father to his Son*.² Allegories also appeared—*The Three Pilgrimages*, for example; in which we find, first, the pilgrimage to the heavenly Jerusalem, guarded by angels and a flaming sword; secondly, the pilgrimage

¹ Matter, *Hist. du Christianisme*, vol. III. p. 193.

² Published by M. Méon, Paris, 1808. Matter, vol. III. p. 174.

of a soul separated from the body, and struggled for by contending powers, some dragging it downwards to purgatory and hell, others seeking to lift it to paradise, which it enters at last ; and thirdly, the pilgrimage of Jesus Christ, which is in fact the gospel history reduced to rhyme. A book called *The Virtues of a Good Life* seems really to have been a satire on priestly vices ; this, and other satires on men and things in general, evidently met the public taste. Literature of the kind now noticed presents a mirror of the strange mixture of licence and devotion so prevalent at that period.

CHAPTER VI.

MYSTICISM.

THEOLOGICAL mysticism is a phase of thought which originates not with the logical faculty, nor in what is meant by the human understanding; certainly it does not arise from the operations of common sense, usually so called. The imagination and the affections are its birthplace and its home. There it lives, and moves, and has its being; craving after that which the judgment of the world cannot comprehend; claiming powers of intuition and pure spiritual insight free from the trammels of dialectic investigation, and turning its attention to transcendental themes. It has an affinity for what is mysterious, and it is given to poetical conceptions of Divine things, resembling views caught by artists through a veil of mist. The beauty of the object contemplated appears heightened by the golden haze through which it dawns upon the eye of the soul. There may be truth, there may be error, in these phases of thought, but they are natural to minds of a certain cast and bent. Such minds have existed in all ages; we meet them at the scholastic period, when, sometimes openly fighting against the dialectic method of treatment, and at other times entering into fellowship with it, they fixed their thoughts intently upon Divine things.

A mystic element, as we have already seen, appears in John Erigena; sometimes it comes out even in Anselm, not unfrequently in Alexander Hales, oftener still in

Bernard ; but the representatives of this form of thought now selected for notice, between A.D. 1097 and 1274, are Hugo of St. Victor, Joachim, Amalric of Bena, and Bonaventura.

I. HUGO OF ST. VICTOR (A.D. 1097-1141) is described as "a man of deep religious experience, the St. John of his age." He divided the nature of man, after St. Paul, into three parts — body, soul, and spirit ; and distinguished between the eye of sense, which is perception, the eye of the intellect, which is reason, and the eye of the spirit, which is intuition. Sin, he said, had blinded the last, dimmed the second, and left clear only the first. Faith takes the place of original intuition, and by it we realize what we cannot behold. It gives a certainty less than knowledge, but more than opinion, and enables the heart to apprehend and love God. Upon this basis rests mystical contemplation, which is a foretaste of heaven. Hugo followed Anselm in illustrating the doctrine of the Trinity by its supposed resemblance to human nature. Spirit, wisdom, love, correspond with the three Divine persons. Also he followed Augustine in his notions of humanity, striving, however, to unite human freedom with Divine sovereignty. He distinguished between grace which prevents sin, and grace which produces goodness, saying that after the fall, grace operating was needed in addition to grace co-operating. The essence of original sin was by him resolved into ignorance and concupiscence ; and ardent love to Christ was exalted as the germ of all excellence. Where there is love, he said, there is purity. These ideas of Hugo are found in the *Summa Sententiarum* and the *De Sacramentis Fidei*. He insisted upon the doctrine of disinterested love, saying, "If thou shouldest think eternal

life to be anything else than the supreme good, which is God Himself, and shouldest serve Him solely with a view to attain that other object, it would be no perfect service, no disinterested love.”¹

A vein of mysticism appears in all this, but it was combined with scholastic habits, and was wrought out in a scholastic form. Dialectics were blended with contemplation, and from imaginative musings, often true, Hugo drew forth a logical concatenation of results. Nor did he proscribe the use of science, he called it in to aid his meditations; and, more intellectual than sensuous, also, with a practical turn in his sentimentalism, he presents one of the most favourable specimens of the mystical divine to be found amongst the Churchmen of the middle ages.

And it may be added, that in this mystic theologian may be found a return to the old but of late unpopular notion of a legal transaction with the devil, though he asserted at the same time the moral significance of our Lord's death. The notion in reference to Satan is very misty, and had best be given in his own words: “Christ therefore by His incarnation paid to the Father man's debt, and by dying expiated man's guilt, that when He for man endured a death which He did not owe, man might justly on His account escape a death which he did owe; and so the devil could not find any cause for complaint, because he had no right to domineer over man, and man was worthy to be delivered.”²

2. JOACHIM (A.D. 1145—1202), Abbot of Corace,

¹ *De Sacram.*, lib. II. p. XIII. c. 8. On Hugo St. Victor see Herzog, *Encycl.*; Vaughan's *Hours with the Mystics*; and Neander's *History*, VIII. 247—263.

² *De Sacram.*, c. 4. Quoted by Hagenbach, *Hist. of Doct.*, vol. II. p. 41.

affords the example of a vigorous mind, driven by aversion to scholastic methods of inquiry, as well as drawn by the imaginative and susceptible character of his own nature, into the depths of mystical speculation. Moreover, the worldliness of the secular clergy and the corruption of the monastic orders awakened in him a strong desire for a different state of things in Christendom—a feeling in this case, however, not to be confounded with longings for reform as manifested by sects formed outside the Church, or by men within it like Claude of Turin. The Abbot Joachim was to all intents a High Churchman, opposed to ecclesiastical schism in every form. His dreams of improvement were steeped in a mystical spirit, which coloured his views of theology, history, prophecy, and ecclesiastical politics. These views were distinctive of the man, and determine the place he occupies in the annals of religious thought.

What seems to have been lying at the basis of his system was the opinion he held respecting the Trinity. We have seen at an early period two tendencies at work respecting the Divine nature—one pointing to the unity, the other to the distinctions of the Godhead. Peter Lombard, whilst admitting that there are three persons in the Divine essence, insisted much upon the unity of that essence, as underlying the distinction. The Master of the Sentences had laid down the principle that the Divine essence is in such sort common to the three persons, that this essence is neither begotten, nor begetting, nor is it proceeding; so that no one should say the Father begot the essence, nor that the essence begot the Son.¹ Thus darkening counsel with words without wisdom, Peter excited the antagonism of Joachim, who,

¹ *Sententiarum*, lib. I., dist. 5.

increasing the confusion and unprofitableness of the controversy, contended, that according to this scholastic theory the essence appeared distinct from the three persons, that, in fact, a fourth element was attributed to the Divine nature. If we admit what Peter Lombard says, Abbot Joachim declared, we must grant four things in God—the three persons, and the essence distinct from these three persons. To this, by a metaphysical or logical refinement illustrative of the thinking common at that period, he opposed the formula—the three persons are the same essence, but the same essence is not the three persons.¹ He seems to have regarded the Unity as collective and metaphysical, and concentrated his reflective power, which was very great, upon the triune distinction, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. The Trinity he saw reflected everywhere. History exhibited a Trinity. The first state was under the Old Testament, pertaining to God the Father; the second came under the New Testament, pertaining to God the Son; the third under a later period, the last time, belongs to the Holy Ghost. The working of the Father produced power, fear, faith; of the Son, humility, truth, wisdom; of the Holy Ghost, love, joy, freedom. The letter of the Old Testament was of the Father; the letter of the New Testament of the Son; the third dispensation is not of the letter, but of the Spirit. The first state was slavery, the second filial service, the third friendship and freedom. Then, passing from general to personal history, he fixes on the three apostles Peter, Paul, and John as representative men, and remarkably anticipates interesting meditations upon the peculiarities of each, as pointing in different directions: Peter as a man of simple

¹ Dupin, *Ecclesiastical Writers*, XIII. cent. 54.

faith, laying foundations ; Paul as a man of knowledge, building up an edifice of instruction ; and John as a man of love, crowning all with contemplative perfection.

History with Joachim ran into prophecy. A new creation springing out of the third period was to appear, the beginning of which might be obscure and contemptible. Secularization was to be succeeded by spirituality. The Father had come, the Son had come, and now comes the Holy Ghost. "The Holy Ghost comes and reposes in our hearts when we taste the sweetness of His love, so that we break forth into songs of praise to God, rather than keep silence. Then will ensue the truce of an Easter jubilee, in which all mysteries will be laid open, the earth will be full of the knowledge of the Lord, and it will be scarcely possible any longer to find a man who will dare deny that Christ is the Son of God. The Spirit will stand forth free from the veil of the letter. It is the gospel of the Spirit, the everlasting gospel, for the gospel of the letter is but temporary." We may catch in this strain, which rung in many ears six or seven centuries ago, the very tones which are heard in our times—one day in schools of mystic piety, another in schools of mystic rationalism. Both, like Abbot Joachim, dissatisfied with the revelation of Christianity as it is, are praying or longing for a new age, a new dispensation. The abbot thought of history and prophecy under forms derived from his own profession. He deplored existing corruptions and abuses. Cardinals, legates, courtiers came in for his denunciations. Rome was Jerusalem and Babylon combined. Jerusalem the spiritual power, with which he identified the ideal papacy—*this* he revered ; Babylon committing fornication with the kings of the earth—*that* he abhorred.

Asceticism was his delight. The first state of the Church was of married persons, the second of learned clerks, the third of contemplative monks and hermits. Again the idea revived that the end of the world was at hand. The Lord was coming ; Antichrist, already at Rome, had been born as a harbinger of the last conflict. So Joachim told Richard Cœur-de-Lion. " In that case," his Majesty replied, " Antichrist can be no other than the reigning pope Clement." The seculars were to perish in a war with Antichrist ; the true monks were to shine in glory, the purified papacy was to triumph, and the immediate agency of the Holy Ghost was to supersede the necessity of human instruction. Ecclesiastical politics were blended with Joachim's anticipations. He accused secular princes of robbing the Church. He regarded the German empire with abhorrence. He denounced reliance on secular help. He deplored " the Babylonian captivity." He said the Pope, in relying on the King of France, leaned on a broken reed which would pierce his hand. The Byzantine empire and the Greek Church, of course he disliked, though he thought a remnant might be in them, like the seven thousand who did not bow the knee to Baal.¹

3. AMALRIC OF BENA (died A.D. 1209) also was a mystic. In him imagination and feeling broke loose from judgment and common sense, and in an intensely subjective state of mind he plunged into wild reveries of pantheism. He is represented, and there is no reason to

¹ Neander, vol. VII. pp. 295-311 ; Robertson, vol. V. pp. 339-345. There has been controversy respecting the genuine works of Joachim. Hahn considers *Concordia Veteris et Novi Testam.*, *Psalterium Decem Chordarum*, and an *Exposition of the Apocalypse* to be genuine. Other works ascribed to him are spurious or interpolated.

doubt the truth of the representation, as teaching that God is the end of all things, because all existence flows back to Him, that in His immutability it may find final rest; that as one man and another are of the same nature, so God is the same as the universe, and the universe is the same as God.¹ To this mystical identification of nature and God Amalric added an extravagant identification of believers with Christ, saying that as such they had actually participated in the sufferings of Christ on the cross.² Literally interpreting the language of St. Paul, Amalric and others of his class might give a Scripture colouring to their imaginations; but all sorts of absurdities

¹ Hagenbach, *Hist. of Doctrines*, vol. II. p. 145.

Gerson represents his opinions in the following way: "All things are God. God is all. The Creator and the creature are the same. Ideas create and are created. God Himself is the end of all things. All things return to Him, that in God they may rest immutably and remain one, undivided and immutable. God is the essence of all creatures."—*De Concordiâ Metaphysica cum Logicâ*, IV. pars II. p. 826.

Herzog's *Cyclopedia* (Art. Amalric) thus describes Amalric's pantheism: "In the Old Testament age God was incarnate in Abraham; and a revelation of justice is given in the law. In the New Testament age the Son was incarnate in Mary; and a revelation of grace is given mainly in the sacraments." "Now the Holy Ghost is incarnate, becomes incarnate in every individual, and all receive salvation, therefore, without the intervention of any external ceremonies." "As the ceremonial forms of the Old Testament revelation of the Father had to yield to the New Testament revelation of the Son, so do the external forms of the latter disappear in the age of the Holy Ghost. The New Testament loses its validity, the sacraments, all rites and ceremonies, become superfluous. The Pope is Antichrist, the Romish Church is Babylon." Do we not see here a violent reaction against the immense ritualism which the Church had identified with Christianity?

² Hagenbach, *Hist. of Doctrines*, vol. II. p. 46.

may be covered by the injudicious application, or rather by the perversion, of Bible texts; and nothing is more certain than that common sense is one of the first requisites for a proper understanding of the sacred writings, Carrying his intense subjectivity into other fields of thought, Amalric confounded heaven and hell with man's own consciousness to such an extent that the external was denied or ignored; and under the influence of an all-absorbing idealism he insisted that paradise is simply within a man's self, and that hell dwells in one's heart as the toothache throbs in one's nerves.¹ Amalric, in A.D. 1207, recanted those of his doctrines which in 1204 had been condemned by the University of Paris. If we look at the effects of his teaching, so far from abating the force of our description, they serve to increase it. For through his disciple, David of Dinanto, and others imbued with the same spirit, a party was formed in the thirteenth century called the sect of the Holy Ghost. They talked of the incarnation of the Spirit in all the faithful, maintaining that those who possess the true knowledge no longer need faith and hope, that the resurrection is past, and that renewed souls have entered into the real heaven.² The opposition these people made to the dominant Church, which they denounced as the Babylon of the Revelation, would, it is true, be unfavourable to their obtaining a fair hearing, and yet the report respecting them is such as to leave an impression of its substantial accuracy.

¹ Hagenbach, vol. II. p. 145. It is very important to notice how in these and other mystical speculations we find anticipated a good deal of modern thought now deemed so "fresh" as well as fascinating.

² Neander, *Hist.*, vol. VIII. p. 210.

4. BONAVENTURA, the "seraphic doctor" (A.D. 1221—1274), affords another specimen of the mystic class. He lacked somewhat the sobriety of Hugo, he was untinged with the pantheism of Amalric, and he must be regarded as more in harmony than was either of these with the dogmas and spirit of the mediæval Church. His credulity, as seen in his *Legenda S. Francisci*, and his Mariolatry, in writings about the Virgin, are very distressing; and it is a relief to turn from these productions to passages in his *Stimulus Amoris* expressive of intense love to Christ; it should be added that such love had much to do with his misguided veneration of Christ's mother. His mind had a strong affinity for Neoplatonic views, and he sought to mediate between conflicting opinions, and to reconcile free will with the predeterminations of almighty grace. In his *Itinerarium Mentis ad Deum* he exhibits union with Deity as the supreme good, and as the only method of reaching truth and happiness. Looking upon all knowledge as a Divine manifestation, and distinguishing between that taught by the external creation, that revealed by the reflection of the Divine image in the human soul, and that communicated immediately from above by the Holy Spirit, he speaks of those who contemplate God in the first as occupying the vestibule of the temple; of those who attain to the second as entering the holy place; and of those who penetrate into the third as reaching the holiest of all, where rests the ark of the covenant under the wings of the cherubim. Then he goes on to speak of the points of view whence one may contemplate the mysteries of God, and attain to the knowledge of His unity of nature, and His Trinity of persons—the one involved in the idea of His essence, the other in the idea of His communicable

goodness.¹ Thus by an effort of reason, or rather of mystic imagination, Bonaventura spins by a web of deductions from primary postulates a scheme of theology in accordance with ancient creeds. In his *Breviloquium*—according to Baumgarten the best dogmatic compendium of the middle ages—he states and illustrates these seven articles: the Trinity of God, the creation of the world, the corruption of sin, the incarnation of the Word, the grace of the Spirit, the medicine of the sacraments, and the final judgment.²

The cast of his piety as well as his theology appears in his reply, when asked what books he studied. "That," pointing to a crucifix, "is the source of all my knowledge. I study only Christ, and Him crucified." He once said, "If God were to bestow on any one no other talents besides the grace of loving Him, this alone would suffice, and would be a rich spiritual treasure. A poor old woman may love Him more than the most learned master and doctor of theology."

Leaving these four mystics of the eleventh and two following centuries, we notice a powerful wave of mystical excitement rolling over the Teutonic Church in the fourteenth; and its tendency was to break down the traditionalism of the past, and to sweep away certain principles upon which the ecclesiastical system of the middle ages had been made to rest.

A prominent and well-known theological teacher of the fourteenth century was JOHN TAULER (died A.D. 1360), a Dominican of Cologne. ECKART, a member of the same order in the same place (died A.D. 1329), preceded and influenced him in his views; but Eckart

¹ *Itinerarium*, ch. v., VII.; *Opera*, tom. VII. 132.

² Herzog, *sub nom.*

was an extreme Neoplatonist, and expressed himself so as to give the idea that human individuality is to be absorbed in the ocean of the Divine essence, not making the important distinction between getting rid of one's own personality, which is impossible, and getting rid of the notion of one's own intrinsic merit, which is good and wise. Tauler stopped short of that wild extreme, yet dwelt much upon self-annihilation, to be interpreted in a spiritual sense; and upon the inward and Divine light, which is enjoyed by souls united to Christ by a living faith. He loved to think of the Lord as the first-born amongst many brethren, as communicating Himself to, and dwelling within, His spiritual kindred, so as still to be living upon the earth in the persons of His redeemed people. Self-surrender he regarded as the secret of religion. United to Christ's humanity in a spirit of self-surrender, we shall be filled, says Tauler, with Christ's Divinity, through the richness of His gracious communications to our souls.

It is apparent, on a moment's reflection, that this kind of sentiment was inconsistent with that dependence on ecclesiastical authority, ecclesiastical orders, and ecclesiastical ordinances which formed the backbone of the mediæval Church. Such incipient Quakerism as Tauler's, if we may so call it, struck at the root of all priestism by placing the soul in the Divine embrace, where it receives life direct from God Himself. Of course all merit in this self-surrender was repudiated. To lie still in the celestial arms, which is the highest act of human volition, could have in it no more intrinsic holiness than can be found in a block or a stone. Such an idea was logically incompatible with the scholastic dogma of merit, either of condignity or of congruity. Of more

than one of Tauler's mystical ideas may it be said that it "was the ark of an unconscious Protestantism." By his faithful preaching he produced surprising effect in the cities of Cologne and Strasburg, not only gathering excited crowds by the witchery of his German eloquence, but by the loving proclamation of spiritual truths folding many of Christ's sheep.¹

JOHN RUYSBROEK (died A.D. 1381) followed in the wake of the illustrious German, and wrote books in the Flemish language, which were extensively circulated. "They were characterized by thorough knowledge of the spiritual wants and aberrations of the age. He strove to wake afresh the consciousness of individual fellowship with God, in opposition to the modes of thought which prompted men to lean for help on outward union with the Church."² The character of his theology is indicated by the titles of some of his works: *Summary of the Spiritual Life, The Mirror of Salvation, The Seven Guards of the Spiritual School, The Seven Degrees of Love, The Spiritual Nuptials.*

JOHN WESSEL of Gröningen (A.D. 1429-1489) in rare measure "combined accomplishments so diverse as scholastic dialectics, mystical speculation, and thoroughly classical training."³ He is described as a theologian who closely followed the great Augustine; but he went further than his master, and so far anticipated Luther, that Luther said, "If I had read Wessel before I began, my opponents would have imagined that Luther had derived everything from

¹ See Tauler's sermons, translated by Miss Winkworth, and Vaughan's *Hours with the Mystics*, vol. I. pp. 232, 314-324.

² Hardwick's *Middle Age*, p. 381; Vaughan, vol. I. p. 254.

³ Kurtz, *History of the Church*, vol. I. p. 478.

Wessel, so entirely do we two agree in spirit." Gieseler gives a number of quotations from John Wessel, which support and illustrate this statement of the great reformer.¹

The mystic element, freed from habits of scholastic thought, yet not assailing the authority of tradition, appears further in that remarkable book the *Theologia Germanica*, also praised by Luther. The intense piety breathed throughout its pages, what it says about the hatred of sin, aspirations after holiness, the renunciation of self-dependence, and the constant recognition of the union of the soul with Christ as the only way of salvation,—a conspicuous feature of the book,—must awaken sympathy in devout minds; but most English readers will find in it a large amount of transcendental thinking and experience, at times somewhat cloudy and unintelligible. To the whole of this current of thought the remark is applicable: "It is characteristic of such mysticism that in its contemplation of what the Saviour does *in us* it undervalues what He has done *for us*, and that it devotes more attention to communion with God and sanctification than to justification by faith, which is the condition and basis of all fellowship with God."²

Another remarkable book of the period, also anonymous, though commonly ascribed to Thomas à Kempis, is the *Imitation of Christ*, which, translated into different languages, has been a favourite with Protestants perhaps more than with Roman Catholics. The fourth book of the original, "on the Sacrament of the Altar," has been regarded by critics as the composition of a different person from the writer of the first three books. The work has been eulogized for its simplicity, devoutness, and practical

¹ *Hist.*, vol. III. p. 388.

² Kurtz, vol. I. p. 470.

character ; and it is noticed by one of its modern editors, as a circumstance which has escaped general observation, that there is in this popular work of the fifteenth century no "mention of the intercession of the Virgin to obtain the forgiveness of sin."¹

This celebrated work has been attributed to GERSON, Chancellor of the University of Paris, who stands distinguished in connection with the Council of Constance, A.D. 1414 ; but the authorship probably belongs to Thomas Hamerken of Kempen, near Cologne, a canon regular of Zwoll, who died in 1471. Gerson, however, was a mystic, and with laborious zeal aimed to reform theology, which he complained of as having degenerated into trifling. His object, to use his own language, was "concordare theologiam mysticam cum nostrâ scholasticâ ;" and in his system he distinguished between speculative mysticism and practical mysticism. Like Richard of St. Victor, he named three stages of mental ascent—*cogitation*, *meditation*, and *contemplation* : the first relating to sensible objects, the second to an investigation of truth, the third to a free gazing on things Divine. Love, he says, is the experimental perception of God ; through it the eternal Word is born into the soul, and so the human becomes united to the Divine. But Gerson avoided pantheism, depreciated visions, and recommended ascetic practices as a means of advancing the spiritual apprehension of the Almighty.² His *Method of studying Theology* and his *Mystical Divinity* exerted a powerful influence ; and his disciple Nicholas Clemanges, a zealous Church reformer in the early part of the fifteenth century, followed in the same order of thought, insisting upon the connection

¹ Preface to Dr. Dibdin's edition.

² *Opera*, I. pt. I. 43. See art. "Gerson" in Herzog.

between theology and the spiritual life of the theologian, and urging that preachers should illustrate in their conduct what they proclaim from the pulpit. His teaching, with a tinge of mysticism, was eminently practical.¹

Gerson was thoroughly dissatisfied with the logical quibbles of his age, sick at heart as he looked into the books written and the schools conducted by the later nominalists. He was deeply convinced that the scholastic method of study needed reform, and that theology must be lifted out of the debasing associations into which it had been plunged. Mysticism was his remedy, the fulcrum on which he sought such leverage as would raise religious thought above its degradation. Mysticism, no doubt, was a potent instrumentality for undermining Aristotelian forms of argument in the fifteenth century, indeed for overthrowing a system of inquiry which had lasted for about seven hundred years. And here, as we take leave of scholasticism, and mark a sundering in twain of the old connection between divinity and school logic, we may notice that philosophy in a new shape, or rather in an old one fitfully revived, began to appear, not in the Church, but in the world; not in association with religion, but in a way totally independent of it. The fall of Constantinople and the renewed study of classical Greek led to the perusal of Plato's dialogues and other works, and a learned society was established at Florence for that purpose. The admiration felt for the ancients now knew no bounds. "The effect of this influx of Grecian influence, at a period when philosophy was emancipating itself from the absolute authority of the Church, was to transfer allegiance

¹ Matter, *Hist.*, vol. III. p. 229.

from the Church to classical antiquity.”¹ In the movement there was much good. The revival of Greek learning prepared for the criticism of the New Testament, which had been sadly neglected. The careful study of the Gospels and Epistles in the original could not but expose the absurdity of many mediæval comments on the inspired Christian writings; but it must not be forgotten that the classical enthusiasm, kindled and kept alive in the early Italian schools of learning, had in it more of a pagan than of a Christian spirit.

¹ Lewes, *Hist. of Phil.*, vol. II. p. 88.

CHAPTER VII.

PREPARATION FOR REFORM.

THERE were many earnest and devoted men in the Church of Rome who, between the fourteenth and sixteenth centuries, discerned clearly enough the abuses and corruptions which abounded in Christendom. They attacked boldly the evils which aroused their indignation, and they advocated various practical reforms. But they had no clear insight into the causes of those mischiefs which they deplored. They laid down no principles pregnant with beneficial results. They adopted current dogmas and espoused long-established institutions, and did not seek to reform the creeds or in any way to improve the theology of the Church. Persons of this description do not come within the range of our present studies, which are confined to phases of biography and history such as serve to determine the traditions, the developments, and the revolutions in doctrinal opinion.

The theological element to which in the last Chapter we directed attention played a conspicuous part among ante-Protestants in preparing for reform in the sixteenth century. Referring to sects opposed to Rome, a French historian has observed, "The principle of this opposition, being a kind of mysticism, nourished more or less by the reading of certain biblical books,—a primitive measure more simple and direct than any other,—absorbed the thoughts of these pious congregations, and revived in the

whole Christian community that primitive charity, that love to God, that purity of manners, and that exaltation of faith, which had been the glory of the best days of the Church."¹ Mysticism undermined Popery and its corruptions.

In Germany and France mysticism and reform appeared in close connection, but in England it was otherwise. The morning star of the English Reformation shines upon us apart from what many would call the mists, however gloriously tinted, which floated so widely over theological skies.

The personal history of JOHN WYCLIFFE (A.D. 1324—1387) has of late years been subjected to severe critical tests, and the result is that there appear to have been more than one ecclesiastic at that period bearing the same name. Hence one has been confounded with another in certain comparatively unimportant respects; but these researches have rectified such mistakes, and also relieved the Reformer from a suspicion that hostility to the Pope and some other circumstances in Wycliffe's history arose from mere personal resentment. Further, it has been shown that his opposition to the mendicants did not begin until after he had published his views on the eucharist—views which resembled those of Berenger,—and that his opposition aimed at their doctrinal errors and their personal inconsistencies, and did not proceed from any fundamental difference as to the principle on which mendicant orders were based. For Wycliffe himself insisted much upon the law of evangelical poverty, that is to say, the renunciation of property for the sake of Christ, and in imitation of Christ's example; and the Reformer's institute of "poor priests" seems to have been

¹ Matter, *Histoire du Christianisme*, vol. III, p. 282.

mainly an improved type of that established by St. Francis, some old monastic peculiarities and pretensions being dropped, and useful practices substituted in their place. Singular notions about property, which have created much discussion, and are not easily understood, Wycliffe expressed in an unpublished work entitled *De Dominio*; and if we may trust a report of the contents by Dr. Lechler,¹ they would seem to amount to something of this kind—that the absolute proprietorship of things belongs to Almighty God, and that no other absolute proprietorship obtains anywhere; that the possession of property on the part of mankind is a sort of feudal trust, held immediately from the Divine Lord and Owner of the universe; and that such possession is truly and rightly held by those alone who are in a state of grace, and, hence, are loyal and obedient vassals of the King of kings, rendering the righteous fealty which arises out of their relationship to Him. Man's right comes directly from God, and is granted in immediate fief to each individual soul, that soul being responsible for the use made of the Divine estate. No one comes between God and man. God deals directly with man, and man deals directly with God. Here lies a germ of religious thought out of which may grow the Lutheran principle of personal justification; but no clear and consistent enunciation of that principle has been cited out of Wycliffe's works. Perhaps passages on grace, faith, and acceptance with God may be found in Thomas Aquinas as decided and as strong, taken by themselves, as any in our English divine; only there is this important difference between them, that, whereas the elaborate teaching of the former in reference

¹ *John Wicliff and his Precursors*, by Prof. Lechler, D.D., was translated by the late Dr. Lorimer.

to priesthood, sacraments, and other kindred subjects tends to neutralize much of the evangelical doctrine of Aquinas, there are not such checks on evangelical truth in the writings of Wycliffe; indeed, there is, on the contrary, much to check the superstitious application of sacramental views, the absence of which is manifest in the system of St. Thomas Aquinas.

In comparing Wycliffe with other prominent men of the period, we find that in his opposition to the wealth of the Church, the despotism of the Papacy, and the method of supporting and promoting the cause of Christ he somewhat resembled Arnold of Brescia; nor were political complications wanting in the case of the English Reformer to bring out a further likeness between him and the Italian revolutionist; but Wycliffe was totally destitute of that classical enthusiasm which strongly marked the course of the other memorable personage. He appears more like a Hebrew prophet, bearing the burden of the Lord, and seeking to infuse into the Church of Christ renovated life through the grace which flows from its Divine head. In that respect he reminds us of Tauler of Strasburg. Like him too he was one who broke the shell and got at the kernel of truth; but he never lost himself, like the German mystic, in bright clouds of transcendental imagination. He was not a sentimentalist, though a realistic philosopher,¹ but a man of common sense, of practical understanding, with a clear head and a sound heart. Deep piety lay at the bottom of his experience and character. He loved the Bible; he translated it, on

¹ "In philosophiâ nulli reputabatur secundus, in scholasticis disciplinis incomparabilis." Knighton, 2664. *The Last Age of the Church* would seem not to have been written by Wycliffe. Lechler, vol. I. p. 228; II. 447-53; Robertson, vol. VII. p. 265.

account of the new life it inspired in his own soul, and for its purifying comfort amidst life's sorrows. Life he called a valley of weeping, and though not a martyr, his course, the latter part of it, at least, appears to have been by no means smooth. Though employed at one time in important diplomatic service, also assigned a post of honour in the University of Oxford, and spending, as he must have done, peaceful hours in the rectory of Lutterworth, a sort of mournful monotone runs throughout his writings, and one of his biographers found it "difficult to suppose that his brow was often cheered with a smile."¹

He adopted the Augustinianism of Bradwardine. His principal treatise on doctrinal principles is his *Triologus*,² which is written in the form of a conversation between truth, falsehood, and prudence. The absolute causality of God and the exclusive authority of Scripture are the two main points on which the whole discussion turns. He attempts to reconcile human freedom with the Divine causality by saying that man is like a child in leading-strings, who at the same time freely uses his own limbs. The eternal purpose gives a bent and direction to human nature and its dispositions, but the individual acts of men are free. God is the efficient cause of all good; and as to evil, that, being negative and having no real existence, must not be ascribed to Divine causality. Wycliffe grappled with the origin of evil, and sought to solve the problem by an illustration. There are three ways of beholding God—by direct perception, by refraction through a medium, and by

¹ Dr. Vaughan, *Life and Opinions of Wycliffe*.

² It is remarked by Dr. Lechler that the title is founded on a false analogy, as if "dialogue" were derived from *δύο*.

reflection from a mirror. Fallen angels declined from the first to the last, and came to see themselves not as they are in God, but in separation from Him, whence they became proud and independent, and fancied themselves equal to the Highest. Herein was their sin ; and what they had thus learned they taught mankind. The transmission of evil from generation to generation Wycliffe conceived to be, through the connection of human souls with human bodies. He believed that every new soul was a fresh creation, not an existence arising from parentage, and that, being created with no positive character, but only a *tabula rasa*, it contracts pollution by its contact with human materialism.¹

He resembles Anselm in dwelling on the necessity of the incarnation for redeeming mankind ; and he insists upon the death of Christ as a substitute and a satisfaction, adopting the distinction by Thomas Aquinas between Christ's active and passive obedience. As intimated already, he did not teach the doctrine of a forensic justification ; but, confounding justification and holiness, he described salvation as an infusion of grace into the soul. Faith he regarded chiefly as an intellectual act, yet as having a supernatural origin and a decidedly practical end.

It cannot but be noticed, by those who have paid attention to Wycliffe's writings, how free he was from mystical tendencies. Diffidence was mingled with boldness ; he claimed the liberty of doubting where a subject is not plain ; and the homely and profitable common sense of his countrymen appears throughout the whole performance of his arduous task. One grand

¹ Kurtz, vol. I. p. 487. He gives a condensed account of the contents of the *Trialogus*.

principle of the *Trialogus* is the supreme authority of Scripture; and this he not only vindicated in theory, but carried out by the most characteristic labour of his life. The version he produced of the whole Bible was begun about A.D. 1378. It was made from the Vulgate. Christianity had been latinized in many respects, and the use of the Roman tongue in sacred literature had been a symbol of that mediatorial place which the Roman priesthood had assumed. In Latin men spoke to God. In Latin God spoke to man. Wycliffe broke down the Latin wall of partition. He would have people listen to the voice of the Eternal in no foreign, mediatory tone. Through him Anglo-Saxons came to hear the word of God in the racy speech of Anglo-Saxondom. His work shows how clearly he saw that the pathway of reformation must be through a knowledge of the Bible; and he distinctly maintains that Christ's law sufficeth, that a Christian man may gather from it what is needful for salvation, that there is no court of appeal but that of heaven, that though there were a hundred popes, and all the friars were cardinals, yet should we learn less from them than from the gospel, and that true sons will in no wise go about to infringe the will and testament of their Father.¹

The practical character of this Reformer's sermons is thus noticed by one who gave much time to the study of them. "References," says Dr. Vaughan, "to abstruse and speculative questions frequently arise, either from the import of the text, or from the reasonings suggested by

¹ *Trialogus*, iv. 7. Respecting Wycliffe's theological opinions, the student should consult Vaughan's *Life of the Reformer*, Lechler's learned work, and Robertson's *History of the Church*, vol. vii. pp. 287-294. On the history of his translation see *Our English Bible*, published by the Religious Tract Society.

it; but these are soon dismissed, that the attention of the people might be directed to 'things more profiting.' Through the whole the manifold corruptions of the hierarchy are vigorously assailed, as forming the great barrier to all spiritual improvement. The duties of men in all relations are frequently discussed, and always with a careful, and mostly with a judicious, reference to the authority of Scripture; while the doctrines of the gospel are uniformly exhibited as declaring the guilt and the spiritual infirmities of men to be such as to show the atonement of Christ to be their only way of pardon, and the grace of the Divine Spirit to be their only hope of purity. We sometimes feel the want of more clearness in the statement of these truths, and we often wish to see them more fully developed; but no room is left to doubt as to their being there, and there as the full substance of the doctrine taught."¹

The followers of Wycliffe, commonly called Lollards, were numerous, especially amongst the common people; there were not wanting, however, in the upper and better-informed classes, some who went great length in the way of reform as to Church doctrine and discipline, for a petition was presented to Parliament containing twelve conclusions: one pronounces priestly ordination a human device, and another declares that the dogma of transubstantiation leads to idolatry. In religious opinions the Lollards do not seem to have been alike. In looking over documents relating to these men, we find that disbelief in the Papal doctrine of the real presence was a prime charge brought against some, as well as the notion that the efficacy of sacraments is destroyed by the immorality of priests. Pilgrimages and the worship of

¹ Wycliffe's *Tracts and Treatises*, edited by Dr. Vaughan, p. 82.

saints were condemned by the Lollards, and the Pope was called Antichrist. Different phases of theological sentiment appear, and it was only natural in an age of mental activity, when literature revived, art flourished, and commercial prosperity advanced, when cities were rejoicing in chartered liberties, and Parliament was growing in power, that an impulse should be given to religious thoughtfulness in different ranks of the community; that old beliefs and old institutions should be exposed to a searching criticism, and that diversities of opinion should exist amongst those who rebelled against the Church authorities of the day.

Some distinguished persons for a while adopted, more or less, the Wycliffite faith. Philip Reppington, Canon of Leicester, afterwards Bishop of Lincoln, and Nicholas Hereford, an Oxford divine, who afterwards, with many "prelates and worshipful men, and others," sat in judgment over accused heretics, were of this description, but they afterwards abandoned their Lollard opinions. Walter Brute too, a layman, somewhat eloquent and exceedingly prolix, whose theological peculiarities are stated at length by John Foxe,¹ not only opposed Popery and its characteristic dogmas, but engaged himself deeply in endeavours to explain unfulfilled prophecy, seeking the fulfilment of Scripture in passing events, and in changes he supposed to be close at hand.

Perhaps the most singular instance at that period of mental activity in connection with religious doctrine and ecclesiastical matters may be found in the case of REGINALD PECOCK, appointed to the see of Asaph A.D. 1444, and to the see of Chichester 1450. At one time

¹ *Acts and Monuments*, vol. III. p. 131 *et seq.* Religious Tract Society's edit.

he maintained that it is not necessary to believe our Lord descended into hell, or to believe in the Holy Spirit, or in the Catholic Communion, or in the infallibility of the Church, or in the universal authority of general councils. Finally he said, "It is sufficient for every one to understand Holy Scripture in its literal sense." Afterwards, at St. Paul's Cross, he abjured these "errors and heresies." He recanted, says Thomas Fuller, confuted by seven solid arguments, thus enumerated— "*Auctoritate, Vi, Arte, Fraude, Metu, Terrore, et Tyrannide.*" Pecock wrote two books against the Lollards: *An Introduction to the Chief Truths of the Christian Religion*, in A.D. 1440, and *The Repressor of Overmuch Blaming of the Clergy*, in 1449; his *Treatise on Faith* also opposed the Lollards. These were published before his recantation at St. Paul's Cross, and on that occasion were burnt before a great multitude of people.

"Pecock himself," says one qualified to give an opinion,¹ "is a singular illustration of the eclecticism, so to say, which prevailed. He virtually admitted, on the one hand, the fallibility of general councils, and insisted strenuously on the necessity of proving doctrines by reason and not simply by authority; while, on the other, he carried his notions on the Papal supremacy almost as far as an Ultramontane could desire, and was blamed even by men like Gascoigne for giving more than its due to the Pope's temporal authority. In maintaining Scripture to be the sole rule of faith, and in rejecting the apocryphal books as uncanonical, he agrees with the Reformers altogether; in his doctrine of the invocation

¹ The Rev. Churchill Babington, editor of Pecock's work *The Repressor of Overmuch Blaming of the Clergy*. Published in 1860.

of saints and in various other particulars, he agrees altogether with their adversaries. If in his discourse of images he writes some things which few Anglicans would approve, so also he writes others in the same discourse which many Romanists would still less approve. Perhaps it would not be greatly wrong to assert that Pecock stands half way between the Church of Rome and the Church of England as they now exist, the type of his mind, however, being rather Anglican than Roman." His Ultramontane views would hardly confirm this last judgment; and perhaps what follows should be somewhat modified—"of Puritanism in all its phases he is the decided opponent." To maintain that Scripture is the sole rule of faith, looks somewhat like Puritanism. Consistency cannot be looked for in Pecock. He appears as a sort of theological chameleon, so different in one place from what he is in another, that three bulls came from Rome in his defence, and Foxe treats him as a Reformer before the Reformation. Indeed Babington remarks that Pecock "contributed very materially to the Reformation, which took place in the following century."

The intellectual and literary character of the *Repressor* stands very high. It has been said that it contains passages well worthy of Hooker, both for weight of matter and dignity of style. And Babington adds, "Fullness of language, pliancy of expression, argumentative sagacity, extensive learning, and critical skill distinguish almost every chapter." "It is the earliest piece of good philosophical discussion of which our English prose literature can boast."

Wycliffe's influence as a Reformer extended beyond his own country. JEROME OF PRAGUE, who visited England in A.D. 1400, carried home English reformatory influences,

which blended with others of the same description already existing in Bohemia. JOHN HUS (A.D. 1373—1415) came under their power, and though at first unfavourable to some of Wycliffe's tracts, he afterwards aided Jerome in their circulation, and avowed himself a pupil of the English Reformer. His doctrinal views are expressed in his work *De Ecclesiâ*. In it he exhibits the gospel under its moral and spiritual aspect, and he shows how he had imbibed the theological principles of Augustine. With the errors of transubstantiation, purgatory, and others of the same kind still clinging to him, he himself earnestly trusted the crucified Saviour, and strove to lead others to do the same.¹ He studied in the University of Prague, and in that grand old city spent most of his life, where he proved himself to be a great spiritual power. He laid hold of the idea that the whole Church of Christ is a priesthood, and has no mediator but Him, thus grasping what is fatal to such an ecclesiastical system as that of the mediæval epoch. The spirit of his teaching lived on after he had been burnt to ashes outside the gates of Constance, and the Hussite cause became a great trouble to the Church of Rome.

One JOHN OF TROCZNOW, commonly known as Ziska, took the lead in this movement, having sworn to avenge the death of Hus. Many who assembled on St. Magdalene's day, when the communion was over, followed him to Prague, attacked the convents, and even put to death some of the magistrates of the city. Wenceslaus, King of Bohemia, died from apoplexy brought on by this disturbance; and the Emperor Sigismund, whose safe-conduct to Hus had been violated, remained heir of the royal inheritance. As he had become an object of

¹ Kurtz, vol. 1. p. 496.

execration to the Hussites for violating his promise, they broke out into unrestrained disturbance at the thought of his accession to the throne. There was a mild party of Bohemian Reformers called *Utraquists*, or *Calixtines*, because mainly anxious to have the cup as well as the wafer in the sacrament ; but there existed another party, led on by Ziska, who opposed the Church system altogether, rejected tradition, and required Scripture warrant for every religious practice. With their religious opinions republican principles were interwoven, and to this class belongs the name of Taborites, from their making Mount Tabor a centre of resort.¹

The moderate party drew up a document in A.D. 1420, called the *Four Articles of Prague* : first, that the Word of God should be freely preached ; secondly, that the eucharist should be administered in both kinds ; thirdly, that the clergy should be deprived of their secular lordships and temporalities ; and fourthly, by a strange classification of offences, that besides deadly sins, the exaction of fees by the clergy should be forbidden and repressed.

¹ "On St. Mary Magdalene's day, 1419, a great meeting of Hussites was assembled on a hill near Aust, in the circle of Bechin, where the holy communion was celebrated in the open air. There was no previous confession ; the clergy (among whom were John Cardinal and Jacobellus of Misa) wore no distinctive vestures ; the chalices were of wood, and the three hundred altars were without any covering. Forty-two thousand persons, men, women, and children, communicated ; and the celebration was followed by a love-feast, at which the rich shared with their poorer brethren ; but no drinking or dancing, no gaming or music, was allowed. The people encamped in tents, which, in the Bohemian language, were called *Tabor* ; and out of this celebration grew a town, which received that name, with reference at once to the circumstances of the meeting, and to the mount of the Saviour's transfiguration."—Robertson, vol. VIII. p. 19.

The avarice of the Church had provoked this last stipulation. These articles, which did not satisfy the Taborites, seem to have been tolerated for a time; but the war went on, and as late as A.D. 1431 a new crusade against the Hussites was authorized by the Pope.

The Bohemian Brethren must not be confounded with the Hussites either in history, doctrine, or spirit. They first appeared at Prague about A.D. 1450, being influenced by a layman, Peter of Chelcick, who contended more for the moralities of religion than for particular dogmas, and opposed the Church system, as well as oaths, war, and capital punishment: some of the Lollards and some of the Waldenses did the same. The Brethren determined to have a ministry of their own, not caring about any order of succession, but looking only to personal qualifications. They bound themselves not to seek the redress of grievances by taking up arms, as the Hussites had done, but to defend themselves by remonstrance, patience, and prayer. Negotiations were carried on between them and the Vaudois, and some of their ministers received ordination from a bishop of the valleys. But, though so peaceable, they could not escape persecution. In A.D. 1468 a decree was issued against them; their members were thrown into Bohemian prisons; and their first bishop, Michael, continued in close confinement until the death of King Podibrad, A.D. 1471. Some perished with hunger, others were tortured, the remainder fled to Bohemia, where they found comfort and joy in studying the Scriptures. Not daring to kindle a fire by day, lest the smoke should betray their haunts, and dragging brushwood after them to obliterate their footprints, these *pit-dwellers*, as their enemies nicknamed them, heaped up blazing fagots at night, not only to

warm their limbs, but to serve as lamps for reading their much-worn New Testaments in the forest sanctuary. When they obtained some respite from persecution, they were amongst the first to employ the newly-invented art of printing for sacred purposes ; and before the Reformation they issued three editions of the Bohemian Bible.

We must turn to Italy for one moment. JEROME SAVONAROLA (A.D. 1452-1498) distinguished himself in Florence as a Dominican preacher of rare eloquence and immense popularity. He denounced the fashionable weaknesses and vices of his day, and wrought a wonderful outward reformation in the city ; he even persuaded men and women to burn, in an enormous heap, various articles of luxury. The crowds that came to hear him have been well described. "The people got up in the middle of the night to get places for the sermon, and came to the door of the cathedral and waited outside till it should be opened, making no account of any inconvenience, neither of the cold, nor the wind, nor of standing in winter with their feet on the marble ; and among them were old and young, women and children, of every sort, who came with such jubilee and rejoicing that it was bewildering to hear them, going to the sermon as to a wedding. Then the silence was great in the church, each one going to his place ; and he who could read, with a taper in his hand read the service and other prayers. And though many thousand people were thus collected together, no sound was to be heard, not even a "hush," until the arrival of the children, who sang hymns with so much sweetness that heaven seemed to be opened. Thus they waited three or four hours till the padre entered the pulpit. And the attention of so great a mass of people, all with eyes and ears intent upon the

preacher, was wonderful; they listened so that when the sermon reached its end it seemed to them that it had scarcely begun.”¹

The fanatical strain which mingled with the better characteristics of Savonarola's sermons, which often glowed with evangelical light and fervour, is to be connected with the incident just noticed; and some of the political and personal complications of his career must be included amongst the shadows of his illustrious life. Nor should we omit to mention that he indulged in strange interpretations of prophecy, and spoke of visions he had of a wonderful kind. He for a time wielded the fierce democracy of the Florentine Republic, without penetrating it with that piety which pervaded his own soul; the consequence was the bitter enmity of political opponents, especially the partisans of the Medici, whose policy he opposed. He roused the priesthood against him by exposing their misconduct, and also provoked the Pope of Rome, who, after having offered him a cardinal's hat, excommunicated the preacher. At last the eloquent Dominican was brought before a commission appointed to try his case, and on being put to the torture his delicate frame could not endure the agony, and, unconscious of what he was saying, he confessed whatever was suggested. The tragedy ended in his being hanged and burnt. In early life he had been addicted to literary studies, and wrote a compendium of philosophy, “an epitome of all the writings, various as they are, of the Stagyrite;” a work which, according to Padre Marchese, “might have acted as a stepping-stone to the *Novum Organum*.”² This seems very improbable, as the minds

¹ Burlamacchi, quoted in Mrs. Oliphant's *Makers of Florence*, p. 244.

² *Ibid.*, p. 231.

of Savonarola and Bacon were as unlike as they well could be. "Another treatise of a similar character he had begun upon Plato." This was much more in his way, but the author tells us that he destroyed it. In after years he thought less of Aristotle and Plato, and more of the Bible, making it his text-book, and learning it by heart.

Savonarola's orthodoxy has been regarded as unimpeachable by the Romish Church; and his book on the *Triumph of the Cross* has been approved by the Jesuits; it is even said that two popes declared him worthy of canonization. Yet Luther was charmed with some of his writings, and pronounced him one of his own fore-runners; accordingly, he appears in that position on the monument at Worms. He did not attack the Church system of the day, only its corruptions; nor did he propound any theory adverse to the priesthood or its clerical grades; he only assailed the immoralities and inconsistencies of his brethren. He did not go so far as Wycliffe; he did not insist, like Hus, on the priesthood of the universal Church. But, like him, he stirred up personal animosity, and had to pay the penalty. He is not to be regarded as a reformer, or as a distinguished theologian, or as a precursor of the Reformation in the way of laying down great principles; he is rather to be looked upon as a pious, devout, and earnest man, striving, not always wisely, to sweep away vice, irreligion, and folly, and to reform the republic in which he lived.

Before leaving Savonarola altogether, we may be allowed to add a word or two relative to a characteristic of his teaching which appears to have been not peculiar to himself. A history of the interpretation of prophecy does not come within the limits of this work; a history of original prophecies uttered by persons re-

garded by others as in some way inspired is still further removed beyond the line of our present study. But it is worth while to notice that Savonarola not only expounded the Apocalypse and applied passages in it to approaching events, but he spoke of words revealed to him in visions from the Lord.¹ Some of his predictions so uttered were fulfilled, and this produced or strengthened the belief that he was an inspired prophet. We are not aware whether he taught any particular dogma on the subject of inspiration; but clearly the claim to a power of foreseeing events, and a concession of that claim, involved the idea that gifts of inspiration had not ceased, that God still revealed His purposes to men—an idea which, if not formulated into a theological dogma, must have been a powerful element in religious belief. It is curious to find still in existence notes taken by a contemporary containing extracts from Savonarola's prophetic preaching, and from the writings of other persons who foretold what was to happen in the Church and the world.² The contents seem to be of little or no interest, because the specimens given are vague or unintelligible; but they indicate a habit of thought pertaining to incipient Reformers, and very popular amongst their followers. A book entitled *Prognosticatio* was published in 1488 by some one assuming the name of Ruth, meaning by it a gleaner in the field of prophecy,

¹ As to Savonarola's preaching, see Gieseler, vol. III. p. 377; he gives copious extracts: M'Crie's *Hist. of the Reformation in Italy*, pp. 27-36, and translations in the Appendix, p. 449: Mosheim,—a good note with references in Reid's edition,—p. 540: and Robertson, vol. VIII. p. 236.

² See Maitland's *Eight Essays*, p. 217. Many years ago I saw and perused a MS. translation of a number of Savonarola's prophetic orations.

following predecessors, as Ruth did Boaz. The proper name of the author, according to the book itself, is *Johannes Lychtenberger*, and he gives something like a theory of prophetic gifts. They result, he says, first, from long experience and observation ; secondly, from the stars—in other words, astrology ; and, thirdly, from revelations through Divine visions and other ways. Then the author speaks of the Sibyl, the Old Testament prophets, St. John, St. Bridget, and a certain *Reynhardus Lolhardus*—probably a Lollard of the name of Reynard. It is a singular coincidence that we find John Foxe speaking of “prophecies amongst the Lollards ;” and beyond all doubt prophesyings were popular towards the close of the Middle Ages, both inside and outside the Church of Rome. Lychtenberger’s book passed through many editions. Maitland gives a list of eighteen, between A.D. 1492 and 1539, and intimates that this list does not contain the whole number. To one of these Luther wrote a preface.¹

¹ Maitland’s *Eight Essays*, pp. 216–227.

CHAPTER VIII.

GENERAL REVIEW.—A.D. 200—1500.

HAVING concluded our brief and imperfect review of the history of theology down to the beginning of the sixteenth century, we may here with propriety pause for a moment in order to gather up a few observations, some of which have already been anticipated.

1. Old forms of pagan philosophy, which played a conspicuous part in the ante-Nicene Church, disappear as we follow the development of theology in the Middle Ages. Gnosticism and Neoplatonism were antagonist forces, for some time very troublesome and very formidable. The former occupied a large share of controversial attention. Irenæus, Hippolytus, Epiphanius, and Theodoret took a leading part in this warfare, and did their utmost to discover, expose, and overthrow the dogmas and dreams of such men as Basilides and Valentinus. It is plain that systems of thought which to many now-a-days may seem powerless and contemptible, had in the estimation of early theological critics a very serious and threatening aspect. They felt that it was no easy thing to brush them aside, that they had laid forcible hold on many minds, and that it required a considerable effort to tear them away. The view taken by some in our own times of Gnostic ideas as anticipations of modern philosophy is enough to show that they had in them a fascination for minds of a certain order; and the more we dwell upon the subject, the more clearly do we see

that an alarming amount of peril existed at the gates of the Christian Church, and that only by earnest battle against the errors and falsehoods of Gnosticism could Divine truth be preserved in its substantial integrity. Neoplatonism, as propounded by Plotinus and Porphyry, had also much to recommend it to Alexandrian thinkers. The tincture it received from a study of the great master of Greek wisdom imparted to it a sweetness of flavour fitted to the taste of not a few. Had Gnostic myths gained a footing in the Church, had gospel narratives been buried under a load of Gnostic fables, the consequence would have been most disastrous, and Christianity would have become a heterogeneous mass of notions, in which the true would have been neutralized by the false. Also, had Neoplatonism gained a mastery over the minds of the Fathers, had Clement and Origen become like Plotinus and Porphyry, had the Nicene Church been penetrated by the principles of the new philosophy, so as to forsake Scripture, or to question its authority, the doom of the early Church would have been sealed. But Divine providence, and the power of that Spirit which Jesus Christ promised to His disciples as an abiding Guide and Comforter, preserved Christendom from such tremendous mischief. The injurious influence of old philosophies in certain ways upon the development of doctrine in Christendom we have pointed out, and they ought to be carefully kept in view; but, on the other hand, it is inexcusable to overlook the great victory which, on the whole, was won by Christian theology over the philosophical as well as the mythological systems of paganism. The fundamental facts of our religion, its historical character as opposed to mere mythical ideas, the nativity, the life, the death, the

resurrection of Jesus Christ, held their ground in the Confessions of the Church and in the hearts of believers ; and at the same time the Church at large, amidst perils and struggles, continued to maintain a clear, distinct, and invincible faith in the incarnation, the Divinity, the redemption, and the glory of our blessed Lord. Whatever we may have seen of that which is truly called vain philosophy in the history of mediæval thought ; whatever marks may have been made by it on certain notions and tendencies which it has been our business to describe ; though both superstition and rationalism may be detected here and there, it would be historically untrue, it would be an implicit denial of the Lord's promise that He would be with His people to the end of the world, and it would be ungrateful to the Giver of all good, to represent Christendom in the Middle Ages as having relapsed into something like paganism.

2. The extinction of Arianism soon after the Nicene period is another notable fact. The spread of Arianism for a time went far beyond what many persons suppose. Not only were many of the Greek theologians imbued with it, not only was it countenanced by emperors and courts, not only did the cities of the East on both sides the Mediterranean come under its influence, but those northern tribes which invaded the Roman empire and broke it up into fragments adopted forms of Arian belief. The Goths, the Vandals, and the Burgundians were more or less Arianized in their opinions. On the banks of the Danube, in the region of Gaul, to the south of the Pyrenees, and on the Italian shores the heresy established itself. Names mentioned with honour in the records of history and perpetuated with renown in the monuments of art

belonged to Arian sects. Ulphilas, who translated the Scriptures, was an Arian teacher ; Theodoric, who built the magnificent Byzantine church of San Apollinare Nuovo at Ravenna, and whose mausoleum, erected by himself, is one of the most interesting relics in that ancient city, was an Arian prince. Much of the literature produced at the time when the empire was crumbling to pieces has perished, and is now beyond recall. Greek, Latin, and other books then read are by us totally unknown ; but there is reason to believe that many of them were composed on the Arian side, and valued by Arian Christians. Orthodox productions have been preserved, and heterodox writings are lost, a circumstance which was to be expected. In short, the diffusion of Arianism over Christendom in the fourth, fifth, and sixth centuries is a clearly-attested fact of history. But the rapidity of its decline resembled the rapidity of its advance. It swept over Europe with a marvellous force, and then collapsed with a marvellous weakness. In Africa, in Italy, in Gaul, in Spain it was extirpated. It lingered longer in Lombardy than it did anywhere else, and expired there in the seventh century. The Arian controversy had no place in the theological conflicts of the Middle Ages, and waited for its revival at a much later period.

3. The conflict between Augustinian and Pelagian sentiments was by far the most persistent and prominent amongst mediæval controversies. The mutations in the history of human opinions are truly surprising, and their causes, in many cases, baffle the search of inquisitive students ; but there is one very obvious fact in relation to this subject which probably had a causative influence upon the disputations now under notice, that they chiefly

prevailed in the Western or Latin Church. The energy of the Greek intellect seems to have exhausted itself in inquiries respecting the Divine nature. Monarchianism, Eutychianism, Nestorianism, Monophysitism, and Monothelitism were phases of thought which had a perfect fascination for Eastern minds, and long kept them in a state of agitation. Also by the greater thinkers of the East the foundations of orthodox Trinitarianism were laid, and the writings of Athanasius remained when he was gone, the standard works on the subject suggesting arguments to subsequent polemics. Ambrose and Hilary and other Western champions on the orthodox side were followers, rather than leaders, in the battle against Arianism, and in originality and force were left far behind the Bishop of Alexandria. Theologians still turn to his productions for weapons in defence of the doctrine of our Lord's true and proper Divinity. But if the question about the Trinity bears on it most deeply the stamp of the Greek mind, the question about grace and free will, Divine predestination and human agency, has received its strongest marks from the thoughtfulness of Western minds. Augustine made it all his own. He took it up and worked it through with a depth and comprehensiveness which left little to be supplied by the mental activity of any one else. And what he had himself produced he bequeathed as an heirloom to the Latin Church of the Middle Ages; and most carefully they watched over the bequest. Augustinianism on the points just mentioned, and on others closely related to it, took deep root in the opinions of theologians through the successive stages of scholastic divinity. What Augustine had said carried with it the highest human authority, and to come in antagonism to

Augustine's conclusions imperilled the reputation of any teacher. Round the circle which he had drawn the thought of one schoolman after another patiently revolved, most commonly confirming what he had said, but occasionally, yet with more timidity than boldness, venturing to differ from some of his positions. Pelagianism, in its avowed original form, and semi-Pelagianism too in systematic shape, disappeared almost as completely as Arianism; but tendencies in that direction, schemes of thought of a decidedly Pelagian colour, were ever and anon presenting themselves, to the vexation of orthodox divines. A large space in the preceding chapters has been taken up by a statement of the opinions of John Erigena and of Archbishop Anselm, of Abelard and of Bernard, of Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus; and those opinions in their distinctive character all seem to turn more or less upon the grand moot-points between Augustine and Pelagius. Anselm, Bernard, Aquinas, as we have shown, walk in the steps of Augustine. John Erigena, Abelard, and Duns Scotus keep, more or less closely, to the lines marked out by Pelagius. But there is this difference, that whilst the orthodox were glad to quote the Bishop of Hippo as their leader, those who were counted heterodox were by no means proud of the name of the British monk. Every schoolman wished to be considered an Augustinian; no one counted it an honour to be treated as a Pelagian. What lay at the heart of the question went far deeper than any dispute of a metaphysical or logical kind. It had to do with the relationship in which man stands to God, and therefore it touched the highest interests of humanity. To determine whether we are saved by grace, or by inherent merit; whether we are to depend upon God, or upon

ourselves ; whether a Divine plan governs the world, or men are left to determine all things according to their own wills ; whether we are fallen and need redemption, or are in the original condition of our first parents, and only need instruction and example,—these surely are profound questions, if there be any within the scope of human reflection. To treat them as though they were mere abstractions, trifling and frivolous centuries ago, and without any practical interest for men and women of the present day, betrays a singular want of philosophical instinct, as well as of historical penetration, to say nothing of devotional sentiment. Whether Christ is to be regarded as a creature, or as essentially one with God, is certainly a point upon the determination of which a great deal in our religious life must depend. Personal piety with its practical consequences must take a shape corresponding with the results we reach respecting it ; but if the great controversy of the East has important issues, in spite of all the depreciation of it by many very estimable persons, the great controversy of the West comes home to our business and our bosoms quite as closely, if not still more so. What God *is* and what we *are* and *must be* in relation to Him, are inquiries of the very highest interest ; and as Athanasius took up the one question, so Augustine took up the other. Moreover, if Arianism tends to affect us in our devotions, that is to say, in the most secret communion between our souls and the Infinite and Eternal One, Pelagianism tends to affect us in the same respect, and, by weakening our faith in the efficacy of Divine grace, to diminish that hope of succour here and of everlasting bliss hereafter which has ever been such a motive to Christian obedience, and such a source of comfort amidst the sorrows of human life.

4. The controversy which, next to that just noticed, occupied the attention of divines in the Middle Ages relates to the nature of the Lord's Supper. The opinions of Paschasius Radbert, Archbishop Hincmar, and the rest, on the one side, and of Ratramnus, Berenger, and the rest on the other, have long been canvassed chiefly in reference to a difference of doctrine on the subject between Roman Catholics and Protestants. Transubstantiation, or what closely approached it, is treated as a superstitious and hurtful error, and so it undoubtedly is : opposition to the tenet of a substantial change in the primitive elements inspires sympathy and admiration as a sign of Christian intelligence and superior faith ; and this is perfectly right. But we cannot help recognizing in the disputation something beyond this. The Lord's Supper is a most significant gospel rite. It points to the historical fact of our Lord's death. It perpetuates the memory of His crucifixion. Its frequent repetition keeps alive in devout minds what they owe to Him who shed His blood for the forgiveness of sins, and who by the sacrifice of His own life has poured a new life into the bosom of every believer. In these momentous associations we find the secret of that power which the Lord's Supper has ever had over the minds of Christ's disciples. "Do this in remembrance of Me," are words full of evangelical suggestions ; for we are led to ask, Why are we required to remember Him, but because we owe our salvation to Him ? "This is My body, and this is My blood," are words which point to the vital efficacy of His grace who offered Himself for us on the cross. We cannot help seeing on these very accounts, so clearly revealed to us in the Gospels and Epistles of the New Testament, that the Lord's Supper from the

beginning was lifted up to a lofty elevation as a central act of Christian worship, as an expression of union with the Saviour, and as a bond of fellowship between His followers. That being so, the excitement of human imagination and the ecstasies of pious devotion, not controlled, as they ought to have been, by enlightened Christian reason, led the understanding captive, and blinded the judgment, so that in days when magical charms were common and ceremonies were in high repute, people came to attribute intrinsic virtues to what were meant only as signs, and mistook types for the substance they shadowed forth. This, probably, is the genesis of those extravagant and unscriptural views of the Lord's Supper which prevailed in early time and advanced in the Middle Ages, and which called forth the protests of Ratramnus and Berenger. The impassioned rhetoric of Chrysostom and others, when celebrating the Eucharist, had come to be treated as a logical description of the bread and wine employed in the holy commemoration; and what had been only an imagination of the preacher was transformed into a solid reality in the hands of the priest. But that and all the disputes it engendered bore witness to the existence of faith in Jesus Christ, as being much more than a teacher, much more than a martyr, much more than an example, much more than the greatest of human benefactors. Transubstantiation must have been an exaggerated perversion of the truth that Christ is the bread of life come down from heaven to give life to the world. Apart from the true doctrine of redemption through our Lord Jesus, the notion of a Divine real presence in the Lord's Supper would have been impossible, and controversies on the question could

never have found a place in the history of Christian doctrine.

5. We have seen throughout the Middle Ages the coexistence of traditionalism and free inquiry. The dogmas of the Church were carefully maintained, but individual opinion found room for play, notwithstanding the checks of ancient prescription. The spirit of liberty never died out during the thousand years of spiritual despotism. Fathers, councils, and creeds could only to a certain extent stereotype the faith of men included within the precincts of the orthodox Church. John Erigena, Peter Abelard, Duns Scotus—though many in our day would count them mere rationalists—lived and died members of the Catholic Communion. They never threw off their ecclesiastical allegiance. They never denied the supremacy of the Pope, or called in question patristic and conciliar decisions; yet still they broached and defended their own opinions. They exercised, if they did not formally claim, a considerable amount of intellectual independence, and did not regard themselves as thereby compromising in any degree their claim to the character of orthodox Churchmen. In the case of men often accounted rationalists this is plain enough. The names just cited will be admitted as representative of a free thought party in the dark ages. But another class of thinkers who have passed before us are also entitled to be joined to the same category, though not commonly brought within it. Gottschalk and Bradwardine were removed to the furthest point on the side opposite to rationalism. Gottschalk repudiated the idea of setting up reason against revelation. No one could more humbly submit to authority in religion. Nor did he formally oppose the authority of the Bible

to the authority of the Church. The latter did not come within the range of his dispute. He took the side of Augustinianism, and pleaded for Divine grace against human merit, and in doing so exercised an amount of freedom on one side which balanced that of very different thinkers on the other. He might be said to be more Augustinian than Augustine himself, for in the use of his own private judgment he added the idea of reprobation to the idea of election. Bradwardine resembled Gottschalk. He advocated the principle of Divine sovereignty and free grace against the idea of human meritoriousness and the liberty of the will. He pushed the doctrine of Divine decrees to the greatest possible extent. He complained of the Church of his day as being thoroughly Pelagian. He was left alone, he said, like Elijah amidst the priests of Baal. Luther was scarcely more bold. In contending for orthodoxy against heresy, Bradwardine evinced as much freedom of thought as any heretic could in fighting against the orthodoxy of his age. Reginald Pecock is only another variation of the same general type. Some of the errors and heresies with which he was charged, and which he publicly abjured at St. Paul's Cross, probably he had held, and so far he had walked in rationalistic paths; also he admitted the fallibility of general councils, and insisted upon reason and upon Scripture rather than upon Church authority as the rule of faith; but in his defence of the episcopal order, at the time very unpopular,—in his opposition to rigid Anglicans as well as to decided Lollards, who were both powerful parties,—in his book entitled *The Repressor of Overmuch Blaming of the Clergy*, where he defended his brethren from popular aspersions,—and in his Ultra-

montane support of the Papacy, when its arrogant pretensions were being resisted, he manifested an individuality of opinion no less free and bold than it had been at another time on the opposite side. In these very different ways the exercise of private judgment appeared in the Middle Ages, when, as many formerly supposed, the minds of men were in a state of common hardness and inaction, like one solid block of ice.

6. Upon the later, no less than upon the earlier developments of theological opinion, different influences had their effect. Throughout the chapters on scholastic divinity the influence of Church authority has been apparent at every step. The decisions of Nicæa and Constantinople are seen to have been all along of binding force. Mediæval councils with their doctrinal canons come in the wake of the Nicene ones. Positions in advance of earlier times are taken up and maintained, as on the condemnation of Semi-Pelagian notions at the Council of Orange in A.D. 529, and on the scholastic affirmation of transubstantiation at the Council of the Lateran in 1215. Church authority in the Middle Ages was more potent than Church authority in the fourth century. The habit of submission became confirmed through long exercise. Men of commanding minds—whether distinguished by original genius, as in the case of Anselm, or by the power of industrious compilation, as in the case of Peter Lombard, or by the gift of keen analysis and logical arrangement, as in the case of Thomas Aquinas—came forward in the defence and development of orthodox doctrines, upholding the authority of the Church, and by example and argument promoting obedience in the faithful. At the same time the effect of ancient learning was perpetuated

even when its records had ceased to be read. Ignorance of Greek in the Middle Ages, though perhaps exaggerated, cannot be denied. Alexandrine and Byzantine Fathers could no more be read than the original New Testament; but streams of thought flowing from the writings of Nicene theologians were conducted through Latin channels into mediæval minds. And in the same way Greek culture of another kind continued to touch and direct scholastic minds, sometimes in the form of Platonic, sometimes in the form of Aristotelian philosophy. Latin learning was in the ascendant. The classics, though looked on with suspicion, were not totally neglected. Under protest, and by stealth, in some cases, they were studied by men of superior taste and irrepressible curiosity; but of course the Latin Fathers stood first and foremost on the shelves of the library, and were oftenest lying on the desk of the student. The effect of Latin divinity on the minds of Churchmen all over Europe for a thousand years can hardly be over-estimated.

But there was a source of influence which must be considered by itself. The breaking up of the Roman empire by invasions from the north, which, pouring down on the countries of the south, carried with them consequences beyond convulsions in government, beyond changes of dynasties, beyond any kind of secular revolution. They set up a new order of things throughout Europe, fraught with new institutions, new languages, new literatures. The Teutonic element regenerated European life, and started our division of the human race upon an unprecedented career. What would have become of society had the old Roman empire been left to itself it is impossible to say, but that society could not have

taken the shape it did in the Middle Ages and afterwards, without the crisis of disruption, and the infusion of new blood, nobody can deny. And its effect on theology, as on other things, was very great. The Teutonic intellect is clearly distinguishable among the other factors of mediæval thought. That intellect is more robust, more rich, more varied, more agile, more methodical, and more closely allied to the sensibilities of humanity than what we find in Oriental and Saracenic races. Teutons, fierce and brave as the men of Eastern climes, had qualities different from those of their swarthy brethren, and these qualities told upon the Church. If the influence of Teutonic soldiery appears in certain mediæval bishops who exchanged the crosier for the sword, laid down the mitre that they might put on the helmet, and stripped themselves of sacerdotal robes in order to clothe themselves in coats of mail, the influence of Teutonic morals upon the purer domestic life which grew up in the Middle Ages, as well as the influence of Teutonic independence upon the struggles and reforms which inspire the story of mediæval Christendom, also come in for a share of recognition. And in accordance with all this, the Teutonic mind laid hold upon the gospel with a firmer and more comprehensive grasp than any of the Greeks had ever done. They were strong on certain points, but their theology was angular, sectional, not embracing a wide range, not traversing the land of truth in the length and breadth thereof. But mediæval divines, with the advantage of Teutonic power and inspiration, whatever their errors and defects, entered into fields of inquiry neglected by the Greek Fathers, and took up and pursued with greater penetration and industry subjects started by the old leaders of Latin Christendom. We

cannot imagine that what was accomplished by the best of the scholastic divines could ever have been reached by such men as peopled the shores of the Mediterranean in the fifth century. All the mediæval doctors, whatever their birthplace, whatever their descent, shared in the effect of the great revolution which had come over the world. Those who were born Italians, like Anselm, Peter Lombard, and Aquinas, had Teutonic influences at work on their minds, if they had not Teutonic blood flowing in their veins. And this is remarkable, that those who were the most independent thinkers were of Teutonic race: Alcuin, John Erigena, Gottschalk, Abelard, Bradwardine, Wycliffe, Pecoek, and the German and Flemish mystics.

But for that influence which was at once most salutary and most efficacious in the production of mediæval theology we must turn to the Holy Scriptures and the Spirit of God. That the Scriptures were known and read and studied in what are called the dark ages has sufficiently appeared on the pages of this volume. Ignorance as to that fact is now nearly dispelled; and to an acquaintance with that book which makes wise unto salvation must be attributed the best portions of that theological literature which has passed under our review. Nor should we fail to recognize also the gracious illumination of the Holy Spirit in leading mediæval divines into those paths of gospel truth wherein they walked to their own peace and comfort, and to the profit of those who followed their instructions. Every Christian student of ecclesiastical history will be constrained to believe, with thankfulness, that, in spite of errors and corruptions, a Divine power has been at work in the successive ages of Christendom. In the darkest of them all, lights of

truth and grace are seen kindled and kept alive in the literature and the lives of Christ-like men ; and does not this fact clearly denote that the Spirit of God was present and operative in all such cases ? This volume does not embrace the history of religion in the characters, achievements, endurance, and manifold virtues of eminent Christians, in whom were most visible "the fruits of the Spirit ;" but the literature of the Church, which has been only partially reviewed, bears witness to the operation of the same agency. Works on devotional and practical divinity, which do not come within our department of study, meditations and prayers, liturgies and hymns, and sermons and treatises on faith, hope, and love, testify the existence of what has been called "the life of God in the soul of man ;" and not a little of dogmatic theology, touching the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, the responsibility and sinfulness of man, redemption through Christ, and the efficacy of Divine grace, attests a spiritual illumination which comes from the Father of lights.

7. The connection between theology and philosophy in the Middle Ages has occupied much of our attention. There is another point akin to this upon which we have not touched, because it has not come directly in our way, namely, the part which theologians took in scientific pursuits ; but it here claims at least a passing remark. Theology and science are often regarded as being in irreconcilable opposition to each other ; and no doubt there was plenty of ignorant prejudice in the mediæval Church against free scientific investigation. We are aware that Augustine, though he did not deny the rotundity of the earth, asserted that there could be no inhabitants at the antipodes, because such people are

not included in Scripture amongst Adam's descendants.¹ Virgil, Bishop of Salzburg, and Boniface, Archbishop of Mentz, followed on the same side as the Bishop of Hippo. There was no distinctness of ideas on scientific subjects. Physical reasoning was neglected. Popular opinions ran, with reference to nature, in strange and absurd directions. Mysticism blended itself even with arithmetic; but still such science as there was fell into the hands of theologians, to be by them pursued with some ardour, if not with much success. Upon the extent to which theologians applied themselves to scientific matters we prefer using the words of one well qualified to speak on the subject. "Gerbert in the tenth century went from France to Spain to study astronomy with the Arabians, and soon surpassed his masters. He is reported to have fabricated clocks, and an astrolabe of peculiar construction. Gerbert afterwards, in the last year of the first thousand from the birth of Christ, became pope by the name of Sylvester II. Among other cultivators of the sciences, some of whom, from their proficiency, must have possessed with considerable clearness and steadiness the elementary ideas on which it depends, we may here mention (after Montucla) Adelbold, whose work on the sphere was addressed to Pope Sylvester, and whose geometrical reasonings are, according to Montucla, vague and chimerical; Hermann Contractus, a monk of St. Gall, who in 1050 published astronomical works; William of Hirsaugen, who followed this example in 1080; Robert of Lorraine, who was made Bishop of Hereford by William the Conqueror in consequence of his astronomical knowledge. In the next century Adelhard Goth, an Englishman, travelled among the Arabs for purposes of study, as

¹ *Civ. Dei*, lib. xvi. c. 9.

Gerbert had done in the preceding age ; and on his return translated the elements of Euclid, which he had brought from Spain or Egypt. Robert Grossetête (or Grosseteste), Bishop of Lincoln, was the author of an epitome on the sphere. Roger Bacon, in his youth the contemporary of Robert, and of his brother Adam Marsh, praises very highly their knowledge in mathematics. ‘And here,’ says the French historian of mathematics, whom I have followed in the preceding relation, ‘It is impossible not to reflect that all those men, who, if they did not augment the treasure of the sciences, at least served to transmit it, were monks, or had been such originally.’ ‘In the sciences we should have had all to create, and at the moment when the human mind should have emerged from its stupor and shaken off its slumbers we should have been no more advanced than the Greeks were after the taking of Troy.’¹ The services rendered to the interests of literature by the theologians and religious men of the Middle Ages are now acknowledged on all hands, and from what has been just stated it appears that what they did for the cause of science was not inconsiderable ; certainly the Franciscan friar, Roger Bacon, was a great scientific light, anticipating in some of his enlarged views the deep philosophical principles of his namesake. Much has been said of the scientific progress of the Arabians in the Middle Ages, and some have supposed that as students of physical philosophy Mohammedans were far ahead of Christians ; but Dr. Whewell questions, and more than questions, “the higher claims which have been advanced in favour of the Arabians. We can deliver no just decision unless we will consent to use the terms of science in a strict and precise sense ; and if we

¹ Whewell’s *History of the Inductive Sciences*, vol. I. p. 198.

do this we shall find little either in the particular discoveries or general processes of the Arabians which is important in the history of the inductive sciences."¹

8. Finally, within our rapid review we may fitly embrace the premonitions of a great approaching change which appear as we advance towards the sixteenth century. At that period the practical corruptions of Christendom were great and terrible. They were seen and confessed by many who were zealous upholders of the organic ecclesiastical system. Popes themselves could not deny them, and councils assembled because these corruptions were manifest, and they were forced to seek some remedy. If Christianity was to last and exercise much longer spiritual power in the world, reform was essentially necessary. It became a question of life or death. To any one who believes in the gospel, the dismal condition of things a hundred years before the Reformation contained in itself a mute prophecy that the night was far spent and the day was at hand. The promises and predictions of Scripture implied that a change for the better was inevitable. And in the theology of those times there were indubitable signs of its advance. The bright side of mysticism, the spiritual religion which in such works as the *Theologia Germanica* and the *Imitatio Christi* struggled to gain the ascendancy over rites and ceremonies, and all that is external, and the ideas of reform expressed and advocated by Wycliffe, Hus, Savonarola, and others, were unmistakable heralds of a brighter epoch. And, also, there were in the current scholastic theology deeply-imbedded principles of religious truth touching faith, grace, righteousness, and love, which, though buried under loads of superin-

¹ *History of the Inductive Sciences*, vol. I. p. 257.

cumbent notions, that for a time checked their growth, formed an "incorruptible seed which liveth and abideth for ever." The Church theology might be said to have had in it that which would certainly some time or other break out with vital energy, and force its way through all resistance to the surface, covering it with Divine beauty and fruitfulness. Theology had never been so corrupted as to have the doctrine of salvation by grace, the doctrine of human responsibility, the doctrine of Christian holiness, effaced from its literature. God was there, Christ was there, the Holy Spirit was there, the atonement was there, faith was there, eternal life was there. The pages of this manual present ample evidence of it all. A distinction is to be made between the actual life of Christendom and the theoretical divinity of Christendom. The latter was vastly superior to the former, and there lay hope for the future. The Church still held views utterly inconsistent with its errors and abuses; those views, when redeveloped in their distinctness, could not but prove fatal to the errors and abuses which gathered around them. Hence, when the Reformation came it proved a sifting time. There was a winnowing on the Church's barn-floor, and the wheat was separated from the chaff. Not chaff alone was there, but abundance of wheat as well. The Reformers could find much truth in Augustine, Anselm, Bernard, Aquinas, and the rest, which they were able to employ in conflict with the Papacy, the system of supererogation and purgatory, the merit of pilgrimages and ceremonial observances, and a whole host of ecclesiastical and popular abuses. Whatever truth there was in scholastic divinity could well be turned against its errors.

PART V.

FROM THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE
REFORMATION IN GERMANY TO THE
CONCLUSION OF IT IN ENGLAND.

A.D. 1518-1560.

CHAPTER I.

REFORMED THEOLOGY IN GERMANY AND SWITZERLAND.

WE have reviewed the history of theology during successive ages of the Church. The *first* of these ages may be described as the age of ideal Christianity, when the apostles were its inspired teachers, and revealed truth became partially and imperfectly realized in the minds and lives of Christian professors. The *second* was an age of innovation, when practices and opinions were introduced involving departures from the primitive model. During the *third*, extending from the Nicæan era to the middle of the eighth century, these innovations developed themselves into bolder forms. And in the *fourth* they hardened into stereotyped traditionalism, which lasted to the fourth Council of the Lateran. Then, *fifthly*, an age of agitation and reaction commenced, and went on till the period of reformation.

Theology underwent corresponding changes. We have endeavoured to trace them, and now we reach the crisis, when an attempt was made to exhibit the Divine ideal in its primitive form, and by it to test the whole sum of religious opinion. At the Diet of Worms Luther appealed to the Bible, saying, "Here I take my stand; God help me." The whole Reformation was there.

A number of causes contributed to produce the Reformation in Europe, especially as it regards eccle-

siastical governments and the relation in which they stood to the civil power. There were also particular local circumstances in connection with Church property and foreign politics which contributed to shape organic social changes in England and Scotland. Moreover, in France court intrigues, aristocratic rivalries, dynastic struggles, and other similar movements served to shape to some extent the course of religious events; but it remains true, in relation to theology, that whilst extraneous incidents were not without some effect in the formation of Protestant opinions, their main impulse and guide and determining power will be found in the study of the Scriptures. First, the sacred records came to be studied in the original as a result of the revived study of Greek and Hebrew learning, aided by habits and tastes which sprung out of the critical spirit cultivated by classical scholars;¹ and secondly, these records were translated into the living languages of Europe, and such translations, through the invention of printing, were brought within the reach of people in general. Thus an appeal was made to private judgment—the terror of Popery, and the strength of Protestantism. The right of private judgment,—where it was not abstractedly maintained, or where it was inconsistently advocated, or where it was restricted and modified by remaining ecclesiastical authority, and by natural influence of a clerical kind,—came into forcible operation, and that on a very extensive scale, whence followed in the main that overthrow of old opinions, and that establishment of new ones, which make the sixteenth century a marvel in the intellectual history of mankind.

¹ This subject is too large to be taken up here. There is a good chapter respecting it in Matter's *Hist. du Christ.*, vol. IV. c. 2.

Our business in studying its history is confined to the theological developments of the epoch, and it will be our duty to trace the characteristic doctrines of various Protestant divines. We shall take a rapid survey of them as expressed in Germany, Switzerland, France, Scotland, and England.

Germany first requires our attention. The writings of Reuchlin and Hutten had prepared the way for the reforming movement. Biblical erudition, pungent satire, expositions of Scripture, and attacks on existing corruptions obviously contributed to results far beyond the anticipation of certain scholars. Most active in the new direction amongst them, Erasmus stands pre-eminent as a commentator on the New Testament, and as an assailant of monkish ignorance and popular superstitions. But after Erasmus had led on an attack, which Luther commended and helped, the two men before long seriously differed from each other.

We shall best exhibit the prominent features of the reformed theology of Germany by a review of the controversy with regard to Divine grace and the human will, and the doctrine of Luther on justification. For grace and justification were the main points in discussion between the Romanists and the Reformed in Germany as elsewhere. The ancient creeds were accepted by both parties. The Trinity of the Godhead, the atonement of Christ, as taught by Anselm and other schoolmen, were not matters in dispute between them. Ecclesiastical systems produced the widest differences and the most violent discussions. Rites and ceremonies, sacraments and priestly claims, the merit and intercession of saints, purgatory, indulgences, and absolution, these were subjects of keenest debate; but here we have

to do with doctrinal theology alone, and in this department of belief the two grand moot-points were those we have now indicated.

We commence by noticing the controversy between LUTHER (A.D. 1483-1546) and ERASMUS (A.D. 1467-1536) as to Divine grace and the human will.

Erasmus took up the cause of reformation on the literary, intellectual, and moral side. He had no sympathy with the spiritual earnestness of Martin Luther, and his religious life was quite of another description. He could not enter into the conflicts which agitated the Reformer, had no sense of sin, no convictions of the need of grace for the saving of the soul, such as Luther felt. Erasmus had much in common with Pelagius; he was a man of a similar religious stamp. He admits, in his book entitled *De Libero Arbitrio*, published in 1525, that Pelagius had carried his notion of liberty too far, but he speaks of him with moderation and sympathy. He thinks that Pelagius might have redeemed himself by the help of clearer theological distinctions, but he appears throughout to agree in the main with the Semi-Pelagians before his time and with the Remonstrants afterwards.¹

Erasmus had been nettled by a letter which Luther wrote to him containing rude personal remarks; even speaking of "his imbecility." Some objectionable observations by Luther on the human will, to the effect that its freedom was a figment, and that all things happened by necessity, further roused the scholar's ire, and the result was the famous treatise on free will. Erasmus was more of a dilettante litterateur than either a skilful scholastic or a profound divine. He had far more learning, and far less intellectual and moral force, than

¹ *Opera*, tom. x. col. 1502; Jortin's *Life of Erasmus*, vol. II. p. 270.

his great antagonist. His treatise is wordy, diffuse, and much employed in personalities. "The question might have been discussed, and the doctrine of Divine assistance, conditional decrees, and human liberty established in a smaller compass."¹

Erasmus speaks of the *power* of the will as that by virtue of which it can turn itself to righteousness and eternal life, or turn itself away from these infinitely desirable blessings. He does not mean simply that man has a susceptibility for what is really good, but that he has the power of producing it out of himself. This goes to the heart of the question, Where lies the turning-point of salvation,—with man's will or God's grace? Erasmus said, "Man has two arms, one for good, the other for evil; Luther cuts off the right, and leaves only the left. Without free will there is no sin, no guilt, no righteousness in punishment, and the aim of exhortations and warnings is done away with." He saw clearly that free agency is essential to human responsibility, that Scripture treats man as a free agent, and that human consciousness testifies to the fact of human liberty. Erasmus was invulnerable and irresistible on that point. But he was one-sided, and had no just conception of the mischief done to man's moral nature by sin, of the alienation of the human mind in its unregenerate state from the love and service of a holy God.

Where Erasmus was weak, Luther was strong. The parallel between Luther and Augustine is as striking as the parallel between Erasmus and Pelagius. His spiritual conflicts with sin, and his inward consciousness of the impossibility of self-redemption, furnish the key to his theology, and for his theology a preparation had been

¹ Jortin, vol. II. p. 271.

made by his previous studies. Occam had been his favourite master in philosophy, and Gerson, Bernard, and Tauler had helped him in divinity. Amongst the Fathers Augustine inspired his reverence and affection; and amongst the causes which led to his ultimate conclusions we must not lose sight of his conflict with Tetzels, and the horror he felt at the system of Papal indulgences in connection with the doctrine of human merit. An abstract denial of the freedom of the will was not his starting-point, it was not his primary postulate. He felt it forced upon him by previous notions of Divine grace. In every age of religious revival there is "a powerful emphasizing of absolute dependence on God." St. Paul is felt to be the true exponent of man's wants, the clearest revealer of the needed supply. It is remarkable how reformers and revivalists lay hold on the skirts of the apostle who said, "By the grace of God I am what I am."

The monk of Wittenberg starts from the fact that the greatest saints have, in their temptations, forgotten the freedom of the will, even though they held it in theory. And it is a fact that amidst all spiritual excitement man forgets himself, and is lost in God. He does so in prayer, in penitential sorrow, in rapturous joy. The Divine is felt overmastering the human. The hymns of the Church, in all diversities of creeds, illustrate this. No hymns can be more self-abnegatory, more God-exalting and glorifying, than the hymns of "the people called Methodists," who believe fully in free will.

"If I felt," says Luther, "that my salvation depended on my own freedom of choice, I should be as one that beats the air. But since God has taken my salvation

into His own hands, I am certain of His faithfulness and His promise. What an anxious life it would be if we could only comfort ourselves with the assurance of grace when we had fulfilled the law—for who does that?"¹

The doctrine of election our German Reformer regards as the objective complement of the assurance of salvation. The latter is perfect only when resting on the counsels of grace, which are eternal, unchanging, and omnipotently decisive.

The strength and kernel of his treatise *De servo Arbitrio*, published immediately after the work by Erasmus, is found in a firm adherence to the teaching of St. Paul in his Epistles to the Romans and to the Galatians. From the righteousness of faith, Luther said, there flow peace and liberation from the bondage of the law. "Paul soars above time, and adoringly engrosses himself in the Divine counsel, which marches, without wavering, through all the stages, from the calling to the glory of the justified; in order then, in the joyous consciousness of a personality hid in God, to break into the lofty song of triumph (Rom. viii. 32)."

Augustine rejoiced in redemption wrought by grace, as securing the noblest freedom—even a liberty to obey, to love, and to enjoy God. Luther did the same. If Erasmus made man richer in freedom at first, Luther made him richer in freedom at last. Luther's conception of freedom through grace is that of a Divine freedom—a freedom *from sin in holiness*. The redeemed and

¹ The most thorough investigation of Luther's opinions, as well as the whole story of his life according to the latest researches, will be found in Kostlin's *Martin Luther, sein Leben und seine Schriften*; 2 vols.

sanctified will, according to his theory, has a bent towards what is true and right and good.

Erasmus was one-sided; so was Luther. He did not look as he ought to have done to human responsibility and to Divine justice. In advocating the cause of God's grace he sometimes imperilled the cause of God's righteousness. If all men were saved the case would be different; but as some men are lost through sin, how can their perdition be vindicated on grounds of Divine righteousness if man be not responsible, and how can he be responsible if he be not free? As Luther at times put his doctrine of the bondage of the will, he really reduced man to a machine, he made sin a necessity. Where then could be its guilt? And if sin in man did not carry with it personal demerit, then what becomes of salvation? What reality is there in that? If man be not truly a sinner, how can he be truly saved? And if not truly saved, where is God's love? If man be lost through sin, and he cannot help it, where is God's righteousness in his punishment? These questions were pressed home on Luther, and they puzzled him. In meeting them he got entangled in logical confusions and contradictions. Metaphysical notions of bondage and freedom led him astray; but deep spiritual instincts counteracted the effect of those notions. He says neither the human will nor the Divine will does anything by compulsion, only by *inclination*; yet he distinguishes between the two kinds of will most broadly by saying, "In free will lies a Divine power which no creature has in himself, and no one ought to bear this name but the Divine Majesty." In support of the statement that man does ever that to which God determines him by personal inclination, he says, "God moves every

power according to its nature.”¹ Again, whilst maintaining the doctrine of Divine predestination, he insists upon the universality of Divine love; also, he admits the possibility of apostasy on the part of those who are subjects of grace. This surely is inconsistent with his doctrine of the will, for here the will of man appears defeating the will of God.

We now proceed to notice the teaching of Luther relative to the doctrine of justification. In Luther's case pre-eminently the reformed faith was reached through spiritual conflict. Not by rote, not from man, not through hard criticism, but by the discipline of a troubled conscience and the devout study of the Scriptures he came to see the truth on this subject. Tarrying in the city of Rome, whilst he was still filled with ignorance and superstition, even when crawling up Pilate's Staircase with the hope of a Papal indulgence, words of inspiration—“the just shall live by faith”—burst out upon his soul like the sun from the clouds on a stormy day. It is to be remembered that he had studied the Bible at Erfurt. On such a mind as his particular passages would fix themselves. This one from Habakkuk and St. Paul had since then often impressed him; now it came home fresh as light from heaven. But it did not shine steadily, for this occurrence belongs to the year 1510; not till afterwards did he distinctly bring

¹ Luther made a distinction “inter Deum prædicatum et absconditum, hoc est inter Verbum Dei et Deum ipsum. Multa facit Deus, quæ verbo suo non ostendit nobis. Multa quoque vult quæ verbo suo non ostendit sese velle. Sic non vult mortem peccatoris, verbo scilicet; vult autem illam voluntate illâ imperscrutabili.”—*Opera*, III. fol. 189. In accordance with this distinction, Calvinistic divines used frequently to speak of secret decrees, which they sought to reconcile with revealed declarations.

out his doctrine of justification, and when he first proclaimed it he scarcely saw the consequences to which it would lead. His doctrine came partly as a revulsion from Papal dogmas and Papal doings.

The manner in which the dogma of human merit was taught in the schools we have already shown. With this the efficacy of penance had been connected and strenuously urged. The *opus operatum* of sacraments was also a scholastic doctrine and a popular belief. Virtue became attached to pilgrimages, and to the intercessions of saints, whose shrines were frequented. And the sale of indulgences was the crown of all these errors and abuses. Luther, as he contemplated such things, was driven to seek from the Word of God a true and effectual way of salvation. After much study of the sacred oracles, his standpoint was not so much the exact nature of what he called justification, as the faith which secured it—faith as opposed to merit. In describing faith he attacked the doctrine of *fides formata*, or faith which is perfected by charity and good works; for that doctrine, he said, confounds works and faith together. It is from his views of justifying faith that the Protestant distinction between being made personally just or righteous, and the being accounted and treated as such, necessarily results.¹

The impulsiveness of Luther's nature was such that, as might be expected, in his strenuous advocacy of justification by faith, as opposed to justification by merit, he dealt sometimes in unguarded language, open to misconception. There are statements in his works

¹ For views of Luther's opinions, and for references to his works, see Bishop Harold Browne *On the Thirty-nine Articles*: 'Justification.' See also *Homes and Haunts of Luther*, Religious Tract Society.

on this subject which cannot be vindicated, but, at the same time, it would be unfair to charge him with being a teacher of Antinomianism, for no one, whilst denying the *merit* of good works, could more vigorously enforce their necessity than he was wont to do.¹

MELANCTHON (A.D. 1497—1560) is commonly styled the secretary of the Reformation; being more of a scholar, more of a scientific divine, and more of a cautious thinker than his illustrious friend. He took moderate views of most subjects, and sought to mediate between the two parties in theological conflict. But his sympathies were decidedly in favour of the reformed doctrines, and his opinions respecting them may be seen in his *Loci Communes* or "Theological Commonplaces;" in *The Augsburg Confession*; and in the *Apologia Augustanæ*, the apology for it, which forms one of the symbolic books of the Lutheran Church.

In the first of these, the *Loci Communes*, he says that salvation includes the forgiveness of sin, our recon-

¹ The charge of Antinomianism brought against Luther is ably met by Hare in his *Vindication*. The following passage in Bell's translation of Luther's *Table Talk*, p. 208, is worthy of notice: "Philip Melancthon said to Luther, 'The opinion of St. Austin of justification (as it seemeth) was more pertinent, and fit, and convenient when he disputed not, than when he used to speak and dispute; for this he saith we ought to hold, that we are justified by faith, that is, by our regeneration, or being made new creatures. Now if it be so, then we are not justified only by faith, but by all the gifts and virtues of God given to us. Now what is your opinion, sir? Do you hold that a man is justified by this regeneration, as is St. Austin's opinion?' Luther answered and said, 'I hold this, and am certain that the true meaning of the gospel and of the apostle is that we are justified before God *gratis*, for nothing, only by God's mere mercy, wherewith and by reason whereof He imputeth righteousness unto us in Christ.'"

ciliation, and our justification before God. These blessings, which he does not confound with holiness and good works,—the treatment of that subject follows on a distinct division,—he says are not dependent on fulfilling the law, but are on us freely bestowed through the meritorious sacrifice of Christ, who gave Himself a propitiation for our sins.¹

In the *Augsburg Confession*, which is very long, the doctrine of Augustine as to free will is adopted at considerable length in his own words, and Pelagianism is condemned. And it is affirmed that works cannot reconcile us to God or merit forgiveness, and that justification comes from believing in Christ (which truth is pronounced in the second part of the *Confession* to be “the principal part of the gospel”). Men are justified first, it is said, “for Christ’s sake when they believe that they are received into favour and their sins forgiven for Christ’s sake, who by His death hath satisfied for our sins. This faith doth God impute for righteousness before Him.”² But good works, it is declared, are necessary “because it is God’s will, and not in any confidence of meriting justification.”³ The *Confession* especially in its earliest form, reflected the evangelical views of both Luther and Melancthon, and exerted a powerful influence throughout Germany. It became the standard of orthodoxy in all the Lutheran Churches,—whether in Germany, or in Sweden, Denmark, and Norway,—and was adopted by some other reformed communities. It is the doctrinal creed of the Moravian Brethren; it influenced the theology of other countries than those which made it their symbol; and the effect

¹ Sect. *On the Gospel*.

² First part, Art. IV.

³ Art. VI.

of it may be traced in the Articles of the Church of England.

It must here be added, and it is the more important because the fact is often overlooked, that the *Augsburg Confession* underwent changes more or less important, as revised by Melancthon, between A.D. 1530 and 1540. Our references are to the *Confession* of 1530. The last edition indicates changes in the theological views of the author. "He gave, upon the one hand, his views on absolute predestination, and gradually adopted the synergistic theory (which brought him nearer to the Roman Catholic system); while, on the other hand (departing further from Romanism and approaching nearer to the Reformed Church), he modified the Lutheran theory of the real presence at least so far as to allow the reformed doctrine the same right in the evangelical Churches. He never liked the Zwinglian view of a symbolical presence, nor did he openly adopt the Calvinistic view of a spiritual real presence, but he inclined to it, and regarded the difference between this and the Lutheran view as no bar to Christian fellowship and Church communion."¹ It is in the form it bore at Augsburg in 1530—the text *invariata*, as it is called—that our references are made; the text *variata*, as it is termed,—evidently framed to promote union amongst Protestants, an object very dear to Melancthon,—was, however, accepted by the Lutherans, notwithstanding its important variations from the original symbol.

In the *Apology* Melancthon clearly distinguishes

¹ Schaff's *Hist. of the Creeds of Christendom*, p. 240. In the *Creeds of the Evangelical Protestant Churches* Dr. Schaff gives the text of 1530, but not the text of 1540, though he indicates where variations occur.

between justification and holiness, and defines the former word used by the Apostle Paul in Romans v. 1 as bearing a forensic sense, signifying to absolve and pronounce just on account of the righteousness of another, even Jesus Christ, which righteousness is communicated to us through our faith. But at the same time Melancthon guards against the idea of a mere external privilege; for he insists upon the *vital* nature of faith, which appropriates the benefits secured by Christ, and precedes the fulfilment of the law in us. Sometimes, even, he seems to forget his own definition of justification in his eager inculcation of holiness through faith.¹

Luther and Melancthon did a great work by letting in the breeze of heaven upon the Church's barn-floor, so as to fan the accumulated heaps of theology, and to begin the needed process of separating the wheat from the chaff. They found much in the Fathers and the schoolmen worth preserving, but they also found a vast deal which was worthless, and a large part of it they swept away. The mystics had done something to make straight the path for these great German Reformers, and now the latter accomplished what their predecessors were not in a position to effect. There was a mystic element in the mind of Luther which sometimes comes out in his writings, but generally it is under the control of practical wisdom, or what Englishmen call common sense.

¹ It may here be observed that the Reformation in Germany was largely promoted by hymnology. This was, in fact, the cultivation of simple Christian piety apart from controversial discussions. Roman Catholics, on their side, published vernacular hymn books. With regard to one dated Leipsic, 1537, Burton, in his *Hist. of Scotland*, vol. VI. p. 5, remarks, "One might read a considerable portion of this collection without noting the marks which appropriate it to a school opposite from that of the Lutheran hymns."

Mystical thoughts had no attraction for the clear, bright, sharp intellect of Melancthon, and this fact suggests a further comparison between the two friends.

Their natural idiosyncrasies little resembled each other. There was strength and there was beauty in them both, but the relations of the two qualities varied. In Luther there was beauty, like flowers and fountains in the clefts of rocks ; but strength was predominant—massive, bold, rugged. In Melancthon there was strength, as in the palm rising heavenward ; but beauty, like the gracefully-expanding leaves at the crown of that southern tree, was in him most conspicuous—beauty of mind, of culture, of disposition, of character. The spiritual qualities of each corresponded with native endowments. Both were men of faith and love. There was love in the heart of Luther for home, for Christ, for His people, for His cause ; but faith is the spiritual quality in his life which strikes us above all beside. “The just shall live by faith” is a passage of Scripture bound up with his history. It filled his mind at Erfurt when a monk ; at Rome when climbing Pilate’s Staircase ; and at Wittenberg during his after life as preacher, author, and private Christian. Wonderfully did his faith appear when, after interceding for Melancthon during his illness, he seized him by the hand, and exclaimed, “Be of good courage, Philip ; you shall not die.” At the root of all his courage at Worms, and elsewhere, there lay the same secret as in the case of Moses—“he endured as seeing Him who is invisible.” And faith made him pure and patient in his domestic relations, and inspired him amidst his toils and troubles with faith and joy, and made him more than conqueror over death, as he had been conqueror over the world and sin. Few dying

chambers have been more illumined by a calm, bright faith than the one in the old town of Eisleben, where he was born and where he expired. "I know that I shall abide eternally with Thee. Into Thy hands I commend my spirit. Thou hast redeemed me, O Lord God of truth." And there was faith in the heart and life of Melancthon, clear and bright. He saw God's truth with a rare distinctness of conception, and walked in the light. But love shone above everything in his character and conduct. He was the peacemaker of the Reformation, ever seeking to moderate, to conciliate, to unite. He might go too far sometimes in that direction, but "e'en the light that led astray was light from heaven." And the man who sought to bind together professors of different creeds and members of different communions was filled with home affection and neighbourly charity. Appropriate are the words inscribed under a likeness taken after death hanging in the room at Wittenberg where he died: "From this mortal life to the eternal God, and the society of the saints, he holily and placidly departed, in the sixty-third year of his age." His last words were, "No one shall pluck My sheep out of My hands."

Comparisons between these two have been elaborately made. Perhaps nothing on the subject is better than what Luther said himself: "I was born for struggling on the field of battle with parties and devils. There it is that my writings breathe war and tempest. I must root up stock and stem, clear away thorns and brambles, and fill up swamps and sloughs. I am like a sturdy wood-cutter, who must clear and level the road. But master of arts, Philip, goes forward quietly and gently, cultivating and planting, sowing and watering joyfully,

according as God has dealt to him so liberally His gifts.”

We just now touched upon the mystical element as preparing for the Reformation. The part played by it in the fourteenth century was on the whole beneficial. It was otherwise afterwards. Prophets of Zwickau, and others who plunged into all sorts of wild mystical fancies not worth description, were a sore trouble to Martin Luther, and seriously hindered his work. What was helped by the mystic two centuries earlier was hindered and imperilled by him now. “In that huge ship of the Church ecclesiastic which all true hearts and hands in those troublous times were concerned to work to their very best, a new code of regulations had been issued. Such rule came in with Luther. Now some of those who would have been among the best sailors under the old management proved useless or worse than useless under the new. One set of them were insolent and mutinous—had a way of reviling the captain in strange gibberish, and the most insane tendency to look into the powder-room with a light. Another class lay about useless, till, having been tumbled over many times by their more active comrades, they got kicked into corners, whence they were never more to emerge.”¹

We must now return to glance for a moment at the modifications of Lutheranism after the Reformer's death in 1546.

OSIANDER (born 1498), who is ranked amongst Lutheran divines, taught that justification is not a forensic act, acquitting men from liability to punishment, but a gracious operation producing holiness. Thus he fell back on the mediæval dogma. “Legal justification

¹ Vaughan's *Hours with the Mystics*, vol. II. p. 36.

through the imputed righteousness of Christ he would denominate redemption, and this he supposed always preceded what he called justification. The mode of justification, in his sense of the term, he supposed to be the indwelling of Christ in the soul, producing there a moral change."¹

SWECKENFIELD, another Lutheran divine, maintained that there was a tendency in the great Reformer's teaching to mislead Christians on this subject. He admitted in a certain sense the truth of his doctrine respecting faith and good works, but he thought it might be perverted so as to induce a mere verbal faith, and to lead to a life of moral indifference.² But this was an objection to the form rather than the essence of Luther's teaching, and to the perversion rather than the correct apprehension of his doctrines. As to mere verbal faith and moral indifference, Luther opposed them as decidedly as Sweckenfield.

Several doctrinal controversies arose among the Lutherans besides those just noticed. The following list of them is supplied by Hagenbach :

"The *Antinomian Controversy*; it originated with John Agricola of Eisleben (from the year 1536 he was professor in the university of Wittenberg), during Luther's lifetime. Comp. Elwert, *de Antinomiâ J. Agricolæ Islebiî*. Tur. 1836.

"The *Adiaphoristic Controversy*, which had its origin in the interim of Leipsic (from the year 1548), and gave rise to a lasting difference between the more moderate view of Philip Melancthon and the more rigid doctrines of the orthodox Lutherans. The former view was

¹ Mosheim, edited by Reid, p. 652, who gives authorities.

² Hagenbach, vol. II. p. 273.

represented by the university of Wittenberg, the latter by that of Jena. This difference manifested itself especially in

“The *Controversy* between *George Major* and *Nicholas Amsdorf*, concerning the question whether good works are necessary to salvation, or whether they possess rather a dangerous tendency : (about the year 1559). This controversy was connected with the two following, viz.—

“The *Synergistic Controversy*, respecting the relation in which human liberty stands to Divine grace ; it was called forth (A.D. 1555) by the treatise of John Pfeffinger, *De libero Arbitrio*, which was combated by Amsdorf.

“The *Controversy* respecting the nature of original sin, between *Victorin Strigel* (in Jena) and *Matthias Flacius*. It commenced A.D. 1560, and led to the disputation of Weimar, A.D. 1561. About the same time a controversy was carried on in Prussia, viz.—

“The *Controversy* between *Andrew Osiander* (in Königsberg) and *Foachim Mörlin*, *Francis Stancarus*, etc. It bore upon the relation in which justification stands to sanctification, and to the main point in the work of redemption. Comp. Tholuck, *Literarischer Anzeiger*, 1833, No. 54 seq.

“The *Crypto Calvinistic Controversy* concerning the Lord's Supper—in the Palatinate (1559), in Bremen (1561), and in Saxony.”¹

¹ Hagenbach, vol. II. p. 162.

CHAPTER II.

REFORMED THEOLOGY IN SWITZERLAND.

WE shall best represent the forms which theology there assumed by indicating the opinions expressed by Ulrich Zwingli, and the conclusions reached in the Helvetic Confessions.

ULRICH ZWINGLI (A.D. 1484–1531) was a very different man from Martin Luther, and this must be taken into account in order to a correct apprehension of his theology. “That joyous heart, of which his cheerful countenance was the unfailing index, had been well-nigh unacquainted with the spiritual tempests in which Luther learned to fathom the abyss of human depravity and tested the victorious power of faith; and therefore what the Saxon friar undertook as the result of holy impulses and spiritual intuitions, the Swiss clergyman was rather aiming to achieve by the employment of his critical and reasoning faculties.”¹

But in Zwingli's case, no less than in Luther's, reformed theology came as a result of Scripture study under the guidance of modern criticism. No one could have more profound convictions of the authority and sufficiency of the Bible,—which he sedulously studied in the original Hebrew and Greek, with the advantages of a riper scholarship—than was possessed by Luther's Swiss contemporary. He had studied classical philosophy at Rome, physical science at Vienna, and systems of theology at Basle. The

¹ Hardwick, *Reformation*, p. 112.

Word of God carried with it, in his apprehension, its own evidence, and could be rejected, he thought, only by a vitiated mind. "It is perfect in itself, and revealed for the welfare of man, but he who neither loves it, nor understands it, nor will receive it, is morally sick."¹ Sin is a subject on which he wrote a treatise entitled *Declaratio de Peccato Originali*;² and from this work and other writings it appears that he did not adopt the Augustinian theory, but believed that whilst the contagion of evil extended to all, its *damnatory* consequences were removed—certainly in the case of the children of believers, probably also in the case of others. He denied that original sin is anything more than a moral disease, or a condition obnoxious to death. Sin, properly speaking, is wickedness, turpitude, crime; and the action of the will is essential to all kinds of individual guilt.³ Infants without exception, dying before the commission of actual sin, were in his estimation admitted to the kingdom of heaven.⁴ He believed in predestination, but in doing so he followed a different line of thought from Augustine and from Luther; and, though quoting Scripture to show that God elected men to salvation, and bestows on them the gift of faith, he seems to have been a kind of philosophical Necessitarian, and to have proceeded somewhat on speculative grounds.⁵ He did not take a limited view of the atonement; indeed he went so far as to say, "If the question be put, Did Christ restore the whole human family, or only the Church of believers?"

¹ *Deutsche Schriften*, I. 68; Hagenbach, vol. II. p. 228.

² *Opera*, III. 627. Schuler's edit.

³ *Fidei Ratio*, quoted by Shedd, vol. II. p. 175.

⁴ *De Peccato Orig. Opera*, vol. II. 118, and I. 383.

⁵ Hagenbach, vol. II. p. 260.

I might shortly answer, Christ has brought by His salvation as much good into the world as Adam by his sinning brought evil." His idea was that the efficacy of Christ's work extended beyond those who actually believe; and not only to infants incapable of faith, but also to virtuous heathen who never heard the gospel. The latter he included amongst the elect.¹ But though he differed in these and some other respects from contemporary as well as ancient divines, no one could more zealously extol the riches of Divine grace, more distinctly trace up to it the salvation of men, or more clearly attribute the enjoyment of justification to the exercise of faith.²

Zwingli's treatise on *True and False Religion* consists of twenty-nine chapters, and goes over rather wide ground. Some of the headings are very general: such as concerning God, concerning man, concerning religion, concerning the gospel. Several are ecclesiastical rather than doctrinal: concerning the keys, concerning the Church, concerning matrimony, baptism, the eucharist, etc. He closes with a chapter on statues and images. There is no attempt in this book at scientific order. It presents neither in form nor substance a system of divinity.

Every reader of ecclesiastical history knows that Zwingli was a man of eminent Christian piety, and they are also aware of some of its leading elements. It was pervaded by a lofty and noble spirit, which Myconius, his

¹ Several passages to this effect might be cited. See *Opera*, vol. II. 371, 559.

² There is a beautiful evangelical strain in his chap. *De Peccato in De Vera et Falsa Religione—Opera*, vol. III. 203. Also see chap. *Evangelium*, p. 191. See also Christoffel's *Life of Zwingli*, p. 392 *et seq.*

friend, connected with the Reformer's early life amidst the Alpine solitudes of Wildhaus, has well described. "I have often thought," he says, "that, brought nearer to heaven on those sublime heights, he contracted in them something celestial and Divine." His evangelical fervour bursts out in the oft-quoted passage from one of his sermons: "It is to Christ that I desire to lead you, to Christ, the true source of salvation. His Divine Word is the only aliment I purpose offering you for your lives and your hearts." His love for the Scriptures is world-known. He translated them, and commented on them, and found in them food for his own soul. The plaintive, melancholy side of his character comes out in his remark, but too prophetic, on what he saw one evening in the heavens. "Yonder fatal star has come to light the pathway to my tomb. It bespeaks my end, and that of many an honest man beside. It is true I am short-sighted, but I can see a host of calamities in the future. The cause of truth and the Church of God will be threatened, but Christ will never forsake us." The general character of Zwingli—who was a self-sacrificing patriot, and who died on the battle-field, not fighting for his country, but attending, chaplain-like, on her troops—is not so well known. "He ate and drank with all who invited him, and despised no man; he was full of compassion for the poor; always firm and always cheerful, alike in good and bad fortune; no trouble appalled him; his words were always full of courage, and his spirit cheerful and comforting." Above all, the story of his home life is beautiful. His romantic marriage, his tender affection for his wife and children, and his domestic habits, form a most grateful episode amidst the story of his labours, controversies, and trials. "The Lord keep

thee ; may we soon meet again, thou soul of my soul, thy host and husband, Ulrich Zwingli." So ends one of his letters to his wife.

From the writings of Zwingli we pass on to the *Helvetic Confessions*, the first belonging to A.D. 1536, the second to 1566. There is a great difference between them in point of extent : the first consists of twenty-eight articles succinctly expressed, the second of thirty articles expanded into a lengthy treatise.

They both set out with a distinct recognition of canonical Scripture as containing the perfect rule of faith and practice ; and the second Confession, whilst largely amplifying the position in the first, adds a denunciation against ancient heretics who denied the inspiration or corrupted the contents of the sacred writings. The authoritative interpretation of Holy Writ by fathers, councils, and ecclesiastical tradition is most decidedly rejected. The orthodox doctrine of the Trinity is laid down ; and Zwingli's doctrine of the freedom of the will is asserted briefly in the ninth article of the first Confession, very elaborately in the ninth article of the second. The tenth article in the former instance only exhibits the counsel of God respecting the recovery of man in a few general words, but the tenth article in the latter is a full exposition of predestination by God and His election of the saints. The short fourteenth article of the earlier document concerning faith is in the fifteenth of the latter expanded into a statement of the true justification of believers, to whom God imputes the righteousness of Christ, and who are not only cleansed from their sins, but are made holy, and, being absolved from condemnation, they become heirs of eternal life. The last fourteen articles of the two Confessions treat of questions

touching the Church, the ministry, the sacraments, Divine worship, ecclesiastical property, magistracy, and marriage; upon these points the Latin Confession is as full as it is upon those we have just noticed.¹

HENRY BULLINGER (A.D. 1504—1577)—first a disciple and friend of Zwingli, then, after the death of the first Swiss Reformer (1531), the chief pastor of Zürich, and the leader of the Reformation—was the author of the second Helvetic Confession. He came under the influence of Calvin's teaching, and this Confession from his pen is substantially Calvinistic; but an endeavour to soften the harsh features of the Genevan theology in reference to Divine predestination and influence is very obvious.

Helvetic theologians went great lengths on the subject of inspiration. Luther rejected the verbal theory, and the symbolical books of the Lutheran communion are silent on the subject. Calvin and others entertained moderate views regarding it; but in Switzerland the controversy proceeded so far that no candidate could be admitted to ordination without professing his belief in the Divine authority of the printed Hebrew text.²

At the same time it is remarkable that a Helvetic divine, Curio Cælius Secundus, published in Basle, 1554, a treatise entitled *De Amplitudine beati Regni Dei*, which, though not decidedly in favour of universal restoration, points that way, contrary to what had been, and still was, the general opinion of Christendom. The Protestant and Catholic Churches generally held the doctrine of future everlasting punishment.

¹ The two Confessions are printed in Schaff's *Creeeds of the Evangelical Protestant Churches*, p. 211 *et seq.*

² *Formula Consensus*, etc., canon II.

CHAPTER III.

REFORMED THEOLOGY IN FRANCE AND SCOTLAND.

IN taking up the reformed theology of France, we must confine ourselves to the writings of JOHN CALVIN, a Picard of Noyon (1509-1564), undoubtedly the greatest theologian of his age; the head of the reformed Church of Geneva, the guide of French Protestants, and, to a large extent, the moulder of Puritan opinion in Great Britain.

At once we are struck with the manifest difference between Martin Luther and John Calvin. Like the former, indeed, the latter was a man of deep spiritual experience. At the outset he says of himself, "I was very far from having a conscience perfectly tranquil. Every time I went down into myself, or raised my heart to God, so extreme a horror fell upon me that no purifications, no satisfactions could cure me of it; and the more closely I considered myself, the sharper were the goads which pressed my conscience, so that there remained to me no other comfort than to deceive myself by forgetting myself." He earlier and more easily obtained peace than did his German contemporary; but the current of his spiritual life soon mingled with his intellectual disposition. "Having therefore acquired some taste and knowledge of true piety, I was immediately inflamed with so great a desire to profit, that albeit I did not wholly abandon other studies, I somewhat

relaxed my zeal for them.”¹ Between Luther and Calvin these differences appear: the latter had the more comprehensive intellect of the two; though less impulsive and heroic in action, he was more systematic in his habits of thought, not merely bringing to the front strong points, like the former, but working out his opinions in an orderly and harmonious whole, which Luther did not and could not do. Calvin was the more learned and accomplished man of the two; he used language with greater precision, and had at command a less energetic and incisive, but a more rich, varied, and flowing style of diction. Throughout his genius as a Frenchman, and his education as a lawyer, should be kept in view.

His *Institutes* form the *magnum opus* of his life, first published in French in 1535, then in Latin the following year; a second and main edition appeared in 1539, and the last revision in 1559.

The first book is taken up with God the Creator and His attributes, and then with man as formed in the Divine image. The second is devoted to the knowledge of God the Redeemer. Here come in original sin, the bondage of the will, and the work of God in the hearts of men. The nature and end of the law are noticed, to prepare for an exhibition of the saving work of Christ as mediator, prophet, priest, and king. The third book shows how we are to receive the grace of Christ, what fruits come thereof, what effects follow. Faith, regeneration, and repentance are next considered; then the doctrine of justification. The fourth book unfolds the outward means and help whereby God calls us into the fellowship of Christ; and here Calvin gives

¹ Bungener's *Calvin*, p. 22.

his views of the Church, and of its sacraments. Such is the arrangement of the treatise.

It is not necessary for us to go over the ground in which he agrees with other orthodox divines. The peculiarities of his theological system, the contributions he made to dogmatic science, alone require our particular attention.

1. In his doctrine of original sin he differed from Zwingli, who defined it as a disease, and denied it the character of guiltiness. Calvin describes it as a corruption poured into all parts of human nature, making men guilty in the sight of God, and as that which Paul oftentimes calleth sin. Therefore, he adds, being so corrupted, we are deservedly condemned. In the same strain as Augustine, Calvin insists upon it that we are not ourselves innocent, and pronounced guilty on account of another; but that all men are involved in original sin, and defiled with its spots. Infants themselves, he says, whilst they bring with them their own condemnation, are bound not by another's, but by their own fault. We derive from Adam not only the punishment of sin, but sin itself, to which punishment is due. He sought to justify the Divine government, in connection with the present constitution of things, by attributing personal guilt to human beings from the commencement of their existence, and by insisting upon it that they deserve what they suffer.¹ But in attributing personal guilt to infants, unconscious of moral responsibility, he only shifted the difficulty, as he did many another difficulty; just put it in another place, without doing anything to set it aside altogether.

2. His doctrine of predestination is developed in his

¹ *Instit.*, lib. II. c. 8.

third book, and to this we must direct our special attention. It occupies the twenty-first and three following chapters, yet forms by no means so prominent a topic in the *Institutes* as many imagine. First, he defines eternal election; secondly, he confirms the doctrine; thirdly, he confutes the slanders wherewith it has been assailed; fourthly, he maintains that election is established by Divine calling; and finally, that the reprobate do bring upon themselves the just destruction to which they are appointed.

He describes predestination generally as that whereby God appoints some to the hope of life, and some to eternal death; and in explaining this, which he says all godly people will in some sense accept, he brings out his own distinctive ideas.¹ He rests the eternal election of the saved upon the fact that individual salvation is simply and entirely the result of Divine grace. Therefore the exercise of that grace in time results from a gracious purpose from all eternity. But the peculiarities of Calvin's theory do not appear in connection with the salvation of those who believe in Christ so much as in connection with the perdition of those who do not believe. The schoolmen had made much of the distinction between the Divine prescience and the Divine predestination. Those who are saved had been regarded as the Divinely *ordained*; those who are not saved as simply the Divinely *foreseen*. Of that distinction Calvin refuses to avail himself, and seeks to bring the whole sum of things under one comprehensive system of Divine appointment.² He could not look at anything

¹ *Instit.*, lib. III. c. 21; v.

² *Ibid.* lib. III. c. 23; VI. He styles the distinction frivolous, in his comment on Rom. ix. 19. Yet what he says in *Inst.*, lib. III.

in the universe apart from God's power and control. That God should let anything alone, that He should simply look on and do nothing, that He should foresee what is to take place and not interfere, was to this inquisitive and systematic thinker a conception not to be entertained for a moment. Nor could he content himself, as some of the schoolmen had done, with leaving the question in mystery and darkness, as something not to be touched; he felt impelled to scrutinize it, and to bring the result into systematic relation to other subjects. He seems in this respect to resemble Gottschalk, who differed from other mediæval divines not so much in his theory of the salvation of the elect, as in his theory of the destruction of the non-elect. He would bring the two subjects into harmony.

Calvin could not look at a Divine election without seeing in connection with it a Divine reprobation, at the sight of which he trembles, for he calls it *horribile decretum*, a terrible decree.¹

Bungener accurately sums up Calvin's teaching on this subject in these words: "God, in the fulness of His sovereignty, by His eternal and immutable counsel, hath decreed some to salvation, others to damnation; and as He owed nothing to either, the elect have to bless Him everlastingly, and the reprobate have no right to complain. Calvin acknowledges, or nearly so, that there is no explicit statement to that effect in Holy Writ; it is sufficient for him that it is a logical deduction. 'Those whom God in election passes over,' he will say, 'God reprobates.' To admit the election of grace and reject

c. 23; VII. turns upon Divine foresight and foreknowledge, which he repeatedly mentions.

¹ *Instit.*, lib. III. c. 23; VII.

the election of death is 'puerile,' is 'stupid folly.' Human ideas, human justice, and human pity must be banished from these questions. 'The honour of God demands it.' Calvin forgets one thing only, which is, that logic is also human. Logic is reason, and even reason arrogating to itself the right of judging alone, supremely and without appeal. 'The honour of God,' therefore, imperatively demands, also, that we should at times silence it, and that we should not presume to impose upon God our conclusions, however clear and unanswerable they may seem to our intellect. When Calvin deems that predestination is proved by the sole fact of there being no other logical solution, his method at bottom is only that of the infidel establishing *logically* the impossibility of a supernatural revelation; or of the Romanist establishing, not less logically, that, a revelation being granted, God *must* have instituted a visible authority intrusted with its interpretation. All this supposes that God cannot find any solutions but such as appear to us the only possible ones: all this logic, consequently, is illogical when the question relates to God, His designs, His wisdom, His goodness, and His power." ¹

Calvin says God is justified in punishing, because He is not the cause of sin. But since the sinfulness runs up to Adam, the cardinal question is, How does the fall stand related to God's will? Here Calvin felt there was a difficulty. Whilst not satisfied with attributing to God a mere permission of evil, he yet sought to devolve on man the whole guilt of sin. Man, he says, falls because God so orders, yet he falls through his own fault (*cadit homo Dei providentiâ sic ordinante, sed suo*

¹ Bungener's *Calvin*, p. 51.

vicio cadit). So keen an observer as Calvin could not but see the two facts, that God is an omnipotent and holy Sovereign, yet that sin exists under His government. He sought to comprehend this mystery, to reduce these two facts into harmony, and only failed as everybody else fails who touches the inscrutable problem. However, Calvin would not let his theory of predestination prevent him from maintaining the idea of human guilt and of Divine righteousness. This must be carefully kept in mind. Nothing can be more unfair than to represent Calvin as careless about the justice of God, as only intent on exhibiting His grace. He was as zealous for the one as the other, however unsatisfactory might be his mode of presenting them. No one should assume that Calvin was perfectly consistent, and say,—because he believed Providence had ordered the fall, therefore he *must have* believed God was the author of evil, and must have denied the Divine righteousness; better and truer is it to say, Calvin was inconsistent, and believed in two things, which he vainly attempted to reconcile. Indeed, he checks the development of his own views, and recommends the student of these subjects to keep to the *approximate* cause of destruction—sin; and to the *ultimate* cause of salvation—God.

Faith, he says, comes from election, and the knowledge of individual election comes from faith. No one is elected who is not called, though some are called who are not elected. Beginnings of the Spirit's work are vouchsafed even to the reprobate, but the highest work of the Spirit is confined to the elect. In election lies the *donum perseverantiæ*; calling and faith would be little without this. There is an abiding communion with Christ for all the elect. He believed the elect

might fall for a time, but not permanently apostatize.

As in the case of other great theologians, so in the case of Calvin, his theology should be studied in connection with his spiritual life. "His dogmatical structures, bold as they are in the logical consistency of their thought, yet always preserve for him, at the same time, an edifying character. Even when he daringly seeks to pierce into the Divine mysteries of predestination, he is always led by the practical desire of subserving the holiness and majesty of God, and of finding for the heart an eternal anchorage in which it can securely repose in the consciousness of election by Divine grace."¹ This was central with him—the indissolubility of conscious communion with the Redeemer, and the indefectibility of grace.² Whatever may be the logical inferences which we consider legitimately deducible from his opinions, it is quite clear that he does not sanction any Antinomian conclusions from his theory of election. Faith, he maintained, is the root of all good.³ It breedeth repentance.⁴ It regenerateth man.⁵ Holiness of life is the end of election.⁶ What lies at the bottom of Calvin's theology is Paul's doctrine of the sovereignty of God. In grace, as in nature, all things are of Him. Calvin saw God everywhere in nature ;—"Him first, Him last, Him midst and without end." His philosophy was steeped in a Divine spirit. He was one of the most determined *Anti-positivists* that ever lived ; just like Paul and Augustine. How he would have fought against the dogmas of scientific Positivism! In his eye the universe is full of

¹ Dorner, *Hist. of Prot. Theology*, vol. I. p. 386.

² Dorner, vol. I. p. 384. ³ *Instit.* lib. IV. c. 13, 20.

⁴ *Instit.* lib. III. c. 3, 3. ⁵ *Ibid.* ⁶ *Ibid.* lib. III. c. 23.

God. So is the Church. He was penetrated with the conviction that Divine power, wisdom, righteousness, and love are at the basis of all things. It came first in his theology, not second, because he believed it stood first in the Bible; certainly it stood first in his own soul. He had a place in his mind for human responsibility—not the large place it ought to have had; the first place, the all-absorbing place, was occupied by the sovereignty of the Most High. His standpoint was an *à priori* one. He went back to the beginning, took his place beside the eternal throne, and calmly looked through the vista of the ages onward to the day of doom, downward to the pit of hell, upwards to the gates of heaven. He was so full of the thought of the grace of God that it blinded his vision to other things which he ought to have seen. All relating to humanity which he did see, he looked at from the standpoint of the Divine purposes. He had a marvellous genius for dialectics. He was an inflexible, fearless logician. His argumentative power sometimes kept his whole nature in abeyance, even his strongest affections. He worked out a system of Divine decrees—effectual calling, irresistible grace, and the reprobation of the lost—with a tremendous consistency of deduction; but these doctrines were in his view but phases of the one truth laid down by the apostle: “Of Him, and through Him, and to Him, are all things.”¹ He was one-sided, and from one principle sought to construct a harmonious scheme of doctrine. His mistake was in not seeing that for sound logical conclusions on this mysterious theme there are more premises than one. One fundamental, primary, incontestable principle in religion he did hold;

¹ Rom. xi. 36.

and that we must hold, or be one-sided in another way, and fall into errors differing from his, but most mischievous.

3. In relation to the atonement, it is to be remarked that Calvin entered upon it more largely than some other Reformers. He insisted upon its *necessity*; dwelt upon the *self-sacrifice* of Christ; asserted its *vicarious, expiatory*, and *satisfactory* character; but he did not adopt any distinction between the active and passive obedience of Christ.¹ That seems first to appear in Protestant theology in the *Formula Concordiæ* of 1576.²

As to the extent of the atonement, we do not find any discussion; but when he speaks of Christ's purchasing salvation for *us*, his reasoning implies that by *us* we are to understand believers in Christ—the elect. He certainly takes that view in his commentary on 1 John ii. 2, where he alludes to and admits the idea that Christ's sufferings were *sufficient* for the whole world; but he denies that the "whole world" for which Christ made propitiation includes the reprobate. Yet in his epistles he speaks of the redemption of all, *omnium redemptionem*, and of the human race being reconciled, *universum humanum genus reconciliandum*.³

4. On justification by faith he gives his views at length. He distinguishes between different kinds of faith, and says that "the true faith or knowledge of Christ is when we conceive Him in such sort as He is offered of the Father, that is to say, clothed with His gospel. Faith hath a mutual relation to the Word, and the Word to faith. The Word is the foundation of faith, the ground of faith, the mirror in which faith beholdeth God. Although it

¹ *Instit.* lib. II. c. 15.

² Shedd, vol. II. p. 343.

³ *Epistola*, p. 395. Ed. 1575.

assenteth to all parts of God's Word, yet it has especial regard to the Divine good will and mercy, and to the promises of grace grounded upon Christ." It is to be noticed throughout that with Calvin the object of faith is not so much Christ Himself, as the truth revealed respecting Him.

He removes all obscurity from his idea of justification. "We expound justification," he remarks, "to be an acceptance of us by God, whereby He receives us into His favour and takes us to be righteous. The same consists in forgiveness of sins and in the imputation of the righteousness of Christ." Then he adduces several passages of Scripture in support of his view. He goes on to urge that, "to the end we may be persuaded of the free justification of the gospel, we must lift up our minds to the judgment-seat of God ;" by which he means that we are to meditate on the pure and perfect law, and the infinite justice of God, and so impress upon ourselves a conviction of sinfulness and our need of mercy. He maintains¹ that there are two objects noticeable in justification : first, that the glory of God may be manifestly declared, and secondly, that human consciences may derive from it untroubled quietness. Calvin shows that both these ends are accomplished by the free justification of sinners according to the doctrine which he lays down. He describes different kinds or degrees of justification which are insufficient and false—contending that no human works or endeavours are capable of making men acceptable to God ; finally he teaches in scholastic phraseology that the procuring cause of salvation is the mercy of God, the material cause is the righteousness of Christ, the formal or instrumental cause is the faith of the believer,

¹ On Justification, see *Instit.* lib. III. c. 11, 12, 13, 14.

and the final cause is the exhibition of Divine righteousness and the praise of Divine goodness.

5. In reference to regeneration, it is instructive to compare the teaching of Calvin with that of others. Luther clung to the old notion of baptismal grace. He spoke of the blood of Christ as tinging the water, and rendering it rose-coloured; as making the water different from what it was, having added to it the glory, might, and power of God Himself.¹ Calvin protested against the doctrine of our being cleansed by baptismal water. It is not, he says, the water which cleanses, but the blood of Christ; thus he comes to a conclusion somewhat resembling Luther's, though not so rhetorically expressed. "At what time soever we are baptized," he remarks, "we are at once cleansed for all our life." "As oft as we fall, we must go back to the remembrance of baptism, and therewith arm our minds."² But we should connect one part of Calvin's theology with another; and it may be noticed that he treats of repentance by itself, and dwells upon it as the fruit of faith, to which he ascribes our regeneration; moreover, repentance is with him essentially different from Romish penance, and is described in such a way as amounts to the same thing as is meant by regeneration, and this he carefully defines as a result of faith.³

The tendency of the reformed doctrines no doubt was to create a revolution of thought relative to the doctrine of regeneration. Old views could not hold their place consistently with justification by faith, with the distinction between Divine acceptance and personal holiness, and with the denial of the efficacy of sacraments.

¹ *Werke*, XII. 714.

² *Instit.*, lib. IV. c. 15.

³ *Ibid.* lib. III. c. 3.

But neither Luther nor Calvin could at once shake off their early associations with baptism; and Zwingli stands alone among the leading foreign Reformers of the day in treating baptism as a simple sign, and the regeneration of the soul as proceeding from God's grace alone.

On one subject connected with baptism Calvin differed widely from those of the Fathers whom in the general tone of his theology he most resembled. Ambrose had taught distinctly that no one rises into the kingdom of heaven except by the sacrament of baptism. From this necessity, he expressly says, infants are not to be excepted. Augustine at first was more moderate, but afterwards he pushed his theory so as to exclude unbaptized infants from heaven; but he considered their condition as higher and more tolerable than that of the lost in general. From so repulsive and unscriptural a view the Genevan divine shrunk back with something like horror, and asked those who doomed infants to eternal death because unbaptized, how they could reconcile it with the words of Christ, who taught that of such is the kingdom of heaven.¹

The French genius which inspired the theology of Calvin helped to promote its acceptance with his fellow-countrymen. Not only in the Gallic-Swiss community of Geneva, where he reigned supreme as a doctrinal divine and as an ecclesiastical ruler, was his system embraced, but it was adopted by French Protestants generally. The Reformed Church of France became decidedly Calvinistic.

The opinions of Calvin in reference to the Lord's Supper had better be placed side by side with those of

¹ Compare passages cited in Hagenbach, vol. I. p. 365, with Calvin's *Institutes*, lib. IV. c. 16, § 26.

Luther and Zwingli, whose teaching on the subject we have intentionally passed over.

Luther renounced the doctrine of *transubstantiation*, and put in its place the doctrine of *consubstantiation*. He earnestly contended for the literal meaning of the Saviour's words, "This is My body, this is My blood." But he explained the change in the sacrament thus: the bread and wine are not themselves substantially altered, but with them the real body and blood of Christ are incorporated and do coexist. The glorified humanity of our Saviour Luther believed to be ubiquitous. Zwingli, on the other hand, as firmly insisted on the figurative meaning of the Redeemer's words. "This is," he said, means, "This signifies." Luther appealed to the letter, Zwingli to the spirit, of God's Word. The latter could not endure the notion of an ubiquitous body maintained by the former. He recognized in the Supper nothing more than a devout commemoration and a sign of Christian fellowship.¹ Whether Zwingli before his death modified his view, and entertained the idea of a spiritual presence of the Lord in the sacrament, is doubtful.² But such certainly was the doctrine adopted by Calvin. He would not, he says, "fasten Christ's presence to the element of bread, or shut Him up in it." But, he maintains, there is a true and substantial communicating of the body and blood of the Lord under the signs of the Supper, so that they are not received by imagination only or understanding of mind, but enjoyed in very deed as the food of eternal life. He enforces the fact that Christ's body is in heaven, and insists on the figurative

¹ Hase's *Hist. of the Christian Church*, p. 389, supplies ample references.

² Hagenbach, *Hist. of Doct.*, vol. II. p. 297.

meaning of the word "is;" but he goes beyond the notion of a mere commemoration in the sacrament through symbols, and speaks of "the presence of the flesh of Christ in the Supper."¹ But he adds, "If any man asks respecting the manner, I am not ashamed to confess that it is a higher secret than can be comprehended by my wit or uttered by my words. I rather feel it than understand it."²

The Calvinistic Confessions of faith intended for local purposes are the Geneva Catechism, the Zürich Consensus, and the Geneva Consensus; they are of secondary authority, and are not included in the *Corpus et Syntagma Confessionum* which appeared in Geneva. But the influence of Calvin's theology and Church polity is manifest in all the leading Confessions of the Reformed Churches, especially the French, Dutch, and Scotch; also in the Lambeth Articles, the Irish Articles, and the Westminster Standards.³

The chief place amongst Swiss and French Reformers must be assigned to John Calvin. Great as he was in theological literature, he was perhaps even greater in ecclesiastical action; and viewed under either of these aspects, his personal character must be united to his achievements in order to his being fairly appreciated. He lived sparingly, and died poor, leaving behind him, besides his library, not more than fifty pounds. Sternness was a leading characteristic in the Genevan Reformer.⁴ He had to rule a riotous city, and he did so

¹ *Instit.*, lib. iv. cc. 17, 19.

² *Ibid.* lib. iv. c. 32.

³ Schaff's *Hist. of the Creeds of Christendom*, p. 467.

⁴ The execution of Servetus, whatever might be Calvin's share in it, is a sad blot in the history of Geneva; but in this respect Geneva only resembled England.

with an iron hand. But his purpose was noble, and, as it regards outward reformation, his success was great. He won the homage, if not the hearts, of the citizens, and as he walked the streets of the lake-washed city, all who passed by felt that he was a king of men.

We have noticed the intolerance which his position developed; but in contrast we ought to look at him during the interval of his life passed at Strasburg, as pastor of a Church composed of his own countrymen. "At no time does he appear more admirable than during these years of exile. His magnanimity and single-minded earnestness come out strongly tempered by a certain patience, moderation, and sadness that we seem to miss elsewhere. Relieved from power, he was also relieved from its wounding irritations, which were apt to chafe his keen spirit; and we see only the simple grandeur, wonderful capacity, and truthful feeling of the man. They were years of busy interest and activity—political, domestic, and theological."¹ He died with the ministers and syndics of Geneva round his bed, of whom he begged forgiveness for occasional outbursts of violence.

Calvin's system of doctrine and government was carried over into Scotland. The Reformation there may be dated from about 1525, when Patrick Hamilton, titular abbot of Ferne, preached against mediæval abuses, and advocated Lutheran ideas of grace, faith, and free-will. "The smoke of Patrick Hamilton having infected as many as it blew upon, an Act was passed in Scotland against the damnable opinions of the heretic Luther;"² and a struggle began which ended in the complete overthrow of the Roman Catholic system.

¹ Dr. Tulloch.

² Keith's *History of Church and State in Scotland*, vol. I. p. 27.

JOHN KNOX (A.D. 1505–1572) was the man who, beyond all others, led Scotch reform onwards to its memorable victories. What had been done by the leaders of English Protestantism seemed wavering and timid to one of his ardent spirit and daring temper; and having found at Geneva, in John Calvin, a teacher more after his own heart, he returned to his native land, imbued with both the Frenchman's theology and the Frenchman's ecclesiastical principles. At last he succeeded in impressing them upon the minds of his countrymen. Little of original literature appears in Scotland connected with the religious revolution of the sixteenth century. It is a mistake to suppose that there were not men of culture at the time amongst these northern Protestants. Buchanan was a Latin poet; Row was a Hebrew scholar, and used in family intercourse the French language, with Latin, Greek, and Hebrew readings of Scripture; Balnaves had a high reputation for erudite attainments; John Erskine of Dun was the first to patronize the study of Greek classics; Fergusson improved the language of his country, and made a mark by his witty sayings; but none of them produced any theological works of importance. In this respect even Knox falls below what would be imagined by those acquainted only with the activities of his career. He wrote a characteristic history of the Reformation, and blew his terrific *Blast of the Trumpet against the Monstrous Regiment of Women*; but in the preface to a sermon he published he says, "That I did not in writing communicate my judgment upon the Scriptures I have ever thought myself to have most just reason. For considering myself rather called of my God to instruct the ignorant, comfort the sorrowful, confirm the weak, and rebuke the proud by tongue and

lively voice in these most corrupt days, than to compose books for the ages to come (seeing that so much is written, and by men of most singular erudition, and yet so little well observed), I decreed to contain myself within the bounds of that vocation whereunto I found myself especially called." Thus he at once disclaims pretension to any great theological authorship, and gives as a reason the well-known fact—that an abundance of Protestant literature had been published by his contemporaries, especially in Germany, Switzerland, France; and that much of it had been circulated partly through translations in Great Britain. His chief theological work is *An Answer to a Great Number of Blasphemous Cavillations written by an Anabaptist and Adversary to God's Eternal Predestination*. As this work is little known, we supply a description of it, after examining the rare copy in the Advocates' Library, Edinburgh.

The first edition is dated 1560,¹ and the preface contains reasons alleged by the author for his publication of this treatise. Far from taking up the subject as a mere doctrinal theory, he insists upon predestination as lying at the root of all real religion. "We fear not to affirm," he says, "that so necessary as it is that true faith be established in our hearts, that we may be moved to praise Him for His free grace received, so necessary also is the doctrine of God's eternal predestination." Then he proceeds to contend that it is essential to the existence of Christian faith and the possession of genuine humility. He resents the denomination of his opinion by "the

¹ "Printed by John Crespin." It does not say where. An edition of Knox's works in four volumes has been published under the superintendence of David Laing, of the Signet Library. Dr. McCrie in his *Life of Knox* has done more than any one to revive the memory of the Scotch Reformer.

odious name of stoical necessity,"—such necessity he denounces as "devilish" and "profane,"—and proceeds to explain the difference between the doctrine of Calvin and that of the Stoics in the following manner: "We imagine not a necessity which is contained within nature by a perpetual conjunction of natural causes, as did the Stoics; but we affirm and maintain that God is Lord, Moderator, and Governor of all things, whom we affirm to have determined from the beginning, according to His wisdom, what He would do; and now we say that He doth execute according to His power whatsoever He hath determined." In treating of prescience, it is curious to find the author noticing the Platonic theory of ideas: "When we attribute prescience to God, we understand that all things have ever been and perpetually abide present before His eyes, so that to His eternal knowledge nothing is byepast, nothing to come, but all things are present; and so are they present, that they are not as conceived imaginations, or forms and figures whereof other innumerable things proceed (as Plato teacheth that of the form and example of one man many thousands of men are fashioned). But we say that all things be so present before God that He doth contemplate and behold them in their verity and perfection." Against the moral perversion of his doctrine Knox protests. In reference to the idea "that we imagine it sufficient that we be predestinate, how wickedly soever we live," he says, "We constantly affirm the plain contrary;" and refuses, in unmeasured terms of condemnation, to accept his antagonist's caricature of Calvinism: "God hath created the most part of the world, which is an innumerable multitude, to perdition because it so pleaseth Him." Whatever might be the construction put on Knox's

view, which was substantially the same as Calvin's, he asserted most strenuously the wisdom, the righteousness, and the love of the Almighty in all His dispensations. Calvin and Knox might be logically inconsistent in some respects, but to charge them with opinions which may seem to a critic logically involved in the positions they maintained, when such opinions are expressly repudiated, is decidedly unfair. With reference to the non-elect, the Scotch Reformer declares, "To those whom He hath decreed to leave in perdition is so shut up the entry of life, that either they are left continually corrupted in their blindness, or else, if grace be offered, by them it is oppugned and obstinately refused; or, if it seem to be received, that abideth for a time only, and so they return to their blindness and crooked nature and infidelity again, in which finally they justly perish." From beginning to end Knox's book is a protest against certain consequences, dishonourable to the righteousness of God's government, which the adversaries of Calvinism deduced from Calvinistic principles. Respecting the Reformer's logic, and his application of Scripture texts, of course there will be varieties of opinion. The simple affirmations of the Scotch theologian are all we have to do with here, and these we have endeavoured impartially to extract from the scarce volume above described.¹

The *Confession of the English Congregation at Geneva*, 1558, was probably composed by Knox, and consists of only four articles—respecting the Father, the Son, the Holy Ghost, and the Church. The first and

¹ It is a 12mo book, and contains 455 pages. There is also another edition in the Advocates' Library, dated 1591, "imprinted at London for Thomas Charde."

last bear some resemblance to the Scotch Confession. This latter was drawn up by the Reformer and his brethren John Spottiswood, John Hillock, John Douglas, and John Row. No doubt Knox took a leading part, owing to his experience in Geneva, his acquaintance with the Swiss standards, and the help he had given to the English Articles under Edward VI. This Confession, prepared in 1560, as Dr. Schaff observes, though decidedly Calvinistic, is free from the scholastic technicalities and angular statements of the Calvinism of a later generation; and it has been also remarked by Dean Stanley that it is the only Protestant Confession which, far in advance of its age, acknowledges its own fallibility.¹ Upon the Eucharist, then a principal subject of controversy, it is said, "We confess and undoubtedly believe that the faithful, in the right use of the Lord's table, so do eat the body and drink the blood of the Lord Jesus, that He remaineth in them, and they in Him; yea, that they are so made flesh of His flesh, and bone of His bone, that as the eternal Godhead had given to the flesh of Jesus Christ (which of their own condition and nature was mortal and corruptible) life and immortality, so doth Christ Jesus, His flesh and blood eaten and drunken by us, give to us the same prerogatives."

An incisive and even startling expression of Knox's view of the atonement is found in the following passages from a letter written to his mother-in-law in A.D. 1553, whilst he was at London, before he went to Frankfort. "If we understand of whom God requires satisfaction, whether of us or of the hands of His only Son, and

¹ It promises reformation of that in it which should be proved amiss. See Schaff's *Hist. of the Creeds of Christendom*, pp. 681, 683.

whose punishment is able to recompense our sins, then shall we have great cause to rejoice, remembering that God is a just God; for the office of the just man is to stand content when he has received his duty. But God has received already, at the hands of His only Son, all that is due for our sins, and so cannot His justice require or crave any more of us, either satisfaction or recompensation for our sins." "He that is faithful has promised free remission to all penitent sinners, and He that is just has received already a full satisfaction for the sins of all those that embrace Christ Jesus to be the only Saviour of the world."

It is remarked, by one who attributes to John Knox a larger amount of fanaticism than facts are sufficient to warrant, that "there were moments when, amid the lull of controversy, he retreated to his closet, communed deeply with himself and God, and after patiently investigating the mysterious problems of the Bible, reasoned with comparative sobriety upon the nature of the means to be adopted in transmitting Christ's evangel to posterity." We see no reason for being surprised at this, and we fully adopt the following remark: "Accordingly, the first Confession indicates no wish whatever to break away from the traditional terminology of the Church, so far as it concerns the doctrines of the blessed Trinity, the incarnation and atonement of the Saviour, and the Godhead of the Holy Ghost."¹

No particular form of ecclesiastical government or religious worship is laid down in the Scotch Confession of 1560. Knox prepared a book of *Common Order*, adopted by the General Assembly in 1564, and used for a long time; and a National Covenant followed in 1581,

¹ Hardwick's *Reformation*, p. 155.

after Knox's death, in which "bastard sacraments," "the blasphemous opinion of transubstantiation," the "devilish mass," the "wicked hierarchy," and the "bloody decrees at Trent" are renounced for ever; it was not, however, until a later period that the Presbyterian system reached its completion in Scotland. A modified Episcopacy lasted to the end of Knox's lifetime, in A.D. 1572, and a convention at Leith that year restored the titles of "archbishop" and "bishop." But in 1574 Andrew Melville, the friend of Beza, returned from Geneva to his own country, and determined to carry on the Presbyterian Reformation from the point where Knox had left it. He believed in the Divine right of Presbyterianism, and laboured for eighteen years to work out the system fully in his native land. The *Second Book of Discipline*—containing an elaborate and consistent development of the theory, in which, by a clear analysis, "the two ruling powers are separated from each other, and the ecclesiastical set above the secular,"—was drawn up chiefly by Melville in A.D. 1578, and inserted in the Registers of the General Assembly in 1581, but it did not receive the ratification of the temporal power until 1592. Knox began, but it was Melville who completed the Scotch Reformation.

The two men resembled each other. They were much more like Calvin than like Zwingli, or Melancthon, or even Luther. They both played a distinguished part in the history of their country, and made many enemies; but no one ever imputed to either what was sordid, selfish, mean, world-loving, or dishonourable. Open as the day, and courageous to a proverb, they defied all opposition, and counted not their lives dear unto them. The Regent's exclamation by the

grave of Knox will never be forgotten : " There lies he who never feared the face of man ; " and Andrew Melville, in contending against Prelacy and for Presbyterianism, was just as brave. When threatened by Morton, he replied, " Tush, man ; threaten your courtiers so ? It is the same to me whether I rot in the air or in the ground ; and I have lived out of our country as well as in it. Let God be praised, you can neither hang nor exile His truth." Melville, as well as Knox, had left Scotland for the Continent, and lived in Geneva. There the former became an intimate friend of Beza, and Beza did much to shape his ecclesiastical character. " Next to the Reformer," says the biographer of both, " I know no individual from whom Scotland has received such important services, or to whom she continues to owe so deep a debt of national respect and gratitude, as Andrew Melville." ¹

¹ M'Crie.

CHAPTER IV.

REFORMED THEOLOGY IN ITALY.

ITALY was the first country in Europe to enjoy the great intellectual and literary revival of the fifteenth century ; but in connection with it a strong current of sceptical thought swept through cultivated minds in that beautiful peninsula, where nature appears in harmony with all which is graceful and refined. Faith in the dogmas and institutions of Rome was rudely shaken ; and because with these the whole of Christianity had come to be identified, truth as well as error suffered from the violent collision. Classical tastes also in themselves at the time produced serious perils. The Humanists, as they are called, were so enamoured with pagan antiquity as to regard with scepticism, and even antipathy, the gospel of the cross. The temper caught from the poems of Lucretius and from the dialogues of Cicero, not the nobler philosophy of Plato or of the Stoics, laid hold of the sensuous nature of the Italian, and dragged him down into moods of thought infinitely below those which had moved prophets and apostles.

But when the first quarter of the sixteenth century had elapsed, we discern signs of better things. A translation of Melancthon's *Loci Communes* was printed at Venice in A.D. 1526. Vernacular versions of Scripture had previously made their appearance ; and in 1530 a new one issued from the busily-worked presses of the City on the Sea. Military and commercial relations existed

between the people of Germany and of the South, and these brought Lutheran and other Protestant publications into Lombard and Tuscan towns; at the same time Renée, Duchess of Ferrara, welcomed to her court some of the leading Reformers, who inculcated their tenets upon the noble and the learned.

Not only was Protestant theology imported into Italy, but in Italy Protestant theology was also produced, to nourish the increasing band of such as embraced the "new faith" between 1525 and 1540. Even in so unlikely a production as a preface to the famous *Orlando Inamorata* may be found opinions of a decided Protestant character; and Panizzi, who discovered this curious relic, and who was so intimately conversant with the literature and history of his country, went so far as to say that the reforming tenets were as popular amongst the higher classes of Italy in those days as liberal notions in ours.

JUAN VALDES was a Spaniard, and died in 1540, but he lived for some time in Italy, and there produced a deep and extensive impression. He was the author of several works on Divinity, but that by which he is best known consists of what are called *A Hundred and Ten Considerations*, written in his native tongue, and then translated into Italian. The Italian version has been rendered into English by Mr. Betts, with a valuable introduction by Mr. Wiffen; and now we are enabled to clear away the confusion which from ignorance of his writings long attached to his name and reputation. From a perusal of the work we find that he did not deal in scholastic propositions, or in logical reasoning; that his habits of thought were rather religious than theological, experimental than scientific; that he did not attack the errors and superstitions of Romanism, but confined himself to the

inculcation of what he believed to be Divine truth. In his *Considerations* he dwells upon the atonement, which he describes as "Justice executed upon Christ;" upon justification by faith, which is expounded in a somewhat Lutheran form; and upon regeneration as the work of the Holy Spirit, after much the type of doctrine generally adopted by Evangelical divines. The fruitlessness of mere speculation, the moral power of Christian faith, and the spirituality of religion, are ever-recurring topics in the long series of his remarks, which do not exhibit any systematic order. He quotes Scripture texts, but more abundantly refers to the illumination of the soul by the direct agency of the Holy Ghost. Several questionable statements are introduced; but the chapters are rich in shrewd ideas and lively illustrations, and present throughout subtlety of thought, and a keen habit of analysis. The whole is pervaded by the spirit of characteristic authors classed together as Mystics; and this accounts for misapprehensions of his meaning into which critics both foreign and English have been betrayed.¹ Old moulds and forms of thought were broken up by some writers of this description, and they were not unlikely to say things which enemies and even friends might regard as heretical.

GABRIELE VALLICULI, of whom nothing more is known, wrote a book on the *Free Grace of God and the Bondage of the Human Will*, printed at Nuremberg in 1536, and possibly published still earlier in Italy.

This book, which is said to exhibit more piety than

¹ Calvin and Beza, as quoted by Bayle, Art. 'Valdes.' Hallam's *Introduction to Literature*, vol. I. p. 509. See also M'Crie's *Reformation in Italy*, p. 135, 150, and *Life and Times of Paleario*, by M. Young, chap. VI.

talent, presents something like a reflex of Luther's theology, without any of Luther's power. The *Loci Communes* of Melancthon are frequently referred to as a vehicle in the conveyance of Protestant ideas into Italy; but the calm and balanced judgment of that learned theologian would have less charms for such a man as Valliculi, supposing he had read Melancthon's work, than the burning words of his brother Martin. Probably we are correct when we recognize this Italian treatise as a fair type of the popular theology which was making its way in the Papal States, where Bishop Sylvestro Benedetto was born, to whom the treatise is dedicated.

As a specimen of the popular reformed theology of Italy, we may notice *Il Sommario de la Sancta Scriptura*, etc., in two parts. A prologue explains the nature of the work, stating that, in the first place, it is intended to teach how every one ought to believe, and what he ought to hope for; that we are children and heirs of the kingdom of God; that we are justified without our own merits, and should not place any confidence in them; and that we are not to neglect good works, but know how to perform them, hoping for salvation not from them, but solely from the grace and mercy of God through Christ. The author then states that, in the second place, he designs to inculcate what is practical; not that subjects should be disobedient to their princes, nor that monks should leave their monasteries, but that they should know their errors and learn to correct them; for it avails more before God to be a humble publican than a holy hypocrite. The doctrine as to justification bears a Lutheran stamp; but it is clear that whilst so far the popular theology is reformed, there is no condemnation

of a monastic life, but only an attempt made to improve the habits of those who followed it.

No one is more conspicuous amongst the Roman Catholic Italians who held a doctrine of justification like that of Luther than Cardinal GASPAR CONTARINI (A.D. 1483–1542). He published a tract on the subject, in which he distinguished between two kinds of righteousness—that inherent in us, and that imputed in Christ. If asked on which we should rely, Contarini remarks, A pious man will answer, “We can trust to the latter alone.” “Our righteousness,” he goes on to say, “is only inchoate, incomplete, full of defects; the righteousness of Christ, on the other hand, true, perfect, thoroughly and alone pleasing in the eyes of God; for its sake alone can we trust to be justified before God.” This passage appears in the Paris edition of 1571, but not in the Venetian edition of 1589, a circumstance which indicates how unwelcome such teaching was to Papal authorities after the Council of Trent. The Inquisitor-General of Venice tampered with the book, omitting some passages and altering others, before the new edition could receive an imprimatur.¹ Contarini was very anxious to promote an understanding between the Lutherans and the Roman Catholics, and in the doctrine now referred to approached so closely to the former, that little difference on that point remained between him and them. Nor did he stand alone in this respect; Seripando, general of the Augustine order, whilst declaring he did not adopt the Lutheran tenet, yet admitted a twofold righteousness — one inherent through unmerited grace, the other imputed, able to compensate for all defects, and sufficient to secure the salvation of the imperfect.²

¹ Ranke's *History of the Popes*, vol. I. p. 205. ² *Ibid.* vol. I. p. 205.

REGINALD POLE (A.D. 1500—1558), who became Archbishop of Canterbury, sympathized with Contarini on the subject of justification, and went so far as to approve of his treatise upon it, "because he said it laid not only a foundation for agreement with the Protestants, but such a foundation as illustrated the glory of Christ, the foundation of all Christian doctrine, which was not well understood by many." He repudiated the charge of novelty brought against it, alleging that "it lies at the foundation of all the doctrines held by the ancient Church."¹ Fourteen years after that he became Archbishop of Canterbury, and then carried out the intolerant policy which kindled the Smithfield fires, with the other horrors of the Marian persecutions; but Pole in Italy, where he spent much of his time, and Pole in England, appear as different persons. Cardinal Morone concurred with Contarini and Pole in the matter of justification, and so did other distinguished Roman Catholics. A formulary was drawn up, that it might be seen how near they could approach the Lutherans. It was submitted to Cardinal Cortese, who suggested alterations for the purpose of making the formulary more strict and conservative; but Morone objected to them, and they were afterwards dropped. Things at this moment (September, 1542) looked so favourably in the direction of union, that Pole in a letter to Contarini praised God "for the great gift of charity which had been bestowed in connection with that holy business at Modena."² Some Roman Catholics have,

¹ Pole's letters to Contarini, 17th of May, 16th of July, 1541, and 1 May, 1542.—M'Crie, p. 206. See life of Pole in Hook's *Archbishops*, vol. VIII.

² Pole, *Epist.*, vol. III. p. 58.

notwithstanding all this, denied that Pole held the dogma of justification by faith only; but Caracciolo, in his life of Paul VI., is candid enough to confess: "Cardinal Pole, either through the influence of Marc Antonio Flaminio, or because very erudite in profane literature,—he was little skilled in scholastic theology,—was on this point so wedded to the dogma of justification by faith only, and grace of imputation, that he not only, for a long time, held this false Lutheran opinion, but also went about making disciples and numerous converts amongst persons of importance, and filled his house with servants and courtiers holding the same opinion."¹

The most remarkable work in the "evangelical" theology of the period in Italy is *Il Beneficio di Gesù Cristo*, printed in 1543, and afterwards translated into Spanish and French. Curiously enough, Macaulay, led astray by Ranke, pronounced the book as hopelessly lost, like the second decade of Livy; but it was brought to light in 1855, and reprinted with a learned introduction.

The work enjoyed great popularity, 40,000 copies being sold in six years. The authorship of the work has been a subject for dispute. A contemporary says, "Many are of opinion that there is scarcely a book of this age, or at least in the Italian language, so sweet, so pious, so simple, so well fitted to instruct the ignorant and weak, especially in the doctrine of justification. I will say more; Reginald Pole, the British cardinal and intimate friend of Morone, was esteemed the author of that book, or partly so; at least it is known that he, with Flaminio Priuli and his other friends, defended and

¹ Quoted in Hook, vol. VIII. p. 185.

circulated it.”¹ It is now thought to be the production of Aonio Paleario, a celebrated Italian, who for his opinions was committed to the flames at Rome in 1570. Perhaps Flaminio revised it.²

To the Italian consensus on justification and salvation through Jesus Christ may be added what we find in one of the letters of Flaminio, who wrote paraphrases on the Psalms, and was a friend of Pole and Contarini. “The gospel is no other than the blessed tidings that the only begotten Son of God, clad in our flesh, hath made satisfaction for us, to the justice of the eternal Father. He who believes this enters into the kingdom of God; he enjoys the universal pardon; from a carnal he becomes a spiritual creature; from a child of wrath, a child of grace; he lives in a sweet peace of conscience.” “It is hardly possible,” says Ranke, “to use language of more orthodox Lutheranism.”³

ANGELO BUONARICI, general of the Canons Regular at Venice, is a similar instance. He lays down in unmistakable terms the doctrine of justification. “Not that we are to conclude that those who believe in Christ are not bound and obliged to study the practice of holy, devout, and good works; but no one must think or believe that he can attain to the benefit of justification by good works, for this is indeed attained by faith, and good works in the justified do not precede, but follow, justification.” Strange to say, these sentiments appear in a work published under the sanction of the Venetian inquisitors. Still more strange, during the sittings of

¹ Vergerio, *Amanit. Eccl.*, p. 158; M'Crie, p. 156.

² Young's *Life and Times of Paleario*, vol. I. p. 332. A translation of *Il Beneficio* has been published by the Religious Tract Society.

³ *Hist.*, vol. I. p. 139.

the Council of Trent, the teaching of an Italian Dominican—to the effect that elected souls cannot perish, but will be recovered from all their falls, and that salvation and perdition depend not on the human will, but the Divine predestination—was vindicated by the Patriarch of Aquileia in a treatise on the subject. Yet more remarkable, the Tridentine Fathers, in 1563, after an inquiry prolonged through twenty-four days, acquitted him of heresy, though they blamed him for making his opinions public.

This shows how far in some cases theologians might go in the same direction as Augustine and Gottschalk, and even further still, without incurring censure. Such tendencies—at a time when the controversy on justification and kindred topics was so rife, and precision of language respecting them had been carried to such a height of refinement and subtlety—really meant more than they did in the fifth century or the ninth century; yet if men did not assail the Roman Catholic system in general, and remained in open communion with it, they could pass muster. Suspicions arose, the suspected fell into trouble, but in the end they escaped. Contarini, Pole, Flaminio, Buonarici, and others remained in the Papal Church to their dying day; and it may be mentioned that Flaminio prefixed to his book on the Psalms a dedication to the Pope, in which he is styled “watchman, prince of holiness, the vicegerent of Christ upon earth.” Thus it plainly appears that the fact of theologians holding opinions like Luther as to justification and other related doctrines did not of itself make them Protestants. Reformers they may be justly pronounced, but not Protestants in the proper acceptation of the term. Inconsistent thinkers, no doubt, they will appear to many

of our readers ; but inconsistency is a very common fact both in the history of human opinion and in that of human conduct.

Amongst other Italians requiring notice was BERNARDINO OCHINO, a Capuchin, who came to England in 1547, and was a guest in Cranmer's palace. At one time he was renowned for his evangelical preaching. "The favourite doctrine of Ochino was justification by faith in Christ, which, as appears from his printed sermons, he perfectly understood, and explained with much Scriptural simplicity. Purgatory, penances, and Papal pardons fell before the preaching of this doctrine, as Dagon of old before the ark of Jehovah."¹ Ranke, as well as M'Crie, gives him a high character, and quotes Cardinal Bembo, who found such a fascination in Ochino that he said, "I opened my heart to him as I would do to Christ Himself: it seemed to me that I had never beheld a holier man."² Of his extraordinary eloquence, which acted as a spell on Charles V., and of his immense popularity wherever he went, there are numerous attestations. But in Zürich, whither Ochino repaired, he comes before us with a damaged reputation. Calvin, indeed, had vindicated him from the charge of Antitrinitarianism in 1543; but in 1558 a report was in circulation "stating that Ochino and the brothers of Lælius Socinus were secretly undermining the doctrine of the merit and satisfaction of Christ."³ About the same time he published a book entitled *Labyrinthi*, in which he discussed free-will and predestination. Next he published *Dialogi xxx.* at Basle, 1563; and one of these dialogues especially offended the Zürich clergy, who regarded it as defending the practice of polygamy. But the opinion has been started

¹ M'Crie, p. 146.

² Ranke, vol. I. p. 145.

³ M'Crie, p. 430.

that the greater part of the offensive discussion was borrowed from a book written in defence of Philip, the Landgrave of Hesse, and published in 1541. Other dialogues were charged with heterodoxy as to the nature of Christ, and the mode of the Divine existence; but they have found defenders, who deny the imputations cast on the famous Italian Protestant. The views of this most remarkable man have recently undergone a careful investigation by the learned Karl Benrath, who has traced his career from beginning to end in a singularly interesting memoir. He throws much more light on the nature of Ochino's theological and ethical opinions than Bayle, M'Crie, and Young had been able to do; and shows very clearly how Ochino repeats again and again, "You may say what you will, polygamy is immoral," and how he also admits the baseless and perilous principle, that in this and in all other cases "the final decision lies in the conscience of the individual enlightened by the prayer of faith."¹ With regard to the Trinity, Benrath considers that Ochino discourses in a spirit of doubt, always ready at hand with objections, but yet himself representing "the traditional doctrine adopted by the Reformers." There is, to say the least, a haziness resting over Ochino's treatment of the doctrine; and there can be no doubt that in forms of expression, and even in the substance of his sentiments, he departed, to what extent it is difficult to say, from the teaching of most Protestant, as well as all Roman Catholic, divines. Finally, he went to Poland, where he died; and, as his sympathetic biographer observes, "when at the close of his life he looked back with tears upon his long path of

¹ *Benardino Ochino of Siena*, by Benrath, translated from the German by Helen Zimmern, with a preface by William Arthur, 1876.

sorrows, he was still able to say, for the consolation of his friends, 'I have had to suffer many things, but that is spared to none of Christ's disciples and apostles; but that I have been enabled to endure all things shows forth the might of the Lord.'"¹

Another Italian better known in this country was PETER MARTYR (1500—1562), a Florentine by birth, distinguished alike by learning and eloquence, and associated with Ochino by bonds of friendship and by early endeavours to promote reformation in Italy. He acted as pastor of a Protestant Church at Lucca, and about 1543 published an exposition of the Apostles' Creed in the language of his countrymen. Driven from his own land by persecution, he laboured in Strasburg, whence he wrote to his late flock at Lucca, saying, "Although you should be altogether destitute of the ministers of the word, to whom the preaching of the gospel is committed, which God forbid, yet the Spirit of God will never be wanting to speak to your hearts instead of preachers. Moreover, there are among you those who, by the grace of God, are so truly illumined with the light of the truth that they can also impart light to others, and give testimony to the truth."² Such a strain of address is a key to Peter Martyr's theology. His opinions went beyond the Protestantism of his German brethren, for he was hostile to the Augsburg Confession, calling in question some of the destructive dogmas of Lutheranism.

Reformed doctrines were propagated in Spain, and to the movement there the writings of Juan Valdes in Spanish contributed, together with the efforts of his brother Alfonso. The *Bibliotheca Wiffeniana* describes

¹ Benrath, p. 298.

² *Life of Paleario*, vol. I. p. 417.

the Spanish Reformers from the year 1520; and in the first volume—the only one we have seen—there are notices of Juan and Alfonso de Valdés, also of Franzisco and Jaime de Enzinas, together with Juan Diaz. But we do not notice anything which makes a mark in the history of theology except the *Considerations* of Juan Valdés. So far as literature is concerned, perhaps the translation of the *Theologia Germanica* occupies a principal place. That work appears to have had much effect on Valdes' mind; indeed, his *Considerations* are steeped in the same spirit, and it is said that he strongly recommended Taulers' sermons. English influence may also be traced in Spain, for, says Pilkington, afterwards Bishop of Durham, "We have seen come to pass in our days that the Spaniards sent for into the realm on purpose to repress the gospel, as soon as they were returned home replenished many parts of their country with the same truth of religion to which before they were utter enemies."¹ The History of the Reformation in Spain is chiefly a record of Christian faith, intense suffering, and dauntless heroism.² The Roman Catholic Theology of Spain will attract our attention in a future volume.

¹ M'Crie's *History of the Reformation in Spain*, p. 228.

² See Dr. Rule's *History of the Inquisition*. It appears from p. 179, that in the Spanish Index of prohibited books the writings of Thomas Cranmer were included.

CHAPTER V.

REFORMED THEOLOGY IN ENGLAND.

THE history of the Reformation in England resolves itself largely into a record of ecclesiastical controversies, and important changes in the government of the Church. These subjects lie outside the line of our present studies, by which we are confined to the state of theological literature, properly so called, and the changes exhibited in doctrinal opinion.

One theologian of the period occupies a conspicuous position entirely his own—WILLIAM TYNDALE (A.D. 1477-1536). He will ever be illustrious as the first translator of the Scriptures from the original into the vernacular of his own land ; as a main instrument in the really religious reform of his fellow countrymen ; and as a patient, heroic martyr in the cause of truth. He is not so well known as a theological writer ; yet in this respect he deserves special and most honourable mention.

The Papal supremacy was the object of Tyndale's intense detestation. Graphically he portrayed its progress, as it rose and spread itself around and above the secular powers of the empire—begging now this privilege and then that ; now this city and then that ; seeking friends with flattery, and repaying their simplicity by subjecting them to its despotic ambition ; so that, as he said, it resembled the ivy, which springeth out of the earth, and creepeth along the ground till it findeth a large tree, into whose bark it thrusts its roots, and around whose branches it entwines its tendrils, amidst whose leaves it intersects

its own, drinking up the moisture of the tree, crushing its strength, choking its life, and becoming a seat and a nest for unclean birds.¹

But he was far from being a mere Antipapist. "If," he says, "after thou hast heard so many masses, matins, and even-songs, and hast received holy bread and holy water, and the bishop's blessing, or the cardinal or pope's, thou wilt be more kind to thy neighbour, and love him better, and be more obedient to thy superiors, more merciful and ready to forgive; if thou dost more despise the world, and thirst for spiritual things, then do such things increase grace. If not, it is a *lie*."

A clear evangelical light floods every page of his writings; Christ is upheld as the world's hope and the Church's Lord—as the sinner's friend and the believer's joy—as able and willing to save to the uttermost all who come unto God by Him—as bestowing pardon, and peace, and heaven upon the believing soul, without money and without price. No one could more fully believe that salvation is all of grace—that according to His mercy God saveth us. "The lost condition of man, and redemption through Christ," he declares, "are the two keys which open all Scripture—so that no creature can lock thee out, and thou shalt go in and out, and find pasture."

"If," said he, writing to John Frith, when imprisoned in the Tower of London, "if you give yourself, cast yourself, yield yourself, commit yourself wholly and only to your loving Father, then shall His power be in you, and make you strong, and that so strong, that you shall feel no pain, which should be to another present death; and His Spirit shall speak in you, and teach you what to answer, according to His promise."

¹ *Practice of Prelates*, published in 1530.

These passages, it is true, are more the expressions of devout sentiment than of intellectual thought ; but on that very account they are worthy of notice, because throughout Tyndale's work we see more of the warm-hearted religious teacher than of the scholastic or metaphysical theologian.

There was a bold individuality in William Tyndale, so that he appears in history as a star which "dwelt apart." He did not cross the path of other Reformers, nor did he proceed together with them along the same lines. The idiosyncrasy of his mind, and the independence of his character, as well as the peculiarities of his circumstances, led him throughout his "pilgrim" life, as he called it, to walk alone, leaning only on the staff of life, the Word of God. But it was the characteristic of the Reformers generally, especially such as held high office in the Church of England, to act together as far as possible ; and this kept in check personal peculiarities of opinion, and at least prevented the publication of divergent sentiments on points of lesser importance.

If theology penetrated the Scotch Church, and through it produced a great effect on the State ; it may be said that in England the Church controlled theology, and that the State had more to do with guiding both theology and the Church, than either had to do with guiding the State. English Reformers were far different men from John Knox,—a fact differently viewed according to a person's ecclesiastical sympathies. Politics were less bound up with theology in England than in Scotland ; but so far as they came in contact, the relative position in one case was far different from the other.

Three eminent men in the reigns of Henry VIII. and Edward VI. may be grouped together.

NICHOLAS RIDLEY (A.D. 1500–1555), Bishop of London, a learned scholar and divine, who had studied at the Sorbonne in Paris, was remarkable for caution, and wrote to Bradford in reference to the doctrine of predestination after a manner which at once reveals the theological temper of his mind: "In those matters I am so fearful that I dare not speak further, yea, almost none otherwise than the text doth, as it were, lead me by the hand."¹ His writings, it may be remarked, turn on ecclesiastical more than theological points; and, in opposition to John Knox, whom he disliked, he manifested reverence for antiquity, and was unwilling, where he could help it, to break with the traditions and usages of the Church. On the subject of the Eucharist, however, he seems to have held a view similar to John Calvin.² Such a view was also adopted by the Scotch Reformer. The scholastic divine appears in the writings of Ridley.

HUGH LATIMER (A.D. 1472–1555), Bishop of Worcester, a man of little learning, unskilled in scholastic logic, but of more originality and vigour, best known by his racy sermons, has much more to say than Ridley on the evangelical points of reformed doctrine. The pulpit in his day was a powerful instrument in promoting the Reformation, and St. Paul's Cross became a centre whence Protestant light streamed in all directions, as the old man eloquent might there be seen from time to time ascending the stairs, with a Bible in his hand. Justification by faith formed a favourite topic with this homely orator; evidently it was welcomed by a sympathetic congrega-

¹ *Works*, Parker Society edit., p. 368.

² See *Brief Declaration of the Lord's Supper*, pp. 10, 11, Parker Society edit.

tion. Abjuring the idea of salvation by works, or by sacraments, or by any kind of priestly mediation, he urged men to believe in Christ as the Justifier of the guilty. And as with Luther, so with Latimer, faith, rather than the forensic idea of justification, is the master theme, though the one appears in such manner that in it the other became necessarily involved.¹ "If any of you will ask now, How shall I come by my salvation? how shall I get everlasting life? I answer, If you believe with an unfeigned heart that Jesus Christ the Son of God came into the world and took upon Him our flesh of the Virgin Mary, and suffered under Pontius Pilate the most painful death and passion on the cross. He was a Lamb undefiled, and therefore suffered not for His own sake, but for our sake; and with all His suffering hath taken away all our sins and wickedness, and hath made us, which were the children of the devil, the children of God; fulfilling the law for us to the uttermost, giving us freely as a gift His fulfilling to be ours, so that we are now fulfillers of the law by His fulfilling, so that the law may not condemn us, for He hath fulfilled it, that we, believing in Him, are fulfillers of the law, and just before the face of God." This is a specimen of the popular and by no means scholastic theology of this renowned preacher. Latimer does not in his sermons, so far as we can find, insist upon baptismal regeneration. He says, "baptism is a thing of great weight; but to be baptized, and not keep God's commandments, is worse than heathenism."² Again, "regeneration cometh by hearing and believing."³ Latimer was less of a theologian than a popular preacher, and though unlike Chrysostom in

¹ *Sermons*, vol. II. p. 147.

² *Ibid.* vol. I. p. 346; vol. II. p. 127.

³ *Ibid.* vol. I. p. 471.

the cast of his eloquence, he, like the Greek Father, reflects in his sermons a picture of his age; and as we read his discourses we behold the manners and customs of our ancestors in the reigns of Henry VIII. and Edward VI. But good humour, sparkling wit, and strong English common sense are the distinctive features of Latimer's sermons, which are much more worth reading than the works of Ridley or Cranmer.

THOMAS CRANMER (A.D. 1489–1556), Archbishop of Canterbury—originally a master of canon law more than either a biblical scholar or a scientific divine, and brought into public notice by his advocacy of the cause of Henry VIII. against the Papal court in the matter of the royal divorce—was not a man of much original wit, or independence of character; yet, from position, learning, and, with all his inconsistencies, sincere piety, he could not but possess a large amount of influence on the opinions of others. That influence must be sought not so much in any work which appeared in his own name, as in publications issued by authority at an early stage of the Reformation.

The first of these contains *The Articles about Religion set out by the Convocation, and published by the King's authority* in the year 1536. Here the doctrine of justification by faith may be seen emerging from amidst cloudy articles on the sacrament of penance, and on "laudable ceremonies used in the Church"—first of images, then of praying to saints, next of rites and vestments, finally of purgatory. These articles are signed by Cranmer and other bishops, and members of Convocation.¹

The Institution of a Christian Man, 1537, contains, besides a great part of the former publication, large addi-

¹ *Formularies of Faith*. Oxford, edited by Bishop Lloyd.

tions on the Creed and the Ten Commandments. In the fourth part there is introduced a note on the Article of Justification, in which contrition and charity are united with faith, whilst the merits of Christ's blood and passion are declared to be "the only sufficient and worthy causes thereof."¹

A Necessary Doctrine and Erudition for any Christian Man, 1543, is the same as the former, with additional articles on the subject of free-will and good works. Collyer remarks that in some points of controversy it "drives further into the doctrines of the Roman Communion." "It is probable that Gardiner (Bishop of Winchester) had greater influence in the preparation of this work than in either of the former."² The note on the Institutes on Justification is here considerably expanded, and we are struck with the fact that it follows the more evangelical view found in the best mediæval writers, ascribing justification to Divine grace, yet speaking of it as conferred in baptism; and of repentance, hope, and charity as joined together in the obtaining of it.³ The note on the Article of Free Will cites Augustine, and is tinged with his spirit. The hands of Gardiner and of Heath are no doubt to be traced in this composition; yet Cranmer appears on the whole to have sanctioned it, though not in every particular.⁴ The Protestant doctrine does not wholly disappear, but it is found in a wavering position, and is seen through a clouded atmosphere.

The first book of Homilies, twelve in number, 1547, contains the well-known ones on *Salvation*, on *Faith*, and on *Works*. It is clearly proved that Cranmer is the

¹ *Formularies of Faith*, p. 209.

² *Ibid.* pref., p. viii.

³ *Ibid.* p. 368.

⁴ *Remains of Cranmer*, edited by Jenkins, vol. I. p. xxxviii.

author of these, as they correspond with a MS. in his handwriting entitled, *Notes on Justification, with Authorities from Scripture, the Fathers, and the Schoolmen.*¹ In these notes he remarks, "When St. Paul said, 'We be justified freely by faith without works,' he meant of all manner of works of the law, as well of the ten commandments as of ceremonials and judicials. St. James meant of justification in another sense when he said, 'A man is justified by works, and not by faith only.' For he spake of such a justification which is a declaration, continuation, and increase of that justification which St. Paul spake of before." "We do by faith transcribe the whole glory of our justification to the merits of Christ only."² The particular Homilies just referred to are an expansion of these cardinal ideas of the Reformation.

The *Short Instruction into Christian Religion*, 1548, the year after the accession of Edward VI., manifests a decided advance in Protestant doctrine. Gardiner and others no longer checked Cranmer's reformatory tendencies, and he now availed himself of a German catechism, translated into Latin by Justus Jonas, and bearing the impress of Lutheran theology. The *Short Instruction* is in substance taken from this catechism; and the doctrine of justification is that of the Saxon Reformer. Justification is clearly distinguished from sanctification, the latter receiving distinct treatment.³

The *Articles of Religion* (A.D. 1553) are forty-two in number. They commence with the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity and incarnation, and then affirm that Holy Scripture is sufficient to salvation. There is no cata-

¹ *Remains*, vol. II. p. 121,

² *Ibid.* pp. 126, 128, 131.

³ *Short Instruction*, Oxford edit. 'The second Sermon of our Redemption,' p. 116.

logue of Scripture books. The three creeds are adopted. The doctrine of original sin is Antipelagian, without adopting Augustinian peculiarities. The tenth Article relates to Divine grace, maintaining its force and efficacy, yet not so as to destroy free will; respecting justification reference is made to the Homily on the subject; works done before justification are pronounced to be not pleasant to God, forasmuch as they spring not from faith in Christ. The Article on Predestination has an Augustinian tinge. Of the whole it is remarked by one author, "They are generally admitted to be a compilation, and the Confession of Augsburg is usually mentioned as their chief source."¹ Another observes, "The Archbishop of Canterbury was, I think, indebted to the Archbishop of Cologne. In that prelate's valuable formulary may be seen the ground-work of the Articles."² They are to be considered as expressing the views of Cranmer at the time. And no doubt in them Ridley and Latimer concurred.³

There can be no doubt that foreign Reformers exercised a considerable influence on the English Reformation; Bucer, it will be remembered, not only came over to this country, but wrote one of his books, *De Regno Christi*, in Lambeth Palace, and in 1549 was appointed a professor of theology in the University of Cambridge. Peter Martyr also resided for a time in England, and in the same year became Professor of Divinity at Oxford. There he held a disputation on the Eucharist; and in

¹ *Remains of Cranmer*, by Jenkins, vol. i. p. cviii.

² Hook's *Lives of the Archbishops*, 'Cranmer,' p. 289. On the whole of what we have said of Cranmer's opinions, see pp. 178, 212 of the same volume.

³ We have not touched upon the Book of Common Prayer, as that relates mainly to worship.

the account of it given by himself, he denied the Lutheran doctrine of Christ's corporeal ubiquity, and said, "The body of Christ was present to us by faith, and that we are incorporated into Him by communication." "That which He especially endeavoured to assert was, that they united not the body and blood of Christ carnally with the bread and wine by any corporeal presence."¹

The names of Bucer and Peter Martyr are conspicuous in the accounts of other discussions amongst the English Reformers between 1550 and 1552, whilst Edward VI. sat on the throne and Cranmer filled the archiepiscopal chair of Canterbury. Upon the death of the boy-king the Italian divine, after much difficulty, left our shores and proceeded to Strasburg; ultimately he took up his abode at Zurich. Then after the accession of Elizabeth he corresponded with English divines, especially Bishop Jewel; but in a letter dated November 1560,² the latter alludes to unfavourable reports he had heard respecting his friend, which it is conjectured had reference to his intimacy with Ochino. However, some overtures were made to him to return to England, which came to nothing; and it is not likely that Archbishop Parker, who belonged to a different theological school, would have made Peter Martyr an adviser, as Cranmer had done. In connection with the effect of foreign theology upon the opinions of English Protestants, controversies respecting the doctrine of the Eucharist should be especially kept in mind; nor should the fact be passed over that Helvetic Confessions on the subject varied, and that attempts were made to reconcile the Swiss and the Germans. This was the case at Basle in

¹ Strype's *Cranmer*, vol. I. p. 288, Oxford edit.

² *Zurich Letters. First Series*, p. 91.

1534; and the changes and compromises which thus took place could not fail to make some impression on our own theologians, who were in frequent communication with their brethren on the Continent.

Two prelates under Elizabeth, not to mention others, were theologians of note. MATTHEW PARKER (A.D. 1504—1575), Archbishop of Canterbury, was active and very influential in the settlement of the Church of England after the death of Queen Mary. Not as a writer, but as a ruler, did he exercise influence, his chief publications being of an antiquarian description; and in this respect he was more of an editor than an author. About the stamp of his theology, however, there can be no doubt. His turn of mind was different from that of Luther, from that of Zwingli, from that of Calvin. He also differed from his Protestant predecessor in the see of Canterbury. He was acquainted with the writings of foreign Reformers, and was affected by them; but he was not prepared to break with antiquity in the way they were disposed to do. He had great reverence for the early Fathers and Councils; and though he regarded Scripture as the arbiter of controversy, he interpreted its decisions in the light of patristic teaching. He thought more of Ambrose, Augustine, and Jerome than of Luther, Zwingli, and Calvin, and preferred the rule, *quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus*, to the decisions of either Trent on the one hand, or Augsburg on the other. He was unquestionably "the great conservative spirit of the English Reformation," and prevented the work from being carried out to the extent desired by many divines of learning and piety.

The impress of his mind is seen in the Articles of 1559, 1563, and 1571. The Articles on the sufficiency

of Scripture, original sin, free will, works before justification, works of supererogation, and predestination remain substantially the same as in the Articles of 1553. The fifth Article, on the procession of the Holy Spirit, is a new one, bringing the reformed branch of the English Church into accordance, in this respect, with the old Western one. The Article on justification is enlarged; the words, "We are accounted righteous before God only for the merit of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ by faith, and not our own works and deservings," being prefixed to the former brief mention of the Homily on the subject. Certainly the reformed doctrine does not appear in a paler light than it did before; but there is no further approximation made to Helvetic Confessions, and Calvinism does not seem to have produced any new modification. The number of the Articles is reduced from forty-two to thirty-nine, and several alterations, more or less important, are introduced.

JOHN JEWEL (A.D. 1522-1571), Bishop of Salisbury, at first leaned to the side of Puritanism; but he afterwards made himself obnoxious to its advocates, and pursued a course more accordant with what is commonly called Anglo-Catholicism, though he retained, as did other divines not identified with the Puritan party, sentiments on predestination and kindred points very different from those upheld by the Anglo-Catholics of the next century. In fact, the current theology of Elizabeth's reign was Augustinian. Jewel's great theological work was his *Apology for the Reformation*. Hallam remarks, "This short book is written with spirit; the style is terse, the arguments pointed, the authorities much to the purpose, so that its effects are not surprising;"¹ but it

¹ *Introd. to Lit.*, vol. II. p. 118.

bears little upon dogmatic controversy beyond that which relates to the pretensions of Rome. Those pretensions were of a high sacerdotal and sacramental character, and included, of course, the pre-eminence and supremacy of the so-called successors of St. Peter. Such pretensions, if they could be supported, were fatal to the Church of England, and it was to defend it that Jewel wrote his *Apology*. Jewel, as just stated, had been Calvinistic in doctrine, whilst inclined to Puritanism in practice; but before he became a bishop, though there is no reason to suppose he altered in reference to the former, he certainly must have changed as it regards the latter. Perhaps things may be found in his *Apology* which Parker and other Churchmen of the same stamp would not approve; but Jewel appears throughout as a bold and able champion of the Reformation settlement under Queen Elizabeth, and Parker himself, in a prefatory epistle to Jewel's work, asserts some share in the authorship. Foreign versions of it appeared shortly after its publication. It could be read in Italian, French, Spanish, German, Dutch, and Greek. Jewel's connection with the Protestants abroad would naturally give them an interest in the circulation of his volume; but far beyond the range of their society and influence it seems to have made its way, and this fact is the more remarkable, as the treatise vindicated a national Church different from any existing on the continent.

Jewel's sermon at St. Paul's Cross in 1560, which preceded the *Apology*, contained a challenge, somewhat after the old scholastic fashion, or rather resembling the declaration of the *Theses* by Luther at Wittenberg. Items relating to the mass, to the Bishop of Rome, and to images, are introduced; and the preacher declared he was ready

to renounce his opinions if his adversaries could convict him of error out of the Scriptures, the old doctors, and the Councils of the Church. The appeal seemed to involve a dogmatic principle, which lay at the basis of the whole theological and ecclesiastical system of the Anglo-Catholic Reformers, namely, the authority of Fathers and early Councils in deciding controversy as to the meaning of Scripture. Jewel did not merely maintain, as a matter of fact, that his opinions were in harmony with the early Church, as well as with Scripture, but he pledged himself to renounce his belief if it could be proved contrary to primitive teaching.

In opposition to the Anglo-Catholic, there existed a strong Puritan party, including such eminent men as MILES COVERDALE (A.D. 1485 or 7-1567), who had been Bishop of Exeter in Edward's reign; THOMAS SAMPSON (A.D. 1517-1589), Dean of Christchurch; LAWRENCE HUMPHREY (A.D. 1527-1590), President of Magdalen College, Oxford; and JOHN FOXE (A.D. 1517-1587), the Martyrologist. By their zeal, piety, and learning they gave no small weight and influence to their cause; and even GRINDAL (A.D. 1519-1583), Archbishop of Canterbury, PILKINGTON (A.D. 1520-1575), Bishop of Durham, and HORN of Winchester (bishop A.D. 1560-1580) looked with favour on the Puritan party, and were deeply imbued with its Calvinistic theology. Those who had been abroad, and mixed with Swiss Reformers, had imbibed somewhat the spirit of Zwingli, and longed for some changes in the Church of England which neither Archbishop Parker nor Queen Elizabeth could be brought to approve. Articles were proposed in 1559 embodying the views of such divines, which, though in accordance with the formulary of 1552, are fuller on the subject of predestination, whilst that

on justification is entirely new ; but in this, as in other respects, they found no favour with Parker and those who sympathized with him.¹

Throughout the progress of the English Reformation the subject of predestination occupied the thoughts of our countrymen. In the reign of Henry VIII., even the Roman Catholic Gardiner, Bishop of Winchester, went so far as to say, "The true teaching of Christ's Church abhorreth necessity, and yet worshippeth for most certain truths, God's providence, election, and predestination, whereby we be taught that God is author of all our health, wealth, and salvation ; the circumstance of which working in God, in His election and predestination, although it be as impossible for man's wit to frame with (*i. e.* make consistent with) our choice and free will, as to devise how a camel should pass through the eye of a needle, without making the needle's eye bigger or the camel less ; yet that which is impossible for man is not impossible for God."² The controversy penetrated the prison of the martyrs : Bradford prepared a statement on the subject, which he sent to Cranmer, Ridley, and Latimer, then at Oxford awaiting their fiery doom ; and it was on that occasion that Ridley made the cautious confession which has been quoted in a former page of this volume.³ The agitation does not seem to have been between a simple affirmation and a simple denial of the doctrine, but as to the modes of expression, or rather the length to which the theologian should go in affirming the principle. With this was connected a contention as

¹ See Strype's *Annals*, vol. I. p. 172. Hardwick's *Reformation*, p. 247.

² Gardiner's Declaration against George Joye, quoted in Hardwick's *Reformation*, p. 248.

³ See p. 430.

to whether it should form a topic of public discourse. Archbishop Parker charged a clergyman not to preach controversial sermons on the Divine counsels; this brought on him the rebuke of zealous upholders of Calvinism, who argued that predestination, as "the only doctrine of salvation," ought to be preached in all places and before all men.¹

There certainly was a party of theologians at the time who not only refused to preach, but also refused to believe, after the manner of certain other Protestant brethren, and consequently were called "Freewillers, Pelagians, Papists, Anabaptists, and the like." A minister of the name of Talbot, Incumbent of St. Mary Magdalen, Milk Street, London, came forward as the mouthpiece of these individuals, the number of whom cannot be ascertained. In the name of many both of the clergy and laity of the realm, a petition came before Parliament near the beginning of Queen Elizabeth's reign, exhibited by "the aforesaid Talbot," as we learn from Strype.² The persons accused, it was said in the document, "held, contrary to a great number of their brethren, the Protestants, that God's holy predestination is no manner of occasion, or cause at all, in any wise, of the wickedness, iniquity, or sin" of mankind. They argued that if God should predestinate evil He would be the cause of evil; that He doth foreknow and predestinate all good, and doth only foreknow, and not predestinate, any evil. They contended that they were charged with Pelagianism, whereas, according to their statement, they held "no such thing as they were burdened withal." It was prayed

¹ Haweis' *Sketches of the Reformation*, quoted by Hardwick, p. 248.

² *Annals*, vol. I. p. 494, Oxford edit.

that they might be relieved from the odium cast upon them, that they might be free from all penalties incurred by "the aforesaid errors and sects," that controversy respecting predestination should be carried on in writing, and that "it should be lawful for both parties freely to put in print their opinions." What the petitioners acknowledge with respect to the doctrine of predestination is almost identical with what Aquinas, and other orthodox schoolmen, taught, and also with what was taught by moderate divines following in the rear of Calvin; but surely such a view of predestination could not have laid them open to the charge of Pelagianism. Either they went further in that direction than they were disposed to acknowledge; or they had come into collision with some high predestinarian dogmatists, who adopted views such as those of Gottschalk and Bradwardine, and who accused of heresy any who could not keep up to them in their own chosen path. There can be no doubt that amongst those who called themselves Reformers there were diversities of sentiment on the subject of Divine decrees, some being "high" and some being "low;" and it is very likely that one class misapprehended what was professed by another. The dispute in England at the time, so far as we can see, indicates only the mutual antagonism of certain advocates of Protestantism, without throwing any light upon the scientific treatment of the doctrine in question.

None of the English Reformers, whether of the Anglo-Catholic or the Puritan school, can be compared with Luther in boldness, or with Zwingli in originality, or with Melancthon in theological learning. Nor did doctrinal discussions take the same form here as they did abroad. They turned chiefly on the claims of the Papacy, and the dogmas of Rome as to Church authority, tradition,

transubstantiation, purgatory, penance, and absolution. English divinity was more practical than metaphysical ; and though the fathers of our Reformation maintained the doctrine of justification by faith, they did not treat it in the same subtle fashion as was adopted in Germany and Switzerland, nor did they disagree amongst themselves about delicate shades of meaning ; neither were they so independent in their studies and conclusions as were their neighbours abroad. They produced little effect on the Continent ; the Continent produced much effect on them. Luther and Calvin, as already noticed, exerted a powerful formative influence over Protestant Churchmen under Henry and Edward. Luther's writings and the visits of Continental divines did much to shape individual opinion, and even directly to fashion the formularies of the Church. Zwingli perhaps made less impression on England than did other Continental Reformers ; but on the Genevan exiles, who returned home after the death of Queen Mary, and through the *Institutes*, which became an almost universally adopted text-book amongst Protestant divines, the great John Calvin made an ineffaceable mark upon English theology.

There are two or three things which forcibly strike us as we bring our rapid review to a close, and they apply to religious thought abroad as well as at home down to the middle of the sixteenth century. What a contrast is presented in point of language when we place the new by the side of the old literature ! The old, with few exceptions, is written in mediæval Latin. Through what was deemed the tongue of the learned, divines spoke to their fellow-men all over the educated world. Persons not familiar with the speech of ancient Rome were supposed to lie outside the circle of theological

culture, at least in any scientific form, and to be accessible only through simpler methods of thought and expression. But whilst the Reformers, like their predecessors, were still at home in the use of Latin, and could write in a purer and more scholarly style, they largely employed their own vernacular, and addressed their countrymen on sacred topics in a way never dreamed of by the mediæval schoolmen.

This suggests another point of difference. In the course of these pages, how much we have had to say of the scholastic speculations which agitated the Realists and Nominalists! These became inextricably entangled with theological matters. The wearisome dispute penetrated into such questions as the doctrine of the Holy Trinity, of the fall of man, of Divine grace. But the controversy almost entirely disappears at the Reformation. Luther was a Nominalist, and he did not altogether forget Peter Lombard; but he spoke of Nominalists as a sect to which "he once belonged," and of Peter Lombard as one who assigned too small an influence to grace, and too large an influence to free will. Such authorities belonged to the past. It was no longer a question what Aquinas or Duns Scotus said, but what the Bible taught. The appeal was to the Word of God. Some of the English Reformers—Ridley, and in some degree Cranmer, but especially Parker—were anxious to have the Fathers on their side, and cited passages in abundance out of patristic literature; but others of them, though revering Augustine and Bernard, were most at home in quoting Scripture as the final arbiter of religious controversy. Nor did any of them care much for philosophy, either physical or metaphysical: logical formularies still retained a hold on their habits of argumentation; but Platonism,

pure or modified, seems to have retired out of their sight ; they did not interest themselves in Alexandrian opinions. John Erigena and the mystics had no charm for them. Luther, indeed, admired Tauler and the *Theologia Germanica* ; but the mystical element, natural to the German, had little place in the mind of Englishmen.

Finally, this is worthy of notice, that with all the agitation of thought in England and elsewhere, scepticism made but little advance. " Protestantism was a form of free thought ; but only in the sense of a return from human authority to that of Scripture. It was equally a reliance on an historic religion, equally an appeal to the immemorial doctrines of the Church with Roman Catholicism ; but it conceived that the New Testament itself contained a truer source than tradition for ascertaining the apostolic declaration of it." ¹

¹ Farrar's *Critical Hist. of Free Thought*, Bampton Lecture, p. 139.

CONCLUSION.

A. D. 30—1560.

CHRISTIAN Theology might be said to take a fresh start in the sixteenth century, under new circumstances, new conditions, new experiences, new prospects. How different in these respects does it appear at that time from what it did either immediately after the apostolic age, or in the midst of the mediæval period.

1. At first it had to face the religious ideas of Judaism not as they would have been, if simply derived from the Law and the Prophets, but as they actually were, full of traditions and prejudices, which had corrupted the simplicity of the Old Testament dispensation. And with these was blended a bitter antipathy to the Nazarene and His followers, derived from a generation passed away. Outside this narrow world of thought appears another—the pagan world, permeated throughout with numerous theologies and philosophies, all of them roused into deadly opposition by the authoritative and supreme claims of the religion of the Cross—a religion to the Jews a stumbling-block, and to the Greeks foolishness. Christian Theology, from this very circumstance, was for a while thrown back upon itself; and there it lay in sympathetic minds, firmly rooting its simple truths in believing hearts. But at the Reformation this state of things had entirely passed away. Theology had no longer to fight with corrupted Judaism. The mythologies of Europe had vanished,

except as memories of them remained in learned books ; and the old Greek and Oriental schemes of philosophy—revived, at least the former of them, in the classical schools of Italy—had undergone considerable transformation, no longer defying the Gospel, as at the beginning. Through Antenicene and later writings they had percolated and flowed into contemporary Christian literature. Aristotle and Plato were regarded as friends rather than foes, and the theology of the Church was freed from the necessity of wrestling with the ancient antagonism of heathendom in its intellectual forms. Pagan persecution was at an end ; pagan idolatry was at an end ; pagan enmity in other ways was at an end. All this was an advantage to the interests of Christian Theology. But on the other hand there arose a great disadvantage. The Church stood at the distance of nearly fifteen hundred years from the days of the apostles. Memories of them and of their teaching continued in written documents, inestimably precious ; but there had come down with these a mass of traditionary opinion and custom which, in many cases, obscured their meaning and perverted their application. The original oracles were too often seen, not in their own light true and pure, but by means of coloured windows within which they had become inclosed ; whilst a thousand disputes arose because of the stained medium through which the Divine source of illumination was contemplated. Questions of interpretation, questions of doctrine, questions of fact, questions of institute, rose and were canvassed such as had no place in the primitive age. Yet though such a state of things caused perplexity and created division, there is this to be said, that instead of that simplicity which originally existed, akin to the innocence and limited

knowledge of infancy and childhood, there had now been accumulated in the schools of Christian learning an immense stock of erudition ; and with it stores of experience, such as Christians of early centuries never dreamed of. Child-like want of experimental knowledge accompanies child-like simplicity and innocence. The experience of manhood must be set over against the temptations and conflicts of manhood. Now the scholars of the Reformation, if not as to malice children, were certainly in understanding men.¹ They had all the benefit, and certainly it was a great benefit, of thoughts and conflicts in past ages. Many heresies had been separated from truths. Lines of distinction had been drawn between fundamental doctrines and the errors which had assailed them. Athanasian and Augustinian controversies had done service, in spite of infirmities, defects, and animosities attending the agitation. Perils, and the way which led to them, had been laid down in theological charts. Sunken rocks had been indicated, and a mark set over them. The best men of all denominations in the sixteenth century, in spite of manifold imperfections, had a larger, a sounder, a more discriminating and intelligent acquaintance with Christian doctrine than the fathers of the first three centuries. But there were divisions among them, and serious collisions of opinion, which is a fact having a dark side to it. Yet has it another side. Divine truth is manifold. It presents a variety of aspects to different minds. It is a mountain to be looked at from all points of the compass. That which makes it what it is can be seen only by a number of individuals looking at it with their own eyes, from their own stand-points. Innumerable are the angles of vision under which it may

¹ 1 Cor. xiv. 20.

be gazed at by attentive, studious observers ; and numerous side views, each valuable, are in this way caught. They must be put together in order that the truth may be ascertained and measured in all its proportions and relations. Only the infinite mind can see truth all round, and all at once. The finite has to examine it piece by piece. Various views, and the discussion of them, form no evil of themselves ; the evil is in a want of candour and charity, so commonly betrayed in controversy. The quarrels, heart-burnings, and strifes, the persecutions, and the bitterness displayed by polemics of the Reformation on different sides, were sad enough and much to be deplored ; not so the thoughtful searchings, the careful siftings, the determined separations, with a condemnation of errors on the one hand, and an elucidation of truth on the other, by which the story of forty years in the heart of the sixteenth century is so wonderfully distinguished.

2. Changing our point of view, and going no further back than the twelfth or eleventh century, another and different contrast appears between the theological world at that period and what it had become at the crisis of the Reformation. In the former instance we find the Western Church pretty well agreed in what was fundamental in doctrine, government, and institution. The papacy was at the zenith of its power and pride. Hildebrand, in person or in spirit, held supreme sway over all the ecclesiastical, and most of the civil, dominions of Europe. In the latter instance it was far otherwise. The papacy had received a shock which seemed for a time to threaten its existence. Whole countries were shaking off the old yoke, and where it still remained no little restiveness under its pressure was exhibited,

and the weight of it could not press so heavily as once it had done. The unity of the past had been broken up. Germany was, to a great extent, Protestantized; France was divided into Catholic and Reformed; England and Scotland had separated themselves entirely from the authority of Rome. The principal cantons of Switzerland had followed the same course. Sweden, Denmark, Norway had come under the influence of Lutheranism. Even Italy and Spain were affected by the teaching of German and Swiss Reformers. Hence ecclesiastical and theological controversies raged from north to south, from east to west, creed rose up against creed, and confession against confession, and divines of different communions carried on a determined intellectual warfare with one another. Comparing the MS. folios which issued from the monkish scriptorium, or from the episcopal cabinet, or from some newly-founded college on the one hand, with the innumerable printed volumes of all sizes on the other, we feel ourselves passing from an old world into a new one; and the public interest taken in theological discussion, promoted by the pulpit as well as the press, presented a revolution in popular activity of mind as great as that which appears in authorship and in publishing. At the earlier of the two periods now under review the authority of the Church, as expressed in patristic writings and the decisions of councils and papal decrees, was accepted in principle throughout almost the whole of Christendom, whatever objection might be made to particular parts of the vast system of doctrine and law. Scarcely anybody disputed the right of ecclesiastical authority to rule, and the duty of mankind in general to obey. But at the later period the right of private judgment was asserted and adopted

in most of the countries of Europe ; and that was necessarily fatal to the existence of the ancient order of things. Church authority and the right of private judgment were as opposed to each other as darkness and light ; they could not co-exist except in a state of deadly warfare. There was inconsistency enough in the proceedings of some Reformed governments in Church and State between their theory of mental rights and their conduct in reference to those who exercised them, between the principle of freedom and the practice of persecution ; yet wherever the principle was conceded, however out of harmony with practice, it put the country in a condition respecting theological thought and expression the opposite of what it had been when the Council of Lateran sat under Innocent III. in 1215. There were heretics then, but public opinion on the whole was on the side of putting them down by force. Comparatively little revulsion of feeling was occasioned by the Crusades against the Albigenses, but such crusades became impossible in the sixteenth century ; then, instead of them in France, rose Huguenot soldiers against Roman Catholic troops, and the right to defend conscientious beliefs was asserted with a decision, which it was impossible to crush and destroy. The setting up of this new standard, which drew around it such a host of valiant and determined supporters, marked one of the most wonderful revolutions the world ever saw. It is very true, that throughout the Middle Ages, as appears in this volume, there existed more of mental activity than was once supposed, and it was exercised at times by notable men, such as John Erigena and Peter Abelard to a wide extent, and with immense force ; but such activity was circumscribed, and the field for a free use of theological weapons was hedged round

within fixed limits. Nobody was permitted to break bounds, scarcely any one thought of it. Few men dreamed of defying the Pope's spiritual rule, and setting at nought the opinions of ecclesiastical antiquity. Most preachers reconciled free action with profound submission in a marvellous way. But after Luther burnt the Bull at Wittenberg; after he stood up at Worms, and, appealing to the Bible, declared, "Here I take my stand! God help me!" time-honoured barriers were thrown down and trampled in the dust. Limitation of inquiry really came to an end. The whole region of theological thought lay open. Fundamental questions were brought within the range of dispute. From all this it plainly appears that theology at the Reformation commenced a course amidst new circumstances, for new objects, and under entirely new conditions.

INDEX.

* * Where a subject extends through several pages, the number of the first page only is given.

- ABBO, ABBOT**, on end of the world, 207
Abelard, Peter, 348, 352; theology of, 233, 249, 273; preaching of, 296
 Adiaphoristic controversy, the, 382
 Adoptionism, 182
Ælfric on Eucharist, 197
Aëtius, 110, 115
Agobard, teaching of, 202
Agricola, John, 382
Aix-la-Chapelle, Synod of, on the Holy Spirit, 133
Alanus de Insulis, story of, 147, *n.*; on the Trinity, 248
Albigenses, opinions of, 205
Alcuin, 180; story of, 251
Alexander of Alexandria, 94
Alexandrian School, 42, 63
Amalric of Bena, opinions of, 249, 313; pantheism of, 314, *n.*; recantation of, 315
Ambrose, 98, 102, 151; on justification, 157; on final punishment, 159, 160; on baptism, 402
Amsdorf, Nicholas, 383
Amulo, opinions of, 185, 202
Ancyra, synod at, 112
Angelic Doctor, the, 256
Anselm, 71, 174, 304; his theology, 216, 233
Anthropology, 65
Antichrist, opinions about, 206, 313, 332
Antinomianism, 52; the Antinomian controversy, 382
Anti-Trinitarianism, 86, 423
Antony of Padua, preaching of, 292
Apollinaris, opinions of, 117
Apologies of Justin Martyr, 23
Apology, Jewel's, for the Reformation, 438
Apostles, writings of the, 63
Apostles' Creed, simplicity of, 128
Apostolical Fathers, their writings, 17
Aquileia, Patriarch of, on predestination, 422
Aquinas, Thomas, works of, 256; *Summa Theologiæ* of, 256; theology of, 257; on the Sacraments, 266; on eschatology, 267; *Catena Aurea* of, 268; contrasted with Duns Scotus, 270
Arianism, extinction of, 345
Arians, the, 103; disputes of, 103; origin of, 108
Arius, opinions of, 104; *Thalia* of, 105
Aristotle, philosophy of, 214; revival of study of, 250
Arnulph, opinions of, 203
Art, mediæval, 299

- Articles, the Lambeth, 404; the Irish, 404; the Anglican, 434
- Asceticism, 52
- Athanasian controversy, 103
- Athanasian Creed, 81, *n.*, 130; quoted, 123; origin of, 126; compared with the Nicene, 126
- Athanasius, 94, 126, 129, 238, 347; *Orations* of, 105; system of, 108; phraseology of, 109; theological opinions of, 139, 149, 153, 154
- Athenagoras, *Apology* of, 26; on the Trinity, 79
- Atonement, the, doctrine of, 79, 148; Athanasius on, 148; Augustine on, 150; Hilary on, 150; Anselm on, 223; Lombard on, 243; Aquinas on, 262; Duns Scotus on, 272; Hugo on, 309; Wycliffe on, 329; Zwingli on, 385; Calvin on, 399; Knox on, 410
- Augsburg Confession, the, 376
- Augustine, 20, 63, 76, 86, 214, 215, 347, 358, 369, 370; writings of, 99, 137, 158; faith of, 138; his controversy with Pelagius, 137, *et seq.*; his opinions on predestination, 143, 161, 183; his views of the atonement, 150, *et seq.*; on justification, 155; on baptism, 402
- Augustinianism and Pelagianism, 346, 353
- Aurelius, Marcus, 23, 26, 37
- Ausbert, theology of, 202
- Autolycus, objections of, to the Resurrection, 27
- Babington on Pecock, 333
- Bacon, Roger, 274; theology of, 275; aim of, 276; friendship with Grossetête, 277; a great scientific light, 360
- Balaamites, 53
- Balnaves, 406
- Baptism, patristic views of, 75, 96; Augustine on, 146, 161; mediæval reformers on, 209; Anselm on, 221; Aquinas on, 263, 266; Luther on, 401; Calvin on, 402; Latimer on, 431
- Basil on Sabellius, 80; on justification, 157
- Basilides, opinions of, 56, 343
- Baumgarten-Crusius, 164, 317
- Baur, 175
- Bede, theology of, 179
- Bembo, Cardinal, 423
- Benedetto, Sylvestro, 417
- Berengar, or Berenger, on Eucharist, 198, 325
- Bernard, 20, 249, 250, 301, 308; theology of, 237, 240; controversy with Abelard, 238; preaching of, 297, 350
- Beza, 412, 416
- Biblical interpretation, 177
- Bohemian Brethren, 337
- Bonaventura, John, 193, 301, 303; preaching of, 293; a mystic, 316; piety of, 317
- Books, popular, in mediæval times, 304
- Bradwardine, Thomas, *De Causâ Dei contra Pelagium* of, 281; on predestination, 281; anti-rationalistic, 352
- Bucer, influence of, 435
- Buchanan, 406
- Bullinger, Henry, 389
- Bungener on Calvin, 394
- Buonarici, Angelo, on justification, 421
- Cabasilas, Nicolaus, opinions of, 175
- Calixtines, 336
- Calvin, John, 100, 389, 406, 409, 416; *Institutes* of, 391; theology of, 392, *seq.*; spiritual life of, 397; exile of, 405
- Calvinism, 409, 410, 436
- Calvinistic Confessions, 404
- Canon of Scripture, 88
- Canon of Vincentius, 100
- Carthage, council of, canons against Pelagius, 156
- Cassian, John, 147
- Catena Aurea*, 268
- Cathari, the, 205
- Catholic theologians, 42, 288

- Chalcedon, council at, 93; condemns Eutyches, 118
- Champeaux, William of, 231
- Change, premonitions of, in the fourteenth century, 361
- Charlemagne, 133, 180
- Charles of Anjou, 249
- Charles the Bald, 185, 197
- Chartres Cathedral, statues of, 299
- Chaucer's *Canterbury Tales* quoted, 282
- Christ, Person of, controversies concerning, 119; will of, controversy concerning, 120; work of, Aquinas on, 262
- Christology, 77
- Chrysostom, 95, 109; on justification, 157; on final punishment, 159; on Eucharist, 162, 351; liturgy of, 163
- Church authority, 354
- Church, Eastern and Western, 21
- Church system, development of, 89
- Churches, their respective mission, 6; theology in, 300
- Circumcissio*, doctrine of, 79
- Classical revival, 322
- Classical studies, mediæval condemnation of, 251
- Claude of Turin, teachings of, 201; influence of, 204
- Clemanges, Nicholas, 321
- Clement of Alexandria, 66; *Exhortations* of, 28; *Pedagogue* of, 28; *Stromata* of, 28; doctrinal opinions of, 66, 69, 75, 77, 79
- Clement of Rome, Epistle of, 17
- Coinherence, doctrine of, 79
- Commentators and Commentaries, 177
- Conceptualism, 233
- Condignity and Congruity, 259
- Confessions* of Augustine, 100
- Confessions of faith: by Irenæus, 41; in the Reformation age, 404, 409, 411, 434. See Creeds.
- Constantine, conversion of, 86; at Nicæa, 89, 92, 103
- Constantine (Silvanus), 169
- Constantinople, councils at, 93; creed of, 114; heresies condemned at, 117; decision of, 121; condemns *filioque* clause, 133; fall of, 322
- Consubstantiation, 403
- Contarini, Gaspar, on justification, 418
- Contra Celsum*, Origen's, 33
- Contractus, Hermann, 359
- Conviction, varying degrees of, in religious matters, 9
- Council of Robbers, 119
- Councils, early, 21, 91; Ecumenical, 92, *seq.*, 133; "of Robbers," 119; of Orange, 354; of the Lateran, 354; of Trent, 422
- Coverdale, Miles, 440
- Cranmer, Thomas, 432; works of, 432
- Creeds, 113
- Crypto-Calvinistic controversy, the, 383
- Curio Cælius Secundus, 389
- Cyprian, writings of, 49; opinions of, 50; on justification, 74; on the Church, 90
- Cyril of Alexandria, life of, 95; on the Holy Spirit, 132
- Cyril of Jerusalem, opinions of, 95; on faith, 155; on the Lord's Supper, 162
- Damiani, Peter, 246
- Dante's *Divina Commedia*, 301; summary of, 302; quotation from, 302; theology of, 303
- David of Dinant, 249, 315
- Declaring, a method of preaching, 291
- Demons, doctrine of, 151
- Demiurge, 57
- Development, doctrinal, 8
- Devil, the, and the Atonement, 151
- Diaconus, Paulus, 289
- Diaz, Juan, 426
- Dies iræ*, 303
- Diognetus, Epistle to, 19, 36, 42, 69
- Dionysius the Areopagite, writings of, 163; effects of, 166; translated by Erigena, 185

- Dionysius of Rome on the Trinity, 79
 Divines, Philosophical, Evangelical, and Catholic, 288
 Divines, Eastern, 169; Western, 176
 Doctor Subtilissimus, 270
 Dominicans, 274
 Duns Scotus contrasted with Aquinas, 270; opinions of, 270
- Eastern theology, 21
 Ebionitism, 55, 86
 Eckart, 317
 Ecumenical councils, 92
 Election, Augustine on, 144; Calvin on, 396
 Eligius, sermon of, 290
 Engelhardt, 164
 England, Reformed theology in, 427
 Ephesus, councils at, 93; the "Robber synod," 119
 Epicureans, 73
 Epiphanius, 80, 343
 Erasmus, controversy with Luther, 368; opinions of, 368
 Erigena, John Scotus, 166; translations of, 185; theology of, 186; reverence of, for revelation, 189; treatise of, on predestination, 190; condemnation of, 192; mysticism of, 192; many-sidedness of, 193; on Eucharist, 197
 Erskine, John, 406
 Eschatology, 66; Aquinas on, 267
 Eucharist, Cyril of Jerusalem on, 162; Chrysostom on, 162; Nicolaus Cabasilas on, 175; Radbert, Maurus, and Ratramnus on, 195; Ælfric on, 197; Berengar on, 198; Lombard on, 245; Damiani on, 246; Bishop Stephen on, 246; Aquinas on, 266; mediæval controversies concerning, 350; Luther on, 403; Zwingli on, 403; Calvin on, 403; Geneva Confession on, 410; Peter Martyr on, 436
 Eunomius, 110
 Eusebius of Cæsarea, 39, 92, 94; a semi-Arian, 112
 Eusebius of Nicomedia, 94; an Arian, 111; opinions and character of, 112
 Eustathius of Antioch, 94
 Eutyches, opinions of, 118; condemnation of, 118, 120
 Eutychianism, 120, 347
 Evangelical divines, 288
 Everlasting punishment, Fathers on, 159
 Evidence, early writers on, 23, 26, 27
 External change, influence of, on theological opinions, 85
 Eznas, Franziscode, 426
 Eznas, Jaime de, 426
- Faith, Lombard on, 245; Aquinas on, 261
 Fathers, Apostolical, 17; omissions of the, instructive, 158
 Faustus, Bishop of Rhegium, 148
 Felix, Minucius, 49
 Fergusson, 406
 Ferrara university founded, 249
Filioque clause, the, 133
 Flacius, Matthias, 383
 Flamini, Marc Antonio, 421
 Foreknowledge, Justin Martyr on, 25
 Four Articles, the, of Prague, 336
 Foxe, John, 332, 342, 440
 France, Reformed theology in, 390
 Franciscans, 274
 Fredegis, 200
 Frederic, Emperor, 249
 Free thought in mediæval times, 352
 Freewill, patristic views of, 76; Augustine on, 139, 144; Luther and Erasmus on, 367
 Frith, John, 428
 Fursey, visions of, 179
- Gardiner, Bishop, 431, 439, 441
 Geneva Catechism, the, 404
 Geneva Consensus, the, 404
 Gerbert. See Sylvester.
 Gerson, 321, 322
 Ghibellines, the, 286

- Gnosticism, 39; theories of, 56; leaders of, 56; theories of, 58; literature of, 59, *n.*; superseded by Manicheism, 85; opposed by Dionysius, 164; lingering influences of, 169; general review of, 344.
- Gnostics, 30, 32, 40, 44, 46, 60; method of, contrasted with that of the Fathers, 61
- Gottschalk, 183, 190, 352, 394, 427
- Gauthier, 249
- Greek learning, revival of, 322
- Gregory of Nazianzum, character of, 95; *Orations on Theology* of, 96; on redemption, 152, 171
- Gregory of Nyssa, works of, 96; on sin, 140: on redemption, 151
- Gregory the Great, works of, 102; on final punishment, 160; the last of the original commentators, 177
- Grindal, 440
- Grossetête, friend of Roger Bacon, 277, 360
- Guelphs, the, 286
- Guizot, M., on the influence of mediæval theology, 176
- Hades, 67
- Hales, Alexander, philosophy of, 253, 307
- Hallam on Sebonde, 287
- Hamerken, Thomas, 321
- Hamilton, Patrick, preaching of, 405
- Hampden, Dr., on Erigena, 186, *n.*; on Aquinas, 264
- Haymo, 194
- Hegel, 61
- Hegesippus, 20
- Helvetic Confessions, the, 388
- Henry the hermit, 309
- Hereford, Nicholas, 332
- Heretical dogmas, 52
- Hexapla*, the, 32
- Hieronymus. See Jerome.
- Hilary of Poitiers, 97; on the Trinity, 97, III; on the atonement, 150; on final punishment, 159
- Hildebert, philosophy of, 228
- Hincmar, 184; on Eucharist, 187
- Hippolytus, *Philosophoumena* of, 42; theology of, 43, 80, 343
- Holy Ghost, Sect of the, 315
- Holy Spirit, relation of, to Father and Son, 132; doctrine of, 112; procession of, 132; the influence of, in successive ages of Christendom, 357
- Homilies, first book of, 433
- Homoiousians, III
- Homoousians, III
- Honorius, Pope, 192
- Horn, 440
- Hugo of St. Victor, mysticism of, 308; on the atonement, 309
- Humanists, the, 414
- Humphrey, Lawrence, 440
- Hus, John, 335, 340
- Hussites, 336, 337
- Hymns, Latin, 303; Hussite, 304; Bohemian, 304; German, 304
- Ignatius, remains of, 18
- Imitation of Christ*, the, 320; authorship of, 321
- Incarnation, the, 149, 172, 225, 243
- Indulgences, sale of, 260, 374
- Inspiration of the Gospel, early views concerning, 64
- Institutes* of Calvin, 391
- Irenæus, youth of, 37; studies of, 37; character of, 39; *Treatise against heresies*, 39; orthodoxy of, 40; theology of, 42; views of, about millennium, 67; on redemption, 69, 71; on the Sonship of Christ, 79
- Irrefragable Doctor, the, 253
- Isidore, Bishop, 163
- Italy, Reformed theology in, 414
- Jacobites, sect of, 120
- Jerome (Hieronimus), learning of, 98; Vulgate version of, 99; works of, 99; on justification, 157; vision of, 251

- Jerome of Prague, visit of, to England, 334
- Jerusalem taken by Saracens, 207
- Jewel, John, opinions of, 438
- Jews, the, 23, 26, 55
- Joachim, Abbot, 309
- John, the Apostle, 37, 67, 169, 312; his Epistles, 53; his Gospel, 269
- John IV., Pope, 128
- John of Damascus, 170
- John of Trocznow (Zisca), 335
- Jovianus, 99
- Justification, patristic views of, 73; Pelagius on, 136; doctrine of, 155; Cyril on, 155; Augustine on, 155; council of Carthage on, 156; Basil on, 157; Ambrose on, 157; Chrysostom on, 157; Jerome on, 157; Bernard on, 238; Aquinas on, 260; Duns Scotus on, 271; Luther on, 373; Calvin on, 399; Contarini on, 418; Cardinal Pole on, 419; Buonarici on, 421; Tyndale on, 428; Reformers on, 431, *seq.*
- Justin Martyr, conversion of, 21; *Dialogue* of, 22; apologies of, 23; views as to the Scriptures, 24; references to Plato, 24; on the Logos, 25; on foreknowledge, 25; views about millennium, 67; on redemption, 69; on regeneration, 75; on the Trinity, 78
- Kempis, Thomas à, 320
- Knox, John, 406; *Confession* written by, 409; on the atonement, 410; theology of, 411; compared with Melville, 412
- Lactantius, 50; *Institutes* of, 51; views on millennium, 67; on redemption, 73
- Latimer, Hugh, 420; sermons of, 431
- Latin Christianity, 43
- Leo III. on the Holy Spirit, 133
- Lisbon university founded, 250
- Liturgy of Chrysostom, 663
- Logos, the, 24, 32, 78, 79, 81, 107, 149
- Lollards, the, 331, 337, 342, 353
- Lombard, Peter, *Sentences* of, 241; theology of, 241, 267, 310, 445
- Lord's Supper. See Eucharist.
- Losinga, Herbert de, on prophecy, 208; prayer of, 226; vision of, 252
- Lully, Raymond, 278
- Luther, Martin, 20, 100, 319, 340, 353, 384, 389; at Worms, 365; controversy of, with Erasmus, 367; theology of, 370—375, 401, 403, 417, 441; comparison between him and Melancthon, 379
- Lutheran controversies, 382
- Lychtenberger, Johannus, 342
- Macarius of Jerusalem, 94
- Magnus, Albertus, theology of, 255; preaching of, 295
- Major, George, 383
- Manes (Manichæus), system of, 62
- Manicheism, system of, 62; spread of, 63; tenacity of, 85; influence of, on later sects, 169, 206
- Marcellus of Ancyra, 94
- Marcion, 39, 45
- Martin V., Pope, 128
- Martyr, Peter, 425
- Matilda, queen of Henry I., 226
- Maurus, Rabanus, 184; on Eucharist, 195; theology of, 199
- Melancthon, 373, 382, 443; works of, 375; Augsburg Confession of, 376; *Apology* of, 377; compared with Luther, 379; *Loci Communes* of, 414, 417
- Melville, Andrew, 412, 413
- Merit, Aquinas on, 258
- Millennium, early views about, 67
- Milman, Dean, on *Sentences* of Lombard, 241
- Minne-songs, 304
- Mohammedans, 360
- Monachism, appearance of, 90
- Monarchianism, 79, 347
- Monophysitism, 120; effects of, 127, 347

- Monothelitism, 120, 347; condemnation of, 128
 Montaigne on Sebonde, 287
 Montanism, peculiarities of, 48
 Montanus, theology of, 46, 62; asceticism of, 47
 Moravians, 376
 Mörlin, Joachim, 383
 Morone, Cardinal, 419
 Myconius, friend of Zwingli, 386
 Mysteries of religion, 8
Mystical Theology, 164
 Mysticism, 240, 307, 359, 361

 Naples, university of, founded, 249
 Neale on mediæval preaching, 298, *n.*
 Neoplatonism, 86, 163, 173, 187, 318, 343, 344
 Nestorius, 117; condemnation of, 118; influence of, 182, 347
 Nicæa, council at, 89, 92; controversy at, 104
 Nicæo - Constantinopolitan Creed, 114; differs from Nicene, 116
 Nicene Creed, 113, 133; differs from Constantinopolitan, 116; compared with Athanasian, 126
 Nicholas I., Pope, on the Holy Spirit, 133
 Nicolaitans, 53
 Nicolaus Cabasilas, 175
 Nicolaus of Methone, 173
 Nominalists, the, 200, 229, 234, 284, 286, 443

 Occam, William of, 283
 Ochino, Bernardino, 423
 Old and new opinions, 12
 Origen, 31, 43; *Tetrapla* and *Hexapla* of, 32; views of inspiration, 33; *Contra Celsum*, 33; *De Principiis*, 33; theology of, 34, 67, 70, 72, 80, 151
 Original sin, earliest use of term, 66; Fathers on, 66; Augustine on, 140; Anselm on, 220; Aquinas on, 258; controversy on, 383; Zwingli on, 385; Calvin on, 392
 Orthodox Fathers, opinions of, 65

 Osiander, teaching of, 381; controversy of, 385

 Pagan philosophies, disappearance of, 343
 Pantænus, 28
 Papias, 20; tradition from, about millennium, 67
 Parker, Matthew, 435; opinions of, 437, 445
 Patarini, 205
 Parmenides, 215
 Paschasius, 197
 Patripassians, 80
 Paul, the Apostle, 29, 31, 169, 312; his Epistles, 52, 53
 Paul of Antioch, 32
 Paulicianism, 169; diffusion of, 205
 Paulinus on the Holy Spirit, 133
 Paulus Diaconus, homilies of, 289
 Pearson, Bishop, quoted, on the Holy Spirit, 132
 Pecock, Reginald, 332; works of, 333
 Pelagianism, 137, 271, 281, 346; modification of, 147
 Pelagius, 30; theology of, 135, 156, 168; on final punishment, 159
 Penance, Lombard on, 247
 Person, the term explained, 130
 Peter, the Apostle, 53, 169, 311
 Peter de Bruis, 209
 Peter of Cheleik, 337
 Pfeffinger, John, 383
 Philetus, 53
 Philip, Landgrave of Hesse, 424
 Philo, 25, 29
 Philosophical divines, 288
 Photius of Constantinople, 133, 172
 Pius, Antoninus, 23
 Pilkington, Bishop, 440
 Plato, 25, 29, 44, 45, 214, 229, 408
 Plotinus, 86, 344
 Poetry and mediæval theology, 301
 Pole, Reginald, on justification, 419
 Polycarp, remains of, 18
 Porphyry, 86, 214, 229, 344
 Postillating, 291
 Preaching, mediæval, 289; varieties of, 291; Neale on, 298, *n.*

- Predestination, patristic views of, 76; Augustine on, 142, 144; Gottschalk on, 183; Erigena on, 190; Anselm on, 221; Lombard on, 242; Aquinas on, 257; Lully on, 280; Bradwardine on, 281; Zwingli on, 385; Calvin on, 392; Knox on, 407; Patriarch of Aquileia on, 422; controversy on, 441
- Prescience, the Divine, 242, 408
- Priuli, Flaminio, 421
- Procession of the Spirit, 132
- Prophecy, interpretation of, in the 11th century, 208
- Prophecyings, 341
- Purgatory, inventor of, 160; Aquinas on, 267
- Puritan party, the, 440
- Quicumque*, the (Athanasian Creed), 126
- Radbert, Paschasius, on Eucharist, 195, 199
- Rationalism, Deistic and Pantheistic, 55
- Ratramnus on Eucharist, 195
- Realists, 200, 214, 229, 286, 443
- Redemption, patristic views of, 68; Anselm on, 223; Aquinas on, 259. See Atonement
- Reform, preparation for, 324
- Reformation, causes of, 365
- Reformed theology. See Theology.
- Regeneration, patristic views of, 74; Calvin on, 401
- Religion, Revelation, and Theology distinguished, 1
- Remigius, 185
- Renée, Duchess of Ferrara, 415
- Reppington, Philip, 332
- Resurrection, Athenagoras on, 26; Theophilus on, 27; heresies regarding, 53; the early Fathers on, 67, 70
- Reynhardus, Lolhardus, 342
- Ridley, Nicholas, 430, 433, 439, 445
- Ritschl on Anselm, 223, *n.*
- Robertson, Canon, on Augustine, 143; on Taborites, 336, *n.*
- Roman Empire, break up of, 355
- Romance translation of the Scriptures, 210
- Roscellin, John, philosophy of, 229; theology of, 230
- Row, John, 406, 410
- Ruysbroek, John, 319
- Sabellianism, 234
- Sabellius, 79
- Sacraments, 161, 221, 263. See Baptism and Eucharist.
- St. Victor, Hugo, 308
- St. Victor, Richard, 192, 321
- Saints, intercession of, 226
- Salisbury, John of, 236
- Sampson, Thomas, 440
- Saracens capture Jerusalem, 207
- Savonarola, Jerome, popularity of, 338; sermons of, 339; end of, 339; orthodoxy of, 340; character of, 340; teaching of, 340; prophetic preaching, 341
- Scholasticism, rise of, 213
- Science and Theology, 358
- Scotists, the, 274, 286
- Scotland, reformed theology in, 405
- Scripture, Canon of, 88
- Scriptures, the, Theophylact on, 203; influence of, 357
- Sebonde, Raymond de, 286
- Semi-Arians, 110
- Septuagint, the, 32
- "Seraphic Doctor," the, 316
- Seripando, 418
- Sermons, of Eligius, 290; of Antony of Padua, 292; of Bonaventura, 293; of Magnus, 295; of Abelard, 296; of Bernard, 297; of Wycliffe, 330; of Savonarola, 339; of Latimer, 430
- Servetus, 404, *n.*
- Severianus, 163
- Sigismund, the Emperor, 335
- Silvanus, or Constantine, 169
- Simon of Tournay, 249
- Sirmium, council of, 112
- Socinus, Lælius, 423
- Socrates, 25, 44
- Sophists, the, 31

- Sorbonne, the, founded, 249
 Soter, 57
 Soteriology, 68. See Redemption.
 Spain, Reformation in, 425
 Spiritual sympathies, 13
 Stancarus, Francis, 383
 Standards, Westminster, 404
 Stephen, Bishop of Autun, 246
 Stoics, 73, 408
 Strigel, Victorin, 383
 Substance, the term explained, 129
 Supererogation, works of, 259
 Sweckenfield, 382
 Switzerland, Reformed theology in, 384
 Sylvester III., 359
 Synergistic controversy, the, 383
- Taborites, 336
 Taillandier, M., on Erigena, quoted, 192, 193
 Talbot, opinions of, 442
 Tauler, John, 317, 446
 Tertullian, founder of Latin Christianity, 43; theology of, 44; extravagances of, 48; asceticism of, 49; opinions of, 65; on origin of sin, 66; on redemption, 71; on regeneration, 75; on election, 77; on Patripassians, 80; orthodoxy of, 81, *n.*; on the Trinity, 81
 Teutonic intellect, 355
 Theodoret on the Holy Spirit, 132; an anti-Gnostic, 343
 Theodoric, an Arian, 346
 Theodorus, Abucara, opinions of, 171
Theologia Germanica, 320
 Theologians, Eastern, 94; Western, 97
 Theological discussion, mediæval, 176
 Theology, dogmatic, distinguished from religion and revelation, 1; objections to, Positivist, Pietist, Popularist, 3; Divine and human elements in, 6; a factor in religious life, 7; perspective in, 9; one-sidedness in, 10; Eastern and Western distinguished, 21; in sermons, 289; in art, 299; in churches, 300; in poetry, 301; compared with science, 358; in Germany and Switzerland, 365, 384; in France, 390; in Scotland, 405; in Italy, 414
 Theophilus of Antioch on the resurrection, 27; on the Trinity, 78
 Theophylact on the Scriptures, 203
 Thomas à Kempis, *Imitation of Christ*, 320, 321
 Thomists, the, 274
 Traditionalists, 20
 Transubstantiation, first use of term, 246; described, 403; belief in, accounted for, 350
 Trinity, the Platonic, 24; Tertullian on the, 45; use of term, 78; Hilary on the, 97; Chrysostom on the, 110; in the Creeds, 127; the term explained, 131; and the Church, 158; Rabanus Maurus on the, 199; Roscellin on the, 231; and the scholastic philosophy, 234, 238; Alanus de Insulis on the, 248; Hugo of St. Victor on the, 308; Joachim on the, 310; Ochino on the, 424
 Tyndale, William, on papal supremacy, 427; opinions of, 428; individuality of, 429
- Ulphilas, 346
 Unitarianism, 55
 Unity in the Church, ground of, 3
 Universities, foundation of, 249
 Ultraquists, 336
- Valdes, Alfonso de, 426
 Valdes, Juan, 415; theology of, 416, 426
 Valentinus, 57, 343
 Valliculi, Gabriele, works of, 416
 Vaudois, the, antiquity of, 204; and the Bohemian Brethren, 337
 Victor I., Pope, 48
 Vincent of Beauvais, 299, 305
 Vincentius of Lerins, canon of, 100; opinions of, 101

- Waldenses, opinions of, 205, *n.*, 337
 Waldo, Peter, 210
 Wenceslaus, King of Bohemia, 335
 Wessel, John, 319
 Western divines, 176
 Western theology, 21
 Whewell, Dr., quoted, 359
 William of Champeaux, 231
 William. See Occam.
 "Wonderful Doctor," the, 274
 Wycliffe, John, history of, 325;
 opinions of, 324; *De Dominio* of,
 324; character of, 325; *Triologus*
 of, 328; theology of, 328; version
 of the Scriptures, 330; sermons
 of, 330
 Zisca. See John of Trocznow.
 Zoroaster, 60
 Zurich Consensus, the, 404
 Zwicknau, prophets of, 381
 Zwingli, Ulrich, 384; writings of,
 385; on original sin, 385; theology
 of, 385; piety of, 386; on the
 Eucharist, 403; originality of,
 443.